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This work came out of what was then a short lifetime in social movements and the counter 
culture. From 1990-1, when I spent a year as activist and student in Hamburg, I attempted 
to theorise some of that experience: a project shaped by intellectual engagement, political 
commitment and a developing reflexivity. This work was completed as a PhD thesis for the 
Trinity College Dublin sociology department in 1999. Although it has never been 
published, it has circulated unofficially on a small scale and has been favourably 
commented on by other activists, as have some of its individual chapters which have been 
presented or published in various forms. My own subsequent work, as activist, teacher and 
researcher, has also drawn heavily on the lines of thought explored here. Lastly, of course, 
historical development and the work of many other activists and researchers have changed 
matters so that a rewrite of the scale that would be needed has become practically 
impossible. Because of this, I have chosen to let the text (and pagination) stand unchanged 
other than this foreword, and I am grateful to into-ebooks, a project which could easily 
have found a place in this thesis, for making this possible. 
The book argues, among other things, that visible social movements from below represent 
the elaboration and articulation of everyday ways of doing things which cut against the 
grain of dominant social relationships, and that these oppositional popular cultures can be 
connected and extended into more direct challenges. This understanding came in part from 
the processes of networking between and across social movements into a new “movement 
of movements” which became highly public shortly after the thesis was completed in 
autumn 1999. In various ways, I have participated in and attempted to contribute to such 
processes over the years before and since. 
The process connecting the local rationalities of individual ways of living and struggling 
scattered around the world into larger campaigns - against a mine, taking over a factory, 
struggling for non-commodified space in a university etc. - and of these in turn into 
movements (feminist, anti-war, community organising etc.) is a continual one. At times, 
such as the present, these movements in turn come together into wider movement projects 
such as the alterglobalisation movement, with its critiques of neoliberalism, “war on terror” 
and austerity, its summit protests, social fora and alternative media, and its multiple and 
messy realities from Chiapas or Bolivia, India or South Africa, Ireland or Italy.   
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Alf Gunvald Nilsen’s remarkable Dispossession and resistance in India: the river and the rage 
(Routledge 2010) traces one such process, from the resistance of adivasi forest-dwellers to 
local forms of tyranny and exploitation to the Narmada Bachao Andolan’s challenge to the 
Indian state’s changing developmentalist and neoliberal projects. I have been privileged to 
work with Alf on a number of projects which take our shared analysis of these processes, 
and the struggles of recent years, further. Here in Ireland, the remarkable process whereby 
the health and safety concerns of a remote rural community have been supported by a 
remarkable movement alliance and become an international struggle against Shell’s gas 
extraction project (backed up by the Irish police and military) has highlighted this process 
in new ways, increasingly central as the state slides into financial crisis. 
Lastly, I want again to thank the participants in this research. The book argues for greater 
attention to intermittent or “ordinary” activism: popular cultures which support a critical 
worldview that manifests at times as visible public mobilisation. I first met most of those 
interviewed twenty-four years ago, as participants in some of the counter-cultural 
experiences discussed here. Subsequently they have all in their different ways engaged in 
social movements over the years (though they would not all use that language): working in 
NGOs, supporting local campaigns or engaging in dramatic acts; joining summit protests 
or coming on anti-austerity demonstrations. I cherish a photograph showing most of this 
book’s participants at one such protest recently, nearly a quarter of a century after we first 
encountered each other.  
Along with the necessary work of full-time activists, it is the dogged independence of mind 
of such occasional activists and their persistent willingness to challenge the system that is 
central to any long-term struggle for change. The Ireland we now inhabit, with all its 
injustices, has been powerfully changed for the better by such movements; not only those 
we think of as political but also the counter-cultural impulses which have dramatically 
weakened the power of institutional religion, traditionalist patriarchy, virulent homophobia, 
popular deference to authority, routinised violence and sheer provincialism that blighted 
the Ireland we inherited. The results are not what we expected, and there are many 
unfinished agendas; but few of us would want to return to that past.  
Official memory, and the Irish fear of conflict, now attempts to give the merit for these 
changes to some automatic processes (television, globalisation, education or whatever) and 
to downplay just how bad things were. Against this, it is important to say that each step of this 
path has been bitterly opposed, by many individuals who claim to have been in favour of 
change all along and by powerful institutional forces; it has taken courage, and repeated 
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courage, to challenge that self-serving complacency and the power relations that underlie it, 
both in the public sphere and in everyday life. This book is a small contribution to 
understanding the contribution of such “ordinary” participants in social movements from 




It is a requirement of academic theses to claim that they are the product of the author’s 
own work and that of no-one else. To the extent that this is the case, I would think I had 
failed in a thesis whose main point is to attempt to articulate the skilled activities with 
which friends and comrades try to organise and make sense of their own lives, and which 
does so with the use of the theories of earlier generations of movement activists. The 
particular direction from which I have engaged with the counter culture, the political and 
personal context within which this was written, and the idiosyncracies of my own 
understanding of our shared experience and action are certainly mine; but I would hope 
that they do not dominate the text. 
Thanks are thus due above all to my fellow-participants in the counter culture: friends, 
comrades and internal opponents; the activists who have built the institutions of the 
counter culture; and the theorists who have attempted to articulate what we are up to. My 
debt to them all is enormous. In particular, I am indebted to my friends who were willing 
to expose themselves to often difficult interviews and to trust me with the results: Ciarán, 
Das, Frank, Jim, Josh, Mark, Ruth, Steve and Tina. For obvious reasons, they cannot be 
given their own names; but insofar as this thesis is part of an ongoing conversation 
between us over nearly a decade and a half, it is theirs if it is anybody’s. I hope they will 
find something of value for themselves within it, even if they do not agree with all its 
conclusions. 
The “academic mode of production” (Stanley 1990), though apparently more isolated, is 
itself an illustration of the argument I make in chapter six that individualisation has to be 
socially produced. This is especially true for colleagues who are themselves activists; and I 
owe a great debt to participants at the annual Alternative Futures and Popular Protest 
conferences in Manchester, at which many of these ideas found their first expression. In 
particular, I would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Colin Barker, Tom Cahill, Max 
Farrar, Pete North, Simon Parker, Alex Plows, Ben Seel and Bronislaw Szerszynski for 
comments and critiques. 
Hilary Tovey has been an excellent supervisor, willing both to let me pursue my own 
course and to make her own disagreements with it manifest, and this thesis has benefitted 
enormously from her critique. Thanks are also due (in alphabetical order) to Linda 
Connolly, Simon Jones, Shane Kilcommins and Anna Mazzoldi for comments on earlier 
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papers or on drafts of this thesis; and to Martin Geoghegan, Maeve O’Grady and Ruth 
Smith for teaching and supervision situations which have helped me develop some of the 
ideas presented here. 
Ideas have to be materially produced. Thanks in particular are due to Anna Mazzoldi for 
constant assistance and support through the years; to Wendy and Richard Cox for unfailing 
practical help; to Giorgio and Maria-Teresa Mazzoldi for the refuge in which this thesis was 
completed; and to Alessandro Denardo for the loan of a computer for the final version. 
Financial assistance came from the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst; a 
scholarship from the TCD Graduate Studies office; a teaching assistantship from the TCD 
Dept. of Sociology; and conference support from WIT School of Humanities. I want to 
thank John Ennis and Niall McElwee in particular for enabling me to take two weeks at the 
start of term to complete this thesis. 
Lastly, but most importantly, I want to thank Anna Mazzoldi, who has shared the 
experience of living through and working out how to live against the current, as comrade, 
lover, flatmate and fellow survivor of a society which has little space for human needs that 
go against the grain, and who has lived with the ideas articulated in this book for many 
years.  
I wandered out in the world for years 
while you just stayed in your room 
I saw the crescent 




This thesis falls into two parts. The first (chapters one to three) states the problematic of 
the research, develops a critique of the dominant “social movements” literature as 
unhelpful for understanding the counter culture and argues that the latter can more 
effectively be theorised in terms of the implicit theory of social movement found within 
agency-oriented Western Marxism and socialist feminism. This latter theory is developed as 
an understanding of movement as direction, developing from the local rationalities of 
everyday life through articulated but partial campaigns to a “movement project” which 
attempts to deploy such local rationalities to restructure the social whole. Within these 
terms, it argues for an understanding of counter culture as a movement project from below 
within disorganised capitalism. This mode of analysis is seen as that of a historical 
sociology geared to the production of open concepts which can be used by participants to 
theorise the context of their own choices. 
The second part (chapters four to eight) theorises the issues involved in researching social 
movements within this perspective, entailing the need to engage with tacit knowledge, to 
thematise conflicts and collusion between researcher and participants. The findings 
chapters use qualitative interviews from a Dublin movement milieu to develop an analysis, 
grounded in participation, of the local rationalities of the counter culture. In this section 
the key findings are a rationality of autonomy as self-development, which is shown to 
underlie processes of distancing and problems of commitment, and a rationality of 
radicalised reflexivity, which resolves the problem of institutionalisation through the 
deployment of a wide range of “techniques of the self”. The analysis attempts to locate this 
reading within the life-histories of participants but also within the historical development 
of the counter culture, examplifying the ability of the concepts developed in this thesis to 





Building counter culture: the radical praxis of social 
movement milieux 
Laurence Cox 
This thesis draws on a rethinking of existing theories and on reflexive research in a Dublin 
“movement milieu” to develop a theorisation of counter culture as a historical concept. 
The dominant “social movements” literature, as a narrowly field-specific theory bound by 
the methodological assumption of instrumental rationality and of use largely to movement 
elites and their state opponents, is contrasted to the implicit theory of “the social 
movement” contained within Western Marxism and socialist feminism. This latter 
perspective, which sees social movement as a direction of collective action developed from 
the local rationalities responding to given social situations through their organisation into 
explicit campaigns and their abstraction as social movement projects, aiming to restructure 
the social totality in terms of a particular movement rationality, does not presuppose an 
institutional “level”, a homogenous rationality or a single vantage point. Within this 
perspective, the counter culture can be understood as a historically specific movement 
project. 
The thesis aims to research the local rationalities of one particular movement milieu, active 
in Dublin for over a decade, within a reflexive perspective which both identifies the 
specific relationships between researcher and participants and enables the production of 
knowledge relevant to participants in the counter culture. The routine “collusion” between 
academic researchers and full-time activists is criticised in favour of an attempt to make 
explicit the local rationalities of ordinary participants. These latter include in particular an 
orientation towards autonomy as self-development, which necessitates a complex process 
of distancing from existing rationalities and produces a constant tension around 
commitment and institutionalisation; and an orientation towards the radicalisation of 
reflexivity, which entails the deployment of a complex of “techniques of the self” to sustain 
this new lifeworld. The results are theorised critically, both in terms of the limits of these 
strategies within participants’ own lives and more generally in the course of an analysis of 
contemporary movements from below, which aims to show the ability of the concepts 
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developed in the thesis to engage with the problems facing contemporary political activists. 
The thesis includes a sample interview as an appendix. 
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Chapter one: stating the argument 
Defining the research project 
Introducing the thesis 
In this thesis, I try to find a way of imagining and talking about some important aspects of 
contemporary social struggles. This leads me into three related intellectual landscapes. In 
the first, I consider the available languages for discussing social struggles in general, and 
conclude that the narrow focus of both instrumentalist and culturalist approaches to 
“social movements” is inadequate to the range of experiences, needs and intentions of 
movement participants, and that such theories reify “movements” as unusual activity 
against essentially static backgrounds. As against these, I draw on the “movement theories” 
of Western Marxism and socialist feminism to distil a concept of social movements as the 
more or less developed articulation of situated rationalities, from the faltering attempt to 
express new needs to the development of full-blown challenges for societal hegemony. 
This is, I think, a new reading of this literature; I will try to show that it is historically and 
conceptually justified.  
Within this general framework of analysis, I offer the historical concept of “counter 
culture” as a way of theorising what seems to me an important movement project within 
disorganised capitalism. In this landscape, then, the background is given by the suggestion 
that the praxis-oriented theories of radical social movements themselves constitute a theory 
of social movements, albeit one which is not normally recognised as such; in the 
foreground stands the colourful and disconcerting figure of the counter culture, which I try 
to show is at home in this theoretical world. 
The second landscape is represented by my exploration of the everyday “local rationalities” 
of ordinary participants (as opposed to full-time activists) within a particular Dublin 
movement milieu. Members of a network formed in the movement struggles of the mid-
1980s, they have remained regularly involved in movement activities of different kinds 
during the subsequent decade and a half, but this overtly political mobilisation is not the 
centre point of their lives. Part of the interest of this thesis, then, is that it turns the 
spotlight away from movement elites towards the wider networks and milieux whose 
mobilisation or otherwise determines the relevance or otherwise of those elites.  
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Drawing on in-depth qualitative interviews, I try to elucidate something of the nature of 
the way participants organise and make sense of their lives, offering the concept of a 
“reflexive autonomy”, oriented towards self-development rather than towards the 
attainment of taken-for-granted goals, and the concept of a “radicalised reflexivity”, which 
moves from the critique of everyday life to the attempt at its restructuring, as ways of 
capturing this structure of feeling. This landscape, then, offers an interpretive counterpart 
to the theoretical critique of reified theories of movements as unusual activity, by replacing 
mobilisation within its wider context of participants’ daily lives. 
The third landscape consists of a reflexive attempt to understand the nature of this kind of 
exploration, trying not only to identify my own agenda as a kind of local eccentric who is 
trying to make particular kinds of sense of the people he shares a life with, but also to 
understand how they in turn make sense of me - and  by extension something of the more 
general nature of relationships between movement participants and researchers. I suggest 
in particular that unreflexive research on movements is marked by a routine collusion 
between researchers and full-time, politicising activists which obscures the ways in which 
ordinary participants fit the activities of the militants (and researchers) into their own 
agendas.  
This relationship is not a static opposition, but one grounded in shared orientations; and I 
examine the question of how these shared orientations can be best expressed and in 
particular how committed and reflexive research can contribute to this process of self-
development on the part of a movement. This landscape is an unusual one within 
contemporary academic writing on “social movements”, which has taken its distance from 
engagement and is correspondingly weak on reflexivity. It is marked, then, by an aesthetic 
which does not try to offer the painter an Olympian standpoint or hide the fact that they 
are painting for a determinate audience: these pictures are finally intended as sketchmaps 
illustrating one understanding of our situation, produced by one participant in an ongoing 
engagement with others. 
Identifying the problematic 
This research project grew out of attempts to understand and locate my own experience, 
which I have since come to think of as that of a participant in the counter culture. Initially 
the matter presented itself rather differently: growing up within the Dublin movement 
scene of the late 1970s and early 1980s - CND, Amnesty, anti-apartheid, development 
issues - and with the alternative culture of previous generations - Ginsberg, Dylan, Marx, 
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Thompson - I experienced a painful and radical split between this approach to life and that 
dominant in the south Dublin suburbs where I grew up. This was manifest not only in the 
micropolitics of challenging religion in school or not fitting into versions of masculinity as 
essentially physical and aggressive but also in the macropolitics of opposing the Falklands 
War, joining the Dunnes Stores picket line or expressing affinity with New Travellers in 
Britain around the time of the Battle of the Beanfield. 
Over the next few years I was surprised (and delighted) to find this same sense of affinity 
present in other contexts and other countries: in Norway, where I spent a year living with a 
socialist family, busking, demonstrating and hanging out with hippies and junkies; in 
college in Dublin, where I discovered a libertarian left in student politics and a complex 
subcultural scene; among the Greens in Strasbourg, where I spent a year as an exchange 
student; in Hamburg, where I spent a year’s fieldwork in an impressively developed 
“alternative scene” in the midst of Green Party faction-fighting, anti-Gulf War protests and 
conflicts over squats; returning to Dublin, in street politics and the ecology movement; 
intermittently at home with my partner in Italy, slowly discovering its rich history of 
struggle and the alternative imaginary of the post-68 generations. I was less delighted, but 
increasingly less surprised, to find similar attacks on this shared world: criminalisation, 
political exclusion, routine abuse and polemic, down to the same risks of violence I had 
met in school. 
Such experiences obviously call for a personal response in the form of some way of making 
sense of what is happening, identifying what the conflicts are about, and learning to engage 
with solidarity or resistance as appropriate. I am reluctant to call this “just” a personal 
response, in that at a certain basic level it needs to work: as a migrant one needs to be able 
to identify potential sources of solidarity and elicit it in practice and to be aware of 
potential risks and danger zones in public and in polite conversation. As a participant (with 
increasing responsibilities: in Hamburg I helped organise a peace camp during the Gulf 
War and was later one of two people holding together the local Green Party branch in the 
midst of electoral and internal crisis) I needed to be able to live and work effectively with 
others, under pressure and with few resources, in situations where people are not reluctant 
to express disagreement (assembling a leaflet to give out to visitors at the camp, for 
example). While there are obviously many ways of managing this sort of situation, any 
effective resolution has to go beyond a purely personal solution to identity crises and 
involve an understanding with some purchase on a wider reality. 
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Beyond this, as I encountered increasingly sophisticated theoretical discourses as part of the 
context of everyday choice and action within the movements I was involved in,  I found 
myself pushed more and more to develop an understanding marked as far as possible by 
logical coherence, theoretical purchase and ability to convince as well as by empirical 
“workability”; and one which would be able to handle not only the immediate situation I 
found myself in but say something to those other experiences and other places as well. 
Hence I found myself reading the alternative press voraciously, and later exploring political 
theories, movement history and elaborations of alternative cultural identity with more and 
more interest, at the same time as my undergraduate studies - in the history of European 
ideas, political history and sociology - convinced me of the need for explanations which 
would be more than local and ad hoc. 
Having tentatively identified the relevant period as roughly the last third of the twentieth 
century (in particular since the late 1960s, but including precursor movements and 
“scenes”) and the relevant area as the core of the capitalist world-economy, particularly in 
urban areas, I could give the provisional name “counter culture” to this space and set out 
to attempt to find an adequate analysis. Retrospectively, I would say that I set three criteria 
for such an analysis. Firstly, I wanted an understanding which would have a reasonable 
explanatory power for the range of experiences involved, in other words which would hold 
open the possibility of a general understanding if such a thing could be achieved, rather 
than making an a priori choice in favour of fragmentation. Secondly, I was looking for an 
analysis which would engage in a convincing way with participants’own experiences and 
understandings, in other words an ethnographically sensitive reading of the problem. 
Thirdly, I needed a theory which could offer some practical purchase on the day-to-day 
questions and choices brought by involvement, including those faced by participants other 
than myself. 
These criteria, discussed further in chapter two, came out of the experience of involvement 
in a range of different movement milieux, making me suspicious of overly fragmentary 
analysis; of the repeated experience of cultural conflict, which undermined the credibility of 
theories that assumed that movements and their opponents shared the same basic 
orientations; and of my situation as an activist in search of effective and convincing theory. 
From 1989 I had identified the possibility of learning from research on the West German 
situation, and carried out research there from 1990 to 1991 (Cox 1992). From 1992 I had a 
more general sketch of a possible research project on counter culture, and from 1995 the 
present project was in progress. This involved me increasingly in teaching and research 
contexts where I related to this material as an academic rather than as an activist; but as 
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chapter four indicates the activist orientation remained present, and the major substantive 
breakthroughs in the research have come from the need to engage with changes in this 
experience. While this thesis aims at satisfying disciplinary standards, then, its basic 
problematic derives from this movement experience. 
The complexities of the literature 
“Would it be reasonable to suppose that the civil rights movement, the counterculture, and 
the New Left of the early and mid-sixties were the soil for the growth of feminism and gay 
liberation in the latter half of the decade, for environmentalism and later ecologism in the 
early seventies, for the persisting communitarian and localist movements in both decades 
that nourished the anti-nuclear, peace, and citizen activism of more recent times - each 
forming an aspect of a common development with shared roots and expressive of richer 
phases in the definition and struggle for freedom? We have not tried to interpret the sixties 
and seventies as a whole, as a rich continuum that has brought out in ever greater fullness 
the potentiality for freedom that is latent in our era with all its varied and rich articulations. 
In any case, each such articulation - be it feminist, or peace-oriented, countercultural or 
environmentalist, communitarian or localist - remains vibrantly structured in the other and 
exists as part of a whole” (Bookchin 1986: 45 - 46). 
As I proceeded to read up on the subject, I discovered that there is an unfeasibly vast 
literature in this area, produced both by traditional intellectuals (academics, conventional 
journalists) for conventional contexts and by organic intellectuals (activists, movement 
writers) for movement contexts. A significant proportion of this is also cross-cultural in 
scope and historically sensitive. Its major difficulty - apart from sheer size - is that it is 
essentially fragmentary, usually handling isolated aspects of the counter culture in relation 
to their apparent functional equivalents in the rest of society and rarely engaging in any 
direct theoretical exchange with writing on other aspects of the counter culture.  
Not that such a connection is denied, if anything rather the reverse. Movement writers and 
journalists alike (e.g. Horx 1985, Seyfried 1991, Loveday 1991, Gold 1993, Fo and Karen 
1994) draw on a common-sense understanding of a shared history, set of issues and way of 
life which is also reflected in directories of counter cultural institutions (e.g. Saunders 1975, 
Stattführer Hamburg 1981, Færøvig et al. 1990, Boyd 1993, Jaubert et al. 1974). Similarly, 
academic writers (e.g. Brand 1987: 30 - 44, Gitlin 1987: 420 - 438, Raschke 1993: 19, 
Pepper 1991: 208 - 211) routinely draw on an understanding of the historical background, 
social context, political implications or cultural sources of their specific subjects which 
shows that they are also alive to this broader picture, but this does not lead to a recasting of 
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the terms of analysis - a point underlined by the fact that the place to look for these 
recognitions is normally in introductions and conclusions, not the body of their analyses. 
The exact contours of this wider context are obviously not identical from one author to the 
next, but they are sufficiently close to point to the need for a broader analysis. 
To give an idea of the scale of the problem, it is sufficient to mention some of the subjects 
of these separate literatures: 
• the dramatic “world-revolutionary” (Katsifiacas 1987) moment of 1968, when states as 
diverse as France, Czechoslovakia, the USA and Mexico were faced with “wars of 
movement” organised around what was recognised at the time as a qualitatively “New 
Left” (see e.g. Fraser’s massive oral history project (1988), Isserman’s (1989) review 
article, or Katsifiacas’ Marcusian analysis (1987), as well as retrospective reflections by 
participants such as Gitlin’s (1980) analysis of the role of the media, Viénet’s (1992) 
Situationist account or Capanna’s (1998) defence of the 1968 legacy);  
• the less dramatic, but more sustained, “war of position” (Gramsci 1971) which to an 
extent preceded as well as followed this moment, mobilising large numbers of ordinary 
people in ways which marked a shift in the “repertoire of contention” (Tarrow 1998) 
around what were in some cases new issues (gay and lesbian liberation), in others a 
revival of somnolent themes (feminism) or a change of scale large enough to mark a 
change of kind (peace). This literature covers struggles over issues such as ecology, 
anti-racism, Third World solidarity, civil rights, issues of power in the workplace, 
struggles over the democratisation of education and health, squatting, freedom of 
information, up to contemporary “DIY politics” (out of a massive body of writing, 
discussed in part in chapter two, Brand’s (1982) overview of the early debate, the 
round-table debate in Schäfer (1983), the 1985 special issue of Social Research, Roth and 
Rucht’s (1987) collection on Germany, and Jordan and Lent’s (1999) collection, as well 
as the dedicated Forschungsjournal neue soziale Bewegungen (1988 - present), exemplify an 
ongoing academic debate, not to speak of the activist and thematic literature);  
• the creation of “Green” and “New Left” political parties representing or supporting 
(some of) these movements and capable of gathering enough support within a couple 
of decades to find themselves sharing power at local, municipal and regional levels on a 
regular basis, and increasingly at national level, along with the appearance of severe 
tensions within established parties and unions of the Left around these issues (see, for 
example, Müller-Rommel (1989) and Richardson and Rootes (1995) as attempts at 
comparative analysis, Raschke’s massive (1991, 1993) research project on the German 
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party, and comparative accounts by participants such as Parkin (1989) and Feinstein 
(1992));  
• the growth of a large and variegated alternative press, with offshoots in publishing and 
pirate or local broadcasting, as well as the appearance of a strongly anti-authoritarian 
community media (see e.g. for the academic literature Duncombe (1997) or Atton 
(1996, 1997a, 1999), as well as participants’ accounts such as Mungo (1990), analyses 
such as Fountain  (1988), and directories such as ID-Archiv (1991));  
• the appearance of an immense range of new subcultures, once limited to “youth” but 
now encompassing multiple generations (hippies, punks, New Travellers, rave culture 
etc.); a shifting territory of “free spaces” (Bey 1991) sustained within these contexts, 
from urban “alternative scenes” to settled and mobile rural communities and 
households via transient events like festivals and “free parties” (the literature is 
enormous and itself highly fragmented, with large academic literatures on subjects like 
subcultures (McKay 1996), communes (Pepper 1991)  and more general “culture 
shifts” (Inglehart 1990) as well as a massive participant literature such as Earle et al. 
(1994) on New Travellers, Houriet (1973) on communal living or Consorzio Aaster et 
al. (1996) on Italian centri sociali);  
• the flowering of “new religious movements” whether based on the deliberate re-
creation of a utopian past, the importation and transformation of religions from other 
cultures or the re-interpretation of existing religions, as part of the spread of a range of 
new “techniques of the self” (Foucault 1988), from psychedelic and designer drugs to 
meditation and yoga (good academic accounts include Heelas (1996) on the New Age, 
Lopéz (1998) on the Western reception of Tibetan Buddhism and Hardman and 
Harvey’s (1996) collection on neo-paganism; examples of good insider or journalistic 
accounts might include Stevens (1993) on LSD, Adler (1986) on neo-paganism and 
Batchelor (1994) on Buddhism in the West);  
• and the generation of a wide range of alternative economic projects, from cooperative 
and “social economy” activity to local economy trading systems (LETS) and foodbox 
schemes (see e.g. North (1996, 1998), Kennedy (1996), Dürrschmidt (1997) and 
movement theorists such as Huber (1980) or Gunning (1993)). 
- and this is without examining (for example) life-history, biographical and generational 
accounts, counter-movements, and related developments within the academy. I found, 
then, a wide range of separate literatures, isolated from one another by institutional 
contexts and frameworks of understanding, all offering to make some contribution to 
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understanding the areas I was interested in, but no systematic attempts at relating one to 
the other, despite the frequent recognition of some degree of affinity. 
The need for ethnographic sensitivity 
As well as the fragmentary nature of these analyses - that is, the systematic preference for 
referring the explanation of their subject directly to general features of dominant social 
structures rather than examining more deeply their connections with their implied context 
or theorising the implications of their conflicts with the social structures that supposedly 
explain them - one other weakness stood out from this reading of the literature. As a 
participant I often found it hard to find any sense of what their subjects were like in their 
theoretical perspectives: any real analysis, that is, of the difference in frames of reference 
between the university classroom and the demonstration, of the emotional and practical 
understandings shared between activists or in the crashpad, or even of what it feels like to 
participate in an occupation. For the earliest authors this had been one of the overriding 
issues to explain, both for academic observers like Musgrove (1974), with his “ecstasy and 
holiness”, Berger, Berger and Kellner (1974) with their “de-modernizing consciousness” or 
Reich (1971), with his “consciousness III” - as well as for participants then and later, 
illustrated by the titles (and content) of Gaskin’s Haight Ashbury Flashbacks (1990, orig, 
1980), Gottlieb’s Do you believe in magic? (1987) or Fo and Parini’s ‘68: c’era una volta la 
rivoluzione1. 
Tom Wolfe, already an experienced journalist of youth culture and style scenes, was struck 
by this cultural difference in his encounter with the Merry Pranksters. After discussing his 
uncomfortableness with their toilet arrangements and observing “Suddenly it hits me that 
for the Pranksters this is permanent. This is the way they live”, he goes on: 
“Back inside the Warehouse. Everything keeps up. Slowly I am getting more and more of a 
strange feeling about the whole thing. It is not just the costumes, the tapes, the bus and all 
that, however. I have been through some crewcut college fraternity weekends that have 
been weirder-looking and -sounding, insane on the beano. The … feeling begins when the 
Flag People start coming up to me and saying things like - well, when Cassady is flipping 
the sledge hammer, with his head down in the mull of the universe, just mulling the hell 
out of it, and blam, the sledge hammer, he misses it, and it slams onto the concrete floor of 
the garage and one of the Flag People says, ‘You know, the Chief says when Cassady 
misses it, it’s never an accident -’ 
                                                
1 “Once upon a time there was the revolution”. 
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[…] At first this struck me as phoney. But then it turned to … mysto, as the general mysto 
steam began rising in my head. This steam, I can actually hear it inside my head, a great 
sssssssss, like what you hear if you take too much quinine. I don’t know if this happens to 
anybody else or not. But if there is something startling enough, fearful, awesome, strange, 
or just weird enough, something I sense I can’t cope with, it is as if I go on Red Alert and 
the fogging stream starts … (1969: 16 - 17) 
This account, which could be paralleled for other contexts, is a classic statement of culture 
shock and the routine problems facing ethnographers in coming to terms with a new 
culture, although the culture in this case is local, not abroad. For “insiders”, of course, the 
problem is reversed: I feel at home with other participants in a way I cannot with 
colleagues at work. As we have seen, these issues of culture and experience were 
immediately recognised in the early literature. More recently, for reasons which I discuss in 
more detail in chapter four, these ethnographic issues have been largely bypassed, either in 
the sense of taking the experience of by now less newsworthy ways of life for granted or in 
the more damaging sense of projecting one’s own cultural assumptions onto others; 
consistent with this, it is only in the area of new mobilisation (Dix 1998) and revolutionary 
high points (Barker 1997) that the experience of participants has been much of an issue.  
What is involved, I would suggest, is something close to what Raymond Williams describes 
as a common “structure of feeling”. The phrase is often used loosely, and it is worth 
quoting Williams’ statement in full: 
“It is only in our own time and place that we can expect to know, in any substantial way, 
the general organization. We can learn a great deal of the life of other places and times, but 
certain elements, it seems to me, will always be irrecoverable. Even those that can be 
recovered are recovered in abstraction, and this is of crucial importance. We learn each 
element as a precipitate, but in the living experience of the time every element was in 
solution, an inseparable part of a complex whole. The most difficult thing to get hold of, in 
studying any past period, is this felt sense of the quality of life at a particular place and 
time: a sense of the ways in which the particular activities combined into a way of thinking 
and living. We can go some way in restoring the outlines of a particular organization of life; 
we can even recover what Fromm calls the ‘social character’ or Benedict ‘the pattern of 
culture’. The social character - a valued system of behaviour and attitudes - is taught 
formally and informally - it is both an ideal and a mode. The ‘pattern of culture’ is a 
selection and configuration of interests and activities, and a particular valuation of them, 
producing a distinct organization, a ‘way of life’. Yet even these, as we recover them, are 
usually abstract. Possibly, however, we can gain the sense of a further common element, 
which is neither the character nor the pattern, but as it were the actual experience through 
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which these were lived [….] I think we can best understand this if we think of any similar 
analysis of a way of life that we ourselves share. For we find here a particular sense of life, 
a particular community of experience hardly needing expression, through which the 
characteristics of our way of life that an external analyst could describe are in some way 
passed, giving them a particular and characteristic colour [….] 
The term I would suggest to describe it is structure of feeling: it is as firm and definite as 
‘structure’ suggests, yet it operates in the most delicate and least tangible parts of our 
activity. In one sense, this structure of feeling is the culture of a period: it is the particular 
living result of all the elements in the general organization [….] I do not mean that the 
structure of feeling, any more than the social character, is possessed in the same way by the 
many individuals in the community. But I think it is a very deep and very wide possession, 
in all actual communities, precisely because it is on it that communication depends.” (1965: 
63 - 65) 
There are obvious difficulties with this statement, both in terms of the rather different ways 
in which we now think about culture (due in part to Williams’ own work) and particularly 
in terms of the incommunicability of this structure of feeling as Williams theorises it. In 
chapter three, and again in chapters five and six, I attempt a rather different way of 
discussing these issues, in terms of shared forms of local rationality - ways of engaging with 
and making sense of the world. To research the counter culture cannot, for obvious 
reasons, be to research the incommunicable. But it can, I think, start from such an 
experience and try to understand it: to theorise what makes it possible, to abstract from 
specifics in a search for connections and to show what can be shown. 
It may not be possible to come closer than this abstraction within what can be effectively 
communicated: if, as Williams argues, what we are dealing with is more like the shared 
presuppositions of communication than the communication itself, this is hardly surprising. 
What is at stake, in other words, is a necessarily tacit recognition or establishment of 
particular communication situations: people with whom it is safe to talk about particular 
things, people who will understand what you mean by particular statements, people who 
will share your emotional response to particular events. A recognition, in other words, of 
when were are “safe” or “in enemy territory”, as critics of the German Left put it - 
necessary considerations for anyone whose political and cultural activities conflict with 
dominant arrangements. 
To give just one example: in the institute of technology where I work, counter cultural 
participants come to recognise one another, make contact and bond closely in a way 
reminiscent of nothing so much as conventional images of the lives of gay men in small 
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towns. There is a meeting of eyes across the room, an awkward extension of feelers 
designed to give the other person a chance to show recognition (a reference to political 
experience, to particular books and films, to drug or music scenes), and a sudden opening 
up which may last for weeks of simply talking about and establishing a common ground of 
experience. And yet there is rarely if ever any explicit verbalisation of experience. Even 
smoking dope, to take one of the more obvious (and more necessarily clandestine) of such 
symbols, is in such exchanges far less important than the recognition of a way of life in 
which it is a normal part of the scenery. 
The scope of the analysis 
I wanted, then, to produce an account which was sensitive to this ethnographic dimension 
of these contexts. If my practical experience, that this structure of feeling “works” in these 
contexts and not in others, holds true, this would beg the question as to why that might be: 
why here, and not there? why now, and not then? Two kinds of reasons suggest 
themselves. One is that, as Katsiaficas (1987) points out in relation to revolutionary 
periods, significant conflicts within the world-system happen throughout the world-system. 
Authors like Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein (1989) and Lash and Urry (1987) have 
historicised this argument to suggest that the extent to which social organisation takes place 
at a national or global level is itself a historical fact. If either position is correct, there would 
be as little surprise in finding recognisably similar structures of feeling in counter cultural 
contexts as there would be in finding recognisably similar forms of class consciousness. As 
Lukács (1971) in particular has stressed, from a Marxist perspective the determining 
category is that of totality, or of the world-system.  
The other kind of reason, which does not contradict the first, is to suggest that it is not 
simply a matter of people being in similar situations responding similarly, but that those 
responses are themselves interlinked in complex ways. Just as Williams argues that the 
structure of feeling forms a basis for communication, so social movement writers have 
argued that culture is a necessary prerequisite for the co-ordination of action (in that it 
enables trust in the other, a sense of identity, solidarity and common purpose, and a 
meeting-point for understanding) on the scale described above (see chapter two for an 
account and critique of this perspective). As we shall see in chapter five, participants do 
indeed recognise themselves in other contexts and draw on the experiences accumulated 
and skills developed in other times and places as part of their own process of group self-
creation. Co-operation, then, is not necessarily simply a mechanical process of instrumental 
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alliance formation, but is also a result of contexts which have organised themselves around 
ways of acting and thinking that relate them to other contexts.  
On a macro-level, authors like Fraser (1988) and Caute (1988) share with Katsiaficas (1987) 
a stress on the international nature of “1968”. Research on Green Parties has been similarly 
comparative (see the works already cited). Tarrow (1998) has stressed the development of 
“global social movements” and global movement organisations, from the 1980s peace 
movement to Greenpeace to Tibetan solidarity campaigns. On a more micro-level, the 
alternative press networks from one country to another; movement bookshops and presses 
distribute one another’s material; and as with my own experience, many other individuals 
circulate from one city and country to another (della Porta and Diani 1999), finding in the 
process close or distant equivalents to their own local experience. These shared ways of 
doing things, then, make it possible for this widely-scattered, enormously diverse, internally 
conflictual, externally pressured counter culture to exist practically, in people’s lives and 
action, and not simply as a typological exercise. 
It is not unreasonable, then, to think of the counter culture as an international 
phenomenon, rather than a primarily national one. Although for obvious reasons I cannot 
hope to do more in this thesis than offer an ethnography of one counter cultural context, as 
we shall see its participants are highly mobile and have been involved in movement 
contexts in several different countries as well as participating in mobilisations around a 
range of different issues. By showing how this analysis is located within a more general 
theory of counter culture, I hope also to offer the tools with which it might become 
possible to explore how far this counter culture does and does not extend, what internal 
differences of culture can be identified, and indeed to identify more sharply those other 
structures of feeling with which the counter culture coexists, whether in open opposition 
or uneasy alliance (see chapter eight). 
For the moment, however, it is enough to register that it may be possible to think of the 
counter culture in more holistic terms, and that it may make sense to look for elements of 
cultural difference from dominant institutional contexts; what of the third criterion, that of 
a perspective that might also be of use to participants? 
Historical concepts 
This thesis was conceived within the framework of a historical sociology, using “sociology” 
to mean a systematic approach to arriving at theoretical understanding and one that (unlike 
“pure” social theory or philosophy) does not find its method in a withdrawal to the world 
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of thought alone but rather in a consistent relationship between knower and known. The 
qualifier “historical” involves a recognition that the knowledge thus produced is not 
universal, but at the same time that it is not arbitrary or particularistic. Historical sociology, 
then, would be a field of discussion, or a method, rather than a theoretical position. 
Given these constraints, a number of theoretical approaches are possible; not, however, an 
infinite number. Marxist and Weberian historical sociologies are possible, for example (not 
that all Marxist or Weberian writing can be described in this way); a post-modernist 
historical sociology would probably be a contradiction in terms, in relation to the rejection 
of particularity and the consistent relationship between knower and known. My own 
theoretical position, outlined in chapter three, is that of an activist materialism, which sees 
the production of distinct social formations as the result of conflicts between materially-
grounded (hence non-arbitrary) social movements; this process is historically connected 
and in principle knowable on Vico’s verum-factum principle: that human beings’ capacity to 
know the social world is grounded in their ability to produce it (Jay 1984: 108 - 116). 
Such a theory will want to avoid two kinds of category error. One is reifying local empirical 
regularities as universal categories; the other is multiplying rationally-produced concepts 
devoid of (explicit) empirical grounding. Either, through its universalism, fails the historical 
criterion. This is not to imagine that a historical sociology can ever finally break free from 
the tendency to turn its own taken-for-granted context into universals, or that it can avoid 
the need for any universal assumptions to ground its own understanding. It is to say, 
though, that the most thoroughly historical sociology possible will be one that restricts its 
universals to the most abstract micro-analyses of human action and to the most general 
macro-perspectives on social order. The concepts of totality, movement and skill 
introduced in chapter three are intended to be of this order. 
So far, this relates historical sociology more tightly to an epistemology than to a theoretical 
position in the conventional sense. In broad terms, that epistemology falls within what 
McLellan (1981) and Bhaskar (Collier 1994) call, with different shades of meaning, critical 
realism. On this account, an epistemology is realist insofar as it holds that the world is in 
need of explanation; in other words, insofar as it seeks to engage with the world as we 
know it (and is thus not a rationalist epistemology) but holds that what we know directly is 
produced and structured by something that we can only know indirectly (and is thus not an 
empiricism). It is critical (rather than affirmative) insofar as it holds that this indirect 
knowledge is not a matter of pure observation and extrapolation, but is the product of 
active engagement with the directly known, for example, through experiment, interview, 
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labour, or politics. Normally this entails the proposition that such engagement is 
situational, and that some engagement situations are likely to produce better (more 
systematic, less limited, etc.) routes to indirect knowledge than others; though (since these 
engagement situations represent different modes of employment, self-legitimations and 
political perspectives) there is naturally furious debate over which are most appropriate. 
Historical concepts 
What kind of knowledge, then, can we expect of such a historical sociology? I want to 
suggest that the answer is “historical concepts”, by which I mean analytical tools by means 
of which ordinary actors can re-organise their understanding of the world by relating local 
appearances to historical totalities (Mills 1970). “Counter culture” is one such concept, 
which seeks to re-organise our understanding of specific local phenomena like those 
discussed in the literatures already mentioned by relocating them within a more general 
perspective on movements from below in disorganised capitalism. As I argue in chapter 
seven, such tools may be of use to participants insofar as their attempts at developing their 
existing “ways of struggle” run into limits which can only be overcome by broadening their 
framework of understanding and practice. 
Such historical concepts are neither laws nor universal categories; this is both their strength 
and their weakness. They do not offer final answers so much as tools for thinking, because 
of the historically contingent nature of the subject matter. Within materialist epistemologies 
of the kinds argued for in chapters three and four there is another reason for this, namely 
that what is ultimately at stake is human praxis; however constrained by material context 
and social totality, it is a mistake to think that small numbers of systematic thinkers can 
mentally exhaust the practical creativity of far greater numbers of people. At best, as with 
Weber’s ideal-typical rationality (1984: 19 - 41), they can offer an understanding which 
consists of a framework for organising the much greater complexity of the world. To 
suggest “counter culture” as a category for grasping the form and direction of struggles 
from below in disorganised capitalism is thus not to offer a definition but to suggest a 
perspective for analysis. 
Historical concepts, in other words, are forms of open knowledge, suitable to the open 
systems (Collier 1994) represented by even the most closed totality - open because no form 
of exploitation and domination can exhaust the “wealth of human needs”, the creativity of 
human praxis, and the complexity of its natural context, however brutally it may degrade 
them or however subtly it commodifies them. Open knowledge consists of tools for 
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organising and understanding experience: understanding in the pragmatist sense of 
adequacy to the nature of our engagement with the real (but critical insofar as they ask after 
the nature, and implications for knowledge, of our specific forms of engagement). 
Consistent with the critical stress on knowledge as the product of a situated engagement 
with the real, the concepts of a historical sociology bear the shape of tools for 
understanding, in Weber as much as in Marx, in Foucault as much as in Williams (though 
obviously the nature of the engagement is different in each case): instrumental rationality, 
class struggle, discipline, culture. They are not the putative endpoint of knowledge, but the 
point where “science” ends and “technology”, in the sense of the deployment (and thus 
reaffirmation, but also remaking) of such concepts in specific situations, begins. 
Such a form makes historical concepts socially available without the need for the 
authorised interpreter or professional expert, but retaining their critical edge in the level on 
which they are formulated: they explain existing dichotomies in “common sense”, connect 
theory to practice, relate previously unrelated phenomena, point to the rational core of 
mystifying theories and help us understand and engage with ourselves and our world more 
lucidly. Thus a concept which is not an abstraction from and reorganisation of everyday 
experience and action is of little use: it becomes simply a renaming, a replacement of one 
arbitrary sign by another. A historical concept, then, does not claim to be true in the 
absolute; rather, it sets out to be a useful contribution to the process of thinking about the 
human world for human purposes. 
The concept of counter culture 
The concept of counter culture is proposed in this thesis as a category for grasping the 
form and direction of movements from below in disorganised capitalism. To say this much 
is to open a can of worms, which is why (breaking with usual practice) I do not leave it at 
that and refer further discussion to the theory and methodology chapters, but give some 
preliminary qualifiers and explanations at this point. 
These essentially have to do with definitions and referents. “The form and direction of 
social movements from below in disorganised capitalism” is not a closed and homogenous 
set, but neither is it completely arbitrary. Hence it would certainly need to include 
provisionally (i.e. pending further research) the various phenomena mentioned at the start 
of this chapter, as some of the most striking features of this context, together forming a 
significant part of the counter culture as institutional complex. This thesis argues, however, 
that that institutional complex is the result of participants’ abstraction and extension of 
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specific local rationalities of “reflexive autonomy” and “radicalised reflexivity”, this being 
the characteristic and “essential” part of counter culture, in conflict with other rationalities.  
Thus it is entirely possible (say) that Green parties will become so “mainstreamed” in 
personnel, policies, structure and electorate as no longer to bear any relationship to the 
counter cultural rationality or institutional complex, by the process long known in Italian 
politics as trasformismo (cf. the argument to this effect in Statham 1999). The institutional 
boundaries of counter culture are not fixed, then - and it would be an odd social movement 
of which this could be said for any significant period of time, since the point of social 
movements, from above or below, is to contest the control of different areas of social life. 
(This is not to say that static boundaries never develop, of course; the process known to 
political scientists as “pillarisation” is another name for this condition.) 
New social movements or a new left? 
Although it seems natural to examine the most strikingly different features of social 
movements in disorganised capitalism, I am not proposing the category of counter culture 
as a substitute for the concept of “new social movements”. That argument, elaborated by 
authors like Melucci (1989, 1995) and Brand (1987) and criticised by authors like Scott 
(1990) and Barker and Dale (1997), rests on what seems to me a fundamental confusion 
(widespread in the literature) between the issues around which movements mobilise and the 
nature of those movements. To counterpose ecological and peace movements to class and 
ethnic movements and to argue that one is replacing the other is to compare colours with 
books, and argue that books are going out of fashion because people prefer colours. Saner 
voices (such as Bagguley 1992) have argued that contemporary social movements remain 
class - and often working-class - movements, even if their issues and forms of struggle are 
changing. Similarly, Tovey (1993) has argued for a reading of environmental movements in 
Ireland in terms of class and ethnicity. Nor does it seem plausible that “old” movements 
remain in some sort of timewarp; rather, the concept of counter culture implies that (for 
example) the ways in which working-class or women’s movements organise have changed; 
that not only the struggles, but also the actors, of disorganised capitalism take on new 
forms. 
A closer translation would be to the distinction, made in the 1950s and 1960s, between an 
“old Left” and a “new Left” (see e.g. Jacobs and Landau 1967 or Thompson 1977a, but 
also Wainwright 1994) - a distinction I take to be essentially accurate in suggesting that 
what was changing was the form, not the source, of social movement activity. (Incidentally, 
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this is not the first time such a shift has happened: in chapter seven I argue for a tripartite 
periodisation which includes the decline of libertarian and cultural-revolutionary elements 
after the defeat of the revolutionary wave following the First World War and the rise of 
Stalinism and Social Democracy.) 
Movements, then, are still ultimately about exploitation and domination; in a world-system 
which can still be usefully analysed as capitalist and patriarchal, relations of class, gender 
and ethnicity remain important. But insofar as that capitalism can be described as 
disorganised (Lash and Urry 1987), as private patriarchy is giving way to public patriarchy 
(Walby 1990) and as the cycle of inward investment is giving way to a cycle of financial 
expansion (Arrighi 1994) the form of these “movements from above” (see chapter three) is 
changing; and it is unsurprising if that of movements from below also changes (Thompson 
1997).  
Periodising politics 
Numerous authors have argued for a shift in the social relations of capitalism from some 
point in the 1960s or early 1970s. For Lash and Urry (1987), as for Offe (1984), this is a 
shift from “organised” to “disorganised” capitalism. Marxist postmodernists (the basic 
argument is that of Jameson’s title, Postmodernism, or the cultural logic of late capitalism) such as 
Harvey (1990) or Jameson (1990) stress in particular the new forms of culture associated 
with “post-Fordist” production structures. Arrighi (1994) has argued that what is central is 
the changeover from investment in commodity production to investment in financial 
expansion, a process that he argues is a routine part of the development of capitalist cycles 
of accumulation. Lastly, Wagner (1994) has deployed a formidable apparatus to argue for a 
shift from “organised modernity” to “restricted liberal modernity”. 
While these analyses are not identical, they are close enough for my purposes to form a 
backdrop to the suggestion that the “politics of closure” of organised capitalism, within 
which both movements from below and those from above mobilised in authoritarian ways 
around (would-be) taken-for-granted cultural understandings of what constituted 
meaningful goals, ran into deep crisis in the 1960s in particular (an argument I develop 
further in chapter three). Since that point, movements from above and below are replacing 
these strategies with what Magnusson (1996) has called the “flexible specialisation” of 
grassroots campaigners as much as of managerial restructuring, in both cases geared to a 
“politics of openness” which adopts a rhetoric of libertarian ideals and a critique of taken-
for-granted cultural routines. As in organised capitalism, however, the key point at issue is 
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how far the openness and cultural critique (then, how far and for what purposes the social 
closure) should be taken: in particular, whether it is to maintain, create or undermine 
relationships of domination and exploitation. The counter culture, then, represents 
something of the current mode of organisation of movements from below in this context. 
Thus the unofficial labour militancy of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Darlington and 
Lyddon 1998), the “new regionalisms” of the 1970s (Melucci and Diani 1992), the collapse 
of orthodox Stalinism and the fragmentation of Social Democracy (Thompson 1997), the 
revival of anti-authoritarian Left traditions such as Trotskyism and anarchism (Jacobs and 
Landau 1967), the participatory orientation of much working-class community activism 
(Geoghegan 1998b), the various interactions between the “traditional left” and feminist 
(Rowbotham et al. 1979), anti-racist (Farrar 1997), ecological (Antunes et al. 1990), 
disarmament (Hinton 1989), civil rights (David 1997) and similar campaigns suggest that 
the counter culture is present on what now thinks of itself as the traditional Left, as well as 
in more recognisably “new” kinds of activity.  
In my Dublin material, certainly, no sharp distinction is present: participants have been 
involved in class-struggle anarchism and the Workers’ Party as well as in feminist 
organisations and the Green Party; anti-racism and squatting rubbed shoulders with drug-
taking and CND. It is likely that in areas with a stronger Left scene the counter culture and 
the traditional Left might be more sharply demarcated, as Vester et al.’s (1993) research on 
West German movement milieux in different towns showed. While the specific group I am 
researching here has its own local particularities, then, the local rationality it embodies is 
one which is developing across the spectrum of movements from below, and is by no 
means the exclusive property of newly-formed contexts, though their relationship to it is 
naturally different to that of contexts which predate it. 
The term “counter culture” 
Why have I used the phrase “counter culture” to delineate these developments? First, and 
most obviously, although it is widely used to describe movements in which the coincidence 
of political opposition with a coherent and alternative way of life has been particularly 
evident - as in contemporary “DIY” politics and culture in Britain, in the urban alternative 
scenes of 1970s and 1980s Germany and Italy, or in the mid to late 1960s across the 
Northern hemisphere (not excluding the “core” areas within the Soviet bloc such as Prague 
or East Berlin) - attempts to give it a precise conceptual content (Eco 1995, Roszak 1970, 
von Dirke 1997) have had little impact. Economy of language - and the flexibility of 
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thought it can encourage - therefore speak in favour of the “conceptualising” of existing 
usage rather than the coining of a new technical vocabulary. 
The most important reason for speaking of a counter culture - rather than for example an 
alternative movement, a new Left, a cultural revolution, a DIY scene or whatever - is that it 
neatly connects the two elements which are most frequently separated, that of the political 
and the cultural. Despite the best efforts of Gramsci or Williams, these two moments 
regularly fall apart into a “social movements” literature within which the primacy of the 
political is normally taken for granted and “culture” is good for an occasional walk-on part 
or repackaging, and a “cultural studies” which has become more insistently depoliticised as 
it has become unable to situate the deployment of meaning within a determinate system of 
domination and exploitation where some have power over others and those others work 
for the benefit of the former. 
The concept of counter culture, then, is designed to counteract a fragmentation which is in 
the first instance a fragmentation of academic institutions, intellectual training and 
directions of interest. This fragmentation, of course, is tied to the existence of partially 
differentiated fields of institutional action and different logics of rationalisation (Habermas 
1987a) within the contemporary social order. While a historical sociology has to show that 
such divisions of the social world are actively produced by specific social orders rather than 
written into the natural order of things, it does not entail denying their effective existence 
and constraining power on people’s actions. Nor, of course, does it reject existing research 
on the specific modes of operation of particular local social movements - though it does 
question the ahistorical assumption that the way social movements currently operate holds 
true for movements in general. 
Social movements and the social order 
Such a “field-specific” literature operates precisely within the “fields” created and 
transformed by historically specific social orders, which are in turn the products and 
objects of the struggles of social movements (Touraine 1981). Social movement projects, 
however, necessarily operate both “within” the relative closure and institutional stability of 
a given social order (without which they will have little practical purchase on the course of 
events and very limited organisational or institutional power) and “outside” it, in the “open 
systems” within which (and to partially control and draw on which) social orders are 
constructed (without this “outside”, movements are in no position to act strategically with 
respect to the social order itself, whether to change or defend it).  
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Because of this relationship of movement project to (temporarily) stabilised order, a 
research project which restricts itself to examining the tactical activity of social movements 
within the institutionalised social order, or to detailing how individuals and groups 
negotiate the workings of that order, renders itself incapable, if not of accounting for 
change, then certainly of reflecting on the nature of a change which is strategic (changing 
the social order) rather than tactical (reordering relationships within that order) and 
intentional (in the sense of tied to projects for an alternative social world) rather than 
simply a matter of unintended consequences. Neither of the two latter terms in these 
dichotomies are negligible, of course; but they are not the full story. 
Social movements (using the Tourainean sense of this concept defended in chapter three) 
are involved in challenging, maintaining or creating both structures, in the sense of the 
institutionalised framework of a given social order, and routines, in the sense of the 
everyday ways in which individuals and groups relate to these (Lichterman 1996). The 
concept of counter culture attempts to tie together this sense of a double challenge: a 
“political” challenge to structures and a “cultural” challenge to routines. Phrasing the 
matter in this way, however, still adopts the local perspective of the taken-for-granted 
social order. From the perspective of the whole social movement, while these are certainly 
somewhat different fields of operation, there is only limited scope within the social reality 
of a movement to separate the two. 
This is particularly so for movements from below; and it may be significant that Gramsci 
and Williams, the originators of the attempt to think the two together, were both personally 
and politically tied to the experience of poor and oppositional communities: Gramsci in a 
ruined ex-lower middle class family in a peasant village, several of whose members wound 
up in the industrial working class (Fiori 1990); Williams in a straightforwardly working-class 
family and community (Inglis 1998); both went through periods of involvement in the 
nationalist movements of peripheral and essentially powerless regions (Sardinia, Wales) as 
well as more systematic involvement with radical socialist movements. Seen “from below”, 
at least, the “movement project” does not start from acceptance of given social fields but 
seeks to reorder them within a “whole way of life” or a “whole way of struggle”; and this, 
along with an examination of how movement activities appear within a fragmented social 
order, needs to be placed centre-stage in any research project which is interested in how 
social movements change “the world”, and not just how “the world” changes social 
movements. 
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Social movements as active realities 
Another reason for speaking of a counter culture is to place an accent on the construction 
of social movements as social realities: as active, material creations with a life of their own - 
though not, of course, produced “under conditions of their own choosing, but under 
conditions which are directly discovered, given and handed down “ (Marx n.d.: 269), and 
out of (not to mention against) these latter conditions. I am concerned, then, not to deny 
the continuing centrality to the existing social order of domination and exploitation and the 
everyday struggle against those, but to focus attention on how this struggle is carried out. 
An alternative way of putting this, and one entirely compatible with the basic framework of 
this thesis, would be to say that I am interested in class-for-itself rather than class-in-itself, 
that is in the ways in which human beings actively respond to the social relations in which 
they find themselves, and by so doing maintain or change them. In this sense the concept 
of a counter culture is directed against the caricature of a mechanical materialism in debates 
whose purpose is the substitution of the arbitrary and the imaginary for the determinate 
and the active (exemplified by Laclau and Mouffe 1985) - and towards the themes of a 
materialism which stresses creative agency, a sense of the historical, and a dialectic based 
on relationships and processes rather than static categories. 
Lastly, the concept aims precisely to give material shape to this notion: to point to the idea 
of an actively produced social formation, with historical and social links between its 
component parts. This can form the object of empirical research in various ways: through 
the tracing of historical processes, the transformations of institutions, the deployment of 
traditions and the life-histories of participants; through the identification of formal 
linkages, informal networks and relationships of exchange, support and solidarity; in the 
exploration of institutional complexes, “partial public spaces”, formal and informal 
alliances and mechanisms of mobilisation and persistence; or, as in this thesis, in the 
examination of the logics that structure action, the ways participants experience themselves 
and the “techniques of the self” through which they produce, maintain and transform 
themselves. 
My focus on this last set of concerns within the field opened up by the concept of counter 
culture is motivated by a concern to produce emancipatory knowledge that might be useful 
in the present period to the kind of movement participants I know and work with. I want 
to avoid, for example, a purely celebratory (or indeed valedictory) account based on a 
description of institutions which might tell us little about what we should do (the more so 
given the kinds of institutional fragility discussed in chapters five to seven). The focus I 
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have chosen has the primary merit that it comes out of participants’ own self-
understandings and (hopefully) clarifies them and enables a more effective engagement 
with the tasks they have set themselves. Beyond this, as I argue in chapter seven, the 
current period is one in which movements from below are already engaged in a 
considerable amount of rethinking, so that too great a focus on already elaborated 
institutional forms is unlikely to tell participants much that they do not already know. By 
contrast, when the question is one of finding new alliances and developing new structures, 
to start from what might be unrecognised elements of commonality seems a potentially 
fruitful strategy. In other words, I am interested not simply in saying that movements are 
actively produced social formations but in working on tools that might help some 
participants to engage in that work more effectively. 
Before proceeding to a summary of the thesis as a whole, it may be useful to the reader to 
give a concrete example of what I mean by the counter culture, in a context (West 
Germany 1968 - 1990) which offers both an exceptionally clear illustration of the thesis and 
one which has been studied in some detail. 
Reading the West German counter culture 
Rebuilding from scratch 
In the latter half of the nineteenth and the first third of the twentieth century, movements 
from below in Germany had been among the strongest in Europe. A large-scale movement 
of desertion and mutiny had been instrumental in forcing an end to war (Howard 1996); 
the Republic itself was a concessionary measure in the midst of revolutionary upheavals 
(Mitchell 1970: 45 - 49), and one whose sustainability depended on the continuing loyalty 
of the SPD (Neumann 1973: 28 - 31 etc.), who found themselves constantly under threat 
from the left: from the Bavarian revolution of 1918 and the Munich soviet of 1919 
(Mitchell 47 - 48, 112 - 117), the Spartakus revolts of 1918 and 1919 (Mitchell 49 - 56, 105 - 
111, 167 - 171), the March Action of 1921 and the German October of 1923 (Jacoby 1981: 
65 - 66, 94), as well as the working-class defeat of the Kapp Putsch in 1924, showed that 
movements from below, though not able to take power, retained a constant, and not 
simply conjunctural, strength. In 1924 (after the failures of 1921 and 1923) the KPD still 
received 3.7 million votes, while in 1927 it was publishing 36 dailies (Jacoby 1981: 63).  
It took a massive movement from above to end this threat (Lash and Urry 1987: 28 - 29): 
the Nazi period saw not only the decimation of communist, socialist and trade unionist 
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activists, but equally importantly the wiping out of the infrastructure of parties, unions, 
newspapers, coops, friendly societies, sports associations, youth and women’s groups 
which had formed part and parcel of the left subculture (Tyrrell 1986). In the postwar 
period, reconstruction in the context of Cold War drew a sharp line between the social-
democratic left, willing to be co-opted to the NATO project, and the “extreme” left, 
constitutionally defined as that which was unwilling to accept the given constitutional 
order. By 1966, when the first stirrings of student revolt began, the SPD was in coalition 
with the Christian Democrats and passing the emergency legislation which provoked the 
first major mobilisations of students and trade unionists; the KPD had been banned since 
1953 (Markovits and Gorski 1993: 33 – 35). 
As in the USA, then, but unlike the situations in France, Italy, Britain or Czechoslovakia, 
there was no dominant “Old Left” against which and by which the new one would be 
defined. The revolt which reached its peak in 1968 was then that of a new left in the sense 
of the attempt to form a left where no obvious resources other than theoretical ones were 
available - or, to put it another way, the new left was the left. In this the German case 
represents an extreme, and neither its coherent radicalism (with less of a flip-over from 
libertarian to authoritarian at the very end of the 1960s than in most countries) nor its 
social isolation and relatively easy defeat should come as much of a surprise: to hijack 
Grass’ (1980) title, the movement in West Germany was very much a “headbirth”, the 
product of a predominantly male, largely educated and almost entirely German context (but 
see Baumann’s (1979) biography for a working-class participant’s account). 
Given these weaknesses, the surprising thing is rather the relative longevity (von Dirke 
1997) vis-à-vis, say, France, and the long-term impact (Baier et al. 1988) of the movement. 
The first is presumably due to the solidarity of an isolated social group (as with the highly 
organised Japanese students); the second, in part at least, to the “flecks and carriers” (Waite 
1997) of earlier movement history, to some extent on a personal and local level but 
primarily through the voracious literacy of the student activists, somewhat older than their 
British or American counterparts and in a context where philosophy and sociology had 
greater prestige than literature. 
Sustaining the challenge 
The “war of movement”, then, was fought by a small and isolated group, who were easily 
defeated. The “war of position”, however, was long and hard-fought. The women’s 
movement (Knafla and Kulke 1987) , the anti-nuclear / ecology movement (e.g. Michel 
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and Wieser 1977), the peace movement (Markovits and Gorski 1993: 106 - 112), the 
squatting movement (Weinberger 1984: 65 - 76) and the Third-World solidarity movement 
(e.g. Maass 1983) were consistently well-organised and radical, and despite the failure to 
break through the effects of life-world privatisation between 1933 and 1945, social-
democratic hegemony and Fordist regulation of lifestyles to the broad German working 
class, links were made both locally, where for example in Hamburg militant traditions had 
survived, and with some immigrant workers around solidarity issues.  
Within the developing alternative “pillar”, however, mobilisation was wide and determined, 
and in this otherwise deeply corporatist (Esping-Andersen 1990) and “private patriarchal” 
(Walby 1990) society saw very high levels of women’s participation, not only in the 
women’s movement (Kaplan 1992) but very visibly in the peace and ecology movements 
and in institutionalised forms in die Grünen. The long-term product was then a strongly 
organised and articulated counter culture (at least compared to other minority world 
contexts) which by the mid-80s sustained a wide range of political organisations, notably die 
Grünen (Altvater et al. 1991), a very extensive alternative media, such as the daily die 
tageszeitung (Koch 1989: 86 - 107), a well-rooted complex of institutional projects (see e.g. 
Huber 1980, Stattführer Hamburg 1981, Weinberger 1984) covering everything from 
squats to Mitfahrzentrale (institutionalised hitch-hiking, with centres fitting passengers to 
lifts) to organic baking and alternative lifestyles organised around urban “alternative 
scenes” (Mosler 1986) and rural retreats. 
The movement was the target of systematic attacks from above, from “anti-extremist 
legislation” and purges of radicals (von Dirke 1997: 71) to intensive and aggressive policing 
and diffamation legitimated as anti-terrorist (Die verlorene Ehre der Katharina Blum (Böll 
1974)). This primary reliance on policing suggests something of the isolation of the 
movement (the bulk of Seyfried’s (1991) comic history of the movement is dedicated to 
issues of policing alone, unlike e.g. Fo and Parini’s (1997) parallel text for the Italian 
movement). At the same time, however, as Lash and Urry (1987), Inglehart (1990) and 
others have shown, “new left” ideas did over time penetrate the SPD and trade unions: not 
only the more feminised unions, but the metal workers’ 35-hour-week demands; not only 
Oskar Lafontaine, twice the unsuccessful representative of SPD hopes to incorporate the 
Green challenge, but also regional coalitions across the board. 
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Changes in the 1990s 
Although the period in 1990 - 91 when I carried out fieldwork in the Hamburg counter 
culture (Cox 1992) was one of major crisis, with deep divisions over unification and the 
Second Gulf War, mirrored in no fewer than three splits in the Green Party (Radikale 
Linke, Ökologische Linke, Grünes Forum) at national and regional level, the collapse of 
the Green vote in the 1990 election and the failure of the anti-Gulf War movement, as well 
as the rise of far-right parties and neo-Nazi violence and the fragmentation of the 
alternative milieu (Vester 1993: 16), it still struck me as grounds for immense optimism by 
contrast with my experience of its Irish counterpart, not only in terms of its intensive 
institutionalisation and its theoretical articulateness (see e.g. Kongreßvorbereitungsgruppe 
1990 for an example of the debates in the movement at the time) but equally in terms of its 
ability to sustain clear and radical challenges to the social order, and of participants’ ability 
to acknowledge and handle conflictual relationships, both internally and externally. 
Within the “New World Order” defined by unification, rising racism and aggressive 
German foreign policy in the Balkans and Middle East, the German counter culture has 
been painfully reinventing itself. On the one hand, unification and the rightward lurch of 
the Greens have undermined the political orientation and pushed towards a more cultural 
emphasis (visible e.g. in Vester’s research, the reissue of Schwendter’s (1993, orig. 1973) 
Subkultur, etc.) On the other hand, ethnicity (from anti-racism through refugee solidarity to 
foreign policy) has become a central theme, something visible even in the difference 
between the preliminary reports of the Hannover group (Ritter 1990, Clemens 1990, 
Hermann 1990, Geiling 1990, Müller 1990) and the final publication (Vester et al. 1993), 
which stresses the openness of the alternative scene to difference and diversity. The strong 
institutional anchoring of the counter culture is also likely to imply its continued visibility, 
from defending squats from police and skinheads through maintaining alternative 
magazines and venues to defending the place of women’s and anti-racist projects within the 
welfare state. 
A closed counter culture? 
The relative social homogeneity (best expressed as the combination between human 
services, the intelligentsia and a section of the urban marginalised - see Raschke 1988: 414 - 
420; Weinberger 1984: 129 - 130; Bürklin 1987; Offe 1985: 832 - 838, Franklin and Rüdig 
1991), physical concentration (in alternative quartiers in the major cities and “alternative 
scenes” in even small towns - see Geiling 1990; Statistisches Landesamt Hamburg 1991: 45; 
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Raschke 1991: 56; Vester 1993: 123 - 182) and relatively tight interconnectedness (in the 
sense of correlations between Green vote, participation in “new social movements”, 
holding of “postmaterialist values” and so on - see Watts 1987: 62; Inglehart 1990: 280 - 1; 
Franklin and Rüdig 1991; 16 - 17; Raschke 1991: 120; Weinberger 1984: 89) of the West 
German counter culture are well attested, and sometimes mistakenly generalised to aspects 
of the counter culture (Green Parties, new social movements) as a whole (e.g. Eder 1993). 
A traditional way of approaching this problem is through survey data: on voting patterns, 
on participation in or support for unconventional political action, on lifestyles, or on 
attitudes. This data, gathered primarily in the 1980s, consistently shows that participation in 
the counter culture is correlated with high levels of educational attainment (Gymnasium or 
third level); being of the “60s generation” or later in terms of age; and relatively low social 
integration in terms of marriage, property ownership, employment, religion etc. (Bürklin 
1987; Weinberger 1984). Gender is only weakly significant (with women marginally less 
likely to be “potential green voters”, but no difference in actual voting - Franklin and Rüdig 
1991: 9, 40, 42), except, perhaps, in relation to participation in actions which may be the 
target of violent police action, if Auckland’s (1997) analysis can be generalised to Germany. 
Ethnicity, by contrast, is frequently taken for granted in that these are surveys of citizens in 
a state where naturalisation, even of third-generation immigrants, is notoriously difficult. 
Given that in Germany ethnicity is unusually strictly class-related (due to homogenisation 
under the Nazis and post-war population movements, followed by labour migration and 
refugee movements), this essentially identifies the German counter culture as a class 
formation, one of the educated working class (skilled and non-manual employees) and the 
service class (essentially its public-sector component ), along with a considerable 
proportion of welfare state dependents (Raschke 1988: 411 – 436). Following the 
arguments of Claus Offe (1984), it seems reasonable to think of this in terms of the effects 
of decommodification, or what might be called a “movement legacy” of education, welfare 
state employment and welfare benefits. 
Movements are not given, they are made 
This last point highlights one common failure of analysis: between the young male squatter 
from a traditional working-class background and the doctor’s daughter working in the 
health service there is no necessary or obvious homogeneity. There is a potential for shared 
action, and solidarity is a precarious achievement (one squat in Hamburg had a circle of 
supporters from movement organisations or with political skills, but this difficult 
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cooperation had to be mediated through the squat’s lawyers.) In other words, as in the title 
of Thompson’s (1963) book, this is the making of a movement, or better its self-making. 
Organisational data bear out this sense of sheer effort. On the one hand, as with 
nineteenth-century subcultures, there is a dramatic proliferation of autonomous institutions 
to cover virtually every area of social life: the newspaper, the radio station (no TV), the 
bank or more exactly credit union, the coop, the food box scheme, the squat, the shared 
flat, the political party, the free lawyers, the café, the bookshop, the prisoner’s support 
group. Huber, working within a support organisation for alternative projects (Netzwerk 
Selbsthilfe) and from directories of these projects, estimates directly “political” activity at 
only 18% of the total number, including community activism; 70% of the projects were 
“services” such as bookshops, magazines, “socio-cultural centres”, alternative cafés, 
educational and welfare projects and so on; the remaining 12% was agricultural and craft 
production (1980: 10, 28; see Weinberger 1984 for a similar cataloguing of the scene and 
Stattführer 1981 for a “directory” perspective.)  
These institutions are loosely connected - listed in alternative directories and newspapers, 
advertising in alternative magazines, connected through sector-specific federations, 
supported by training, networking and funding organisations. They are also connected 
historically: thus many authors give a historical account of the pathways from “1968” 
through the development of youth culture and alternative ways of life, the alternative 
economy and the “new social movements” to the formation of die Grünen (Burns and van 
der Will 1988; Mez 1987; Baier et al. 1988; Markovits and Gorski 1993). This is naturally 
particularly true as between one political group and another, one magazine and another, 
one project and another, but also in individual and group biographies (Mosler 1988; Cohn-
Bendit 1987; Horx 1985, 1989; Seyfried 1991). 
There are active reasons for this networking and building on pre-existing networks and 
knowledge: the whole business is an immense effort. Sustaining a pillarised subculture 
without the institutional resources of the other subcultures (unions, employers’ federations, 
churches etc.) means reliance on voluntary work, to the level described internally as self-
exploitation; it means consistent disadvantage on the labour market due to missed 
opportunities and inability to put extra energy into careers; it means that disputes over the 
direction of a project are very bitter, because of the implications for enormous quantities of 
shared work and personal identity investment. 
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The committed and the uncommitted 
Consistent with this history of recent creation, massive demands and the context of 
disorganisation, there is (if not by comparison with e.g. the counter culture in the UK or 
the US, then certainly by comparison with other German subcultures) a very high 
proportion of the uncommitted to the committed, most visibly in the relationship between 
Green Party electorate and members, which makes even the neo-liberal FDP look like a 
mass membership party (Raschke 1993: 668). The most extreme example is in the gap 
between the symbolic significance of the RAF up to the end of the 1980s (von Dirke 1997: 
70 - 103; Markovits and Gorski 1993: 59 - 78) and its actual membership; more 
participatory relationships certainly exist locally, for example in squats (one squat I helped 
defend from police in 1991 was able to mobilise 100+ supporters in the early hours of the 
morning by phone tree).  
But in general it can be said that many of the difficulties of the participatory intention, 
oriented to situations of necessary participation such as workplace or state, arise from the 
realities of the low-membership situation. Thus e.g. anti-hierarchical rules in the Green 
Party produced a “rotating elite”, moving from one position to another, but in the absence 
of an active “base” essentially remaining unchanged (Raschke 1993: 646). By contrast, 
though, when “the base” was or became active things changed fast: half the leadership of 
my local group were punks who’d occupied the offices some years previously; by the time I 
left the ex-punks were running the regional party and the constituency branch - the size of 
a parliamentary constituency - was run by an activist who’d just left the DKP, myself and a 
paid worker who’d previously been involved in a cycling campaign. 
For these reasons the German tendency to survey the “base” of occasional participants, 
Green Party voters etc. is in many ways more useful than a focus on full-time activists 
alone could be. Its most effective form - in different versions in Vester (1993), in Hradil 
(1987), in Eder (1993) and in Kleining and Krotz (1986) - is to identify relationships 
between participants’ given structural situation and their active response in the form of life-
world, life-style or habitus: a distinction ultimately derived from the SINUS surveys on 
which much of this research draws and on the other hand from Bourdieu and Thompson 
(Vester 1993: 104 - 107, 109 - 113, Eder 1993: 63 - 80). 
According to this perspective, there is (at least for Vester, Hradil and Kleining and Krotz, 
not for the mechanistic Eder) a distinction in response between a relatively active and 
committed “alternative” lifeworld, in my terms thoroughly structured by the movement 
project, and a somewhat larger and less definitely alternative “hedonist” lifeworld, adopting 
Stating the argument 
 29 
certain political and cultural elements from the counter culture but not fully involved 
(Vester 1993: 21 - 26, 183 - 244; Hradil 1987: 127 - 132, 167 - 169; Kleining and Krotz 
1986: 1 - 5. In effect this latter category - which has almost certainly expanded in the 1990s 
at the expense of the alternative (Vester 1993: 16, 22) - is the most active site of struggle 
between the rationality of the counter cultural project and those of market and state. 
I think the substance of this kind of analysis is sound, but with two important 
qualifications. One is that the focus on individual membership may be a mystification, for 
reasons discussed in chapter three. The second is that even in its less mechanistic 
formulations this account tends to see agency in terms of rational individual responses to 
structure, and hence to be weak both on the specificity of the German legacy of movement 
conflict (so that it is not clear why an identical situation is not reproduced everywhere) and 
on the historical development of this movement, which is normally handled separately and 
chronologically, rather than the two being seen as going hand-in-hand in the active 
“making of the counter culture”. 
German Sonderheit? 
In chapter three I attempt to sketch out a way of historicising movement context and 
development. For the time being, it is enough to note three specificities of the German 
situation: 
1. The continuing “pillarisation” of German society. This is obviously to some extent a 
feature of core European societies generally (Allum 1995). However, in Italy for 
example the traditional “red” culture was eventually able (after much conflict struggle) 
to make space for the counter culture (Parker 1997: 15), so that what exists is not a 
fully separate alternative scene, but rather a spectrum from “old communist” to 
“autonomia” within an expanded left subculture, which e.g. in the split between PDS 
and Rifondazione Comunista was bridged neatly, with divisions being along the lines of 
revolutionary vs. reformist rather than old vs. new Left. In the Anglo-American world, 
however, the relationship is not so much between dominant and subordinate “pillars” 
as between “mainstream” and “alternative” (McKay 1996), or between multiple 
“identities”. 
2. A major reason for this Anglo-American specificity (which is rarely recognised by 
Anglo-American writers) is the distinction between an essentially political internal 
hegemony within the counter culture in Germany and Italy (not that of die Grünen or 
the PDS, but certainly of broader “left” commitments) and an essentially cultural 
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tendency in the counter culture in Britain and the States, which tends towards an 
identitarian fragmentation following a logic of status conflict and valorising cultural 
capital rather than one of political alliance-building.  
There are obviously pre-existing reasons for this - it captures the distinction between 
“corporatist” and “liberal” political opportunity structures and policy regimes (Esping-
Andersen 1990), for example (implying incidentally that “Nordic state feminism” 
(Meyer 1993), for example, may be one example of a third type of relationship) and 
corresponds to the distinction between imperial and global societies and organised 
nation states. More immediately it appears in contrasts between e.g. 
 forming new subcultures - forming new parties 
 literary intellectuals  - social science intellectuals 
 Standortpolitik of financial investment- Standortpolitik of industrial investment 
“Culture” and “politics” are not opposites or mutually exclusive; they are different 
focal points around which counter cultures can be organised, but “cultural” challenges 
to everyday routines have “political” implications for social structure, and vice versa. If 
McKay’s (1996) history of “cultures of resistance” in Britain passes through free 
festivals and punk music to arrive at roads protests, then, von Dirke’s (1997) history of 
the counter culture in Germany passes through barricades and terrorism to arrive at a 
democratisation of culture. These differences are real, sufficient to make comparison 
between the two problematic, but exist ultimately as tendencies rather than opposites. 
These tendencies have effects, though: the counter culture in Germany is more 
cohesive, because more “political”; that in Britain is more fragmented because more 
“cultural”. 
3 There is also a contrast between the situations of core and periphery. As Gramsci 
(1971) and Foweraker (1995) both argue, the “civil society” that movements can fight 
“wars of position” in - a space outside the state within which movements can act 
directly to change local conditions and develop powerful subcultures - is typically 
absent on the periphery (whether Russia in 1917, postwar Latin America or 
contemporary Ireland). Instead, movement projects must engage at an early point with 
the state, and find themselves either as clients and “partners” of the state or violently 
excluded (“subversives” in Ireland, guerrilla movements in Latin America).  
This acts as a disaggregating force on movements in the periphery. Further, in a state 
which is the product of a successful movement from below, the counter culture in 
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Ireland meets the same problems faced by earlier generations of socialists and 
feminists: the terrain of “community” and “grass-roots organisation” is already 
effectively occupied by the Civil War parties, the church and the GAA, the institutional 
frameworks of that earlier movement. 
For this reason the normal shape of Irish counter culture is that of fragmented local 
campaigns (Peillon 1999a, 1999b) occasionally interrupted by massive mobilisations 
(Wood Quay, Carnsore, CND, the Reagan visit, the X case) which leave little in their 
wake. In subsequent chapters I will trace the kinds of network that are possible under 
such circumstances: here it is enough to note that this organisational disaggregation 
places a particular importance on the persistence of “latent networks” (Melucci 1989), 
such as the one discussed in this thesis. 
Summarising the thesis 
In this thesis, I develop the historical concept of counter culture in three stages. In the first 
of these, I attempt to rethink the “social movements” problematic through a critique of the 
existing literature (chapter two), which leads to an alternative conceptualisation of what is 
entailed by “social movements” and of how the counter culture can be analysed in these 
terms (chapter three). Secondly, I consider what is involved in researching counter culture, 
through a discussion of the politics of knowledge involved and the context and nature of 
my fieldwork (chapter four). Thirdly, I explore the characteristics of the counter culture 
which come out through the analysis of the fieldwork: local rationalities grounded in a 
reflexive autonomy (chapter five) and developed in the direction of a radicalised reflexivity 
(chapter six), producing a specific and complex set of choices for the counter culture 
(chapter seven). Finally, I offer a summary and conclusion to the thesis (chapter eight). 
A necessary starting point is an intellectual history (chapter two), in which I use the 
criteria outlined in this chapter to discuss two alternative approaches to understanding the 
areas explored in this thesis. I argue that the existing social movements literature does not 
manage to overcome a tendency to fragmentation, the assumption of a single model of 
rationality, and an unacknowledged tendency to adopt the positions of movement elites. 
Although “social movements” accounts tend to present them only as straw men, I suggest 
that Western Marxist and socialist feminist accounts of human agency have more to offer 
in terms of theoretical purchase on different kinds of activity; of analyses which connect 
cultural difference to social location; and of concepts “from and for” movements. 
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In my approach to understanding social movements (chapter three), I develop this 
approach in an alternative theory of social movement, which proceeds from an 
understanding of human action as a situated engagement with (natural and social) 
otherness located within a given social totality. In this understanding, social movement 
becomes an organising concept for a developmental (rather than institutionally static) 
theory of the direction of collective action, from the “local rationalities” which respond to 
given situations through campaigns as the organisation of these local responses to 
movement projects, which abstract and develop local rationalities around a challenge to the 
construction of the social totality. The struggle for hegemony, from above as much as from 
below, is then central to an understanding of social movement. This perspective is 
illustrated in an analysis of the counter culture as a historically specific movement project 
from below. 
In discussing the politics of knowledge of movement research (chapter four), I argue for 
a shift in emphasis from the activities and ideologies of movement elites to the local 
rationalities of ordinary participants, understood as the starting-point of social movements. 
These can be researched as skills, but within an ethnographically sensitive strategy which is 
alive to the possible multiplicity of rationalities and which is reflexive about its own 
situatedness within the contested field of the construction of movements. In the context of 
this research, I discuss the specificities of the movement network studied and locate my 
own research activity as a participant within this particular milieu, able to draw on shared 
understandings but also tending to particular positions as a participant. 
In chapter five I analyse one aspect of the rationality of this network as reflexive 
autonomy, a specific way of life which stresses self-development as a central theme within 
which participants locate their “political” activity. This self-development is arrived at 
through a process of distancing from taken-for-granted lifeworlds in which other 
movement milieux are routinely drawn on as resources. This distancing leads to a challenge 
to routinisation as such, which makes choice and commitment problematic and 
undermines the possibility of stable institutionalisation. As a result, the production of 
action becomes extremely challenging; while this rationality clears the ground for the 
creation of new projects it tends to undermine their sustainability. 
In chapter six I suggest that participants attempt to resolve these contradictions through 
the practice of radicalised reflexivity, which entails not simply a “suspension of assent” 
but a determination to explore its practical implications. A key element in this strategy is 
the deployment of complex “techniques of the self” in periods of apparent inertia, which 
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enable creative play with new possibilities; these techniques are embedded in collective 
institutions which offer practical support in the development of a reflexive lifeworld. Such 
lifeworlds are an important collective achievement in the contemporary movement context, 
but also represent some of its limits. 
Chapter seven analyses the choices available to the counter culture in an attempt to 
discover ways beyond those limits. It suggests that it is possible to develop an immanent 
critique of the adequacy of different movement strategies to the counter cultural project as 
a whole; and that open concepts can form a useful language within which participants can 
think and argue about their possible futures, exemplifying this with one possible analysis of 
the Irish counter culture using the perspective developed in this thesis. Moving beyond 
this, the chapter attempts to locate this current situation within a longer history of 
movements from below in the twentieth century, arguing for the need to refuse the divorce 
between the critique of structural inequality and challenges to everyday routines. 
The conclusion (chapter eight), finally, summarises and reflects on what has gone before. 
In particular, it asks after the extent to which the thesis has redeemed its own knowledge 
claims, and how this question could be assessed; it looks at the relationship of the 
arguments brought forward in this thesis to existing writing, both academic and activist, on 




Chapter two: intellectual histories 
Introduction 
Chapter one outlines a research project attempting to connect particular social experiences, 
and notes the wide range of literatures related to these. In this chapter I explore some of 
this literature through the category of “social movements”. This language is probably the 
most widely used within sociology and cognate disciplines for writing on this area: despite 
important limitations, it is also wider in intended scope than, for example, the literature on 
green parties or that on 1968. This makes it an appropriate starting point for theorising. 
Existing usages of “social movements”, however, obscure another tradition of theorising 
what the nineteenth-century called “the social movement”: agency-oriented versions of 
Marxism and feminism, which, if understood as theories of social movement, offer fuller and 
more theoretically adequate ways to think about the phenomena I am interested in. In 
chapter three I will attempt a systematic presentation of this latter approach as an explicit 
theory of social movements. 
What is a social movement anyway, and would we 
know one if we saw one? 
In this chapter, I engage with these two literatures with a particular focus on the question 
of what they understand a social movement to be. This is a relatively undertheorised 
question within the literature: while “resource mobilisation” approaches give considerable 
attention to the question of how social movements operate, and “identity” approaches 
engage with the question of why social movements exist (cf. Cohen 1985), what social 
movements are tends to be rather taken for granted (but see Diani 1992a).2  
In other words, an important starting-point is to identify these largely unspoken 
assumptions which structure particular research programmes. As we shall see, the “social 
movements” literature operates with a conception of “social movement” as 
                                                
2 This does not mean that there is consensus on the subject: as we shall see, the phrase is used to cover 
everything from specific campaigns on single issues to the total life-activity of the subordinate classes in 
nineteenth-century Europe. Nor, to the best of my knowledge, has the question of how one distinguishes one 
movement from another ever been systematically theorised (see chapter three). 
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“unconventional political activity”, which contrasts with the “social movement” 
conception of “collective agency”, within which unconventional political activity, in the 
sense used in the “social movements” literature, plays a historically variable role: a 
recognition which is important for a thesis interested in exploring inter alia how collective 
agency may be changing in disorganised capitalism. 
Criteria for an effective theory 
In chapter one I identified criteria for an effective theorisation of the counter culture, 
which can now be defended as intellectual propositions and used to evaluate the two 
literatures discussed. Firstly, I required that such a theory have a reasonable explanatory 
power for the whole range of activities involved. In other words, a narrowly field-specific 
theory begs the question, both of how we understand other kinds of activities which may 
appear in the same life-world contexts (the alternative press as against new religious 
movements, for example) and of what kind of theory of society can give meaning to the 
field-specific theory (Thompson 1977a). An effective theory needs to answer precisely 
these kinds of questions, linking one kind of behaviour to another and setting them within 
a broader context - or, alternatively, showing why this is neither possible nor desirable. This 
is then an essentially theoretical criterion. 
Secondly, such a theory should offer the possibility of a convincing engagement with 
participants’ own experiences and understandings. Given the suspicion that the experience 
of participants in what I am provisionally calling the counter culture might contrast with 
that of people in other social contexts, and given the awareness that complex societies do 
in fact contain multiple and conflicting cultural formations, an approach which is to go 
beyond confirming our own worldview needs to enable a serious engagement - critical 
rather than dismissive, interpretive rather than celebratory - with the perspective of 
participants (Rosaldo 1993). This is then a methodological criterion. 
Thirdly, an adequate answer, from the point of view of an activist sociology of knowledge, 
would be one whose construction is such as to offer some practical purchase on the 
everyday problems faced by participants in counter cultural contexts (Wainwright 1994). 
An alternative way of putting this is that knowledge is always knowledge from some 
particular vantage point and type of engagement; a theory which is not capable of 




Categorising the l iterature 
Affirmative categorisations 
Of the two approaches to social movements I am examining here, only the first is routinely 
examined in any detail in academic writing on the subject. The locus classicus here is Diani’s 
(1992a) article on the concept of social movement, which distinguishes four schools of 
theorising - collective behaviour, resource mobilisation theory (RMT), political process and 
new social movements (NSMs) - to propose a new synthetic definition as follows: 
“A social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of 
individuals, groups and / or organisations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the 
basis of a shared collective identity.” (1992a: 13) 
This definition is explicitly intended to enable the production of a field-specific theory of 
social movements which  
“helps to differentiate them from a) political and social organisations like parties, interest 
groups or religious sects3; b) other informal networks of collective action such as political 
mobilisation campaigns and political coalitions.” (1992a: 13) 
Diani’s classification, in other words, is designed to enable the development of a separate 
field of social movement research, by identifying a “canon” of important theoretical 
contributions. This is not objectionable in itself; what is important to note, though, is that 
this operates through an exclusion of the perspectives I discuss later in this chapter, and 
through a field-specific definition of the subject of “social movements” writing which 
identifies it as a particular “level” of informal activity. 
An alternative, but equally affirmative, classification is that offered by Cohen (1985), who 
distinguishes between “strategy” (or “American”) and “identity” (or “European”) 
paradigms of social movements. The former, identified as the “resource-mobilization” 
                                                
3 While this distinction is intended as one between analysis of a single organisation and that of networks 
between organisations, individuals, etc., there are important historical situations - such as those of continental 
“pillarised subcultures” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Allum 1995) - where at various periods in the past socialist 
or communist parties, Catholic or Protestant churches formed both the “backbone” (in other words, formal 
elements outweighed informal in the process of networking) and the “skin” (extra ecclesia nulla salus) of the 
subculture. The apparently universal relevance of the distinction, in other words, depends on a very specific 




approach, in fact also includes the “political process” school, but is presented as a 
definitive advance on the “collective behaviour” school (1985: 672, 674); the latter is 
identical with Diani’s “new social movements” approach, and is presented as a definitive 
advance on classical Marxism (1985: 691). Again, these two approaches are intended to 
complement one another, in that the first fails  
“(a) to look into the processes by which collective actors create the identities and 
solidarities they defend, (b) to assess the relations between adversaries and the stakes of 
their conflicts, and (c) to analyze the structural and cultural developments that contribute 
to such heightened reflexivity [in contemporary movements]” (1985: 690). 
The latter, by contrast, is criticised for “excluding strategic interaction from the concept of 
a social movement” and for possessing a “vague image of civil society” (1985: 705). The 
first problem is of course remedied by recourse to the “strategy” paradigm, the second by 
relocation within a macro-social theory derived from Habermas and characterised by 
“the distinction between processes involved in the differentiation of the economy and the 
state […] and processes involved in the modernization, or “rationalization”, of the 
sociocultural lifeworld” (1985: 711). 
In other words, Cohen, like Diani, opts for a synthesis of different schools which excludes 
Marxist and feminist approaches and produces a theory of social movements dependent on 
their location within “ ‘society’ in the sense of civil society” (1985: 716). 
Critical categorisations 
Variants of these two approaches dominate in the “social movements” literature, from the 
putatively iconoclastic Scott (1990) to the explicitly canonical textbook produced by della 
Porta and Diani (1999). These are not, however, the only readings of the subject. Jones 
(1993) locates the initial division within the actual differences between European and 
American movements:  
“RMT was more useful for the analysis of national (or international) organisations, with 
traditional hierarchical attitudes towards staff and towards an inactive membership, using 
advanced computer technology, marketing techniques and computerised mailing lists (an 
example here would be Greenpeace) while the European approach was more useful for the 
analysis of more amorphous, diffuse movements, which are not confined to their 
organisational expressions, and where the movement itself can be missed if analysis is 
aimed only at organisations (examples would be the squatter and autonomous 
movements)” (1993: 7). 
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Jones observes that the European attempt at synthesis between the two approaches derives 
from “a desire to increase the distance between researchers and NSMs” as well as a reliance 
on large-scale funding, producing a “Euroconsensus in the making” (1993: 8)4. For Jones, 
the analysis is essentially Eurocentric, privileges the experience of the core over the 
periphery within Europe, and brings about new kinds of power relations - on the one hand 
a “revolt of the subjects” against increasingly established researchers (see Kriesi 1992) and 
on the other hand the question “Why study NSMs? Who benefits from such research? If 
NATO is funding it, is it counterinsurgency research?” (Jones 1993: 8 - 9) Beyond a 
fleeting reference to Castells and a more extended call for theorising the specific experience 
of social movements on the periphery, however, Jones does not propose other directions 
in which to look. 
Equally critical of the project of transatlantic consensus, but equally short on alternatives, is 
Mayer’s (1995) article. This consists of an in-depth critique of the underlying assumptions 
structuring American research: 
“The assumptions guiding collective behaviour and RM theories and the incompatibility 
between American and European research are primarily attributable to some particular 
features of American politics: 
1. Its relatively open, fluid and decentralized political system that has typically 
prevented an antagonistic polarization between movements and the political 
establishment. 
2. The reintegration, again and again, of insurgent, innovative reform 
movements in the course of American history into the dominant American ideology, 
utilitarian liberalism, emphasizing instrumental rationality and pragmatic problem 
solving that prevent the formation of groups who would be unalterably opposed to 
the system itself.” (1995: 184) 
By contrast, Mayer argues, 
“European theories, still influenced by more or less explicit assumptions of a class-
structured society and logics of material (re)production, assume that each new reproductive 
stage produces and is challenged by social movements that articulate historically changing 
social cleavages, if not the older variety of class antagonisms. This European attitude 
contrasts sharply with the view of society as an unstructured ensemble of groups, of ruling 
                                                
4 Since Jones’ paper, the collections by Morris and Mueller (1992) and Johnston and Klandermans (1995) 
have shown that American researchers are equally capable of joining in the process of consensus formation, 
without, however, undermining the substance of Jones’ criticisms. 
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classes as a relatively homogenous elite, of the state as structurally permeable or as 
institutionally biased against insurgency. These various elements of the American 
theoretical framework together produce the image of a static social arrangement that 
continually adapts, in the pluralist view, due to its permeability and openness or, in the 
social-democratic view, is only exceptionally perturbed.” (1991: 189 - 190) 
The European alternative is not the focus of Mayer’s piece, but by implication includes 
“new social movements” writers such as Touraine (1981, 1985) and Melucci (1989, 1992), 
as well as critical theorists such as Offe (1984, 1985) and Habermas (1984, 1987a), and 
presumably the wider body of empirical research on social movements (see e.g. Brand 1982 
for a systematic exposition or the contents of the Forschungsjournal neue soziale Bewegungen for 
characteristic productions). What differentiates this latter from positivist “American” 
research is its routine use of general social theory, hence a continuing interest in structure 
and culture as historically produced, as opposed to the production of a field-specific model 
of utilitarian rationalism which, as we shall see, is an explicit founding assumption of the 
American literature. 
The missing theory I: Marxism as economism 
While criticising the transatlantic consensus, then, Jones and Mayer do not have an explicit 
alternative. What to me stands out from the affirmative categorisations, from the 
background of Irish and British sociology, is the lack of any serious reference to Marxist 
and feminist analyses, given their claim to be theories from and for movements and their 
importance in the development of new macro-structural perspectives (for overviews see 
e.g. Harvey 1990 or Arrighi 1994), the field of cultural studies (cf. Williams 1989a or 
McRobbie 1994) and history from below (MARHO 1983, Gordon 1986). 
This exclusion works largely by caricature, at least for Marxist theories. (Feminist theories 
of social movements are rarely, if ever, mentioned within the “social movements” 
literature; see Wainwright 1994 and Auckland 1997 for useful exceptions.) Here is Cohen, 
for example, who as author of Class and civil society: the limits of Marxian critical theory (1982) 
can hardly be excused by ignorance: 
“[European] theorists are also aware of the inadequacies of Marxist analyses of social 
movements, despite their sympathy with those dimensions of neo-Marxism that stress the 
importance of consciousness, ideology, social struggle, and solidarity to collective action. 
These ‘post-Marxist’ thinkers argue that theories stressing the primacy of structural 
contradictions, economic classes, and crises in determining collective identity are 
inappropriate to contemporary collective actors.” (1985: 691) 
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As it happens, this is not a very good description of one of her key examples of “post-
Marxism”, Touraine, who (as she observes a few pages later) offers precisely a theory of 
“an allegedly new societal type characterized by new locuses of power, forms of 
domination, modes of investment, and a ‘reflexive’ cultural model” (1985: 701). Cohen 
criticises Touraine for what is precisely (and more explicitly in the original: Touraine 1981) 
a theory of “structural contradictions and economic classes”, just as she later criticises 
Habermas for offering a “revival of the classical breakdown thesis” (1985: 710; italics hers), 
presumably an example of a theory of crisis. In other words, people are thinking along 
these lines (whether or not they are right to do so), but these theories are not allowed into 
the canon. Della Porta and Diani (1999) repeat much the same approach: 
“The response of European social sciences to the rise of the movements of the 1960s and 
the 1970s was a critique of the Marxist models of interpretation of social conflict. Such 
models have encountered a number of problems in explaining recent developments” 
(1999: 11). 
These problems are identified as the uncertain centrality of the capital-labour conflict, the 
growing importance of gender, and determinism: 
“The deterministic element of the Marxist tradition - the conviction that the evolution of 
social and political conflicts was conditioned largely by the level of development of 
productive forces and by the dynamic of class relations - was rejected, as was the tendency, 
particularly strong among orthodox Marxists, to deny the multiplicity of concerns and 
conflicts within real movements, and to construct, in preference, outlandish images of 
movements as homogenous actors with a high level of strategic ability” (1999: 11). 
Then comes the punchline: 
“Certainly, scholars of the new movements were not the only ones to be aware of these 
problems. The same difficulties had been raised by those who had studied class action 
from a non-economistic position, when considering an ‘old’ class actor such as the 
workers’ movement (Thompson 1963)” (della Porta and Diani 1999: 11). 
And of course Marxist authors such as Thompson (1963, 1977a, 1993), Hill (1961, 1975) or 
Brailsford (1976) had already defined a project of “history from below” (Davies and Flett 
1999), which gave rise to a substantial body of research on collective agency (MARHO 
1983) which is still very much alive and kicking (Sharpe et al. 1999) and anything other than 
mechanistic (cf. Wood 1990). Similarly, Williams (1965, 1979, 1980, 1981) developed an 
extensive research programme on the relationship between class and culture, which found 
fruition among other things in a tradition of materialist cultural studies (Hall and Jefferson 
1991 (1975)) in which these issues are still hotly debated (Agger 1991; McRobbie 1994). 
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Nor was this development particularly new. As Agger (1992), Jacoby (1981) and Jay (1984) 
observe, critiques of mechanistic and economistic versions of Marxism are precisely what 
have characterised some of the most productive work in European Marxism, from Lukács 
(1971 (1922)) and Gramsci (1975 (1929 - 1935)) in the 1920s and 1930s through the 
Frankfurt School to authors like Lucien Goldmann (1969), before we get to Thompson 
and Williams. In fact, it is hard to think of major European Marxists since the 1920s who 
have not criticised such approaches - Althusser and, in a rather different key, contemporary 
“analytic Marxism” (Cohen 1978, Elster 1985) are among the few obvious examples. In the 
early 1930s, for example, Gramsci could write the following: 
“We can say that not only does the philosophy of praxis [Marxism] not exclude ethical and 
political history, but on the contrary its most recent phase of development consists 
precisely in the stress on the moment of hegemony as essential to its conception of the 
state and in its “valorisation” of the cultural fact, of cultural activity, and of a cultural front 
as necessary beside the purely economic and the purely political.” (1975 [1932 - 35]: 1224) 
The missing theory II: Marxism as culturalism 
If these presentations of “identity”-oriented NSM theory suggest that economistic, 
mechanistic Marxism needs a bit of culture, presentations of “strategy”-oriented RMT, by 
contrast, point to the usefulness of a bit of culturalist Marxism to counteract their own 
utilitarian rationalism (which, in another language, might be rendered “economistic 
mechanism”). Thus the editors of one “state-of-the-art” book note: 
“For Morris and for Taylor and Whittier, conflict plays a more central role. Morris’s 
treatment of the intersection of race, class, and gender in the formation of political 
consciousness is likened to the processes by which class struggle generates class 
consciousness identified in Thompson’s Making of the English Working Class (1963). […] [By 
contrast] those theorizing from a macrolevel constructionist perspective in the tradition of 
Gramsci and Habermas have argued that hegemonic processes are so successful that the 
meanings necessary for collective action are only infrequently available” (Mueller 1992: 13) 
It seems, then, that Marxist theory may have something to offer in this direction, as well 
perhaps (though this is not stated) in dealing with some of the problems facing RMT: 
“Important directions for future research are suggested in these essays. First is that of 
distinguishing the level and type of likely resources available to prospective participants as 
a basic constraint on collective action. The failure to specify differential access to resources 
has been a major factor divorcing recent social movement theory from social structure and 
history. Second is the hypothesized link between constituency resources, mass 
Intellectual histories 
 42 
mobilisation, and major social change. Third is that of connecting the mechanisms of 
constituency mobilization leading to periods of mass participation with the carrying 
structures and oppositional subcultures that develop during periods of relative 
quiescence.” (Mueller 1992: 21) 
It is just possible that Marxists and feminists have already done some thinking about 
subjects such as class and gender, revolution, and class / gender consciousness and culture. 
Following the analysis of the “social movements” literature and evaluation of its possible 
usefulness for my research, then, I proceed to an examination of agency-oriented Marxism 
and feminism in similar terms. 
Affirmative approaches: “social movements” 
The dominant “social movements” literature has been defined from its inception by its 
insistence on an instrumentally rational utilitarianism as the basic mode of explanation of 
social movement participation and its understanding of social movements as a particular 
(albeit informal) kind of social institution. The central claim made by defenders of resource 
mobilisation theory (RMT), the dominant contributor to what became the field of “social 
movements”, is that it represented movement actors as rational rather than irrational; 
informal, but not illegitimate. As della Porta and Diani write: 
“[F]unctionalist theories of collective behaviour […] came under fire for regarding 
collective movements as irrational actors, and collective action as the exclusive product of 
malfunctions of the social system or, more specifically, of its integrative apparatus [.…] In 
deliberate contrast to this way of conceptualizing social movements, American sociologists 
initiated, in the 1970s, a current of research centred on the analysis of processes by which 
the resources necessary for collective action are mobilized. In their view, collective 
movements constitute an extension of the conventional forms of political action; the 
actors engage in this act in a rational way, following their interests; organizations and 
movement ‘entrepreneurs’ have an essential role in the mobilization of collective resources 
on which action is founded. Movements are therefore part of the normal political 
process.” (1999: 7) 
Movements as irrational 
To understand the meaning of this claim, it needs to be set in its historical context, the 
early 1970s in the United States. The locally dominant image of social movements prior to 
this was as irrational expressions of the mobile vulgus, as forms of “collective behaviour” as it 
was delicately put. In part this reached back to the pathologising reactions of 19th century 
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conservatives who presented movement behaviour as a sickness in the body politic, 
presumably in need of surgical or therapeutic intervention. More directly, though, it 
reflected the reactions of American and emigre German intellectuals, for whom the 
European 1920s and 1930s represented a sort of era of collective madness under the 
opposing banners of fascism and communism. Thus from a liberal perspective, writers like 
Heberle (1995 (1951)) had warned that: 
“Depending on how much a social movement comes to pursue its goals as if they 
represented ultimate values in themselves instead of means to higher ends, it will constitute 
a real and serious danger to the society. […] It is, as a rule, not difficult to reach agreement 
on means, but ultimate ends are usually beyond rational discussion.  
We may therefore say that social movements and political parties whose members do not 
claim to be in the possession of the absolute truth are no threat to the social order; they 
may be on the contrary a sign of vitality of a society. The intransigents, especially the 
totalitarian movements and their political orders, on the other hand, are bound to destroy 
the solidarity of a society because they are devoid of that sense of community that includes 
even the political opponent.” (1995: 58) 
Heberle explicitly instances as cases of the latter “[p]resent-day Communists, like the 
fascistic political groups” (1995: 52). Such views were those of liberals who saw themselves 
(while defending “the social order”) as “above the struggle” - as indeed they were, as 
members of the power-holding movements of the “Golden Age” that felt itself under 
threat from Left and Right equally.  
In the 1950s, these views had a new resonance in the US and Germany, coinciding with the 
definition of both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia as “totalitarian states”, legitimating in 
particular US postwar hegemony, the “frontier state” of West Germany (the exclusion of 
“anti-constitutional” activity was anchored in the FRG’s Grundgesetz), and the aggressive 
pursuit of an internal Cold War in both states, with the McCarthy / House Un-American 
Activities Committee (HUAC) period in the States (cf. Jacobs and Landau 1967: 101 - 102 
on HUAC and the university) and the banning of the KPD in West Germany as a threat to 
the “basic order of freedom and democracy” (Markovits and Gorski 1993: 34; see Gitlin 
1988: 61 - 66 on the importance of anti-communism for American liberalism in the 1950s 
and early 1960s). 
Similarly, Blumer (1995 (1951) had presented a picture of the development of social 
movements (incidentally with no reference to empirical research and very few references to 
concrete movements) which stressed above all the elements of emotion: 
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“In the first of these four stages [of movement development] people are restless, uneasy, 
and act in a random fashion. They are susceptible to appeals and suggestions that tap their 
discontent, and hence, in this stage, the agitator is likely to play an important role. The 
random and erratic behavior is significant in sensitizing people to one another and so 
makes possible the focussing of their restlessness on certain objects.” (1995: 64) 
of manipulation: 
“One type of agitator is an excitable, restless and aggressive individual. His dynamic and 
energetic behavior attracts the attention of people to him; and the excitement and 
restlessness of his behavior tends to infect them. He is likely to act with dramatic gestures 
and to talk in terms of spectacular imagery. His appearance and behavior foster the 
contagion of unrest and excitement.” (1995: 66) 
and of unreason: 
“It is clear from this explanation that the development of morale in a movement is 
essentially a matter of developing a sectarian attitude and a religious faith.” (1995: 71) 
For Blumer - perhaps with an eye on the history of religious movements in America - such 
groups would ultimately become more rational, settled, organised and so on; the underlying 
schema of his argument is reminiscent of Weber’s (1991) account of the shift from 
charismatic to bureaucratic organisation. But in Blumer as in Heberle, social movements 
continue to appear primarily as irrational, emotional, and dangerous challenges to 
convention and normality. 
The declining plausibil ity of irrationality 
In the context of the increasingly turbulent and rapidly leftwards-moving 1960s, this 
response - represented by a Clark Kerr in the US (see Jacobs and Landau 1967: 67 - 72 on 
the interaction between the Berkeley Free Speech Movement and Kerr’s administration) or 
indeed a Habermas in West Germany (who spoke of the “left fascism” of the student 
movement: see his self-critique in Habermas 1989: 185 - 186) - lost significantly in 
credibility with younger academics and intellectuals who (without identifying with the 
totality of the new movements) sought a more credible way of understanding movements 
that they sympathised with or were party to - and of course a guide for action and source 
of legitimation for those who were also participants (cf. Freeman and Levine 1984 (1970)). 
What enabled the unchallenged acceptance in the FRG and USA of the essentially anti-
communist analysis of “totalitarianism” and thus of social movements as “irrational”, was 
of course the defeat of their indigenous left movements. As competitor states during the 
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decline of British hegemony (Arrighi 1994), both had severely suppressed socialist and 
union movements prior to World War I, used the war and its ending to attack the radical 
left (Mitchell 1970), deployed welfare measures in a logic of organisation and nationalism in 
the context of rivalry with the Soviet Union, culminating in World War II and the anti-
communist aftermath (Hobsbawm 1995).  
In Germany, the radical left had been decimated by the Freikorps, smashed by the Nazis, 
controlled or executed under Stalin, and banned in the postwar West. Unlike France or 
Italy, the only significant left intellectuals in the immediate postwar period were isolated 
literary (Böll, Gruppe 47) and academic (late Frankfurt School) thinkers with no links to 
organised working-class movements (Burns and van der Will 1988); while the working class 
was organised under a Social Democratic party that had suppressed communists violently 
throughout Weimar and now identified wholeheartedly with nation, NATO and America 
(Markovits and Gorski 1993: 29 - 45): 
“However much the Germans were ‘in movement’, nevertheless they were afraid of it and 
desired stability, peace and order. At least 92 of the 196 years since 1789 were marked in 
Germany by deep state repression of social movements. The strong movements have the 
same cause as the heavy repression: many Germans’ need for harmony and security in the 
search for a conflict-free society. The NS [Nationalsozialistisch] movement as a movement 
for the ending of all social movements and for the creation of a 1000-year empire is the 
most striking symbol of this.  
After 1945 social movement remained a taboo, which could also not be overcome through 
the student movement and today’s new social movements. Political culture was divided on 
the theme of movements. Most older people remained with their aversion, at best 
ambivalence towards social movement: ‘no more movement’ was once of their lessons 
from the Nazi period.” (Raschke 1988: 13) 
To analyse the movements of the 1960s, then, Marxism was, if not entirely unavailable in 
America and Germany, at least considerably less attractive than elsewhere, and for would-
be academics in particular entailed greater risks in countries where HUAC persisted into 
the 1960s (USA) and radicals were excluded from state employment from 1972 onwards 
(FRG). It is in any case doubtful how much disciplinary weight it could have carried against 
the “irrationalist” orthodoxies of the day. 
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The usefulness of rationality 
Resource mobilisation theory, as the developing new orthodoxy came to be known, was an 
altogether more attractive candidate. It challenged the assertion of irrationality with an 
assertion of a rationality of an unimpeachably mainstream kind: 
“the breakthrough was based on a set of simplifying assumptions that placed the study of 
social movements clearly within the instrumental, utilitarian natural science tradition” 
(Mueller 1992: 3). 
While the later Frankfurt School had damned instrumental rationality as the source of all 
evil (Agger 1992), resource mobilisation theory celebrated it as an affirmation of how 
sensible, mainstream and normal movement politics were (no small concern, this, given the 
violence of popular reaction in both countries to “deviance” and “disloyalty”, and the 
reading of “Communism” as a threat to the national community.) Della Porta and Diani’s 
analysis, quoted earlier, thus identifies the central ideological point that RMT theorists 
needed to make: 
“Movements are therefore part of the normal political process.” (1999: 7) 
Thus the assertion of instrumental and individual rationality allowed RMT to argue that 
movements were a legitimate part of the policy process and represented nothing more than 
the highly justifiable attempt to pursue individual interests. In an interesting early piece, 
Perrow distinguished two varieties of RMT. RM I, in his analysis, 
“is Clausewitzian in character; protest is the continuation of orderly politics by other 
(disorderly) means. Because protest grows out of the ongoing political process and is a part 
of it, it need not be irrational nor discontinuous, as older theories might suggest. It is a 
commodious view of social movements - all kinds of things can become resources for 
movements, and there are all kinds of ways to mobilize them. Especially in Oberschall’s 
quite catholic formulation, a large variety of social-psychological, sociological, political 
science, and economic theories find their place” (1979: 199 - 200) 
This approach was highly flexible, allowing an author like Freeman to represent social 
movements as organisms capable of making strategic decisions governed by the eminently 
rational criteria of 
“mobilizable resources, constraints on these resources, SMO [social movement 
organisation] structure and internal environment” (1983b: 195) 
Rejecting “spontaneous generation” and “outside agitator” theories of movements 
identified as “the implicit assumptions in the literature” (1983a: 8), Freeman could point to 
“a preexisting communications network […] that is cooptable to the ideas of the incipient 
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movement” and the presence of either a crisis or an organizing cadre to mobilise this network 
(1983a: 9 - 10) 
Perrow’s second version of RMT, which has become the dominant one, is more narrowly 
rationalistic and “finds its agreeable imagery in economic theory”. Perrow argues that its 
canonical representatives, McCarthy and Zald, are essentially reviving the arguments of 
Moynihan’s attack in 1965 on what would today be called the “poverty industry”5. This 
version of RMT analyses social movements within the language of economic rationality; as 
Perrow comments, 
“As an antidote to an unrestrained and romantic ‘hearts and minds’ approach, such talk is 
salutory. But the striking thing about the movements of the 1950s and 1960s (and social 
movements in general) is that they were not business organizations and industries. I 
suppose that the murder of civil rights activists, unarmed students, and sleeping Panthers 
could be treated as industrial accidents, and police and vigilantes are examples of 
hazardous working conditions, but do we not thereby lose a degree of distinctiveness? […] 
McCarthy and Zald removed Freud but replaced him not with Marx or Lenin but with 
Milton Friedman.” (1979: 201 - 202) 
Such analyses focussed in particular on the role of organising elites in articulating 
grievances, mobilising members, and interacting strategically with state institutions. In this 
they corresponded neatly to the perspective of American movement elites in particular6, 
who in the “war of position” that succeeded the 1967 - 1970 “war of movement” were 
busily converting movement action into professional lobbying. Such elites were of an age, a 
class, and a political perspective with the RMT researchers who celebrated their 
professionalisation; sometimes (Freeman) they coexisted within one person, at others 
(Raschke) they acted as advisors. The contemporary social movements literature still 
stresses the theoretical centrality of this approach, even as it is identifying its limits: 
                                                
5  “In the hands of Moynihan, it was an insightful bit of debunking, arguing that the white middle class, 
quite unbidden, took up the cause of the poor. In particular, professional reformers with social science 
backgrounds created new careers out of a mixture of surplus funds in the federal budget and a 
conviction that they could solve intractable social problems. Promise much and deliver little was the 
recipe for the disorder that followed. Good Catholic that he is, Moynihan is sceptical of promises for 
the here and now; and good politician that he is, he understands the necessity of delivering little to the 
poor and the danger of maximum feasible participation. This cynical tone pervades the elaboration of 
McCarthy and Zald.” (Perrow 1979: 200) 
6 This “realo” trend had a harder fight in Germany, but has eventually made it to displace the FDP from its 
decades-old ownership of German foreign policy, albeit without notably changing that policy. 
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“The building blocks of resource mobilization - resources, formal organization, tactics, and 
political opportunities - are not ignored, but rather reframed within a broader paradigm 
that is at once more sensitive to historical, cultural, and structural differences between 
groups seeking to mobilize on behalf of collective ends and more attuned to the 
micromobilization context in which social movement identities and grievances are forged 
out of specific experiences of constraint and opportunity” (Morris 1992: 22) 
Quite how this particular balancing act – a core of individual economistic rationality, in a 
world of structured culture - is to be managed is not clear in Morris, but in what is to date 
the only collection on Social movements and culture, Johnston and Klandermans spell it out: 
“it is unlikely that the sociology of culture is able to incorporate the most enduring findings 
of the past two decades of social movement research [.…] The fundamental question as we 
see it is what answers cultural variables can provide to the core issues of the field, that is, 
the rise and decline of social movements and the waxing and waning of movement 
participation, movement success or failure.” (1995: 21) 
In other words, here we are and here we stay. 
Critiques of RMT 
As might be expected, critiques of this view of social movements as centred around 
individual, utilitarian actors have not been absent. Piven and Cloward (1995), interested in 
particular in understanding movements of the poor in America, have observed that they do 
not typically possess the kind of economic and political resources stressed by RMT 
theorists, and that the “normalisation” of collective action excludes the “dissensus politics” 
(1995: 160) engaged in by these movements. Since this does not fit within RMT’s image of 
highly organised and rational politics, 
“[l]ike many malintegration theorists before them, resource mobilization analysts have also 
reduced lower-stratum protest politics to irrational and apolitical eruptions” (1995: 162). 
Touraine puts the same point more sharply: RMT is “a kind of spontaneous natural 
sociology of the elite groups who are rich or powerful enough to elaborate complex 
strategies in a highly competitive world”: 
“The notion of resource mobilization has been used to transform the study of social 
movements into a study of strategies as if actors were defined by their goals and not by the 
social relationships - and especially power relationships - in which they are involved. Such a 
transformation is sometimes acceptable when apparently radical or ideological movements 
are actually instrumentally oriented interest groups. But in too many cases, this notion is 
used to eliminate enquiries about the meaning of collective action as if resource 
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mobilization could be defined independently from the nature of the goals and the social 
relations of the actor, as if all actors were finally led by a logic of economic rationality.” 
(1985: 769) 
In other words, RMT’s focus on movement elites neglects the perspective, situated needs 
and logic of action of ordinary participants; or rather these are taken as read, predefined 
elements of the logical games of methodological individualism (the homo oeconomicus, the 
ubiquitously present grievance, the follower in need of organisation). The problem, 
illustrated in Connolly’s otherwise excellent (forthcoming) study of the Irish women’s 
movement, is that a focus on elites can neither explain the success or failure of their 
attempts at mobilisation (which is, after all, the nominal focus of the literature) nor the 
existence of the movements in the first place: why this movement, and not that one, for 
example? The net result is that a focus on elites explains about as much about social 
movements as a whole as a focus on managers explains about production and consumption 
as a whole7. 
This perspective also suffers from the extent to which it takes movements from above for 
granted. Neither the American state nor the West German were the natural products of an 
organic growth: both were created by force of arms and put at the service of quite 
deliberate economic strategies; both, in the 20th century, were extensively remade - several 
times, in the case of the FRG. Yet in this perspective the “system” – political or social – is 
naturalised, leaving movements from below as something to be analysed in completely 
different terms from the “modernising” strategies of elites. 
Although frequently described as a “strategic” approach (following Cohen 1985), a better 
description of this approach would be “tactical”, in that it takes the purpose of the 
movement, the context of the conflict and the nature of the participants for granted, 
tending to reduce the study of social movements to a kind of description of the rules of the 
game8. 
                                                
7 The comparison is not a caricature, but follows the economistic logic of the underlying theory. The two 
propositions, within the analytic rationalism of this style of thinking, stand or fall with one another. 
8 A good example is Gamson’s (1995) analysis of the interaction of movement elites with the media, which 
(although drawing only on examples from the USA during the past two decades) is innocently presented as if 
all movements everywhere found themselves confronted with the same situation: 
“General-audience media are only one forum for public discourse, but they are the central one for 
social movements. Activists may read a variety of movement publications and attend meetings and 




Consequently, Tilly among others has stressed the need to move to an interactive analysis, 
in which movement is thought of in terms of process rather than in terms of individual 
actors. Tilly’s goal, however, is not to overcome the assumption of individual rationality 
but rather to “convert such a model of rational action into a model of rational interaction”: 
“we make the expected benefits and costs (and possibly some of the other variables listed 
above) for each actor depend on the actions of other actors, and institute communication 
among the actors. Within this framework, specifying relevant actors, interests, decision 
rules, costs, benefits, and capacities - not to mention the relations among them - sets the 
theoretical challenge.” (1985: 741) 
Rather than reject the basic logic of RMT’s rationalism, Tilly therefore draws on other 
“analytic traditions that permit dynamic modeling of strategic interaction: game theory and 
simultaneous-equation modeling of mutual-influence processes. To adopt either one, we 
must be prepared to use purposive models, at least to the extent of attributing decision 
rules to each actor, and must specify actors, interests, decision rules, costs, benefits, and 
capacities to act.” 
If classical RMT depended on the image of the business concern, such “political process” 
approaches, into which Perrow’s RM I tradition has also flowed, wind up in practice seeing 
social movements as part of the state, “the continuation of orderly politics by other 
(disorderly) means” (Perrow 1979: 199). One of the most important authors in this 
tradition is Tarrow, whose (1998) exposition “offer[s] a broad theoretical framework for 
understanding the place of social movements, cycles of contention, and revolutions within 
the more general category of contentious politics” (1998: 3). Key concerns within this 
“political opportunity structure” (POS) approach are the identification of political 
opportunities and constraints within the polity: 
                                                
constituency shares these other forums or is aware of this discourse. Only general-audience media 
provide a potentially shared public discourse [….] Someone speaking on neglect of the cities and racial 
injustice in American society in the wake of the Rodney King verdict and the ensuing Los Angeles riot 
can reasonably assume media-based, shared images of these events.” (1995: 85) 
This may well be true for America; it is less clear that it is true for movements in pillarised societies, where 
media are segmented (in Italy, for example, this applies not only to newspapers but until very recently to state 
TV stations, more or less explicitly oriented to the Catholic, lay and Communist subcultures respectively) and 
the primary problem is one of internal mobilisation rather than general appeals to “public opinion”. And this 
is before we look at situations of media censorship and societies (present or past) without mass media access.   
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“contentious politics is produced when political opportunities broaden, when they 
demonstrate the potential for alliances, and when they reveal the opponents’ vulnerability” 
(1998: 23). 
This approach does not reject the “internalist” analysis of RMT, but locates it within this 
explanatory structural context and adds to it the historical concept of a “repertoire of 
contention”, the forms of collective action available to groups within particular historical 
periods: 
“We can begin to study social movements as isolated confrontations between single social 
actors and their opponents, but - particularly when we examine their outcomes - we 
quickly arrive at the more complex and less tractable networks of politics. It is through the 
political opportunities seized and created by challengers, movements, and their allies and 
enemies that major cycles of contention begin. They, in turn, create opportunities for elites 
and counterelites, and actions that begin in the streets are resolved in the halls of 
government or by the bayonets of the army. Movements - and particularly the waves of 
movement that are the main catalysts of social change - are part of national struggles for 
power.” (1998: 25) 
One of the great strengths of this approach is this awareness of structure and history, as 
against the somewhat disembodied model-building imaginary of RMT. A good example is 
Foweraker (1995), who draws on the Latin American experience to stress the lack of an 
independent civil society and hence that: 
“social movements are inevitably political, and must develop a political project if they are 
to prosper. First, they are political in the sense of politicizing new issues [….] Secondly, 
they are political in the sense of entering the political and institutional arena, and of 
engaging in strategic interaction with the state.” (1995: 62) 
Foweraker’s analysis thus stresses the role of interaction with political parties, of cooptation 
and clientelism within the political system, and of the effects of movements on the polity. 
Finally, in what can best be described as a “vulgar Weberian” mode, Scott (1990) has 
developed an analysis of social movements as a response to political closure in corporatist 
polities, instancing the importance of ecology movements in Sweden, West Germany and 
Austria (1990: 144). Unfortunately for Scott’s argument, the development of Green parties 
outside the classically corporatist countries of Western Europe has somewhat undermined 
the argument (Bürklin 1987) that corporatism and movements go together (Franklin and 
Rüdig 1991, Richardson and Rootes 1995), as has the development of “deep ecology” and 




The standard critique of this model of social movements theorising is in Melucci (1989), 
who observes that it amounts to a political reductionism which in essence explains 
movements by their interaction with the polity, irrespective of how important this is in 
their actions, ideologies, motivations etc.; and that it still imputes a hard instrumental 
rationality to actors who in empirical experience are often anything but: 
“social conflicts are reduced to political protest and regarded as part of a political system. 
This emphasis exaggerates the function of politics. Participants in collective action are not 
simply motivated by ‘economic’ goals - calculating costs and benefits of their action - or by 
exchanging goods in a political market. They also seek goods which are not measurable 
and cannot be calculated.” (1989: 23) 
As a counterweight to this excessively political approach, a number of authors have 
developed what can be called “identitarian” approaches, in which social movements are 
effectively a form of display. If RMT-derived approaches stress instrumental rationality to 
the methodological exclusion of anything else, identitarian approaches often present a 
purely expressive analysis of movement activity as sufficient unto itself. Thus Maffesoli 
(1996) has developed a theory within which “identity politics” appears as one aspect of a 
generalised life force: 
“There is no point in going over the difficulty some intellectuals have in understanding this 
‘will to live’ (puissance) which, despite or perhaps because of its many impositions, continues 
to nourish the social body […] Or, we may base ourselves on the idea of Kunstwollen, which 
refers to the masses and to the collective force which drives them - in short, to this 
remarkable vitalism.” (1996: 30) 
In this perspective, social movements are seen as one form among others of a general drive 
to “go forth, increase and multiply” identities and forms of sociality: 
“Let me specify that although the human or social ‘divine’ […] is a preoccupation of social 
thinking, we can nonetheless draw a parallel with a certain mystical tradition which has as 
its goal to lose oneself in the ‘greater whole’. Such an attitude, on the one hand, functions 
as the basis for the formation of small groups (communion, erotic or sublimated 
identification, sects, congregations etc.) which are not unrelated to things we can observe 
today [.…] [A] new (and evolving) trend can be found in the growth of small groups and 
existential networks. This represents a sort of tribalism which is based at the same time on 
the spirit of religion (re-ligare) and on localism (proxemics, nature).” (1996: 40) 
In such an approach, not only the possible rationalities (instrumental or otherwise) of social 
movement participants, but also those of theorising seem to disappear in favour of a kind 
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of uncritical theology of sociability-as-religion. A formal statement of this appears in 
Hetherington (1997), who argues for a “connotative rather than denotative approach to 
new social movement analysis” (1997: 1), meaning a refusal to situate movements within a 
larger structure which they might tell us something about and instead arguing that 
“in order to study new social movements we should see them as situated explorations of 
issues associated with identity, non-identity and identification” (1997: 7). 
Although Hetherington draws on Williams’ notion of a structure of feeling, he is explicit 
about his intention to divorce this from any sense of determination: 
“While Williams does try to address the issue of the relationship between structure of 
feeling and class […] he recognises that he does not do so adequately. For me this is not a 
failure of the term but one of its strengths, allowing us to make use of the concept without 
having to adopt a class analysis of culture nor indeed any notion of a social conjuncture.” 
(1997: 10) 
Within these analyses, then, social movements are in effect collapsed into lifestyles. As 
Szerszynski (1998) has observed of Hetherington and Maffesoli, 
“one problem with many anthropologically influenced approaches to social movements is 
the way that, while usefully highlighting the importance of non-instrumental goods in 
movement membership, the emphasis on the performance of identity within movements 
tends to blur crucial distinctions, such as between those groups which are oriented to 
changing wider society and those which are not.” (1997: 2) 
Such approaches, focussed on the deployment of language and sociality, amount to the 
other side of the mechanistic coin of RMT and POS, in which what is at stake is the highly-
constrained mobilisation of resources of a very material kind, but share with it a taking for 
granted of what ordinary people want (ubiquitous grievances, universal concerns with 
identity and sociality) and of the institutional context in which they seek it (a naturalised 
political sphere for RMT and POS, a naturalised symbolic universe and field of cultural 
consumption for identitarians). 
In a sense this is a continuation of the British and French cultural studies projects, but in 
practice it keeps the form and loses the content. Whereas in Bourdieu (e.g. 1988) or 
Resistance through Rituals (Hall and Jefferson 1991) culture is the language spoken by 
economics and politics, in this approach, as Eco (1984: 502) puts it, “Nomina nuda 
tenemus” - we’re left with the bare names, or rather these apparent reals have become 
themselves symbolic devices caught up in the language and style game. 
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Critique of nominalism 
This nominalism comes out even more sharply in the other tendency of this approach, in 
which situation, movements and action are supposedly connected, but treated so generally 
that we know movements to be constructed, but neither by whom and with what resources 
- nor what difference it is intended to make to anything. Melucci, in his constructivist 
mode, often exemplifies these difficulties, but the definitive work is Laclau and Mouffe’s 
(1985) Hegemony and socialist strategy, which collapses Gramsci’s “directive” intellectual 
activity (i.e. organising: as by priests, doctors, engineers, managers, trade union officials and 
PCd’I activists) into his “theoretical” intellectual activity and the “articulation” of language 
games (for an extended critique, see Geras 1990). Without the counter-realm of the 
practical knowledge developed in material work and social interaction which Gramsci 
counterposes to the former (see chapter four) we are left with a world of symbols and 
language in which everything is possible, and nothing necessary: and a lingering doubt as to 
why, if that were the case, hegemony should exist at all or socialist strategy be either 
meaningful or desirable. 
A dominant feature of this writing, and one that gives a clue as to its social location, is its 
“panoptical” style. In postmodernism’s beloved image of a prison that was never built 
(Foucault 1979), prisoners were self-disciplined by the fact that their cells were always open 
to the scrutiny of a hidden observer. For Foucauldians, this “self-disciplining” characterises 
much of modernity. But if we look not at how ordinary people are expected to behave 
under these conditions of extreme coercion, but rather at the conditions themselves - the 
structure of the cells, the hidden observer who sees all - we find an unsettling analogy to 
this brand of postmodernism. 
Ordinary actors are in effect seen as (safely?) constrained in their action by their 
participation in symbolic structures - of language, of identity, of style etc. - through which 
(in theory) nothing ever breaks and to whose meta-structure nothing ever happens: we can 
exchange one identity for another (be moved to a different cell?), but remain dominated by 
identity – no (other) human needs, no tacit knowledge, no transformation of social 
relationships are allowed. In this respect, rather than in the much-touted difference between 
the dominant structure of structuralism and the multiple structures of post-structuralism, 
little has changed9. 
                                                




Perhaps the most remarkable feature of this writing is how unreflexive it is. The deployment 
of cultural capital in a sort of marketplace of style is a preoccupation of literary intellectuals 
for rather obvious (and unliterary) reasons. In the identitarian literatures, however, this 
particular local rationality is projected onto the rest of the planet in what can best be 
described as a form of ethnocentricity. The refusal of authors such as Maffesoli, 
Hetherington or Laclau and Mouffe to theorise their own specificity, the projection of their 
local cultural concerns onto others, the orientation by their own scholastically given set of 
texts and, crucially, the absence of any methodological strategy for noticing, handling or 
using differences in rationality – explains the essential solipsism of the postmodernist 
worldview at the same time as its lack of reflexivity: to ask why its authors are centrally 
concerned with the deployment of symbols and identities would be both to relativise 
themselves and to point to an “other” - in this case an institutional location and a set of 
social interests – for which there are no terms in this philosophy.  
This can be illustrated by an author like McKay (1996), who, though equally unreflexive, is 
so from the point of view of a long-term participant in the movements he writes about 
rather than a long-term participant in cultural studies departments. Hence the unspoken 
assumptions that he projects onto movements - their essentially oppositional character, 
their coherence and continuity within a history of conflict over 3 decades, and so on - are 
so radically different from the bulk of this literature as to beg the question: why does the 
thematisation of cultural difference in postmodernism not reach beyond the deployment of 
different symbols to the basic sociological question of whether activists and academics may 
be doing different things with the symbols they deploy?  
Constructivist approaches 
A more impressive challenge is to be found in what can perhaps be identified as a 
“constructivist” school of social movements writers. Authors like Melucci (1985, 1989, 
1992, 1995a), Lichterman (1996) and Szerszynski (1997a, b, c, 1998, forthcoming) have 
developed theoretically sophisticated and culturally literate accounts of movements which 
do not assume a single model of rationality. The central problematic in this literature could 
be phrased as “How do movement participants ‘do’ movements?” 
In Lichterman’s account, different models of community and commitment underlie 
participation in different kinds of movements. Contrasting middle-class white Green 




“Activists defined the tension between private life and activism differently in anti-toxics 
and Green groups, and they defined ‘politics’ differently too. Greens wanted to change the 
meaning and practice of both ‘everyday life’ (work and personal lifestyle) and of ‘politics’. 
Most anti-toxics activists, on the other hand, saw a tension between the two in terms of 
physical demands, but mostly assumed them to be separate spheres of activity. For the 
most part they did not try to innovate new definitions of ‘political’. The anti-toxics activists 
were not for the most part concerned with innovating new kinds of political practice. They 
did not practice nonconventional lifestyles or nonconventional relations to work as part of 
a politicized way of life. The two kinds of activist participated in movement cultures that 
encouraged different life-ways of activism entwined with different socio-economic 
opportunities.” (1996: 150) 
Szerszynski, similarly, has been concerned with the motivation of participants, which he 
has tended to frame within an ethical (but not individual) perspective of “communities of 
practice” (Szerszynski 1998). The major difficulty with reading Szerszynski is that despite a 
convincing engagement with the different cultures he is researching and a brilliant 
theoretical imagination, he remains thoroughly opportunist in his actual analyses, jumping 
from tongue-in-cheek analyses of environmental politics as different soteriological 
strategies (1997a) through Aristotelian theorisations of the nature of the good life (1997b) 
to the role of voluntary activity in sustainability (1997c) and a theory of protest as a way of 
performing the public sphere (forthcoming). For the moment, at least, a general theory of 
social movements is not on offer. 
As Melucci is discussed in more detail in chapter three, I will indicate the major limits of 
this approach here. Firstly, while offering one of the few ethnographically sensitive 
approaches to social movements available, it is generally weak on showing culture as a 
response to determinate experience (Thompson 1977a), and where it does so tends to 
collapse into a technological determinism (e.g. Melucci 1989). Secondly, for all its cultural 
sensitivity, it retains (as I will show in chapter three) a definition of its starting-point in terms 
of politics, as indicated, for example, by Szerszynski’s critique of Hetherington and 
Maffesoli, above. The point is not that there are “political” and “non-political” groups, to 
which different terms of analysis might be applicable, but rather that different groups do 
different kinds of politics - including conservative and reactionary politics - through their 
cultures; or, in Raschke’s (1988: 110 - 116) perspective, that we can think of social 
movements as tendentially oriented more towards power (and hence the state) or more 
towards culture. While these approaches question the domination of politics, then, they do 
not really escape from its gravitational pull. 
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General critique of “social movements” writing 
How do “social movements” theories fare in terms of the criteria identified at the start of 
this chapter? Firstly, the literature operates within field-specific theories of social 
movements: as unconventional political activity or as lifestyle. The RMT and POS 
literatures reify social movements as a particular form of organisation (neither the “flecks 
and carriers” of Waite’s (1997) research on downtimes nor the “collective effervescence” 
of Barker’s (1997) writing on uptimes) and thus comes to see them (very explicitly in a 
good writer like Tarrow (1998), for example) as an institutional category of the political 
system, mediating in a more or less linear and mechanical way the instrumentally rational 
action of individuals (Scott 1990).  
Essentially, then, this literature offers “the view from SMOs” in particular periods (wars of 
position) and societies (of the core) as universally valid, because rational in an absolute way. 
As against this, it has to be relocated socially, connecting lifeworlds, organisations and 
campaigns in a picture that does justice both to the structured nature of the former (Vester 
et al. 1993) and the transformative effects of the latter (Dix 1998); and temporally, in a way 
that connects it to moments of downtime and moments of uptime. Yet the definition of 
social movement as in effect a particular type of political institution makes it hard to think 
about periods when it isn’t (downtimes) and periods when it’s rewriting the rules (uptimes). 
Mutatis mutandis, similar problems face the identitarian literature, which does not resolve the 
problem of making connections between organisation and lifestyle by substituting the latter 
for the former10. 
Secondly, these problems arise because the literature is methodologically tied to the 
assumption of an essentially uniform rationality, whether the economic or political 
instrumentalism of RMT and POS or the identitarian logics of sociability and symbolism. 
There is then no real room within this monoculture for a research project thematising the 
potential differences in cultural orientation. This is not the case for the more sociological 
constructivist approaches, although they are more effective at identifying differences in 
orientation than at locating or explaining them. 
                                                
10 Nor does the identitarian literature escape from field-specific definitions of social movements: 
“The social space of movements has become a distinct area of the system and no longer coincides 
either with the traditional forms of organization of solidarity or with the conventional channels of 
political representation. The area of movements is now a ‘sector’ or ‘subsystem’ of the social arena.” 
(Melucci 1995b: 52) 
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Thirdly, the political use of these analyses is relatively limited. As Mayer’s (1995) critique 
suggested, RMT and POS are most useful for the elites of social movement organisations 
in relatively established movement settings and pluralist polities. They offer little guidance 
to ordinary activists or indeed to activists in other contexts. Identitarian and constructivist 
approaches could certainly be read as celebratory texts or, in the case of Szerszynski and 
Lichterman, for self-knowledge. But without a stronger sense of determination and conflict 
it is hard to see what else ordinary participants could actively do with them. Their 
anthropological mode is ultimately a conservative and unreflexive one (Rosaldo 1993), 
useful for romantic or ethical projection but equally for manipulation, colonisation and 
commercialisation. 
A way out of the Panopticon? 
The literature regularly calls for syntheses of “strategy” and “identity” approaches (so 
Cohen 1985, or Diani 1992a). At its extreme, this suggests a “synthesis” of the view that 
movement action is the mechanical pursuit of given interests and that which sees it as an 
act of pure self-expression. This seeming contradiction is possible if we take into account a 
deeper and shared collusion in the taking for granted of large-scale structures (political 
institutions) and everyday routines (a world of “identity conflicts”) which, in a broader 
conception, social movements (from above and below) produce, challenge and transform11.  
The opposition between the two approaches is of course a well-known one in modernity, 
between the grey, mechanical “system” of economic and political interest and the 
colourful, free-floating world of “culture”, which works itself out as a repetitive series of 
static contrasts: 
“This false dichotomy between ‘counter-society’ and ‘political protest’, between fight and 
battle, suggested a simplistic and mechanical conception of struggle, one which robbed 
every political movement of its cultural dimension and every cultural movement of its 
political significance.” (Mamdani et al. 1993: 111) 
Nor is this problem resolved by e.g. Johnston and Klandermans’ dogmatic insistence on 
keeping different sets of accounts (which incidentally undermines the arguments made in 
the rest of their own piece for discussion among scholars, theoretical coherence, and so 
on): 
                                                
11 This is not to deny, of course, that social movements also operate within institutional structures and deploy 
available symbols: it is to observe that they also challenge them, on occasion with some success. 
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“Let us not […] turn our backs on those areas where social psychology, structural analyses, 
and rational choice might prove to be more powerful in favour of a totalizing theory that – 
ultimately – can never be.” (1995: 24) 
The tradition of critical sociology, as that of materialist cultural studies, has sought precisely 
to go beyond this fragmentation in its understanding to see how both “politics” and 
“culture”, and the split between them, are socially produced and maintained. In so doing it 
takes as an intellectual challenge what (in Thompson’s (1977b) phrase) “revolutionaries” 
and “romantics” have taken as a practical challenge: to deconstruct in theory what others 
try to deconstruct in practice - and possibly to do so in cooperation and solidarity. For the 
purposes of my project, to do otherwise would also be to rule out of court the possibility 
of any wider understanding of the phenomena I am interested in. 
This is not to deny any value whatsoever to the theories just discussed, but certainly to 
relativise them as “ideal-typical” descriptions of how a certain logic (of institutional politics, 
of identity deployment) might work if all other things were equal - notably, in situations 
where human beings were constrained to act only as maximising homini oeconomici or only as 
“identities”. One of the tasks of a theory adequate to social movements and social change, 
however, is to dispense with the ahistorical and universalising theoretical base of these 
literatures which claims that the world actually and necessarily is just like this, in favour of a 
historical approach which asks when, why and how - notably, under which kinds of 
hegemony produced by which kinds of movement from above - might this bear some 
approximation to reality: 
“Viewed in terms of their effect on scientific thought, different perspectives and ideologies do not 
exist on the same plane. Some value-judgements permit a better understanding of reality than 
others. When it is a question of determining which of two conflicting sociologies has the 
greater scientific value, the first step is to ask which of them permits the understanding of the 
other as a social and human phenomenon, reveals its infrastructure, and clarifies, by means of an immanent 
critical principle, its inconsistencies and its limitations.” (Goldmann 1969: 50 – 52) 
At that point, we can reinstate both approaches as partial elements of a more historically-
minded and less closed approach, but without taking a given form of action nor a system 
of cultural expression for granted, and always allowing for the possibility not only that 
movements may be primarily “political” or primarily “cultural” in orientation, but also that 
the nature of this choice itself may mean something different at different times.  
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Critical approaches: “the social movement” 
There is one obvious justification for the exclusion of Marxist and feminist theories of 
social movements, which could polemically be phrased as the lack of such a theory. It is 
not, of course, that Marxist or feminist writing on social movements does not exist; but 
rather that to the best of my knowledge no systematic attempt has been made to formulate 
Marxist or feminist theories of social movements.  
The paradox is that Marxism has frequently identified itself as a theory from and for social 
movements: at once a theoretical reflection on the experience of the workers’ movement 
and a source of analyses for the use of that movement; feminism claims to stand in a 
comparable relationship to the women’s movement. How is it, then, that these “social 
movement theories” possess no “social movement theory” of their own, no separate and 
coherent body of theory which could define the nature of social movements, explain their 
existence, analyse their development and theorise their effects? 
The answer I want to suggest here is that Marxism and feminism do not have theories of 
social movements because they are theories of social movements; and, perhaps, nothing 
else. This points to a broader understanding of “social movement” than that discussed to 
date, in which the referent is not a specific institutional shape (unconventional, informal, 
political) but rather “social movement” as collective agency.  
Alternative usages 
As Joachim Raschke observes of Germany, the phrase “social movement” was first used in 
the 18th and 19th century: 
“The concept of movement became ‘a key concept of self-understanding in the “age of 
revolutions” ‘. Movement became used as a metaphor for societal change. The concept of 
movement also served for the deciphering of the inner connections of social development 
(‘laws of movement’) [….] 
Applied to a partial force within society and abstracting from its social-structural basis, 
early liberals from the 1830s spoke of themselves as movement in the sense of the only 
political direction which opposed the forces of inertia: of the ‘party of movement’ or the 
movement party [….] 
The ‘social movement’ is first discovered as the workers’ movement; the concepts of social 
movement and workers’ movement become accepted in the course of the 1840s. The 
concept is thus first applied to a movement with ‘social’ goals, i.e. to a collective with 
socialist answers to the ‘social question’. The chronologically preceding liberal, democratic 
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and national movement was not yet grasped with the concept of social movement; this only 
becomes possible with growing neutralisation of the content of the term social 
movement.” (1988: 23) 
An examination of its meanings in this context is worth undertaking as a way of freeing 
ourselves from the parochialism of contemporary usage and hence of contemporary 
conceptualisation. Above all, it was in the singular: “the social movement”, a usage related 
to “the social question” and to the shifting meaning of the word “social” during this period  
(Williams 1983), from the courtly one preserved in “socialite” to the Enlightenment notion 
of “socialisation” to the class-sharpened meaning of “socialism”. This movement, then, 
was thought of as having a coherent direction - “from below” in the sense of being 
directed against existing forms of domination and social control, exploitation and status. 
This singularity was made possible by a usage which did not deploy a fragmenting (and 
idealist) focus on issues and ideologies, but focussed - logically enough - on the direction of 
the movement. In the imaginary of the day, what Marx and Engels described as the 
“spectre” of Communism (1967) was identified with the proletariat of the new industrial 
towns - an unknown and threatening quantity, free from the tried and trusted structures of 
social control used in the countryside and in the world of urban “citizens” (property 
owners), and the most recognisably “new” element, appearing more or less 
contemporaneously with an age of strikes and revolutions.  
In practice popular movements of this period (until the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century) were “demotic” in Thompson’s (1963) sense, connecting peasants, artisans and 
skilled workers in an uneasy alliance with the unskilled and the urban and rural 
lumpenproletariat. But the crucial point is the perception on both sides - that of the 
intellectuals who sought to organise or lead this movement, and that of the established 
elites that sought to crush it - that while there were differences of interest (to be overcome, 
exploited or used to divide the movement) they existed within a common framework. 
Secondly, this framework spanned multiple “fields” of activity. It was identified in the 
periodic uprisings which on occasion shook European cities and villages, notably 
provoking changes of regime in France - and which far more frequently provoked 
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“preventative” deployments of force to avoid the perceived danger12; in the growth and 
transformation of workplace conflicts in industry and agrarian “unrest” in the countryside; 
in the development of a host of new ideologies: left republicanisms, socialisms, anarchisms, 
syndicalisms, and peasant nationalisms (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 1989); and in the 
effort, constantly undertaken and constantly interrupted, to build the institutions that 
enabled communication, continuity, mobilisation and survival. 
These included secret societies, radical newspapers, political clubs, friendly societies, 
educational circles, cooperatives, and (as the century wore to a close) a host of sporting, 
cultural, and social activities tied to class, ethnic or gender projects from below (Vester 
1975), as well as the political parties and mass organisations that offered new models, for 
movements from above (notably dominant nationalisms) as well as for movements from 
below13. So against the narrow reference of “social movements” writing we have to set a 
much broader conception, connecting large-scale revolutionary upheavals, what would now 
be termed social movements and what are now thought of as areas of cultural consumption 
and identity formation (Thompson 1993). 
Thirdly, the force of the concept derived from the perception that such movements were 
potentially revolutionary and a threat to the established social and political order. “The 
social movement” was not a movement within a neatly known and mapped society; it was a 
movement of that broader and threateningly other “society” which lay beyond the narrow 
“society” of class and kin within which nineteenth-century elites could feel at home. 
The likelihood of revolution may have been overestimated in the nineteenth century, but 
“the social movement” did routinely mobilise social groups whose non-participation in 
politics was fundamental to existing political systems (based on monarchy or restricted 
electorates); did raise demands that could not be satisfied within existing economic relations 
(from the “moral economy” of food prices via the recognition of unions to the 
socialisation of property (Flett 1995)); and did produce ideologies that challenged the nature 
of the state, the form of the economy and the shape of culture.  
                                                
12 Consider in Britain alone the emergency laws and anti-Jacobin hysteria of the 1790s, the militarisation of 
Ireland after 1798, and Peterloo, in a tradition of coercive panic reaching up to the deployment of troops 
during the 1926 General Strike and the extreme policing measures against miners and New Travellers in the 
1980s. 
13 It is frequently forgotten that behind the “repertoire of contention” (Tarrow 1998) there is also an 
organisational repertoire, developed from below for obvious reasons but subsequently adopted from above 
(or brought into power by successful movements, as in Ireland). 
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Not only this: governments were overthrown; “revolutionary moments” (Katsifiacas 1987) 
in the late 18th and mid-19th century brought about “Holy Alliances” in highly visible and 
militarised “movements from above”; and from America to Ireland to the Austrian empire 
the shape of the state-system itself was challenged, leading to the formation of new states 
where successful (USA, Italy) and the consolidation or transformation of old ones (Act of 
Union in Britain, Joint Monarchy in Austria, Swedish control of Norway). Contemporaries 
thus had good reason not to underestimate the potential for transformation contained 
within movements from below and the new kinds of movements from above. 
The project of critical sociology 
This perception, sharpened by personal experience and international and historical 
awareness, was very much present in the minds of the founders of critical sociology, Marx 
and Weber. For both, transformative social action was central to their understanding of the 
world; for both, it attained a new visibility and explicitness in modernity. Classes, status 
groups and parties appear in both of their writings: Weber’s economic classes and Marx’ 
class-in-itself, Weber’s status groups and Marx’ class consciousness and ideology, Weber’s 
parties (a less misleading translation for modern readers might be “factions”) and Marx’ 
parties or class-for-itself. (This parallel has been closely argued by Arrighi, Hopkins and 
Wallerstein 1989: 3 - 27.)  
The relationship of development, growing self-awareness and increasingly organised 
articulation in these concepts suggests an embryonic theory of social movement, though in 
keeping with what has already been said about the concept of “the social movement” there 
was no space for a field-specific theory separated from the rest of society (and crucially 
separating action from structure): 
“Let us not say that the social movement excludes a political movement. There is no 
political movement which is not at the same time social.” (Marx 1963 (1847): 244) 
This enabled Marx and Engels (1967), in the first section of the Communist manifesto, to 
make the dramatic claim that “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of 
class struggles”. This is developed into an analysis of the revolutionary role of the 
bourgeoisie in the destruction of feudalism and the creation of a new world order, 
transforming economics and technology, national and international politics, 
communications and cognition; following this, by the analysis of the development of the 
workers’ movement from the experience of misery to the struggle against oppression, aided 
by growing concentration and communication, into a complex learning process of 
Intellectual histories 
 64 
increasing political self-confidence and clarity towards another and final revolution: 
precisely a theory of social movements as a theory of society. 
As their earlier points of reference - the revolutions of 1789 and 1848 for Marx, the 
construction of the German state for Weber - receded and attention turned more to 
grasping the deep structures of the longue durée (of European capitalism, of Asia, of the 
Middle Ages) from within an increasingly organised capitalism, this holism turned into 
something of a weakness, as the intellectual system-building came to stress structures as the 
way in which action worked (see Thompson 1977a; Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 
1989), though neither was guilty of erecting the dualisms that have disfigured twentieth-
century social theory. 
Social movements and critical rationality 
This experience, nevertheless, equipped Marx and Weber to stress the non-linear nature of 
social action, a key feature of their critical sociologies and a sharp contrast to the 
mechanical positivisms of the Enlightenment writers and the contemporary discipline of 
rationalist economics against which they asserted themselves. This non-linearity comes out 
in Weber’s multiple rationalities, his stress on the unintened effects of action, and his lively 
awareness of how one thing turns into another in the Protestant Ethic (1958; echoed by 
Bloch’s (1961) monumental analysis of the transformations of feudal relationships). It 
appears in Marx’ stress on the dialectic, his ironic awareness of the ways in which ideology 
both connects actions and actor and renders the one opaque to the other, and his stress on 
the ways in which logics of action, world views and moral assessments are not absolute but 
socially and historically situated: 
“ ‘Scientific socialism’ was only used in opposition to utopian socialism, which wants to 
attach the people to new delusions, instead of limiting its science to the knowledge of the 
social movement made by the people itself […Erkenntnis der vom Volk selbst gemachten 
sozialen Bewegung]” (Marx 1974b: 337) 
This last stress, on a rationality which is always that of socially situated human actors rather 
than an absolute and “natural” rationality, as it had been for the eighteenth-century 
philosophes and economists, is what distinguishes critical sociology as an intellectual project. 
Furthermore, it is essential to Marx’ and Weber’s differing accounts of how and why 
scientific knowledge is possible - in the one case, by a connection to the social totality 
grounded in the actions of radical movements from below, in the other by the 
reconstruction of the logics of action of socially situated actors, thought of in terms 
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(hypothetical averages; actually discoverable meanings) as much or more suited to 
movements in the sense of the socially grounded actions of large numbers of people as to 
individuals. Though there are differences between the two, notably in the methodological 
primacy of totality (as Lukács (1971) argued for Marx) or “methodological individualism” 
(Weber 1984), the styles of thought that constructed the “sociological imagination” were 
deeply informed by the experience of a world of social movement, which both saw as 
produced by actors but mediated through structures in such a way as to produce non-linear 
relations between what we want and what we get. 
Contra postmodernists, this critical rationality does not posit any kind of transparency, 
rather its opposite: it starts from the failure of linear and “transparent” accounts to build the 
“Crusoe ideal” in the 18th century or the phalenstère in the 19th, and discovers the social 
world of class society precisely in the gap between the ideal of transparent action and the 
reality of situated rationality and social conflict. In this rather more complex assessment, 
the idea of modernity as it shaped nineteenth-century thinkers is one marked by the partial 
victory of the liberal movement from below and its transformation into a “modernising” 
movement from above, the repeated insurgency of the popular and ultimately socialist 
movement from below, and the rise of the “organising” nationalist movements. In this 
world, situated rationality, non-linear action and conflict were the norm, as the late 19th-
century socialist Morris saw it: 
“(M)en fight and lose the battle, and the thing that they fought for comes about in spite of 
their defeat, and when it comes turns out not to be what they meant, and other men have 
to fight for what they meant under another name” (1968 (1888): 53)  
- a piece of the “theoretical imaginary” that neatly connects intention, movement and 
opacity in what Mills (1970) would surely have had no difficulty as recognising as an 
authentic expression of the “sociological imagination”. In 19th-century Europe, movements 
oscillated between massive popular outbursts of revolution and celebration, and massive 
repression resulting in a life dominated by exile and conspiracy for leaders, by grass-roots 
conflicts and everyday survival for ordinary participants. To think “the social movement” 
was thus necessarily to think in terms coterminous with the social whole, in terms of 





Drawing on the tension between agency and structure in these accounts, but crucially 
under the influence of Stalinism, much later “Marxist” writing on social movements has 
taken the Marxist position to be that structure is everything and movement, if not nothing, 
then an effect of structure. If this mode of thought survives today, it is in non-Marxist 
writers such as Eder (1985, 1993), who is capable of writing the following:  
“This type of collective protest is based on an objective structure which is charcteristic of 
the petite bourgeoisie [.…] The petit-bourgeois consciousness corresponds to its objective 
position. It can be interpreted as a mixture of bourgeois universalism and plebeian 
particularism [.…] The habitus of the new middle class is determined by its situation in 
between the upper and the lower classes. The habitus of the new petit bourgeois is 
objectively determined by the defence of individualization, which is imposed upon him 
[sic] by the status system [.…] The dilemma of the petit-bourgeois habitus consists in his 
being unable to identify with either the objective position or the collective identity of the 
(upper) bourgeoisie; nor is he able to identify with the objective position or the collective 
identity of the proletariat.” (1993: 145 - 149) 
What for Eder is a “genuinely sociological” analysis is supposed to move “beyond social-
structural objectivism and cultural subjectivism” towards a theory of habitus as on the one 
hand objectively determined and on the other hand a “medium for collective action” (1993: 
144 - 5). Since, however, Eder never gets down to the level of analysis at which the 
constructionist element he seeks from the latter might be found, he remains in the 
situation, illustrated above, of ascribing politics to class in a way which was once 
orthodox14. 
Other and more formidable authors are caught by the same trap: the need to adopt the 
“eagle-eye view” on the last two centuries of social movements (for Arrighi, Hopkins and 
Wallerstein (1989)) or on an understanding of contemporary macro-economic and macro-
political processes (Magnusson 1996) makes it difficult not to present movements as the 
more or less mechanical products of objective circumstances. It should be said that the 
problem with this view is not so much that it is wrong - it is of course the case that 
movements respond to determinate circumstances and experiences (Thompson 1977a) - as 
that it is partial and misleading if one seeks to move from this “structuralist” account alone 
to any internal analysis of movement processes - something frequently noted in the 
                                                
14 Rudé’s (1980) analysis of the role of intellectuals in peasant movements is an example of what this mode of 
theorising was capable of at its best. 
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contrast between the grand historical narrative of the Communist Manifesto and the detailed 
and flexible account of the Eighteenth Brumaire (Marx and Engels 1967, Marx 1978). What is 
missing, as Giddens (1993b: 112 - 126 etc.) and others have remarked, is a sense of the 
interaction of structure and agency. 
Critical theory 
It is this kind of “structuralist” writing on social movements which forms the butt of most 
critiques of Marxist writing on social movements, such as those of Pakulski (1995) or Scott 
(1990). The problem, however, is not a new one. As Agger points out, already in the 1930s 
the Frankfurt school were attempting to 
“give Marxism a firmer grounding on a libidinal substratum, thus explaining how 
capitalism can continue long past Marx’s expectations of the date for its demise. Without 
this subjective turn, the Frankfurt thinkers believed, it would be impossible to explain early 
twentieth-century revolutionary failures in Europe and the rise of fascism and its 
metamorphosis into one-dimensional society.” (1992: 19) 
The most influential form of critical theory in social movement analysis is that of 
Habermas (1984, 1987a) who analyses structural contradictions in modernity between the 
instrumental rationalities of the “system” (capital and the state) and the communicative 
rationality immanent in the “lifeworld”. As Cohen (1985) points out, this can be read both 
in a right liberal perspective in which the lifeworld, as for earlier Frankfurt writers, has 
something of the “haven in a heartless world”, and in a left liberal perspective, comparable 
to that of Lash (1994a), in which the lifeworld is an achieved and not an ascribed one, 
redeeming some of the promise of modernity. 
This distinction reappears in Offe (1985) as a theorisation of the stakes of modern political 
struggle: 
“Whereas the neoconservative project seeks to restore the nonpolitical, noncontingent, and 
uncontestable foundations of civil society (such as property, the market, the work ethic, 
the family, and scientific truth) in order to safeguard a more restricted - and therefore more 
solid - sphere of state authority and no longer ‘overloaded’ political institutions, the politics 
of new social movements, by contrast, seeks to politicise the institutions of civil society 
[…] its institutions of work, production, distribution, family relations, relations with nature, 
its very standards of rationality and progress - must be politicized through practices that 
belong to an intermediate sphere between ‘private’ pursuits and concerns, on the one side, 
and institutional, state-sanctioned modes of politics, on the other.” (1985: 820) 
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Offe is by far the most historically specific and empirically-minded of these writers, not to 
say the most radical. But even in Offe, as a fortiori in Habermas or Cohen, the basic 
structure of the social order is accepted. Social movements engage in boundary conflicts 
around the colonisation of the lifeworld (Habermas) or the commodification of 
decommodified spheres (Offe), but they are not allowed to place this general order of 
society in question: 
“One dimension of the response is indeed the defensive fundamentalist refusal of 
reification in family, publics, mass culture, etc. The other dimension is the offensive and 
structurally reformist, self-limiting identity articulated on the basis of genuinely modern (in normative sense) 
potential of contemporary institutions.” (Cohen 1985: 715; my emphasis) 
As we shall see in chapter four, it is not that all movement participants necessarily agree 
that this is what they are up to; it is rather that Cohen (with Habermas and Offe) thinks 
that this is what is both rational and right for them to get up to. This kind of analysis reifies 
as necessary features of the world some of the power relations which movements not only 
challenge, but on occasion also change. This may do at times as an analysis of a particular 
historical situation in which movements are not capable of thinking or doing more; as an 
analysis of movements in general it returns us to a strong structuralism in which 
movements are never able to do more than operate within the essentially given structures of a 
particular social order.  
Materialist cultural studies 
If up to the last quarter of the nineteenth century agency was either everything or nothing, 
by the 1920s this had changed decisively (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 1989). 
Movements from below had made important gains, resulting among other things in both 
the legal right and the capacity to maintain large-scale organisations and networks from the 
1880s to the 1920s, and again from the 1960s on, with the exception of a period of savage 
repression and enforced demobilisation in the highpoint of organisation from above: 
fascism in continental Europe, anti-communism in the United States, nationalist autarky in 
Ireland. For their part, movements from above had learned from their opponents - or were 
themselves, like many a liberal or nationalist order and the odd social-democratic 
government, movements from below which had achieved power. Notably, the twin tools 
of nationalist mobilisation and organisation from above had provided them with vast 
reserves of popular support which the monarchies of the 19th century had only rarely been 
able to deploy outside the local networks of the hegemony of landlords, priests and 
notables (Hobsbawm 1995). 
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The result was a relatively stable character to movement organisations, which together with 
the decisive domination of continental movements from below by the working-class and 
the Left made “the workers’ movement” a more tightly defined animal in the thinking of 
engaged intellectuals of the period. This visibility and apparent specificity also led, however, 
to a crisis around the earlier problematic of rationality. Firstly, increasingly formal and 
centralised organisation – and new divisions – highlighted the distinction between the 
movement and the various organisations that were struggling to lead it: which meant 
among other things increasingly public debate of strategy and tactics (Thompson 1997). As 
well as this, the repeated failure of the movement, despite (or because of?) its 
organisational strength, to storm in the 20th century the bastions it had failed to conquer in 
the 19th, at least within the European core, underlined once again the non-linear nature of 
movement conflict - particularly since movements elsewhere, under apparently far less 
propitious conditions, were taking power. 
Under these circumstances, what I will call “materialist cultural studies” was born, which, 
like the Frankfurt School, pointed to the failure of linear (politically reductionist and 
instrumental-rationalist) accounts of this movement, exemplified in institutional histories of 
parties and unions (and in positivist sociology, even of the Marxist kind, as witness 
Gramsci’s critique of Bukharin (1975: 1401 -1403 etc.)) One way of thinking about this 
intellectual project is to see it as referring to “the movement” as a whole - that is, the total 
lifeworld of the working class and the subordinate peasantry - as against the narrowly 
defined “movement organisations” - that is, parties and unions. But it is also an appeal to 
the “dialectic” or non-linear, sought variously in Hegel (for Gramsci (1975)), Weber (for 
Lukács (1971)) or the Romantics (for Thompson (1977b) and Williams (1958)), as against 
positivist or mechanical readings of the “scientific” project; and (within the hardened 
institutional spheres of organised capitalism) to challenge the separation of “culture” and 
“politics”. 
The guiding thread which I think runs through these theories is a commitment to a view of 
history as nothing other than the product of human activity; and, more specifically, as the 
product of collective human action, articulated in conflicts which encompass the totality of 
society and in turn define that totality; conflicts which are not only grounded ultimately in 
the material activity of human beings but are at the same time conflicts over how that 
activity is to develop. In other words, this project is a theory of social movements which 
elevates movements to the central, perhaps the only, feature of the historical process and 




This is the project of Gramsci and Lukács, notably in the struggle to understand the failure 
(in Italy, in Vienna, in Budapest, but above all in Germany (Mitchell 1970)) of the socialist 
and communist movement against the right-wing reaction which was starting to identify 
itself as “fascist”, and to uphold some kind of claim to valid knowledge). It is also, in 
different ways, that of Thompson and Williams, trying to see the “long revolution” in the 
light of the disappointment of “actually-existing” Communism or Labour; of Touraine 
(1981) and the CCCS in its Resistance through Rituals phase (Hall and Jefferson 1991) in the 
aftermath of 1968; and to an extent of the French historians, both those of the longue durée 
(Bloch 1961, Braudel 1974) and those of mentalités (Rudé 1980, Ladurie 1984). The phrase 
Bloch (1946) used for the outcome of a different kind of struggle - L’étrange défaite - sums 
up the problematic: the linear account had been “falsified”, the mechanical organisation 
defeated. How then to understand the movement? I will return to the answers this 
perspective offers in chapter three. For the moment, I want to highlight three features of 
this project, in this form as “materialist cultural studies”. 
Summarising the analysis 
Firstly, it is concerned to connect everyday challenges to social routines and articulated 
opposition to the structures of the social totality (I take this useful distinction from 
Lichterman 1996). Secondly, it is concerned with the operation both of movements from 
below (those struggling against domination and exploitation) and movements from above 
(those struggling to impose or maintain domination and exploitation), whether or not it uses 
this language. Hence it sees both counter-hegemony and hegemony as social products, 
which implies a refusal to naturalise or take for granted political institutions, economic 
positions or cultural stakes - as well as a sense of this conflict as present in all social 
activity, rather than of specialised fields. Thirdly, it holds to a non-linear account of the 
possibility of social transformation (as a different outcome of the processes and structures 
that produce social stability), in which “human beings make their own history, but not just 
as they please”, in other words in which action is non-linear because situated socially, not 
taking place ex nihilo or in a vacuum. Unlike the “hermetically sealed” utilitarian world or 
the all-pervading phlogiston of identities, the imaginary world of materialist cultural studies 
is one of situated action, guided by metaphors of everyday work of a range of kinds, from 
that of the Romantic artist (Marx 1974a), via the hill-farmer (Williams 1989b) to the 
“hidden knowledge” of everyday networks of social solidarity (Wainwright 1994). 
This approach has been developed along four lines. Firstly, for Lukács (1971 (1922)), 
followed in this by Touraine (1981) and to a large extent by Katsiaficas (1987), there is an 
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analysis of movement as self-expression, in which an essentially structurally given “self” is 
developed to its highest possible articulation and towards a new social totality. As I will 
argue in chapter three, this lacks the sense of practical engagement with the otherness of 
the natural world and human relations, and hence the sense of movement as self-education, 
characteristic of the second line of development, that of Gramsci (1975 (1929 - 35)) and 
Williams (1965 etc.) Thirdly, Thompson (1963) and early Birmingham cultural studies (Hall 
and Jefferson 1991) stressed, against the early Williams’ image of a “whole way of life”, that 
of a “whole way of struggle” (cf. Hall 1989: 61), in other words of the crucial importance 
of conflict, power relations and interaction between movements from above and below in 
the formation of movements from below. 
Finally, from McRobbie (1991 (1975)) on, feminists within this tradition have criticised the 
masculine partiality of this approach. In particular, “unified-systems” socialist feminists 
such as Jaggar (1983) have stressed the importance of theorising the total global division of 
labour, and not simply that of public labour in understanding class-gender location, while 
Wainwright (1994) has argued for the importance of the “hidden knowledge” developed 
within women’s unacknowledged work for the formation of social movements. A full 
theorisation of what this perspective might mean for an understanding of agency remains 
at the level of aspiration, though I hope in the next chapter to show what the building 
blocks of such a theory might be. 
It may be useful at this point to note the major differences between this understanding and 
that developed within the “social movements” literature. Firstly, social movements are not 
seen as unusual phenomena in need of particular explanation, occasional blips on the 
otherwise passive or institutionalised social landscape. Rather, passivity and 
institutionalisation just as much as activity and creativity are part and parcel of a dynamic 
tension actively produced by opposing social forces. Social movements, then, are the way in which 
human practices are socially articulated. 
Secondly, social movements include not only the actions of the dominated and epxloited, 
but also the actions of those who dominate and exploit – notably, the practices of 
domination and exploitation themselves. Changing relations of ownership and changing 
state forms, just as much as political and cultural organisation from below, are forms of 
collective practice geared to maintaining or transforming social relations. Social movements, 
then, come not only “from below” but also “from above” – and the presence of the latter is rather more 
systematic than the former. 
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Thirdly, social movements are not identified with any one kind of social phenomenon: they 
are neither specific features of a political subsystem, nor particlar forms of unconventional 
organisation. Or rather, they may at times be expressed in these ways, but they can equally 
be found in the normal movements of capital, the everyday organisation of needs and 
desires, or the institutionalised relationships of corporatism. From the point of view of the 
movement, all of these are important “moments” of a given history15. Social movements, then, 
are not static forms, but change in both short and long historical movements in interaction with their 
opponents. 
Critique 
How does this line of thinking stand up to the criteria used in this chapter? Firstly, its 
implicit identification of movement with social praxis through concepts of class-gender 
culture and agency certainly enables an engagement with a wide range of social phenomena 
and escapes the “field-specificity” of the “social movements” literature. Yet it does not, as 
it stands, offer a more concrete theorisation of how we can connect these different 
phenomena; or, more exactly, a wide range of versions exist. In chapter three I will use an 
essentially Gramscian theorisation to offer a more complex account. 
Secondly, it is clear about the differences in experience, culture and aims between different 
situated locations, though as I will argue in chapter four more work needs to be done to 
move from this theoretical understanding to an effective methodology for the research of 
social movements. 
Finally, while it is without doubt a theory from and for movements, its political 
implications are as various as its theorisations of movement organisation. In terms of my 
arguments about historical concepts, however, this is no bad thing: the point of an effective 
theory of movements is to enable activists firstly to express their existing perspectives and 
                                                
15 This perspective also historicises movement activity over the longer term, as against analyses of supposed 
“cycles” of movement activity (Brand 1982) or inherent “logics”, for example of institutionalisation (Scott 




orientations, secondly to find some form of common language, and thirdly to do 
something with it. In chapter three I will attempt to show how some of the presuppositions 
of this theoretical perspective can be rendered explicit without becoming ahistorical. 
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Chapter three: understanding social movements 
Introduction 
Within affirmative theories such as those criticised in the previous chapter, the referent of 
“social movement” or its equivalents is taken as a more or less unusual form of action 
against the essentially passive background of a given social order: unconventional action 
within a more stable or more institutionalised political order, particular status claims made 
against the taken-for-granted background of the economic order; in short, agency in the 
foreground and structure in the background. If partial theories may at times fragment the 
world for reasons of analysis and presentation rather than because of a theoretical 
commitment to dualism, nevertheless they do not make the effort to develop their analysis 
to the point where it could contain both social movement organisations and their state 
opponents within a single explanatory framework, or both symbolic claims and the class, 
gender and ethnic locations they proceed from within a single conception. Where the need 
is felt to explain the latter terms in each of these dichotomies, resources for this project are 
found elsewhere, without affecting the analysis of the former terms. This strategy is not so 
much wrong as it is limited and limiting: from a scientific perspective, it curtails the project 
of understanding within a self-restrictive framework; from an interpretive perspective, it 
fails to make a full connection between the local meaning of action and the nature of that 
“local”; from a critical point of view, it renders actors permanently dependent on mystified 
structures in their attempts to change the world, in that the two are seen as belonging to 
different universes. 
The alternative view, then, sees the social world as the product of conflict between social 
movements from above and below. “Social movement” then not only covers a wide range 
of action “from below”, as we shall see, but also the other side of the coin - the action 
“from above” of state and economic elites in particular, with its (usually more powerful and 
more successful) intervention into the social world: 
“Holders of economic or political power must be analyzed as a social movement instead of 
being identified with central cultural values and social norms. Referring to an industrial 
society, I would consider management a social movement exactly in the same way as labor, 
and Ford as a movement leader or an ideologist in the same way as Gompers or Reuther.” 
(Touraine 1985: 774 - 775) 
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This is a thoroughly historical approach, in that it offers an explanation, within the terms of 
the theory, for the production and transformation of “social order” and “social structure” 
through this conflict, and (since these then provide the starting-point for further 
movement activity) the changing nature of movements themselves. In this chapter, I 
attempt to offer a defensible articulation of this perspective within the language of social 
movements; I argue that it fulfils the criteria advanced in chapter one for an adequate 
theory of counter culture; and I proceed to attempt to locate the counter culture within this 
theoretical perspective. 
For my reading of this alternative tradition, I am indebted (beyond the original sources 
cited here) in particular to the American school of research on Western Marxism (Jacoby 
1981, Jay 1984, Agger 1992) as well as to Williams’ (esp. 1979, 1980, 1981) own rereading 
of earlier Western Marxists. My reading of Gramsci in particular draws on my own political 
experience and purposes (as Liguori’s (1996) overview of Gramscian studies shows, this 
has been the norm rather than the exception; see also Hobsbawm 1982). The suggestion 
that socialist feminism can be considered a central contribution to this tradition is that of 
Gottlieb (1989). 
Theorising from and for movements 
Theorising agency 
One of the most important early statements of the perspective I am advocating here is 
developed in Gramsci’s analysis of the nature of “intellectual” activity, which I will draw on 
throughout this chapter: 
“There is no human activity from which every intellectual intervention can be excluded; 
homo faber can not be separated from homo sapiens. Every man [sic: ogni uomo], finally, 
outside his own profession, performs some intellectual activity; is, that is to say, a 
“philosopher”, an artist, a man of taste, participates in a conception of the world, has a 
conscious line of moral conduct, thus contributes to maintain or to modify a conception of 
the world, that is to say to bring about new ways of thinking.” (1975 (1932): 1550 - 51) 
This usage is consistently applied, in these texts which date from Gramsci’s last mature 
writings, in the context of “full-time intellectuals” (cf. Gramsci 1975 (1932): 1516: “All men 
[sic] are intellectuals, one could thus say; but not all men have the societal function of 
intellectuals….”): 
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“By intellectuals must be understood not only those strata commonly indicated with this 
title, but in general the whole social stratum which exercises organisational functions in the 
broad sense, both in the field of production, in the field of culture, and in the political - 
administrative…” (1975 (1934-5): 2041) 
The concept of intellectual activity thus includes not only “theoretical”, but also “directive” 
activity. These reflections combine two things: on the one hand, an analysis of the 
organisation and articulation of human activity which extends from everyday work and 
leisure to formal theoretical and political activity; on the other hand, a grounding of this 
analysis in a philosophical anthropology of human activity as reflective and organised. 
Williams’ theorisation of the labour process adds to this a stress on the importance of 
learning and communication, restoring Marx’ emphasis on the self-creation of human 
beings through this development: 
“The emphasis that matters is that there are, essentially, no ‘ordinary’ activities, if by 
‘ordinary’ we mean the absence of creative interpretation and effort. Art is ratified, in the 
end, by the fact of creativity in all our living. Everything we see and do, the whole structure 
of our relationships and institutions, depends, finally, on an effort of learning, description 
and communication. We create our human world as we have thought of art being created.” 
(1965: 53 - 54) 
Wainwright, finally, historicises this process of self-discovery within a discussion of 
movement development, writing of the second-wave women’s movement: 
[O]ut of the consciousness-raising process developed a recognition of knowledge which is 
implicit in previously unrecognized or under-valued skills. From this arose, for example, an 
extended analysis of housework and child rearing as skilled and socially valuable work 
which needs to be treated as part of the public sphere. A recognition of tacit knowledge 
was also the basis of a major criticism of the health and maternity services - and eventually 
the whole range of public services - for treating its patients as ignorant and passive. This 
generated initiatives for greater responsiveness to women’s own knowledge, curiosity and 
desire to have some control over their bodies; that is, for a notion of expertise involving 
greater interaction between professionals and ‘lay’ patients, users and clients.” (1994: 79) 
This neatly links everyday skills, specific campaigns and general movements within a 
definition of work and skill which is not in theory or in practice limited to paid work: what 
movements from below do is to develop and articulate everyday activity in a challenge to 
existing power structures. 
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Agency and structure 
What is shared in these perspectives is that humans are seen in active and relational terms: 
that is, what characterises our “species-being”, in the young Marx’s terms, is that we create 
the world we live in, together. This position is thus a rejection of the opposition between 
“the individual” as pre-existing essence and “society” as reified structures in favour of a 
view of the world as active rather than static, and interactive or dialogical rather than 
monadic or mechanical: 
“Above all we must avoid postulating ‘society’ again as an abstraction vis-à-vis the 
individual. The individual is the social being. Their manifestations of life - even if these may 
not appear in the direct form of communal manifestations of life carried out in association 
with others - are therefore an expression and confirmation of social life. Human individual 
and species-life are not different” (Marx 1977a (1844): 9316). 
Left to itself, this position could degenerate into a straightforward voluntarism or 
expressivism, and of course this risk of “bending the stick too far in the opposite direction” 
is present in the “Prometheanism” of the Marx of 1844, Gramsci’s admiration for Sorel, or 
Lukács’ Hegelianism, though all of these authors are aware of the danger and overcome it 
even in their most “expressivist” formulations: 
“The way in which human beings produce their means of subsistence depends in the first 
place on the nature of the existing means which they have to reproduce. This mode of 
production should not be regarded simply as the reproduction of the physical existence of 
individuals. It is already a definite form of activity of those individuals, a definite way of 
expressing their life, a definite mode of life. As individuals express their life, so they are. What 
they are, therefore, coincides with their production, with what they produce and with how 
they produce it. What individuals are, therefore, depends on the material conditions of 
their production.” (Marx 1963 (1845-6): 69 - 7017) 
A situated engagement with otherness 
The risk that is avoided here - exemplified in Laclau and Mouffe (1985) - is that of taking 
the potentially liberatory realisation that the social world, which confronts us as alien, is 
ultimately the product of our own activity, and deducing from this that it is entirely social in 
                                                
16 I have replaced the translators’ gratuitous “his” and “Man’s” with the original, neutral formulations sein, 
referring to das Individuum, and des Menschen (Marx n.d.: 75). 
17 Again I have amended “men” to “human beings” (die Menschen): Marx n.d.: 122 - 123. 
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character. If this were so, however, there would be no necessary reason why it should take 
any particular form at any particular time; those relations of power and exploitation which 
alienate our own activity from ourselves could have no firmer grounding than anything else, 
and come to appear as odd patterns in local cultures or as the effects of discourse18.  
However, the myth of a purely social totality - and the characteristic belief of literary 
intellectuals that this totality is thoroughly available, even “transparent” in that it consists of 
“visible” language - is at best a phenomenology (bracketing the “what else?” question as 
unanswerable), at worst a solipsism (insisting that the world is created only by processes 
that are immediately available to me in my own practice, if I am a writer and not - say - an 
activist or a farmer facing the unpredictable response of an apparently silent “other” 
society or nature). If this were true, of course, it would be hard to explain Durkheim’s 
(1973: 4 - 5) observation that the social world confronts us as an objective, pre-existing, 
coercive “thing” except by a theory of mass delusion or as itself purely a language game: 
the otherness and unexpectedness of the social world, to say nothing of experiences of 
alienation, power, learning, failure to communicate or failure to feel we understand, are also 
“bracketed out”19. 
It is this very otherness which is stressed by our authors. We are producers of practical 
knowledge in that we generate (and learn and pass on) a practical understanding of how to 
work with the otherness of the world, whether natural or social - for example, learning 
effective ways of working with the material world, learning the practical realities of conflict 
                                                
18 One consistent conclusion to this analysis is to say that there is no valid “external” reason to object to this 
state of affairs; that (for example) the language game of the gulag is incommensurable with the language game 
of women’s liberation, and that is all there is to it. Another, peculiarly Enlightenment-derived, conclusion is 
the apparent belief that by pointing out sufficiently frequently the constructed nature of the social world 
people will sooner or later come to recognise this fact (and why not, if there is nothing external to discourse 
blocking that recognition and no sharp barriers between worlds?) Postmodernism and situationism, then, are 
both forms of the myth of a “purely social” totality, with contemplative or activist responses appropriate to 
the social situations of their practitioners. 
19 GA Cohen points out that this is the burden of Marx’ critique of Feuerbach (1978: 126, 339 - 340) and 
more generally a feature of his theory of science: “Things do not seem different to a worker who knows 
Marxism. He [sic] knows they are different from what they continue to seem to be. A man who can explain 
mirages does not cease to see them.” (1978: 331) Similarly, I can be fully aware that my taste, normative 
orientations and dialect are social products: this in itself does not guarantee that I can eat spiders without 
being sick, happily participate in torture or convince a native of Newcastle that I was born and bred in the 
area. 
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and cooperation in the work process, learning how to organise effectively, learning through 
domestic labour: 
“The average mass human being acts practically, but does not have a clear theoretical 
consciousnes of this activity, which is however a knowledge of the world, in that it 
transforms it. In fact, their theoretical consciousness can be historically in contrast with 
their practical activity. It can almost be said that they have two theoretical consciousnesses 
(or one contradictory consciousness): one implicit in all their activity and which truly unites 
them with all their collaborators in the practical transformation of reality; and one which is 
superficially explicit or verbal, which they have inherited from the past and have accepted 
without criticism.” (Gramsci 1991: 13) 
To this “tacit knowledge” (Wainwright 1994), then, is contrasted the official or hegemonic 
knowledge from above, derived from and linked to a different set of structural relations - 
drawing on the tacit knowledge of how to rule and how to exploit, how to make 
concessions to opponents, build alliances with other elites, and subsume the work and 
meanings of ordinary people’s lives into the accumulation of capital and power. As 
Habermas (1987a) rightly observes, this relationship is a product of the colonisation of 
communicative rationality by instrumental rationalities tied to the institutions of 
domination and exploitation. There is more going on beneath the surface than meets the 
eye, in other words; and of course a characteristic of much colonial writing is precisely the 
gap between what is said and what is done, whether by the Good Soldier Schweik (Hasek 
1963) or the hero of the Third Policeman (O’Brien 1993) - communication and coercion 
do not fit well together. 
What are power and exploitation, though? If they are neither language games nor innate 
“drives”, it makes most sense to see them as forms of conflict over the intention, process 
and product of human action. In other words, we need a theory of social divisions, which in 
this tradition is grounded in the contention that certain ways of organising human activity, 
located within a history of changing engagement with the world, entail a global division of 
labour which rests on exploitation made possible by domination. “Modes of production”, 
then, are not things but, literally, ways of doing things - forms of skilled human activity. 
Theorising species-being 
Why should this activity change and develop, and why should it do so in patterned ways? 
The answer proposed by the theorists I am discussing is essentially that human activity 
does not take place in a vacuum, as purely self-referential, but is rather an active, creative - 
and hence developing - engagement with a determinate otherness (human and non-
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human), in the course of which “practical dialogue” both “moments” are changed. To 
grasp the nature of this otherness, one needs to fill in a theory of human “species-being”20. 
For various reasons, elucidated by Geras (1983) and Jaggar (1983), western Marxist and 
socialist feminist writers have been wary of such a theory, though this has meant not so 
much a bypassing of the problem as a reliance on unspoken assumptions about (for 
example) the nature of industry, the concept of work, the sources of human motivation, 
the uniqueness of the human species, and so on. As Jay observes (e.g. 1984: 114 - 118), one 
of the greatest weaknesses in the western Marxist tradition - with the partial exception of 
Williams (e.g. 1980) and the anarchist Bookchin (e.g. 1994) - is in its theorisation of nature, 
which may explain some of its weakness in the face of postmodernism21. Some of the most 
important advances of recent decades have been in the socialist feminist theorisation of 
domestic labour, caring labour, emotional labour etc. as central areas of labour (cf. e.g. 
Lynch and McLaughlin 1995), and in the eco-socialist rethinking of the relationship of 
humans to nature (Red-Green Study Group 1995). 
For my purposes, it is enough to sketch in the basic presuppositions of the theory I am 
outlining. One, drawing on Carrithers (1992), is that a consistent theory of human species-
being as social and centred around interaction and learning accounts for the human for 
creative activity in terms of an evolutionary specialisation in skill rather than instinct 
(developed, as Slocum (1975) and other feminist anthropologists have argued, at least as 
much through gathering and caring as through hunting) and the development of language 
and unequalled emotional repertoires as part of this development of a species dedicated to 
socially developed practical skill. This argument is closely related to that made by Williams 
(1965) and to Collier’s (1994) reading of Bhaskar on emergent systems, which parallels 
Bookchin’s (1986, 1994) analysis. 
Secondly, this skilled activity is a practical engagement with otherness - with the natural 
world, with infants, with our own mind and body, with other adults. Only in terms of this 
not-yet-fully-known otherness does the concept of skill make sense. This “otherness” is 
not necessarily, as is sometimes thought, a category of what Williams (1985) called the 
                                                
20 Such a theory is incidentally involved in the assumption that human beings are entirely social - or linguistic 
- just as much as in any other attempt at understanding and explaining our experience which is taken beyond 
the methodological. 
21 For Jacoby (1981: 38 - 9), the central point was a (justified) rejection of Engels’ “dialectic of nature”; but 
this does not resolve the problem of what to put in its place. 
Understanding social movements 
 81 
“dominative mode” in which the “other” is alienated so that it can be dominated and thus 
become exploitable. This is so in contexts where the “self” is reified and seen as insulated 
from the “other” within the terms of an instrumental logic. In non-exploitative contexts, 
however, skill can be seen as a product of dialogue (as implicitly in Kleining 1982) where 
“self-realisation” is precisely the recognition that the highest potential of the self is to be 
found in an emancipatory relationship with the other. 
Thirdly, and crucially, this skilled activity is situated. It is situated in a particular history of 
the material production of human life - food, children, language and all the rest of it - and 
hence also in a particular “division of labour”, between class positions, but also between 
public and private labour and between different areas of the world-economy. In other 
words, where we pick up, change and develop our skilled work in particular locations those 
locations are themselves the product of a wider totality, the total “mode of production”, or 
the global division of labour which embodies a particular “how-to-do-it” which is no one 
individual’s property (the maintenance and reproduction of world financial markets, the 
different practices of child-rearing, the sedimentation of skill in microchips and 
programming languages, the distribution of fresh food) and is entirely capable of being a 
dead-end (global warming, currency crisis, “limits to growth” and the instability of the 
“new world order”); a related argument is developed in Young (n.d.) 
Particular human action, then, is always situated in relation to the active totality of human 
action (“mode of production”) but also in relation to other particular situations within that 
totality. This “double dialectic”, in this perspective, is central to understanding social 
movements, and to distinguishing between movements “from above” and those “from 
below”. Firstly, we engage through labour with otherness in a reciprocally transformative 
process; secondly, this engagement involves us in - and is itself usually a response to - a 
particular situation in relation to other people, themselves part of the “otherness” we have 
to engage with - as colleagues, bosses, subordinates, but also as partners, children, parents. 
Since this latter set of relationships - relationships of production, in sensu lato - are deeply 
exploitative in our kinds of society and bound up with power relations, conflict between 
the two impulses (“forces of production” and “relations of production”) is normal, both 
within ourselves and within society. 
Active theorisations of class 
A brief discussion of one kind of theory of “class” may show why this understanding is 
relevant to social movements. A frequent objection to theories which attempt to place the 
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active production of the social world at the centre of an explanation of that world is to 
represent Marxist analyses of social movements as claiming that this implies that social 
movement X is made up essentially, if not only, of class Y and nearly all of class Y at that 
(e.g. Scott 1990: 52 - 53). Since this is empirically rarely, if ever, the case (consider in 
particular the roles of intellectuals and organisers (Bagguley 1992), but also e.g. of stewards 
and rioters; and the existence of complex countermovements) it is held that the theory has 
been demolished. 
But this argument assumes a non-Marxist theorisation of class as a property of individuals 
leading automatically to mechanical responses (cf. Pakulski 1995: 57 - 58). What Marxist 
writers in this tradition have stressed since the introduction to Thompson’s Making of the 
English working class (1963: 9-14; cf. Sharpe et al. 1999) is that the central term is not “class”, 
as an isolated, pre-existing property of individuals, but class struggle, the conflictual 
relationships involved in particular ways of organising the labour process22. Social 
movements, in other words, are to be found at the centre of social life, starting not from 
public mobilisations but from everyday situations of work, exploitation and resistance. 
What is being said, then, is not that social movements are made up only and entirely of 
individual “class positions”, but that they are classed, in that movement activity develops out 
of conflictual class relations and is expressed in ways that operate through this. 
Secondly, as Thompson also stressed, classes make themselves as active agents; they are 
not simply passive products of other classes or reified systems. “Class” thus necessarily 
involves class consciousness. This returns us to Marx’s discussion in the 18th Brumaire (1963: 
196) of the extent to which French peasants do or do not form a class, which distinguishes 
between the given situation of “class in itself” and the active production of “class for 
itself”. These are often contrasted synchronously, as “objective and subjective”, but a 
better way of illuminating them would be to juxtapose them to Marx’s analysis of the 
development and self-production of the bourgeoisie and working class in the Communist 
Manifesto. Here the bourgeoisie, products of feudal class relations, create a new world at the 
same time as they create themselves. In doing so, they “create their own gravediggers” 
(Marx n.d.: 223), by placing people in the new situation of proletarians. The response of the 
latter is a developing and learning one, creating themselves as a class in the terms of the 
                                                
22 The word “struggle” also conveys something of the sense that these are difficult processes to live through, 
ones which we do not necessarily always see clearly while we are doing them, and ones which constantly 
impel us to change our ways of doing them - classically non-linear, in fact. 
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Brumaire while at the same time and through this process becoming aware of themselves as 
a class. 
An important sense of the word “class” in Marxism, then, is precisely this active, learning, 
self-developing sense in which (to return to more familiar language) movements (classes 
for themselves) constitute themselves through situated conflict (class struggle). Since 
people can respond to situations differently, however, and since the process is one of 
learning and developing skill, different responses are possible (Thompson’s Luddites, 
followers of Joanna Southcott, and Methodists; Marx’s nostalgic guild workers, utopian 
socialists etc.) These remain classed in the sense that they remain active responses to 
determinate situations of class conflict - poverty, desperation, oppression, etc. - and (as 
Thompson showed in his discussion of Blake’s religious milieu (1994) and Hill (1975) 
showed in his discussion of the English Revolution) the most surprising issues take on 
classed implications, as people “do” class conflict through discussion of appropriate 
models of church organisation, for example23.  
Movements, then, are not “explained by” classes, in a relationship of agency to structure; 
rather, in western Marxist formulations “class” expresses precisely the sense of a 
movement grounded in situated conflicts and subject to development – or decline. 
Rethinking the scope of class 
An important modification to this position, developed in particular by socialist feminists, is 
to argue that class defined in terms of paid employment is not the only form of inequality. I 
share this point of view, with the qualification that not all forms of inequality are equally 
important to the explanation of social change (as opposed to, say, in moral terms). Some chains, 
in other words, are more radical than others, not only in terms of hoped-for future 
relevance but most centrally in understanding the roots of the existing totality. 
The movement from above known as capitalism, which is almost certainly the most 
effective social movement in the present-day world, did not only create a relationship of 
exploitation between capitalist and worker, along with the necessary forms of domination 
                                                
23 This process of self-development, incidentally, is not teleological in any useful sense, though as I argue in 
chapter seven it is certainly possible to express situated practical needs and logics cognitively and ask after the 
adequacy of the skilled responses to them, just as we can observe (for example) that the Iron Age bog road at 
Corlea (Raftery 1994: 98 - 111) was a rather bad road in the straightforward sense that it sank beneath the 
surface within ten years of being built. But to observe that more and less skilled responses are possible is not 
to say that the most skilled response will prevail. 
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to enable that. It also created a relationship of exploitation between the “centre” (a social, 
not a physical concept) where these “pure” capitalist relations obtained and a “periphery” 
which provided raw materials and labour power as well as a market for this process 
(Wallerstein 1987); and it created an instrumental and exploitative relationship between 
paid work in the public sphere, governed by commodity relations, and domestic labour in 
the private sphere, governed by ideologies of love, caring and obligation (Jaggar 1983). The 
exploitative relationships peculiar to capitalism, then, are not restricted to those governed 
by the labour contract, and an effective theory of class needs to take this into account24.  
I would argue, then, that at the root of movements “from below” and “from above” are 
local rationalities, skilled and developing responses to the active, dialogical and conflictual 
production and transformation of the social world (whether making cars, bringing up 
children, changing dialects or producing music) which are classed, gendered and ethnic in 
the sense that these categories are dimensions of the global division of labour. Other issues 
(class background, gendered socialisation, ethnic identities etc.) are part of these more or 
less skilled responses and as such feed back into the generation of new situations, but in 
more contingent ways. 
Processual categories for social movement analysis 
This view of movements as in effect the development of skilled activity through processes 
grounded in situated conflicts and practical responses to those conflicts suggests some 
rather different categories for understanding movements (cf. Banks 1972 on social 
movements as “social technologies”, Eyerman and Jamison 1991 on the “cognitive praxis” 
of social movements). The skilled response to a situation can neither be usefully imagined 
as mechanical or as unconstrained. More adequate categories would highlight the extent to 
which this process is creative or stuck, is developing or being undermined25. 
                                                
24 Marx himself was ambiguous on these latter two areas, on the one hand recognising the new relations 
between “sexes” and “nations” created by the formation of capitalism but on the other hand expecting the 
commodity relation and wage-labour to become all-embracing. As Braudel (1974) and the world-systems 
school (Wallerstein 1996; Arrighi 1994) have emphasised, however, the relation between fully capitalist and 
partially capitalist relations has been a long-term feature of capitalism; and as Sylvia Walby (1990) has 
observed, the entry of women into the public sphere has produced rather a “public patriarchy” than an end to 
gender difference. 
25 Williams’ reading of determination as “setting limits, exerting pressures” (1980: 31 - 32) is useful for 
distinguishing determinism from fatalism and mechanism, but what needs to be stressed is that what is 
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Such categories can be found in Hall’s (1996) analysis of popular reactions to official 
ideologies in TV news audiences; drawing on Gramsci’s (1975 (1932): 1513 - 1514) contrast 
between hegemonic power relations, in which a wide range of social groups are “led”, 
theoretically and practically, by “traditional intellectuals” (such as TV producers), and the 
needs and pressures from below partially expressed in “organic” intellectual strata, he 
observes that audience response can be affirmative - adopting the official version fully; 
negotiated - accepting it in general but discounting it in “special cases” close to home; or 
oppositional - rejecting it in general. Similarly, in relation to the existing social order, 
movements can embrace or reject it wholeheartedly, or accept it in general while rejecting 
specific aspects of it. These choices are obviously closely tied to the nature of the conflicts 
movements spring from and their location within or in relation to those conflicts (this is 
close to being a tautology!) As Gramsci puts it, 
“This contrast between thought and action, that is the coexistence of two conceptions of 
the world, one which is verbally affirmed and the other which comes out in practical 
action, is not always due to bad faith. Bad faith can be a sufficient explanation for some 
individuals taken singly, and for more or less numerous groups; it is not satisfactory, 
however, when the contrast can be found in the manifestations of life of large masses. 
Then it cannot be other than the expression of deeper contrasts of a social-historical order. 
It means that a social group, which has its own conception of the world, even if only in 
embryo, which comes out in action and thus sporadically, occasionally - that is, when this 
group moves as an organic whole - has, for reasons of submission and intellectual 
subordination, borrowed a conception which is not its own from another group and 
affirms this verbally; and also believes that it follows this, because it does follow it in 
“normal times” (in other words when its conduct is not independent and autonomous, but 
precisely one of submission and subordination).” (1975 [1932-33]: 1379) 
Along with processual categories, then, power relations remain central to the understanding 
of social movements, particularly those (“economic”) forms of power involved in creating 
given situations and those (“cultural”) forms of power involved in influencing responses to 
those situations, along with those (“political”) forms of power that shape the fields within 
which movements are permitted to organise. A complete theory of movements, then, will 
place considerable stress on the role of movements from above in that they are normally by 
definition the more powerful in organising the overall shape of these relations, even 
                                                
determined is human beings’ skilled responses. Without this emphasis, the “limits and pressures” argument 
simply becomes a half-way house between mechanism and indeterminacy. 
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through the maintenance of effective hegemonic power requires an active response to the 
various pressures of movements from below, as Singh (1999) has emphasised. 
Social structure, on this reading, is in a sense the sediment of movement struggles, or 
perhaps a better metaphor would be that it is something akin to a truce line, to be 
continually probed for weaknesses by both sides and repudiated as soon as this seems 
worth while. Movement struggles, then, are key to understanding social totalities, if we 
adopt this usage of movement as collective situated skilled activity: workplace relations, 
family structure, democratic rights, ethnic interaction, the shape of popular culture - 
synchronic descriptions of this archaeology of movements record the results of such 
conflicts but often miss the processual and conflictual “why”, in effect naturalising power 
relations and preferring to substitute one synchronic theory for another rather than 
develop theorisations of social change. In place of this, Touraine’s (1981) suggestion that 
social order at any given point reflects in particular the stakes of movement conflict, the 
way in which the historicity (capacity for self-production) of a given society is organised 
and conceptualised, comes closer to the mark in its insistence on the radical sociality and 
peculiar combination of co-operation and conflict (what is produced and valued, and what 
it means to whom) that characterises social movements through and through. 
What is a social movement anyway?  
In the foregoing discussion of agency, I tried to highlight the “micro-level” of skilled 
responses to situations that are created at the “macro-level” of the social totality (though 
these are not so much separately existing entities as different perspectives on the same 
thing, corresponding roughly to Habermas’ (1984, 1987a) “life-world” and “system” 
perspectives). If the theory is to avoid reifying the later as something other than the 
existing synthesis of skilled human activity, social movement becomes the term to grasp the 
ways in which - from above and below - people grapple with and try to respond to the 
situations they find themselves in. Such responses cover an enormous range, and within 
this range “social movement” becomes an organising concept (practically, as done by 
activists; intellectually, as done by theorists) standing for the hegemonic (from above) or 
proto-hegemonic (from below) organisation of the skilled activities of daily life towards a 
coherent “movement project” for the social totality: 
A social movement is the organisation of multiple forms of materially grounded and locally generated skilled 
activity around a rationality expressed and organised by (would-be) hegemonic actors, and against the 
hegemonic projects articulated by other such actors. 
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Social movement, then, is precisely a concept of direction, of change, of potentiality, not an 
ahistorical and static definition of a particular kind of institution. This is the sense, I think, 
of “class” for Thompson (1963, 1977a) and Williams (1980), of “praxis” and “intellectual 
activity” for Gramsci (1975) and of “feminism” for Jaggar (1983) and Wainwright  (1994) - 
something including the everyday struggle, the dotty enthusiasm, the heavy political project, 
the “moment of effervescence” and the years of isolation. It is also a good example of the 
kind of historical concept I defended in chapter one, along with “skill”, “labour” and 
“totality” - concepts whose referents and workings we can confidently expect to change over 
time as 6 billion other people put time, energy and thought into producing the social 
realities they indicate. Historical theorising is not about trying to define once and for all the 
way the world is, about elevating local patterns to universal truths or about abandoning 
theorising when our first efforts fail: it is about thinking in ways that leave some scope for 
other people to surprise us. The appearance of a new kind of campaign or the 
disappearance of an old one should encourage us to historicise our concepts rather than 
jettison them: the underlying question is “how are people doing movements in this context 
and why?” rather than “what do movements like this mean?” in abstraction from time and 
place. 
Multiplying movements unnecessarily 
This argument for “social movement” as an organising concept is meant not so much to 
reject as to relativise field-specific social movement theories, by encouraging a greater 
reflexivity about the locations within which those theories are produced. It is also intended 
to undermine the inflation of the movement concept and aid academic and political 
thought by distinguishing what a movement is, or is not. Much of the writing in this area 
has been fatally flawed by an uncritical acceptance of claims to movement status: by 
specific and often short-term campaigns; on behalf of lifestyle and opinion shifts; by single 
organisations - and most damagingly by a definition of “movement” by “issue” (peace, 
ecology, feminist etc.) or “actor” (women’s, workers’, black, etc.)  
What this usage fails to do is to offer an effective means of identifying boundaries between 
movements (where does the ecology movement end and the peace movement begin?), of 
distinguishing between the existence of divergent tendencies within a single movement and 
the existence of multiple movements (for example are there two separate Irish women’s 
movements - middle-class feminism and community women’s groups (Coulter 1993) - or 
two tendencies within a single movement?), or of dealing with “cross-cutting” movements 
(was Greenham Common “part of” the peace movement [issue] or the women’s 
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movement [actor]?). Given that “networks of informal interactions” rarely have neat 
boundaries and “shared collective identities” are routinely objects of struggle, it is 
unsurprising that despite the “terminological ambiguity” to which Diani objects (1992a: 2) 
the term “movement” continues to be deployed more or less at random, not to say 
incoherently: 
“Part of, but also separate from, the student movement [actor] was the reemerging 
feminist [ideology] movement….” (Fink, Gassert and Junker 1998:16; my glosses) 
One might object that these are scholastic questions, which miss the liveliness of actual 
movements - but this is precisely the problem with tying oneself to positivist 
understandings of social movement as institutional form, which makes neither empirical 
nor theoretical sense as a general way to understand movements (consider for example the 
enormous diversity of “the social movement”, the range of “feminist movements” since 
their organisational fragmentation in the 1970s, the self-description of the movements 
leading up to 1968 as “the Movement” or the enormous variety of issues tackled by 
contemporary “DIY” movements). Since, as della Porta and Diani observe, 
“[M]embers’ first loyalty continues to be to the movement and the organization is simply 
seen as a temporary instrument for intervention. Indeed, recent research has revealed a 
pattern of multiple adherence, with simultaneous participation in a range of organizations 
belonging to different social movement. This has led to the idea that there are social 
movements ‘families’; clusters of movements which have different specific objectives but 
share a similar world view, overlap in membership and frequently work together in protest 
campaigns” (1999: 148) 
perhaps the problem is the artificial multiplication of “movements”? The analysis 
developed in this chapter makes it possible to start from the actors rather than from the 
issues (no small gain this, given the non-linear nature of symbolism and ideology in e.g. 
politics and religion), but this is not enough; we must also ask what direction their response 
to their situation is taking them in. As Eyerman and Jamison write, 
“A social movement is not one organisation or one special interest group. It is more like a 
cognitive territory, a new conceptual space that is filled by a dynamic interaction between 
different groups and organisations [….] 
This does not mean that social movements are only learning processes, but it rather means 
that the particular character of a movement, what distinguishes it from other movements 
and what sets it off in time, is its cognitive praxis. Having said this, it is evident that 
cognitive praxis does not come readymade to a social movement. It is precisely in the 
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creation, articulation, formulation of new thoughts and ideas – new knowledge – that a 
social movement defines itself in society.” (1991: 55) 
Movement projects 
I would argue on this basis that the number of coherent “movement projects” that can be 
distinguished at any point in time is relatively small. Such “projects” - drawing on Peillon’s 
(1982) idea of a “class project” - are (a) challenges to the social totality which (b) aim to 
control the self-production of society and (c) have or are developing the potential for the 
kind of hegemony - leading the skilled activity of different social groups - that would make 
(b) and hence (a) possible.  The number of campaigns (attempts at organising skilled 
activity which haven’t, can’t or no longer have this potential) is certainly rather larger, and 
covers everything from isolated eccentrics writing lengthy tomes to large, well-disciplined 
but thoroughly particularist and corporatist institutions with no real intention of leading 
anyone but themselves. Touraine makes a similar point, arguing that 
“Competitive parties do not represent a permanent opposition like the couple management 
- workers does. That can be symbolized by writing that a social movement is i-o-t [see 
below] and a political struggle i-t, o-t, or i-o. The collective pursuit of interests corresponds to 
an even lower level of integration of these elements: the actors are self-centered and the 
field of their competition or conflict can even be defined as a market, which is defined 
independently from actors. That corresponds to i, o, t, where each element is separated 
from the others. So political pressure and defense of interest must be defined not only by 
their specific nature but as nonintegrated and lower-level social movements.” (1985: 761) 
Translating this into the language I am suggesting, a movement project stands out among 
other forms of expression of social movement in that it is capable of identifying (i)  its actors 
socially; naming its central opponent (o), and recognising that the social totality (t)  is the 
product of such struggles. In the modern world some of the most successful such projects 
are those of global capitalism and nation-states, despite changes to the benefit of the 
former and against the latter. These movements are relatively easy to characterise because 
their projects are relatively stable and well-institutionalised in most areas of social life. 
This kind of historical conceptualisation, while being “essentially contested”, is appropriate 
to a historical sociology in that it is developmental rather than static in shape, and so can 
handle equally well moments where movement from below is fragmented and retained 
within narrow limits by successful movement projects from above as well as moments 
where movements from below may be on the verge of success. It is also, I think, geared to 
the requirements of an open and critical sociology in that at this point activists and 
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participants can begin to ask themselves realistic and practical questions about the nature 
and chances of particular movement projects within what remains an open - but not blank 
- field of action. 
Counter culture as counter hegemony 
The counter culture, in this perspective, is one of the more visible movement projects from 
below, a very loose umbrella within which a whole network of “movements”, of “lefts”, of 
“scenes” and of “lifestyles” interacts and shares a common - albeit contested - history 
across the planet. This means that it is a project from below which has the potential for 
hegemony, within which attempts to realise this potential are made, and where at times 
such attempts even meet with some success. What produces the movement, I shall argue, is 
skilled responses to shared situations; what produces the movement project is the continuity 
from shared ways of struggle at the roots all the way to the differing bids for hegemony by 
the post-68 lefts, by Green parties, alternative scenes and some kinds of cultural studies; 
and the differing attempts at co-theorising by socialist feminists, eco-socialists, eco-
feminists, etc. 
Understanding hegemony 
To make sense of this apparently counter-intuitive claim, a brief excursion into the 
meaning of hegemony in Gramsci’s thought is necessary. The primary meaning of 
hegemony for Gramsci can be defined as leadership by consent: 
“For the moment, one can identify two great superstructural ‘levels’, that which can be 
called the level of ‘civil society’, in other words of the totality of organisms vulgarly called 
‘private’, and that of the “political society or state”. These correspond to the function of 
‘hegemony’ which the dominant group exercises in the whole society and to that of ‘direct 
rule’ or command which is expressed in the state and in ‘juridical’ government.” (1975 
(1932): 1518 - 1519) 
Gramsci goes on to identify “social hegemony” with  
“the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the direction 
imprinted on social life by the fundamental dominant group, a consensus which grows 
‘historically’ from the prestige (and thus from the trust) which the dominant group derives 
from its position and from its function in the world of production” (1975 (1932: 1519). 
A hegemonic situation obtains where “intellectuals” give “directive” leadership (organise 
the activities of a wide range of different social groups) and “theoretical” leadership 
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(articulate their thinking) across a whole society. A primary example employed by Gramsci 
of such a hegemony would be the role of landlord, priest and doctor in the social order of 
rural Italy post-independence - organising people’s work, interaction and body-
management in very Foucauldian ways at the same time as organising their political, 
religious and scientific thinking - to be replaced in urban modernity by the manager, the 
engineer and the schoolteacher’s organisation of the social and technical aspects of the 
work process and participation in the public life of the modern nation-state26. 
On this showing, and given the example of capitalism, it is clear that hegemony is neither 
about uniformity nor about coercion. A social group is hegemonic to the extent that it can 
manage the task of providing effective directions and orientations to the life-activity of 
different social groups, meet some at least of their diverse needs and provide a language with 
which they can express their thoughts (cf. Marx 1979: 115 - 118 for a suggestive sketch). In 
other words, it is about power through co-ordination, consent and communication, not 
blockage, coercion and exclusion; though the latter are also part of power relations, they 
are not part of hegemony. Schematically we could say that the sphere of coercion forms the 
context for consent, but the consent of some people is also necessary for the successful 
exercise of coercion against others.  
The strength of capitalism, then, is precisely that it does meet some felt needs, offer a usable 
language and “work” at the most practical and material level - at least to a certain extent. 
This is why a populist rejection of “the system” in favour of “ordinary people” as they are is 
bound to fail under normal conditions, and why Gramsci’s concept of politics is so pre-
eminently an educative one (in the sense used in community development): it is about an 
alternative way of organising that work, alternative ways of satisfying needs, and alternative 
ways to express what we think (cf. 1975 (1932 - 5): 1331: “Every relationship of 
‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogical relationship….”). For Gramsci, these alternatives 
can be “better” in the sense (argued in more detail in chapter seven) that they are more 
                                                
26 Incidentally, and consistent with Marx’ more “pessimistic” and “structural” analyses for the possibility of 
socialist revolution and with contemporary writing on the service class (Lash and Urry 1987, Sklair 1995), this 
seems to imply that from an early point capitalists as such are doing relatively little of the “ruling” and are 
rather a rentier class parasitical on capital as a social formation and set of relationships. This also suggests a 
fairly humble view of the role of intellectuals in movements from below, as a sort of “service class of the 
revolution”, with the same tendencies to develop caste interests (Konrad and Szelényi 1979) but also the 
same risk of becoming redundant to the needs of the movement - a process which has regularly occurred (a 
classic case is the self-dissolution of Gauche prolétarienne in 1973 (Hamon and Rotman 1988: 493 - 530)). 
Understanding social movements 
 92 
adequate to the responses they are attempting to articulate; those responses do not run into 
limits as soon or as much as within the existing hegemony.  
Hence the importance of the contrast between “traditional” intellectuals, whose learned 
ways of doing things, of identifying problems and of articulating ideas derive from the 
existing order, even when they are put at the service of movements from below, and 
“organic” intellectuals, whose ways of doing things, intentions and language represent 
instead a further development of that response at the base27. For this reason, I prefer to 
destress Gramsci’s emphasis on intellectuals as specialised life-positions and focus rather 
on the more general “intellectual activity” in relation to which these specialists gain or lose 
relevance. The role of professional full-time organisers is not a fixed and static thing, 
whether in movements or in states. At certain times (movements in organised capitalism, 
states in dependent societies) it may be absolutely central; at others (much “DIY” politics, 
hunter-gatherer societies) it may be negligible (cf. Atton (1997a, 1999) on the relative 
unimportance of specialised intellectuals in the alternative press, Taylor 1982 on states and 
hunter-gatherers). What is general is human beings’ organisation of their life-activity, 
practically and mentally: the relevance of “professionals” is given by this, within specific 
modes of production, and not vice-versa. 
Understanding counter hegemony 
So much for effective hegemony, which is only ever fully developed through a movement 
from above (Thompson 1977a) - or perhaps on the part of a movement from below which 
is on the point of taking power or has in fact done so. What is the corresponding term - 
and more importantly the corresponding situation - for movements from below? With 
some hesitation I would like to suggest the term counter hegemony. This is not a term used 
by Gramsci, as far as I am aware, but is consistent with his usage, which allows for the 
copresence of (conflicting) claims to hegemony: 
“The critical understanding of oneself thus comes about through a struggle of political 
‘hegemonies’, of contrasting directions, first in the field of ethics, then in that of politics, to 
arrive at a higher elaboration of one’s own conception of the real.” (1975 (1932 - 33): 
1385) 
                                                
27 This is, incidentally, a deeply democratic notion, in the sense used in classical democratic theory of 
democracy not as a choice of commodities but as common deliberation about common problems (Bachrach 
1969). 
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The term counter hegemony is useful to set off the differences between movements from 
below and above, which of course find their sharpest expression precisely here, in the 
power relations between the two. One of the difficulties with counter hegemony is that 
what sounds like a thing is at best a precarious achievement - given that it represents a 
massive upheaval in the hegemony maintained by a movement from above, the latter must 
either respond or collapse; and it is in the nature of a movement from above that it 
normally has far greater resources - such as the state - at its disposal than its challengers do. 
In more routine situations, then, counter hegemony is a process of building this 
achievement - a movement project, in other words - something which may at some future 
point come to structure the movement as a whole, but which is more frequently present as 
potential, aspiration, intention, effort. These are real, both in that actors think and act in 
these terms but also in that we know that movements (such as Irish nationalism in the 19th 
century) can move from symbolic rhetoric to full-scale challenge, and indeed back again. 
So counter-hegemony is precisely a movement project from below, and this is a more useful 
language: we can assess the workability of a project, who is committed to it and in what 
shape, and what would be required to make it work without the (literally) manic claim to 
know what the outcome of the project will be. That some projects collapse and others 
succeed beyond the wildest dreams of their protagonists is a necessary feature of thinking 
in terms of processes rather than of things. 
Counter-hegemony and resistance to hegemony 
There is a more restrictive use of counter-hegemony that I need to distance myself from, 
which is that of seeing it as simply the refusal or “resistance” to hegemony. A good 
illustration of why this approach is insufficient to the study of movements (beyond the 
obvious point that “movement” entails convincing others and constructing alternatives, 
even when we can draw on existing movements for this network solidarity and utopian 
rhetoric) is given in Thompson’s (1994) work on Blake. Here he represents the tradition of 
antinomian Christianity, on which he argues Blake drew, as being in the late 18th and early 
19th centuries a counter hegemonic one, meaning in the first place “in opposition to the 
existing hegemony” of utilitarian philosophy and laissez-faire capitalism. This tendency in 
Thompson’s usage is underlined by the fact that by this stage Blake’s antinomians, under 
the pressure of political and religious repression since their more radical outbreaks in the 
English Revolution (chronicled by Hill 1975) had become deeply quietist and retreated 
inside the safety of their own kinship-based meetings and their esoteric symbology. What 
would be missed by a purely “resistance”-oriented reading, though, is that Thompson’s 
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point is precisely that Blake’s resistance to “the Kingdom of the Beast” is made possible by 
his standing - even as a relatively isolated eccentric in his later years, leaving his earlier 
involvement with political radicalism and organised Swedenborgianism aside - within this 
collective radical tradition and its alternative totality, its shared “utopian” vision of how the 
world ought to be and how one might get there.  
In other words, resistance on its own is local rationality, not counter hegemonic; given the 
presence of effective hegemony from above - the ongoing attempt to incorporate pressure 
from below - it is far more likely to resolve itself into a corporatist or particularist stance 
which offers no wider challenge to hegemony as such. What enables it to go beyond this is 
a refusal to drop the links with other resistances, or a connection to some wider form of 
understanding which turns a local problem “within the system” - a “negotiated” response 
that accepts the general situation but refuses the particular application - to a more 
significant challenge to the system - an “oppositional” response. These links and this 
understanding are of the essence of “movement projects”, whether or not they are of such 
a nature as to be able to survive and be generalised. 
The counter culture, then, is a particular movement project from below, specific to the 
period of capitalist disorganisation; subsequent sections discuss its particularity (what it 
consists of) and this historical specificity (how it relates to this period). In terms of the view 
of historical sociology set out in chapter one, this “historical concept” of counter culture as 
a, if not the, major movement project from below within disorganised capitalism is the 
major substantive contribution of the thesis, whose organisation serves to locate (chapters 
one to four) and subsequently explore (chapters five to eight) this concept. Insofar as the 
thesis claims to make an “original and substantive contribution to knowledge”, this is it. 
What do movement projects do? 
The “counter hegemonic” activity of a “movement project” such as the counter culture 
consists, in essence, of the practical and theoretical abstraction, organisation and 
development of local rationalities. In a sense, this is true not only of full-blown movement 
projects, but of any attempt at developing a movement, as well as being a way of 
conceptualising our everyday activity in the sense of the situations we find ourselves in. 
Given that a major stress of this thesis is the necessary connection between movement 
activity and everyday life, this is a logical and necessary similarity. For analytic purposes, 
however - specifically, to indicate the qualitative breaks between different levels of 
complexity and practical challenges - it is I think useful to distinguish between “local 
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rationalities”, as the skilled response to a given situation as developed within the terms of 
that situation, “campaigns”, as the organisation of such local responses in ways that 
connect people across multiple such situations and challenge the construction of those 
situations, and “movement projects”, which connect a range of such campaigns, with 
starting points that are seen as diverse from a local perspective, around a challenge to the 
way that situations are constructed in general.  
Movement projects, then, involve making the connection between local situations as seen 
from below and the common features of their relationship to the social totality - which is 
the point at which agreement and cooperation can be constructed, or not. While this does 
imply that there are workable and unworkable movement projects, this is a judgement 
which has in part at least to be that of “history”. This analysis implies a research 
programme which relates movement projects to movement milieux, starting not from the 
most articulated and visible mobilisations of movement projects, but from the local 
rationalities to be found within movement milieux, understood as the source of 
mobilisations, of the internal culture of movement organisations, and of the 
transformations attempted or effected within the wider society28. Two major attempts at 
systematically relating milieux and movements are already available. 
Theorising movements and milieux 
Firstly, a number of authors in the critical theory tradition have offered an analysis of 
contemporary movements as forms of the defence of the life-world against colonisation by 
the logics of capitalism and the state. In other words, movements are identified with 
communicative rationality in its opposition to instrumental rationalisation and the systems 
of power and money (Habermas 1987a, Offe 1985, Cohen 1982). This is an attractive 
analysis, among other reasons because it offers a systematic theorisation of the 
relationships between social movements and a defensible concept of modernity. At the 
same time, it suffers from a severe lack of specificity in its analysis of culture. 
While some attempt is made to specify which particular life-worlds (in Offe’s (1985) 
formulation, those of the intelligentsia and the “decommodified” areas of society) should 
be particular sources of movement activity, they are treated as carriers of a universal 
                                                
28 I leave aside here the analysis of campaigns, as being the most historically contingent of these categories 
but also that which (in an apparently universal form) is most adequately covered by existing “social 
movements” literature. 
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communicative rationality, which apparently operates similarly in all life-worlds except to 
the extent that it is deformed by capital or the state. Without wanting to enter the question 
of whether a single logic of communicative rationality can be found, as Habermas (1984) 
claims, within the structure of communication itself, it seems too far a leap from this 
philosophical anthropology to the specific cultural logics of contemporary life-worlds. Just 
as the development of instrumental rationalization had highly specific sources in Calvinist 
soteriology (Weber 1958), despite its capacity for abstraction and generalisation, so one 
would expect communicative rationalisation, whatever its generalisability, to have specific 
starting points. In other words, there is something of a silence as to the specific culture of 
movement milieux and thus of social movements themselves. 
A partial remedy is offered by Eder (1985, 1993), who sees contemporary social 
movements as expressing the habitus of a specific social class, the petite bourgeoisie, and its 
struggle to impose its cultural definitions on the social totality. The difficulty with Eder’s 
position (quite apart from the question of whether contemporary movements are 
movements of the petite bourgeoisie (Bagguley 1992)) is that the habitus he ascribes to these 
classes is simply read off from their structural location as being neither on top nor on the 
bottom of society. There is little sense of the role of experience (Thompson 1977a) in 
mediating between class relations and class culture, or of culture as a creative response. As 
a result, habitus, in Eder’s approach, is effectively ascribed by the theorist, rather than an 
open question for research (see chapter two). 
This is made clear by Eder’s own use of the concept, which (as with many outside readings 
of movement milieux from Berger et al. 1974 to Scott 1990) interprets movement 
discourse in terms of the categories of the analyst’s own milieu, by imputing a romantic 
view of self and nature in terms of “purity” which is simply the mirror image of rationalism 
(Thompson 1994). By contrast, the Hannover research project (Müller 1990, Vester et al. 
1993), based on extensive interviews in movement milieux, identifies both an element of 
continuity with the traditional class habitus of their participants’ background, but also an 
important rupture, most notably in the development of new, reflexive, elements of habitus, 
rather than any given natural self. Similarly, Melucci (1992) has emphasised the complexities 
of the category of “nature” in movement discourses. 
In other words, while both critical theory and Eder suggest that we can find ways of 
theorising a systematic link between the culture of a movement milieu and the activities of 
a movement, both suffer from something of an empirical deficit, or (more importantly) 
from the lack of a recognition of the cultural specificity of movement milieux. Although 
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movements are seen as cultural phenomena, the implications are not fully taken into 
account, giving rise to the normal difficulty in cultural analysis of failing to be sufficiently 
aware of one’s own taken-for-granted assumptions and simply reading other ways of life in 
terms of one’s own cultural perspective. The question then arises as to how we can theorise 
the specificities of movement milieux in a way that avoids such unsustainable a prioris. 
The concept of local rationalities 
What is needed is a provisional concept that identifies the kind of object that is being 
sought for: a heuristic concept that does not already impute a specific cultural form to its 
subject. Such a concept would have to make it possible to link the culture of movement 
milieux with the cultural forms and symbolic challenges raised by social movements; should 
avoid either relegating the political to some other realm of understanding or elevating it to 
the sole explanatory factor; and enable an empirical engagement with the cultural 
specificities of actual movement milieux. I want to suggest the concept of “local 
rationalities” as a means of doing this. 
Rationalities are local insofar as they are situated responses to given situations. In this 
context “rationality” is not a single monolithic “thing” (that usage comes in particular from 
the Frankfurt School’s identification of rationality with instrumental rationality and from 
the irrationalisms of anti-modernist critiques around the turn of the century (e.g. Nietzsche, 
Sorel)) but rather the way that actors practically engage with their world and make sense of 
their actions. Weber identifies four such possibilities: instrumental, value-rational, 
traditional and emotive, qualifying the last two as “on the border and often beyond that 
which is ‘meaningfully’ oriented” (1984: 44). The arguments here are primarily 
methodological, leading Weber earlier in the same discussion to write  
“For typologising scientific analysis all irrational, emotionally conditioned, meaning 
contexts of attitudes that influence action, are as far as possible researched and presented 
as “deviations” from a hypothetical, purely goal-rational process.” (1984: 21) 
The tension in this section seems to lie between that which can be understood and that 
which can be communicated; later on Weber takes the view that 
“If [sociology] speaks of ‘typical’ cases, it means in case of doubt always the ideal type, 
which for its part can be rational or irrational, is usually rational (e.g. in theories of national 
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economy this is always the case), but is always constructed in a form adequate to its meaning 
[sinnadäquat]” (1984: 39)29 
Habermas’ (1984, 1987a) critique and reformulation of the issues involved contrasts the 
instrumental rationalities of capital and the state to the communicative rationality of the 
lifeworld from which the former render themselves independent and which in turn they 
colonise and deform. The point of the concept of rationality in Weber, and to a certain 
extent in Habermas, however, is primarily methodological rather than substantive: for 
Weber, these are heuristic tools against which the sociologist can set actual or average 
actions, processes, and outcomes (Sadri 1992: 11 – 22); for Habermas, they correspond to 
the point of view of “system” (instrumental rationality) and “lifeworld” (communicative 
rationality) respectively. 
Present in both Habermas and Weber, however, is a keen interest in the process of 
rationalisation, classically in the development of instrumental rationality out of something else 
(this is after all the point of the Protestant Ethic (Weber 1958)). So a “rationality”, on this 
relatively abstract and universal level at which it can be a relevant meeting-point for the 
understanding of researcher and researched, is itself an achievement of a certain kind, 
representing the distillation of new forms of expert-system (Habermas) or the development 
of the institution and ideology of self-improvement (Weber), from more specific and local 
contexts: the life-world, Calvinist soteriology; and a substantive analysis can start from this. 
                                                
29 GA Cohen rejects Weber’s reading of the traditional as non-rational, arguing that Weber’s example of 
Silesian peasants responding to a rise in wages by lowering the time worked (Weber: “This general incapacity 
and indisposition to depart from the beaten path is the motive for the maintenance of tradition”) rests on a 
mistaken assumption of the contrast between “traditional” and “rational” action: 
“Suppose we allow that contrast. Then Weber still fails to show that the peasant reacted traditionally and 
hence, on his view, non-rationally. For he did not continue to do what he had always done. He began to work a 
lot less than before [….] Indeed, the labourer’s choice was probably rational. He could not be certain what 
increase in consumption welfare would attend the rise in money income [….] Reasonable conjectures regarding 
the marginal utility of goods and the marginal disutility of labour - in his particular situation - suggest that in 
opting for labour-reduction he won a more substantial benefit.” (1978: 321) 
Thus Weber’s instrumental rationality in this case is so only within capitalist assumptions, not necessarily 
within the peasant’s preferences and assumptions. There are, in other words, different forms even of 
instrumental rationality (as Habermas’ (1984) distinction between those tied to power and those tied to 
money implies). More generally, following in Thompson’s (1993) footsteps, the rationality of apparently 
irrational behaviour has become more widely recognised. 
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For my purposes, then, a local rationality is a formal characteristic about the way make sense of 
and engage with the world which is capable of being generalised and taking on a life of its own. Thus for 
Weber and Habermas the formal principle of a rational calculation of which means are best 
suited to achieving given ends enables that particular rethinking of the world we call 
modernity. Starting from a specific problem in a specific cultural milieu, it could be 
generalised to encompass all aspects of action and could be effectively used to restructure 
any other milieu. Thus I am looking for formal elements in the way people act, talk and 
make sense of the world within specific movement milieux which can be generalised, at 
least in the sense of applying to many areas of activity, notably linking everyday life with 
movement mobilisation, and which enable people to make sense of power and the political 
on their own terms. If the potential for a movement project is present within the local 
rationality, this is because what can be distilled as a rationality is precisely what can be 
generalised. 
It is this sense of rationality as situated that Lukács (1971) appeals to (drawing on Weber’s 
concept of the ideal type) to justify his understanding of class consciousness: the 
standpoint of the proletariat (to paraphrase Weber) is that viewpoint which the proletariat 
would logically have if all accidents and contingencies were cleared out of the way. What 
this misses, however, is the sense of how people actively engage with their world and learn 
by doing so, just as much as an idealist sense of rationality as “speaking people’s actions” 
does. Rationality comes with a past history of skills and ideas; it is created in response to 
given situations; and it is developed and changed through the continued engagement with 
those situations. Even more crucially, it is about how we do things, not only what we think: 
in this sense it is directly related to Gramsci’s intellectual activity. We can certainly think of 
it in terms of lesser or greater adequacy to a situation, as actors implicitly do when they 
change how they do things. It is less easy to think that it is possible to stand outside the 
lifeworlds of six billion people and know in the abstract what the most adequate response 
is: that derives from a rationalist one-sidedness which has no place in a materialist analysis. 
What “theory” can do, perhaps, is identify the conditions under which people seem able to 
develop their response more fully, and say something about the nature of such improved 
responses in other places or at other points in time. 
Movements as the development of local rationalities 
One such answer is that the kind of move I have pointed to, from local rationality to 
campaign, and from campaign to movement project, consists of a process in which local 
rationalities are abstracted, organised and developed. They are abstracted insofar as they are 
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taken out of their immediate, taken-for-granted lifeworld context and “put to work” in 
building practical and communicative bridges to other lifeworlds. They are organised insofar 
as they acquire an institutional and theoretical expression whose explicitness and (relative) 
autonomy leaves space for their independent operation. And they are developed insofar as 
this inevitably involves transformation to meet the exigencies of this greater diversity and 
more challenging ontological situation. This shift, however, is at the same time one of 
hegemonising activity: of connecting different local situations practically and theoretically into 
movements; of coordination and communication between different movements towards a 
shared movement project. 
It is well known - but rarely theorised - that this process is often experienced by 
participants as exhilarating and transforming; this is the record (for example) from the Civil 
Rights Movement in the USA (Jacobs and Landau 1967), from participants in “1968” 
(Fraser 1988), from consciousness-raising in the women’s movement (Sebestyen 1988) and 
on a smaller scale from people’s first experience of “politicisation”, as with the student 
occupation mentioned in chapters five and six. A likely explanation is that participants are 
experiencing their local rationalities expanding, becoming clarified in their own minds and 
ratified in others’ recognition as they co-construct a shared development of those 
rationalities. We might add that this process works so well that many of its techniques - 
labour organising, community development, consciousness-raising, magazine editing, cadre 
parties etc. - have come to take on a rule-bound “how to do it” character which is at least 
semi-independent of any specific local situation. (In Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) terms, 
it is a “package” of knowledge with its own “how” and “why” that can be transmitted 
across social spaces.) 
This model of hegemonising activity connects to Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of 
knowledge in another and more substantive way, through Buckner’s (1971) unusual analysis 
of the relevance of their argument to the development of counter culture in America at the 
end of the 1960s. Buckner argues in essence that the development of ideas and practices, 
their institutionalisation and location within a hegemonic “symbolic universe” dissected by 
Berger and Luckmann is not a consensual process but a conflictual one at each step of the 
way. As corresponding features to the generation of dominant practices and ideas, falsely 
universalised by Berger and Luckmann, he places primary and secondary deviance (the 
latter being the result of the interactional identification, naming and sanctioning of the 
former); corresponding to institutionalisation (in Berger and Luckmann marked as a 
qualitative shift by the development of systematised transmission, and so the separation out 
of the “how” and “why” knowledge involved) are in essence subcultures, whether those of 
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cults, gangs, or what we might now call single-issue social movement organisations; 
corresponding to the symbolic universe of the dominant ideology he identifies fully-
articulated alternative world views, for example in the New Left, the hippy subculture or 
black nationalism. With the strong qualification that these last are not just ideologies but 
that their scope - the ability to connect with a range of local rationalities - derives from 
movement projects which attempt to engage with those rationalities practically30, this emphasis 
seems right. Although I have not followed Buckner’s progression in detail, his orientation, 
in particular the stress on development from local situation to social totality and the 
emphasis on the corresponding but contrasting shapes of organisation from above and 
below, parallels the more Gramscian model I have used here. 
Local rationalities in conflict 
Hegemonising activity, or to use a less ugly phrase the collective development of local 
rationalities, does not take place in isolation, as a purely “expressive” model would have it. 
Rather, it takes place in a context of struggle where the social territory into which 
movements expand is already occupied: activists encounter their opponents not only within 
“the state”, but also within “civil society”, which Gramsci describes in precisely these 
military terms as the outlying fortifications which (in core societies) must be tackled before 
a successful challenge to the state itself is possible (see Armstrong 1998 on the use of 
Clausewitzian metaphors for social movement analysis), within their own organisations, 
and of course within their own life-activity, socialisation, and friendship networks31. 
What, then, does this conflict consist of? I want to suggest that it can be analysed as the 
attempt to extend the reach of different local rationalities, as movement projects, into 
different areas of social life - the self (see Lent 1999 on the local-personal dimension of 
movement orientations), civil society and the “soft fringes” of the welfare state, ultimately 
the coercive core of the state - and to restructure these fields in line with the new local 
rationality or movement project. 
                                                
30  Cf. Katsiaficas’ account (1987: 117 - 150, 265 - 279) of the extraordinary history of the Black Panther-
sponsored alternative constitution in 1970. 
31 Hence the usefulness of a term like struggle to convey the messiness and effort of this activity, as opposed 
to the metaphors of “surgical warfare” in which the other is at a safe distance and bearing distinctive 
uniforms. Movement struggles - to borrow the title of Marx’s (1977b) discussion of the Paris Commune and 
the Versaillais reaction - are more like civil wars than they are like tank battles; see also Gramsci (1975: 122) 
for an extended parallel with wars of colonisation. 
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If we think in these active terms, we are unlikely to fall into the trap of taking these 
rationalities in too reified a sense, in an idealist vision of different Ideas colonising the 
world. To return to the Gramscian model of intellectual activity, a rationality is a way of 
organising-and-thinking-about our activity (the two elements are not really separable in a 
learning species, as Marx (1967: 178) observed in his comments on “the worst architect and 
the best of bees”), actively produced by people working together in given situations and so 
shaped by their shared learning processes, their needs, the interaction between them and 
the situation. The production of a movement project, as the “highest level” of abstraction, 
organisation and development of a local rationality, is a major achievement in finding stable 
and transferrable ways of doing and thinking about thing that have at least some autonomy 
from this context of production (Alinsky’s or Freire’s methodologies of community 
development and popular education are good cases in point), but like any other practices 
and ideas they must be produced and reproduced, whether by separate strata of 
“intellectuals” or in people’s “intellectual activity”, and that their “workability” in different 
contexts and different languages is not a universal given: they may meet social or historical 
limits, “stop making sense”32.  
Movement projects, then, start from particular local rationalities. To move through 
development into “campaigns” and then “movement projects”, these local rationalities 
obviously have to bear some potential relevance to a wide range of other social groups: if 
they are overly particularistic they can offer nothing to anyone else. This potential, 
however, must be actively and creatively developed through intellectual activity, whether 
proceeding from the group as a whole or from a specialised intellectual stratum (see Rudé 
1980 on the relationship between peasant protest and urban intellectuals) or a mixture of 
the two (as in Gramsci, where the early contribution of the “traditional intelligentsia”, 
typically particularly strong in dependent and peripheral societies where “the state is 
everything and civil society nothing”, makes way over time for the “organic intelligentsia” 
that has come up through the movement). These are the two important questions to ask of 
any movement project: where is its starting point, and where is its organising point? I will 
discuss these questions further in this chapter in relation to the counter culture; in chapter 
                                                
32 This has arguably been the fate of the dominant forms of Marxist and labour organising codified in the 
period of organised capitalism: despite their immense reproducibility through the decades and across the 
planet during that period, there is now a clear loss of purchase and at a minimum a need for drastic 
reformulation to make them “work” in ordinary people’s lives on anything like the same scale. 
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seven I will look briefly at a third kind of question: how broad is the potential relevance of 
this movement project for other social contexts? 
The theory I have sketched is not new, although it is new to put it in precisely these terms. 
The analysis I have identified in chapter two and attempted to articulate here, of a critical 
approach to social movements grounded in western Marxism and socialist feminism, is, 
however, useful for the research project I have set myself here. To return to the criteria for 
an adequate theory of the counter culture that I identified in chapter one, this theory does 
not restrict itself a priori to a single level of struggle, but is explicitly geared to handling the 
existence of a wide range of forms of conflict. Secondly, far from assuming a single form 
of rationality, it directs us to look at different forms of situated rationality as the building 
blocks of the theory. Thirdly, rather than an ahistorical formulation it seeks to encourage 
the production of “historical concepts” to enable open forms of theorising by participants. 
The counter culture is such a historical concept. 
Historicising the counter culture 
I have already discussed and exemplified (chapter one) the general referents of the counter 
culture and discussed some national variations within it. In this section I aim first of all to 
locate the local rationalities of the counter culture in terms of the kinds of experience 
(Thompson 1963, 1977a) to which they are responses; secondly, to examine the nature of 
the initial challenge posed by the counter culture to the given order in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s; and thirdly, to discuss the subsequent development of this conflict.  
If the idea of a general, “top-down” and quantitative analysis of which status groups do 
what is fatally flawed, what is possible is a qualitative analysis of the kinds of situation to 
which the counter cultural project responds. In chapters five and six I will examine the 
formation and development of one such “local rationality” in detail; barring a massive 
research project, some general themes can be drawn out from this and from the literatures 
already discussed. In particular, I want to demonstrate the possibility of using the theory 
developed in this chapter to theorise the counter culture as a whole. 
The results of earlier struggles 
The most important preconditions for the development of the counter culture, pace 
Inglehart (1990),  are (a) a certain amount of “free space” (Bey 1991), of a relative 
loosening of traditional “authoritarian” power structures of social control (Berger, Berger 
and Kellner 1974), particularly through what Claus Offe (1984) has called the 
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“decommodification” of certain aspects of working people’s lives - that is, the fact of not 
being continually forced to exchange labour for money under tight power relations; an 
equivalent concept would certainly be needed for the relative loosening of some aspects of 
“private” patriarchal control (Walby 1990). The key features include the development and 
extension of free or affordable education to significant sections of the working class; the 
development of survivable unemployment assistance and other welfare benefits in some 
countries; the temporary existence of near-full employment with its corresponding 
improvements in workers’ situations; the development of greater spaces of civic and 
political freedoms in many states; the weakening of authoritarian child-rearing strategies 
geared purely towards preparation for work or marriage - in other words, the “movement 
legacy” of the workers’ movement, first-wave feminism and radical-democratic liberalism. 
(b) Following the analyses of Lash and Urry (1987) and Arrighi (1994), these can be seen as 
the results of a compromise reached during the commodifying phase (“organised 
capitalism”) of the “long twentieth century”, during which - both as a concession to secure 
capitalist hegemony in the core through compromises with these movements (Moore 1999) 
and because of the beneficial effects of some of these demands for capitalism 
(Keynesianism, dismantling of the older social order, mobilisation of women’s “caring 
labour” (Lynch and McLaughlin 1995) to the benefit of capitalism) - a Fordist mode of 
regulation came into being in and around the organised capitalist mode of accumulation. 
The experience of a closed “core” of corporatist decision-making in Western Europe, 
closed political systems, monolithic corporation and state structures and a top-down 
welfare state bureaucracy was thus the reverse of this same experience of free space 
“outside the system” - a rather different situation to that of agrarian conflict or the battles 
which led to the development of organised capitalism, and are reflected both in an extreme 
tension between the two and a preferred resolution oscillating between hyper-libertarian 
revolution and privatist withdrawal, with commitment even to movement organisations a 
major and precarious achievement. 
The local rationalities at the root of the counter culture, then, are responses to situations 
structured by previous movements from above (the “Fordist mode of production” (Harvey 
1990)) and below (the state-centred movement forms of social democracy, Stalinism and 
mainstream trade unionism along with hierarchically oriented nationalist movements and 
the state-oriented first-wave women’s movements). The resulting “high modern” social 
order (Giddens 1990) - characterised by the dominance of productive capital, nation-states, 
and “organised” modes of representation and consumption - is a good illustration of 
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Touraine’s (1981) point that the stakes of movement struggles are the “historicity” or 
capacity for self-direction of “a society” and in a sense constitute that society through the 
institutions set up on both sides to manage this conflict (Lash and Urry 1987) - the 
interventionist state, the welfare state, organised capital and labour, the service class, mass 
political parties, technocratic national planning, frequently “pillarised” societies, and so on. 
The first counter cultural challenge 
It is this order - hence also this definition of what is at stake - that is challenged, both from 
above and from below, in the late 60s and early 70s. A useful metaphor for this is 
MacIntyre’s: “the problem about real life is that moving one’s knight to QB3 may always 
be replied to with a lob across the net” (cited in Barker 1997: 9). In other words, a routine 
move within the struggles of one particular order (Kt-QB3) can be met at any time with a 
move that opens “a whole new ball game”. 
The challenge from below appears to come first. It consists not only of the “political” 
challenge symbolised as “1968” - the libertarian rejection of organised state solutions, 
whether of the left or of the right; the populist rejection of the Cold War and in particular 
the proxy battle in Vietnam (Herring 1998; where the “stakes of struggle” between the two 
proxy states also clearly constituted a key range of social relations between first and third 
world), the wildcat and rank-and-file challenge to the institutions of corporatist mediation, 
the feminist challenge to the barriers excluding women from and segregating them within 
the public sphere, the black challenge to the imposition of an ethnic division of labour33.  
The challenge is also the “cultural” rejection of existing social relations symbolised by 
“1967” - the rejection of the nuclear family as site of power and consumption by sexual 
liberationists, gay and lesbian activists, radical feminists and alternative parenting; the 
rejection of Fordist labour discipline and organised consumption by youth movements 
from Mods and Rockers to hippies and through communal, alternative and religious 
withdrawals from that world (Partridge 1973); the rejection of existing cultural forms 
through new music, drug subcultures and alternative media; the rejection of dominant 
                                                
33 In terms of Giddens’ (1990) dimensions of high modernity, all four are directly tackled in the movements 
of this period, emphasising the depth of the rejection of the existing stakes of existing movement conflicts - 
for example, antifascism in West Germany challenging the nation-state; anti-militarist action around the 
globe, challenges in the anti-nuclear movement to capitalist industrialism, and widespread critiques of police 
and intelligence surveillance, etc. 
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ideologies and discourses and the creation or revival of Marxist, feminist, pseudo-Indian, 
pseudo-Chinese, ecological etc. systems of knowledge (Eyerman and Jamison 1991).  
The point here is not to draw neat boundaries between the two; as in any “moment of 
collective effervescence” political commitment brings new cultural choices, and cultural 
issues bump up against political relations of force. Nor is the point to argue that these 
movements were consistent, successful, immune to incorporation or whatever. It is to 
observe that they mark a widespread (in the sense of mass participation) and dramatic (in 
the perception of participants, opponents and contemporaries) breach with the existing 
forms of social relations - in other words, a rejection of the stakes, formations and 
strategies of the existing “war of position” between organised capital and organised labour 
within nation-state contexts (Leggewie 1998). 
Although many of these movements did indeed fail or were incorporated, it would be a 
mistake to hold that they failed to challenge the existing hegemony successfully. This is 
clear from the widespread resort to unusual forms of coercion on the part of state 
authorities from the USA to Mexico and from Prague to Paris (Katsiaficas 1987, Caute 
1988) - as we recall, for Gramsci coercion marks the limits of consent; in particular (we 
might note from a Weberian point of view) what is widely seen as illegitimate violence: 
Chicago 1968, the WTO invasion of Czechoslovakia, the role of the RUC and B Specials in 
northern Ireland (McCann 1993), or de Gaulle’s implicit threat to “do a Thiers” in France. 
To the extent that this challenge was contained (cf Storey 1994), it was contained by a new 
form of movement project from above (cf Brinkley 1998 on the Right as the main 
beneficiary of 1968 in America). 
The response from above 
This latter can be identified as the “disorganising” or “globalising” (depending on whether 
we view it from the point of view of the nation-state or that of the world-system) strategy 
of the global service class in particular since the oil crashes of 1973 - 75. This regime 
change (in Arrighi’s (1994) terms, the shift to investment in finance capital or C - M1) and 
the service class actor that brought it about (Sklair 1995) have been extensively studied 
(Lash and Urry 1987) as have the “internal” reasons (internal to the logic of capital, that is) 
driving this changeover (Harvey 1990, Jameson 1990). What needs to be stressed, however, 
is that the idea underlying these analyses, of a self-sufficient logic of capital, is deeply 
flawed (Thompson 1977a). Arrighi, following Braudel (1974), even recognises that 
“capitalism” as such, in the sense of the flows of capital, is only one element even of 
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“productive” economic activity; but this insight is not followed by any significant changes 
to his largely “internalist” model. 
Following Singh (1999), I would argue that hegemony always entails an active taking 
account of and responding to pressure from below, pace Foucault (1979), it is not a matter 
of the top-down imposition of an internally coherent system, discourse or discipline, 
against which resistance is individual and negligible in terms of its effects. The insulation of 
“pure” capitalism from the social world it depends on is itself a complex achievement 
which is regularly threatened. In “1968” the existing institutions for managing and 
channelling pressure from below failed - most symbolically in the first Matignon round, 
where the CGT’s negotiators were booed out of Boulogne-Billancourt by a workforce 
whose demands had suddenly far outreached what “the system” could deliver (Joffrin 
1988). Similarly, the “managed consumer” was no longer given -whether the demise of the 
1950s consumption idyll, the breakup of the existing music market and particularly the 
elite-popular distinction (signalled practically by the success of 1960s musicians in gaining 
the creative control their 1950s predecessors had not had), the rise of drug subcultures or 
the refusal of the work ethic (Berger, Berger and Kellner 1974). Finally, the general shift in 
favour of movements from below (underpinned by near-full employment) threatened 
profit margins through rising wage claims but also the growing pressure to turn 
“externalities” into “internal costs” (rises in welfare, pressure for more rights for women 
and minority workers, pressure to take ecological considerations into account) and the 
extension of “decommodified” areas (Offe 1984). 
The “inward investment” of organised capitalism, in other words, now found itself 
operating within a new context which was deeply unfavourable to continuing profit rates at 
levels higher than could be achieved by financial investment. Thus the switch of the 1970s, 
with all its well-known consequences from structural mass unemployment to new global 
divisions of labour, was in a sense a forced pull-out from an increasingly unfavourable 
battlefield and in this sense both an admission of tactical defeat and an unintended 
consequence of the growing strength of movements from below, not so much between 
1968 and 1973-5 as between 1945 and 1968. So this shift was also a strategic moving of the 
battle to a more favourable terrain, or (to extend MacIntyre’s metaphor) if the response 
“from below” to the sedate Kt-QB3 of the corporatist system was a lob over the net, the 
response “from above” was to move the goalposts. 
I am not of course suggesting that this was the perception of the global service class as a 
whole, though the social and cultural cohesion of the group and its “directive and 
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theoretical” organising role does suggest that insofar as any group can be a conscious social 
actor (cf Melucci 1989), it is they. But I do want to argue that the dominant internalist and 
purely economistic account of the reasons for the shift from M - C to C - M1 or from 
organisation to disorganisation needs to be put in context and seen as the way the global 
service class understood (within the language of relative profits which is after all its native 
language, not just ideologically but also the way it coordinates its practice) the new context 
it found itself in. Again following the logic of its own language, it considered this in the 
instrumental terms of the changing returns on profits rather than asking after the cultural 
and political reasons for this change. These latter kinds of questions were asked somewhat 
later, as new state elites tried to remake their territories and populations - and states - to 
respond to this changing investment pattern. If there are 5 years between 1968 and the first 
oil crash in 1973, there are another 5 between the decisive crash in 1975 and the arrival of 
Thatcher (1979) and Reagan (1980) in power, widely understood (Hall 1988) as the 
development of a new kind of hegemonic movement from above34. 
Just as in large part the hegemony of the globalising project depends on its ability to 
capture and coopt pressures from below, so movements from below in this period have 
largely been successful to the extent that they have been “pushing on an open door”. Thus, 
women’s movements’ demands arose primarily out of a situated (in class and ethnic as well 
as gender terms) perception of women’s needs. However, the relative readiness of capitalist 
states to facilitate women’s entry to the labour market (Walby 1990) as compared to their 
relative unwillingness to make serious childcare provision (except where, as in Sweden, 
women’s movements had strong positions within the state, or where as in France natalist 
commitments - for military and ethnic reasons - outweighed economic considerations) is 
best explained in terms of the growing pressure in the globalist project for the 
commodification of all potential labour and the declining willingness to make concessions 
on profits - and is in some measure a sign of the extent to which the new order “works” 
for capital, but also of the increased hegemonic power of the new order as against the old. 
Preconditions for the war of position 
If the disorganising project of the global service class cannot be seen in purely internal 
terms, neither can the project of the counter culture. In this section I will suggest some 
                                                
34  Incidentally, alternative responses were possible: though Kohl in 1982 follows the same lines, France and 
Italy moved leftwards with Mitterrand and Craxi, with varying degrees of success. 
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general considerations as to how we can understand contemporary movements from below 
in a historical as well as a dialectical framework, in other words how we can locate the counter 
culture within the long history of movement conflicts. To be able to challenge the existing 
hegemony so successfully in the late 1960s and early 1970s (successfully not in the sense of 
achieving all their goals, though a surprising number of concessions - from welfare to 
voting age to withdrawal from Vietnam to an end to gerrymandering - were extracted, but 
rather in the sense outlined earlier of forcing a whole new strategy on their opponents in 
capital and the state: a strategic victory, in other words (Capanna 1998)) there had to be a 
considerable period of prior development. 
As is to be expected within a highly institutionalised order, this development was 
fragmented and rather “working towards” convergence than starting from any common 
point: to be a coherent social actor, even briefly, is a major achievement and usually only 
sustained over time through control over resources to enable unproblematic routinisation. 
Important developments of this period - from the early 1950s to the mid 1960s - include 
the development of new campaigning (Black Civil Rights’ development of non violent 
direct action) and organising (the British peace movement’s achievement in sustaining a 
national political campaign outside party-political structures) skills; the development of a 
whole range of “New Left” theories across the Northern hemisphere and in a series of 
Third World countries; the creation of significant autonomous subcultural spaces in youth 
lifestyles from Beats to hippies; the development of a new range of techniques of the self 
from “Movement organising” to “psychedelic voyaging”, etc. (Gitlin 1988). Most crucially, 
but least spectacularly, it involved the development of new networks of cooperation 
(through drug use as much as through student politics), new means of communication 
(from beat literature via the alternative press to rock music), new ways of experiencing the 
self, new agreement on shared goals (the rhetoric of liberation) and new “repertoires of 
contention” (the sit-in, non-violent direct action (NVDA), street theatre, the student 
occupation, etc.) 
This kind of movement project is of course still quite vague: ideas may seem clearer than 
practice, convergence may mask mutual misunderstanding, and when the time comes some 
participants may vanish while new people are mobilised. Nevertheless this “Movement” - 
at the time usually referred to in the singular, marking precisely this looseness of definition 
but also its widely shared character - was a necessary condition for the “war of movement” 
of 1968: not that action could not take place “spontaneously” once the possibility was seen, 
but that “spontaneous” participants drew their sense of “what to do”, “how to do it” and 
“why” from the “frames” offered by the existing movement project. This dialectic was of 
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course crucial for making 1968 a world-revolutionary moment, as it had been at the end of 
the First World War or in 1848, but can best be seen in a single country such as France, 
where despite the fact that (unlike West Germany or the USA) the events of May took the 
state and media totally by surprise, Hamon and Rotman (1987, 1988) have shown the prior 
development of new leadership elites in the French “New Left” - not only the Situationists, 
but crucially the opposition to the Algerian War. In terms of repertoire, the movement very 
obviously drew on the Parisian tradition of urban revolt, and in terms of themes in 
constant reference to West Germany, America and Czechoslovakia as well as Vietnam 
(Caute 1988). 
The war of movement 
This new period, then, from about 1967 to 1969 in countries such as France, West 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, the USA or Northern Ireland, falls within what Gramsci (using 
metaphors from the First World War) designated the “war of movement”: the head-on 
challenge to the central relations of coercive power (1975 [1932-1934]: 1613 - 1616). Later 
writers have either celebrated the location of “new social movements” within civil society 
(Cohen 1985, 1996, Offe 1985) or denied that there is a “Winter Palace” to storm at all 
(Jordan and Lent 1999). To the first it is sufficient to observe that this argument entails a 
total separation between “1968” and “new social movements”; a better way of putting it 
might be to say that what they describe as new social movements are precisely movements 
from below within the “war of position” in civil society that Gramsci thought necessarily 
preceded the “war of movement” in Western European contexts (1975 [1930-32]: 865-
867)35. 
As to the latter point, the value of Gramsci’s argument is precisely that whether power is 
concentrated in one strategic point or not is a question of what kind of society we live in. 
In “peripheral” countries, “the state is everything and civil society nothing”, and (as in 
Russia) there really is a Winter Palace to storm, and by so doing power relations really do 
change, for good or ill. In “core” countries, this is not the case and power has precisely to 
be conquered slowly in civil society before an attack on the state can succeed. Yet even if it 
is not the only, or even the most important, site of social power relations, any serious 
                                                
35  In relation to the relative isolation of the West German and American movements and the electoral 
triumph of de Gaulle, it could be argued that Gramsci was correct as far as the core goes, though the need to 
call on external force in Northern Ireland and Czechoslovakia suggests that, as he himself observed, this 
situation obtains in some societies - Italy - and not in others - Russia. 
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attempt at transforming those relations will sooner or later bump up against the legal and 
administrative framework of the state and its coercive machinery. Furthermore, the ability 
to challenge the state seriously, even if unsuccessfully, is a major achievement for a social 
movement, given the resources of consent and coercion at the state’s disposal. For these 
reasons, while “wars of movement” - successful or not - are only one “moment” of social 
movements, they are an important one, and conceptually and practically very different 
from “wars of position”. 
The direct challenge to the state reaches its height in the late 60s, then, with the occupation 
of inner-city Paris - and of the Bogside - the radicalisation of the Prague Spring and the 
Democratic Convention at Chicago. In each case, it is defeated in these terms of state power, 
whether by recourse to outside help (the British Army, the tanks of the Warsaw Pact) or by 
the internal resources of the old order, sufficient in the core to hold on to power at least 
temporarily (de Gaulle’s re-election followed by his resignation the next year; the 
implementation of emergency legislation in West Germany followed by the arrival of the 
SPD in power; the failure to get anti-war candidates selected in the USA followed by 
withdrawal from Vietnam, etc.) 
The war of position 
This led the counter culture into a “war of position”, at least within the core where this was 
possible. This is what is described by critical theorists approvingly in terms of self-limiting 
movements within civil society (minus the observation that actors limited themselves in 
part because they were aware of the existence of effective limits set by clubs and bayonets 
in a way their predecessors of a few years ago had often not been). It is thus a period 
within which the tendency is often to avoid general claims of a kind that would lead their 
proponents to run up against what they perceived as the existing limits beyond which 
violent intervention would follow. This has to do less with the idealist explanation of the 
problems with universalist ideas and more with the practicalities of alliance and movement-
building: broad and far-reaching alliances are both more necessary preconditions and more 
plausible byproducts of mounting a serious challenge to the state than they are of 
campaigns within the fragmented and fragmenting terrain of the welfare state and cultural 
formations. 
Consistent with this, organisation (including violent and illegal organisation) around broad 
and radical ideas has remained possible where the counter culture has been able to survive 
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as a pillarised subculture in its own right36 (eg Germany or Italy); where this has been 
simulated in small-group contexts (cadre parties and terrorist organisations in the 1970s); in 
contexts of desperation, marginalisation and utopianism (Rastafarianism, squats, 
communes); or where “civil society was nothing” or more to the point the state had lost 
massively in legitimacy (Czechoslovakia, Northern Ireland). 
This long war of position between counter cultural and disorganising projects, now roughly 
25 years old, has not been fought only from below, although as e.g. McKay’s (1996) work 
shows the counter-cultural struggle from below has its own history and developments - the 
rise of women’s and anti-nuclear movements in the early 70s, the development of 
organised urban and rural “scenes”, the flourishing of zines, bookshops, cafés, venues, 
alternative radio stations etc., the entry of Marxist, feminist and minority work into the 
academy, the development of women’s refuges, community development projects, anti-
racist work, third world solidarity centres etc. into a grey area in and on the fringes of the 
welfare state, etc37.  
It has also been a struggle waged insistently from above: Thatcher’s attack on the GLC and 
the neo-conservative rollback of challenges to dominant cultural forms in Britain and the 
USA; intensive policing and intelligence intervention from attacks on Black Panthers and 
Red Brigades to the rollback of civil rights in West Germany and the exclusion of radicals 
from state employment; the “war on drugs” and moral panics over new religions; the 
physical restructuring of inner-city areas (Berman 1983), and more generally an ongoing 
discourse of trivialisation (“hippies”), demonisation (“terrorists”), and silencing (“Sixties 
                                                
36 See Poguntke (1989) for an analysis of “realignment” within European party systems, consistent with this 
argument. 
37 A similar analysis is found in Taylor and Whittier (1995): 
“Rooted in the radical feminist movement of the early 1970s, lesbian feminists built an extensive 
network of alternative institutions such as bookstores, music festivals, self-defense and martial arts 
schools, rape crisis centers, publishing houses, and travel agencies. The communities nourished a 
complex oppositional culture in which participants politicized the actions of daily life [.…] We found 
that in the hostile climate of the 1980s, the culture of lesbian feminist communities not only served to 
comfort, protect, and console activists in retreat, but also nourished women involved in myriad 
protests, both within and outside the women’s movement.” (1995: 165) 
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ideals”) geared to undermining the “conditions of plausibility” of countercultural ideas and 
practices38. 
It is this general context that forms the rational core for the fragmenting and naïve analyses 
of “new social movements” (reifying a particular moment of this history as universal), 
“postmodernism” (as Harvey (1990) and Jameson (1990) have argued, catching something 
of the experience but failing to understand it and often refusing the project of 
understanding), “postmaterialism” (treating the complex orientations produced in struggle 
as simple linear products of psychological development), etc. Unlike neo-traditionalist left 
writers (e.g. Eagleton 1996), I am not suggesting that these authors are not responding to 
real experiences, but rather that they are abstracting those experiences from an actual 
history of struggle between situated social forces.  
If we relocate those experiences within their historical context, “new social movements” 
writing (Roth and Rucht 1987) appears as capturing one part of movement projects from 
below during the “war of position”, but confusing the issue by bracketing both 1968 and 
state responses out of consideration and so offering purely endogenous - and often 
mechanistic - explanations of changing movement orientations (Bagguley 1992). 
“Postmodernist” writing (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe 1985) registers the breakdown of a 
historically specific moment of counter-hegemony but fails to see the broader structures 
established from above within which this loss of “grand narratives” operates (Jameson 
1990). Similarly, the concept of “postmaterialism” (Inglehart 1990) treats orientations 
which are in fact complex movement achievements (Melucci 1989) as the mechanical products 
of particular childhood environments. In other words, these approaches are curiously weak 
on agency, both that of movements from below and that of movements from above and 
tend to ignore the latter or take it for granted.  
                                                
38 The war of position has itself of course also had a developmental history, though contrary to many idealist 
and Anglophone writers this has varied enormously from one local situation to another (see e.g. Threlfall 
1996 or Kaplan 1992 on European women’s movements; Richardson and Rootes 1995 or Müller-Rommel 
1989 on European Green Parties). It is possible that it is changing shape again, and even returning to a war of 
movement, as social-democratic governments across Europe, some with significant “New Politics” input, 
demonstrate the narrow limits available “within the system”; as new kinds of direct action spread across the 
minority world (eg McNeish 1999); and as new kinds of alliances “from below” between movements are 
explored (Encuentros; June 18th; Reclaim the Streets etc.) This theme will be picked up again in chapter 
seven. 
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As we shall see (chapters five and six), contemporary movement participants do not 
necessarily confine themselves to “old” or “new” movements alone; do not always refuse 
to see themselves within broader perspectives; and to the extent that they step outside 
dominant frameworks of meanings and practices, this begins with a dissociation from other 
people in comparable social contexts. To make these kinds of judgements, however, we 
need first to be able to account for our own claims to understand the local rationalities of 
movement participants (chapter four). 
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Chapter four: the politics of knowledge 
Introduction 
On the basis of the arguments developed to date, the key problem facing social movement 
researchers is to develop a methodology capable of guiding effective research into local 
rationalities while being sensitive to the power relations involved in moving from local 
rationalities to movement projects and retaining a sense of openness, potentiality and 
totality. 
In this chapter, I argue for the centrality of research on the skilled activity of ordinary 
participants as a means of examining local rationalities; examine the methodological 
problems arising from this; and discuss the implications for my own research. 
Starting-points: the local rationalities of 
“movement milieux” 
The argument developed in chapter three sees “social movement” as a directional activity 
proceeding (at its most developed) from local rationalities to campaigns to movement 
projects. This coincides, as far as the first two categories are concerned, with Melucci’s 
(1989) view that social movements are complex accomplishments underpinned by 
“submerged networks” for which mobilisation (as “campaigns” in my terms) is only one 
possible mode of activity, contrasted to that of “latency”: 
“The normal situation of today’s ‘movement’ is a network of small groups submerged in 
everyday life which require a personal involvement in experiencing and practicing cultural 
innovation. They emerge only on specific issues, as for instance the big mobilizations for 
peace, for abortion, against nuclear policy, etc. The submerged network, though composed 
of several small groups, is a system of exchange (persons and information circulate along 
the network; some agencies, such as local free radios, bookshops, magazines provide a 
certain unity.) […] Latency creates new cultural codes and makes individuals practice 
them.” (1985: 800) 
A similar assessment is present in Vester et al.’s (1993) focus on local movement milieux as 
relatively stable structures underlying the rise and fall of movement activity. But to make 
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this identification is not yet to have a theoretical grasp of such milieux capable of 
grounding research. 
Conceptual issues 
The ultimate shape of this assessment, in an author like Melucci, is still determined by a 
conceptual separation between networks and movements “proper”,  tied to a conception 
of movement which remains governed by a political reductionism. This is not the standard 
reading of Melucci, so it is worth going into some detail. Although for Melucci movements’ 
effects on the wider world are achieved at least as much through the “signs” sent by their 
organisational structure (1989: 60) as through any instrumental effect on the state, and 
although movement networks and milieux (in effect, alternative public spheres) are 
acknowledged to have an independent existence (1989: 60, 70), what ultimately appears to 
constitute a movement is presence in the dominant public sphere (cf. 1989: 72). At the 
same time, however, Melucci suggests that movement networks are ultimately dependent 
on political activity, which renders the whole argument rather circular (1989: 71 - 2; cf. 
1985: 801) and leads to the “paradoxical” (incoherent?) conclusion that 
“[U]nless collective action is represented it becomes fragmented and dispersed; at the same 
time, because it is never fully capable of representation it reappears later on new ground, 
with changed objectives and altered strategies.” (1989: 72) 
The real difficulty seems to be with Melucci’s concepts: his practical understanding of the 
actual range (from everyday life to challenges to the state) and diversity (from cultural to 
political) of social movements doesn’t really fit into a definition of social movement as 
ultimately political. Although he is a good enough sociologist to sacrifice consistency of 
conceptual usage for the sake of his substantive understanding, he does not try to develop 
concepts adequate to that understanding. While he is prepared at one point to argue that 
“[l]atency and visibilty are the two interrelated poles of collective action” (1989: 70) and 
that 
“there is a major difference between mobilization and a movement […] [M]ovements live 
in another dimension: in the everyday network of social relations, in the capacity and will 
to reappropriate space and time, and in the attempt to practice alternative life-styles” 
(1989: 71) 
nevertheless he treats “violence and terrorism” (1989: 58), “the proliferation of neo-
religious groups and the move towards hard drugs” (1989: 59), and “sects, emotional 
support circles or therapy groups” (1989: 72) as not part of the “everyday network of social 
The politics of knowledge 
 117 
relations” or of “collective action”, despite the fact that he proceeds to devote considerable 
space to discussion of struggles around issues such as the body and mental health. A 
possible reading of this would be to see this as an opposition of “the search for 
individuation” (1989: 59) to “collective action”, but one page earlier the former was seen as 
a shift within within the “development of a new model of collective action” (1989: 58). In 
an earlier work, Melucci had noted 
“In the field of collective action the lack of more adequate concepts makes it difficult to 
get rid of a notion such as ‘social movement’; but I am aware that the concept of 
‘movement network’ is a temporary adjustment covering a lack of more satisfactory 
definitions and perhaps facilitating the transition to another paradigm.” (1985: 799) 
Refocussing research 
Within a materialist theory of social movement, however, political campaigns are seen as 
one possible product of local rationalities, which latter are of interest in themselves as the 
ultimate explanans, and not simply to the extent that they produce explicitly “political” 
effects. If articulated political action is an initial explanandum, then, the search for its cause 
leads to the discovery that the same cause may explain other forms of social action - as 
Thompson put it, “the Luddite cropper […] the ‘utopian’ artisan, and even the deluded 
follower of Joanna Southcott” (1963: 12) as much as the committed trade unionist or the 
socialist organiser39.  
As the concept of “movement” broadens and deepens, so too does the focus of research; 
notably, it moves one step “down” from elaborated ideologies and formal organisations to 
the movement milieux, local rationalities and ordinary participants out of which the former 
grow. This is an important shift in focus for a historical sociology - both in the sense that 
this “history from below” is looking at more “fundamental” features of particular historical 
periods40 and in the sense of retaining a clearer sense of openness and determinacy. When 
                                                
39 As Robbins (1988) shows, the sociology of “new religious movements” has drawn quite explicitly on the 
social movements and new social movements literature for some time; see also Hannigan 1993. 
40 In the sense of longer-lasting and potentially productive of multiple campaigns: as Davies and Flett put it, 
writing of “hidden from history” approaches to researching activism,  
“[T]he ideas are carried forward and, from time to time, developed by networks of activists. It is these 
activists who are hidden until the next upsurge of struggle occurs when they surface to influence that 
struggle to one degree or another” (1999: 3). 
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we research local rationalities, the determining situations to which they are skilled 
responses come more fully into focus.  
On the other hand, a focus on local rationalities alerts us to the openness of what 
participants do with them. If we start from a specific product of local rationalities, we can 
either restrict ourselves to describing it or - constructing a retrospective or synchronic 
account - produce a causal discussion suggesting that it has to be this way and no other. 
Yet the owl of Minerva only needs to fly at dusk - and the Angel of History only needs to 
look backwards - if our sole focus is on the existing products of social action. If we are 
interested in the shapes of that action itself, we can both show how actors combine it in 
particular ways and why, without implying that it has to be this way. In other words, we can 
produce open concepts which can be of use for movement participants in considering their 
own action: by reflecting their own action back to them, certainly, but also by introducing a 
concept of skill which makes of action not simply an instrumental goal-rationality, an 
automatic reaction to conditions or a discourse in action, but rather something which is 
hard to produce, which comes out of a history, a context and an attempt at collective 
action, and which we can do more or less well. 
Methodological implications 
The proposition that local rationalities are the way in which the everyday activities of social 
networks are structured conceals two important methodological shifts. The first is that it 
gives no a priori ontological primacy to political activities, or to activities of any particular 
type. It may be that these networks are thoroughly politicised - or it may be that politics is 
simply one aspect, and not necessarily the most important, of the inner life of such 
networks. Politicisation makes for a certain coherence; it is not, however, as the history of 
cultural conflicts in Britain suggests (McKay 1996), the only way to achieve that 
“representation” that concerns Melucci41. As Touraine writes: 
                                                
41 Representation is only one aspect of the development of campaigns and movement projects, along with co-
operation, organisation, theoretical articulation etc. The extent to which movements need to develop their 
“representation”, for example within a parliament or the mass media, is historically conditioned by the 
existence or otherwise of these institutions, as well as by their relevance vis-a-vis movement-internal 
organisations; in the terms of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), it is a sign above all of the breakdown of cleavage 
alignment.  
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“[A]ll aspects of social and cultural organization manifest, instead of general values, both 
cultural patterns and power relations, and the social movements which express them.” 
(1985: 766) 
The point is not to exclude the political, rather to relativise it and rethink its meanings; as 
Gordon puts it,  
“If political is to do with power, there are ways in which the masses are involved in 
political activity and political relationships in their daily lives. There is no reason why 
questions of power, even the measurement of power, should not be fit into descriptions 
of, for example, women’s writing, mothering, housework, or leisure.” (1986: 25) 
A second shift is that no special priority is given to the experiences of “intellectuals” in the 
sense of specialised organisers and thinkers. Instead, the emphasis is on the ways in which 
“all human beings are intellectuals”, that is, organise their everyday lives and think and talk 
about it. This may be particularly relevant in contemporary movements, where, as Offe 
writes, 
“while there are at best rudimentary membership roles, programs, platforms, 
representatives, officials, staffs, and membership dues, [these movements] consist of 
participants, campaigns, spokespeople, networks, voluntary helpers, and donations…. 
[T]here seems to be a strong reliance upon de-differentiation, that is, the fusion of public 
and private roles, instrumental and expressive behavior, community and organization, and 
in particular a poor and at best transient demarcation between the roles of ‘members’ and 
formal ‘leaders’.” (1985: 829 - 830) 
The weight of “the political” and of full-time participants, then, is particularly weak in the 
counter culture in general by comparison with the movement projects of organised 
capitalism (and in Ireland by comparison with core countries). Even in other contexts, 
however, it is useful to problematise this relationship rather than take it for granted. 
Movement milieux 
To study social movements from below, finally, it is useful to look at milieux where the 
alternative local rationalities relevant to these movements have been relatively well 
developed, in other words at areas of the social world where the hegemonic rationality has 
been at least partially challenged. 
Hence a focus on movement networks, sets of social relationships which are already 
significantly structured or created around alternative local rationalities. This need not be, 
and for movements from below probably never can be, a total thing; some elements of the 
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dominant rationality are necessarily present wherever it is dominant. But it would be 
difficult to study local rationalities in any positive, active sense (as opposed to the purely 
defensive sense of “resistance”, which has been studied in depth (e.g. Hall and Jefferson 
1991)) without looking at contexts where they have been worked out to some extent in 
practice and have achieved a certain level of development and complexity42. 
“Movement milieux” (Vester 1993: 124 - 125”) - long-standing networks that routinely 
produce campaigning mobilisation, and where elements of counter-hegemonic movement 
projects are present in practice and theory - are then particularly useful both as a way of 
situating existing campaigns and movement projects in relation to particular local 
rationalities and as a way of thinking about what other possible articulations - as campaigns 
and movement projects - these rationalities could have given rise to in the past and might 
give rise to in the future. 
Skil l and knowledge 
How can local rationalities be researched, then? Rationality, in the related approaches of 
Weber (1984), Lukács (1971) and Habermas (1984, 1987a) appears initially as a rationalist 
category - that is, one (apparently if not always in practice) derived from relatively abstract 
considerations of social theory  - possible sources of legitimacy or more exactly possible 
kinds of legitimate reason for Weber, the objective situation of the proletariat vis-à-vis the 
social totality for Lukács, the implications of speech acts for Habermas. It then follows that 
what we can expect to find as the result of empirical research are essentially upsets of this 
pattern - disturbances and contingencies for Weber, political-theoretical failures (implicitly) 
for Lukács, deformation, instrumentalisation and colonisation for Habermas. 
While these are certainly not non-answers - for Weber, the empirical knowledge that is 
produced is found through this gap, while the pure type is presumably a more general 
contribution to scientific knowledge; for Lukács, there is presumably a process of 
increasingly rational action; for Habermas the two kinds of rationality are meticulously 
shown to have the same origin - none of these approaches leaves us much space to learn 
                                                
42 As Fantasia and Hirsch put it,  
“[W]e often find, constructed beyond the sight and earshot of the powerful, socially structured 
‘havens’ that, in the context of acute social struggle, serve as a social encasement for oppositional 
cultural creation, providing a spatial and social-organizational basis for cultural transformation.” (1995: 
146) 
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from the social world, which is of course a common difficulty with rationalist accounts. An 
alternative way of putting this objection is that categories such as “instrumental rationality”, 
“value-rationality”, “substantive rationality”, “formal rationality” and “communicative 
rationality” are themselves formal rather than substantive. Until we know what results, what 
values, what form, what substance, what criteria of truth, sincerity and normative rightness 
are employed, we have a highly formalist theory, which remains in essence a principle of 
classification: to be used in effective interpretation we need to go beyond these categories. 
Local rationality as skil l 
Within critical realist approaches, rationality comes to appear as a central, but only 
provisionally known category: no longer a function of the workings of language, but a way of 
thinking about how far our existing abilities - physical, mental and verbal - enable an 
effective engagement from specific locations with the not-yet-fully-known real. Another way of 
thinking this local rationality, then, might be skill. This understanding is particularly 
important to Gramsci’s conceptualisation of intellectual activity: 
“The active mass human being acts practically, but does not have a clear theoretical 
consciousness of this activity, which is however a knowledge of the world, in that it 
transforms it. In fact, their theoretical consciousness can be historically in contrast with 
their practical activity. It can almost be said that they have two theoretical consciousnesses 
(or one contradictory consciousness): one implicit in their activity and which truly unites 
them with all their collaborators in the practical transformation of reality; and one which is 
superficially explicit or verbal, which they have inherited from the past and have accepted 
without criticism. Nevertheless, this ‘verbal’ consciousness is not without consequences: it 
connects them to a given social group and influences them in their moral conduct and in 
the direction of their will, in more or less energetic ways, which can lead to a point in 
which the contradictory nature of their consciousness does not permit any action, any 
decision or any choice, and produces a situation of moral and political passivity. Critical 
self-understanding thus comes about via a struggle of political ‘hegemonies’, of opposing 
forms of direction, first in the field of ethics, then in that of politics, to arrive at a superior 
elaboration of their own conception of the real.” (Gramsci 1991: 1343) 
To rephrase this argument: human beings have two kinds of rationality available to them. 
One part of this is their practical knowledge, which can reasonably be described as skill 
                                                
43 The last part of this has already been quoted in chapter three. In this context, the construction of the link 
between local rationalities and movement projects as one of conflictual development becomes more visible. 
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insofar as this is the tacit knowledge (local rationality) of how to engage with the kinds of 
problems they find themselves faced with in the situations they are in. However, there is 
also the verbal knowledge available to them and the “official” ways of doing things. Under 
routine situations, of course, this is precisely where hegemony is deployed; under others, it 
could appear as the sedimented skill of a movement from below. Such movements seek 
precisely to give their tacit knowledge a recognised and institutionalised theory and practice 
by displacing existing “official” language and routines. This is the sense of Wainwright’s 
(1994) theorisation of the knowledge-productive role of social movements from below, 
elaborated within an explicit critical realist framework: movements from below know 
things about the world that are not captured by the “official story”.  
Skil l and social movements 
As Berger and Luckmann (1967) argue, institutions cannot exist without knowledgeable 
human activity; alternatively, we could say that institutions or practices are a means of 
making given modes of skilled activity practically available44. These modes of skilled 
activity, as Gramsci observes, can be prediscursive in the sense of contradicting currently 
hegemonic ways of talking and organising; they can also, however, become prediscursive 
through retraditionalisation, in the sense of becoming sufficiently institutionalised not to 
need verbal explanation, and in some cases of becoming so “taken-for-granted” as to be 
abstracted from lifeworld contexts altogether (consider Habermas’ (1984, 1987a) analysis of 
money and power. Language is itself a form in which skilled activity can be sedimented 
(consider the practical orientations embodied in the languages used to discuss emotion, 
ethics or kinship), but only one form among several. 
If human activity is practical learning activity, then skill is something that can be 
developed45; whether practically, in direct interaction with the natural and social world, or 
                                                
44 Eyerman and Jamison put this slightly differently:  
“[C]ognitive praxis is there, but its dimensions must be found by someone looking for them. They 
guide actors but not necessarily consciously or explicitly. Even more importantly, they cannot exist 
without the actors being guided by them. They are a kind of glue that makes a social movement what 
it is.”(1991: 62) 
45 It can also be lost, not only in contexts of deskilling but also in periods of reaction, which consist among 
other things in a sustained assault on the institutions that embody the skills of subordinate movements, from 
political parties and the movement media down to basic conceptions of the world: particular us / them 
distinctions, basic ethical categories such as solidarity, and so on. 
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indirectly, for example by transmission of particular modes of organising social movements 
and thinking about politics. The point of Marxist or feminist theory and organisation, 
insofar as they are “theories from and for movements”, is arguably precisely to enable such 
indirect learning, to avoid having to reinvent the wheel. 
Social movements are a privileged case of such learning, as Vester’s (1975) analysis of 
Thompson’s Making seeks to establish. For Vester, social movements represent “collective 
learning processes”, in which the elements Marx and Engels (1967) analyse as key to class 
conflict – an increasingly clearer self-understanding, a fuller grasp of social structure and 
historical process, and an increasingly adequate mode of organisation and struggle – are 
generated in the conflict with a movement’s opponents. Similarly, Eyerman and Jamison 
write: 
“The collective articulation of movement identity can be likened to a process of social 
learning in which movement organisations act as structuring forces, opening a space in 
which creative interaction between individuals can take place.” (1991: 55) 
Skil l and methodology 
This concept of skill involves a significant rethinking of conventional methodological 
categories, in that (a) verbalised accounts of skilled activity are a necessary part of 
maintaining, developing and transmitting it as well as of researching it. At the same time, 
they are unlikely to be complete. This is so (b) because of the relationship between tacit 
and verbal knowledge where tacit knowledge (though less stable and institutionalised than 
verbal) underlies the production of the latter and is routinely somewhat “ahead of” (more 
skilled than) what has been formalised. It is so also (c) because on this account skilled 
activity is itself a key element in social struggle - so that (as in the “hidden transcripts” 
argument) tacit skill may be (indeed routinely - that is, in hegemonic situations - is) running 
directly counter to verbalised skill or (as in the “Good Soldier Schweik” situation) playing 
with and on it in “second-order” ways. 
If skill is so central to movement action and social conflict, it is unsurprising that 
movement institutions devote much time and effort to transmitting it. As Eyerman and 
Jamison (1991) show, complex “professional” movements devote significant resources to 
elaborating “cosmological” (that is, ideological), organisational and technical knowledge. In 
less professional contexts - such as the Irish alternative press, or indeed in my own 
interviews in the counter culture in Dublin - one can get deeply frustrated (as a sociologist, 
but also as an activist) by the lack of explicit ideological or organisational discussion, and 
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the total preponderance of “technical” knowledge of an apparently “taken-for-granted” 
kind - pieces of legislation, polemic facts, misunderstandings about “Celtic” religion - with 
no explanation as to its purpose.  
But if this apparently “technical” discussion is fitted into a broader conception of skilled 
activity - how to win court cases, how to argue, how to build networks (to quote Watson et 
al. 1997, Campaigns: and how to win them!) - it starts to make more sense within the more 
general categories, widely deployed in the movement, of “information”, “resources” and 
“networking”. In the literature from more highly organised counter cultures, explicit 
discussions of skilled activity dominate the movement’s own literature: how to do NVDA, 
how to run a group, how to argue, how to keep yourself going, how to crack a squat, how 
to build a bong, how to avoid trenchfoot…. 
In my own interviews, four different institutional locations were particularly mentioned: the 
Dublin movement scene for its opportunity to learn from other people’s experience, the 
London squatting scene for the development of practical skills, literature on the American 
1960s as a source for indirect experience of social change, and interaction among 
engineering, computer and physics students geared towards solving technical problems (see 
also chapter six). One particular discussion centred around the book Ideal Home (Suspect 
1986), produced by London anarchists as a guide to squatting and travelling, and described 
by Irish ex-squatters in the following terms: 
Jim: It’s a remarkable book, you really should read through it. “How to break and enter.” 
[laughs] Cheers! [laughter] Legally. You know, it’s like, covers the complete legal situation 
on it, everything. 
Das: What’s it, it’s just called Ideal Home? 
Jim: It’s called Ideal Homes, yeah. It’s er, you know, “how to squat: the law.” - “Thankyou!” 
[laughs] 
Das: D’you remember that book? 
Jim: I forget who used to, it’s Crowbar 
Das: Right 
Jim: It was a squatter’s organisation. Crowbar used to distribute it. 
Das: Three of them, there were Crowbar, ASS and BSA. 
Jim: Yeah. [laughs] 
Das: Cause we had 
Jim: We had leaflets from all of them. [laughs] 
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Das: Yeah. Em 
Jim: Very useful stuff that was disseminated around the place, actually. 
Such literature is by no means unusual in this milieu. It is typically (like Ideal Home) focussed 
entirely on the practical46. The history of systematic attempts at stabilising and developing 
particular forms of knowledge goes back in the case of contemporary movements at least 
to Saunders’ Alternative England and Wales (1975) and Hoffman’s Steal this book (excerpted in 
Hoffman 1989). Comparable literature exists for continental Europe, from details of how 
to set up alternative radio stations (Network Medien-Cooperative 1983) via how to oppose 
the census (Rottmann and Strohm 1987 - which ran through at least 4 editions, 24 printings 
and 240,000 copies!) to how to carry out actions against arms firms (Maass 1983). And, of 
course, much of the alternative press is devoted to such matters, from computer encryption 
to details of forthcoming demonstrations, for which Green Anarchist was recently closed 
down by the British police (Atton 1997b). The production of such material continues 
unabated; one can now learn how to stop a road (Road Alert! 1997), how to organise a 
Rainbow Gathering (Rainbow Family 1995) or how to carry out direct action against 
genetically modified plants (Tulip et al. 1998).  
Where such explicit discussions of skill are available they represent a significant material 
and institutional achievement on the part of the movement - as the articulation, 
standardisation and transmission of “packages of knowledge” (see chapter three) - and 
offer a fruitful line of approach for researchers attempting to get at the tacit skill of the 
movement. Where, as in the Irish case, this is not available, the researcher’s task is more 
challenging, and I will discuss this further in the next section. 
Ethnographic sensitivity in research 
If the starting point of movement research is local rationality or skill, this raises the 
problem of epistemological sensitivity: how to capture this in research. Both researchers 
and participants have a tendency to adopt a “taken-for-granted” language; this is of course 
to some extent a feature of human activity generally, and is if anything weaker in 
movements from below, since as we have seen they involve a challenge to at least some 
forms of taken for granted knowledge and ways of doing things. Activists, then, are under 
                                                
46 The book proceeds from advice on particular acts via discussion of eviction proceedings and details of how 
to defend a squat to histories of successful squats and lists of contacts. 
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some constant pressure to bring new elements of tacit skill into the verbalised / 
institutionalised ways of talking and thinking. 
Researchers need be under no such pressure; and faced with the “official” discourse of a 
movement, they may as outsiders with perhaps no direct experience of the way discourse 
works within movements even “fall for it”. They may fail to see the movement as in any 
way different from their own life-experience; or they may adopt the “official story” 
(ideology and official organisation) for themselves without asking critical questions about 
its relationship to tacit ways of doing things. Both are deeply problematic; yet unless we 
theorise them as problems and set out to tackle them systematically we are likely to 
reproduce them.  
Thematising rationalities 
Firstly, researchers on social movements frequently fail to ask themselves questions about 
the rationalities involved in the movements they study, relying implicitly or explicitly on the 
assumption that the world “works” in the same way and things “mean” the same - if not 
universally, then at least between the researcher’s own rationality and the movement’s47. In 
particular, researchers frequently “impute” to movements (to quote Lukács’ (1971) most 
heavily criticised concept) an instrumentally rational orientation or an exclusive concern 
with the marking and demarcation of identity. The technical name for this is surely 
ethnocentricity - the failure to recognise the interpretive dimension to human action and to 
consider that other people’s rationality may not be the same as our own. For “outside” 
researchers the danger is then one of projecting external categories - because derived from 
their own rationality - onto participants’ discourses and action; for “insider” researchers, 
the danger is that of taking internal categories for granted.  
Effective and credible research, then, needs to place this problem squarely in the centre of 
research - how do we understand what people in a movement are doing given that the way 
they engage with the world (local rationality), how they are trying to tackle it (campaigns) 
and how they would like to remake it (movement projects) are potentially radically different 
(not to mention diametrically opposed) to those of other people in the same society - as 
well as the fact that movements are almost inevitably the subject of fierce conflict, 
controversy and struggles over representation? As Rosaldo puts it: 
                                                
47 Among the few counter-examples are Lichterman 1996 and Vester et al. 1993. 
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“There is no Archimedean point from which to remove oneself from the mutual 
conditioning of social relations and human knowledge. Cultures and their ‘positioned 
subjects’ are laced with power, and power in turn is shaped by cultural forms. Like form 
and feeling, culture and power are inextricably intertwined. In discussing forms of social 
knowledge, both of analysts and of human actors, one must consider their social positions. 
What are the complexities of the speaker’s social identity? What life experiences have 
shaped it? Does the person speak from a position of relative dominance or relative 
subordination?” (1993: 169) 
Whose rationality? 
Local rationality, then, has to be an explicit theme of movement research if it wants to be 
sensitive to this interpretive dimension. This much is recognised by Jean Cohen, who 
writes:  
“The access of interpretation to identity is through the interrogation of forms of 
consciousness. This procedure can take the form of an examination of theories so long as 
the theories in question are those or participants, produced for movements and, to an 
extent, within movements.” (1985: 665 - 666) 
But what Cohen does not do is to account for her own ability to select the theories to be 
examined, arguing instead that  
“[t]he new identity within contemporary social movements […] is in fact the only rational 
identity that is compatible with the organizational form and conflict scenario of 
movements today” (1985: 667; italics in original).  
Thus she arbitrarily opts for Gorz and Touraine in their “post-Marxist” phase (Farewell to 
the working class, Anti-nuclear protest) rather than their “68” phase (Strategy for Labour, Le 
mouvement de mai); for the Realos in die Grünen rather than the eco-socialists or the Aufbruch 
group. She may or may not be correct in her analysis, but it is hard to see how she can 
ground it other than in the ethnocentric assumption of her own version of rationality as the 
only possible way of seeing things48.  
I would argue, then, that research needs to ground itself adequately in a lived context which 
enables it to situate particular kinds of activity and ways of talking about it. It is not enough, 
in other words, to recognise the possibility of difference: researchers need to situate 
themselves in such a way that they can see how the “other” rationality works (as 
                                                
48 She makes no appeal to its adequacy to the empirical situation, and in fact this is ruled out by the logic of 
her argument, which aims precisely at understanding the actual situation via the theories of participants. 
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“outsiders”) - or see in what ways it differs from dominant forms of rationality (as 
“insiders”). This ideally implies a combination of “participatory” methods (membership, 
participant observation, action research), which generate a practical and theoretical 
engagement with the peculiarities of the movements’ local rationalities, with “theoretical” 
reflection on how this differs from dominant forms of rationality, but other approaches are 
possible: Hamon and Rotman (1988) locate the shift among the French New Left from 
Marxism to post-Marxism within the life-histories of their interviewees, while Raschke 
(1988) locates the different ideological strands of die Grünen within a picture of historical 
conflicts within the party and extensive interviews with party elites. It is possible, in other 
words, not only to thematise local rationality but to do so in reflexive ways that do not 
assume that “we” know what is rational and adequate in advance. 
An interesting illustration of the problem is given by Tilly’s (1985) analysis of police 
predictions of strike action in 1906, which, as he observes, was both accurate and useful to 
the government’s control of the situation, unlike the contemporary theorists Le Bon and 
Sorel: 
“I do not mean that the police agents of 1906 had a theoretical understanding of working-
class collective action. Instead, they had knowledge gained through two kinds of practice: 
as direct participants in many of the public actions of workers, and as recipients of 
information from observers who directly transmitted the militants’ plans and practical lore. 
In fact, there was and is a wide gap between ‘indigenous’ familiarity with popular collective 
action and the theories that constitute the language of government officials….” (1985: 726 
- 7) 
In other words, it was when the police drew on participatory understanding of the local 
rationalities of workers that they were effective. When they adopted “a language of order 
and disorder, of attitudes, of good workers and bad” (1985: 727) they had little to 
contribute. It is the former orientation that is useful to research. 
Seeing through ideologies 
A second problem can be phrased as working backwards from official or verbal discourse 
and organising activity to tacit knowledge, given the non-linear relations between the two. 
How can we find the tacit knowledge behind the official, and the situation behind the 
response, given that the one is not a mechanical reflection of or reaction to the other? The 
problem, as Thompson points out, is a general one: 
“evidence does not stand compliantly like a table for interrogation: it stirs, in the medium 
of time, before our eyes. These stirrings, these events, if they are within ‘social being’ seem 
The politics of knowledge 
 129 
often to impinge upon, thrust into, break against, existent social consciousness. They 
propose new problems, and, above all, they continually give rise to experience - a category 
which, however imperfect it may be, is indispensable to the historian, since it comprises 
the mental and emotional response, whether of an individual or of a social group, to many 
inter-related events or to many repetitions of the same kind of event [….] [C]hanges take 
place within social being, which give rise to changed experience: and this experience is 
determining, in the sense that it exerts pressures upon existent social consciousness, 
proposes new questions, and affords much of the material which the more elaborated 
intellectual exercises are about…” (1977a: 7 - 8) 
The way to engage effectively with the problem has to be through the skill of the actors 
themselves. On the one hand, if we choose situations where (originally tacit) “knowledge 
from below” has been able to displace official “knowledge from above”, at least to some 
extent - such as movement milieux - we can at least see how actors have managed, under 
the constraints of their situation and in pursuit of their purposes, to institutionalise and 
articulate something of their tacit skill in a form which - because designed for transmission 
- is purposely accessible to other human beings; and this last point is of course the basic 
principle behind participant observation (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995, Hammersley 
1989). While we may be some steps behind tacit skill, or may only find it articulated as 
“official” in some contexts, this gives us something at least to work with - with the added 
advantage that it has to an extent been “abstracted” from its originating contexts and thus 
rendered more easily communicable. Chapter six in particular attempts such an analysis. 
On the other hand, if we adopt reflexively participant positions, we can come to see 
something of how movement-official ideas and practices “work” by using them ourselves. 
If we are outsiders, we are unlikely to be as skilled at this as more experienced movement 
participants, but this is then a question of degrees of skill, rather than a situation of simply 
not knowing how the official language and structure “works”. In chapter seven I attempt 
to make something of this participant understanding explicit on the larger scale of the 
counter culture as a whole. 
Processual categories 
The passage from Gramsci quoted earlier continues as follows: 
“The consciousness of being part of a given hegemonic force (that is, political 
consciousness) is the first phase in a further and progressive self-consciousness in which 
theory and practice are finally unified. The unity of theory and practice, then, is also not a 
given mechanical datum, but a historical becoming, which has its elementary and primitive 
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phase in the sense of ‘difference’, of ‘distance’, of barely instinctive independence, and 
develops up to the real and complete possession of a coherent and unitary conception of 
the world.” (1991: 13 – 14) 
By implication, this political epistemology does not expect to find, in the normal course of 
affairs, completely developed movements from below that are capable of mounting a fully-
fledged practical and theoretical challenge to the social totality; such a situation represents 
rather the limiting case of a counter-hegemonic project on the brink of a revolution (as 
well, of course, as the normal situation of hegemonic movements from above). 
Nevertheless, this limiting case remains important as the most articulated self-expression of 
a given movement, illuminating most clearly its relation to the totality and to its opponents. 
What can this mean in practice for research on social movements? 
If our categories are to be historical ones, that is, geared to movements as they develop and 
are eroded over the short and long timescales of conflict, they must be oriented to the 
whole history of a movement, not simply its current appearance at a single moment in 
time. As Eyerman and Jamison write, 
“[A] cognitive approach to social movements means having a processual focus, seeing 
social movements as processes in formation. One of the main barriers to recognising social 
movements as producers of knowledge is the widespread tendency to reify them, to 
identify social movements with organisations, parties, sects, institutions etc.” (1991: 59) 
The tradition discussed in chapter three offers two related ways of thinking the problem. 
The first is outlined by Lukács in his discussion of “imputed class consciousness”. Given 
the disfavour into which the concept has fallen, it is worth noting that Lukács himself saw 
it as similar to Weber’s “ideal type”; it was oriented to asking what, all other things being 
equal, one could expect the interests and self-understanding of a particular class to be: 
“class consciousness consists in fact of the appropriate and rational reactions ‘imputed’ to 
a particular typical position in the process of production” (1971: 51; see p. 81, note 11 for 
the reference to Weber). 
The problems with this point of view have already been discussed. A second, less 
“contemplative” approach, to quote Lukács’own later critique of this concept, is Touraine’s 
(1981) methodology of sociological “intervention”. This is geared to discovering, in his 
case through a complex dialogical procedure between the researchers and specially 
constituted focus groups drawn from movement activists and opponents, the highest 
possible self-expression of a given movement; in other words, starting from its actual but 
fragmented position, to see how far and in what directions it is capable of understanding its 
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own nature and interests, those of its opponents, and of articulating an independent social 
project (see Borda 1993 for a related approach).  
The underlying methodology has come in for strong criticism, which I think misinterprets 
its goal. Such approaches are not trying simply to describe the specific situation of particular 
organisations of given social groups; rather, they are trying to identify both the local 
rationalities which are at the root of movement orientations and the directions in which 
those rationalities are articulated, theoretically and practically. In other words, within 
phenomena which are spread across considerable areas of time and space, express 
themselves in a great variety of ways and thematise many different issues, it is attempting to 
extend the logic implicit in participants’ skilled activity to a more comprehensive 
standpoint. My methodology retains something of this sense of directionality, but looks for 
it rather within participants’ existing attempts at direction-finding, both those internal to a 
particular network (chapters five and six) and those aiming at a wider movement project 
(chapter seven). 
Ethnographic sensitivity, participant reflexivity and an eye for the processual, then, are 
necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for understanding movements. In their absence 
we remain caught within our own taken-for-granted categories, on the “official” surface of 
movement institutions and ideologies or frozen in a particular moment; whereas if we 
thematise these issues and try to do something about them, we can at least start to “make 
sense” of social movements. In chapter three I have argued that the theoretical perspective 
I have adopted meets the ethnographic criterion of thematising the issue of rationalities; 
later on in this chapter I will argue that my research methods meet the reflexive criterion of 
engaging with the tacit skills of the actors by using participant knowledge to “locate” the 
research. In subsequent chapters, I will attempt to replace some of the sense of 
directionality. 
The politics of movement research 
The issues I have dealt with in this chapter so far concern firstly the question of what we 
research in social movements and secondly the question of how we handle the differences 
between rationalities and between official and tacit knowledge. But what if that knowledge 
is itself contested? The counter cultural milieu itself is not homogenous: one participant’s 
knowledge is not necessarily exchangeable with another’s. As Melucci (1989) has stressed, 
“movement” is an accomplishment: a movement project consists of the partial exercise of 
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hegemony over a range of campaigns and local rationalities49. The diverse nature of any 
movement project implies that movement milieux are likely to include people who 
participate in a wide variety of different ways and who have a wide range of ideological and 
practical agendas, whose pursuit is combined more or less effectively within the movement 
project as a whole. 
This contested nature of movement knowledge can be turned into a strength in various 
ways. In general terms, chapter three’s recognition that counter cultural rationality is not an 
abstract or an ideal given, but rather the actively produced result of learning and struggle 
(as local rationality) as well as of cooperation, coordination, communication and conflict (as 
campaign or movement project) offers a theoretical parallel to this research situation, and 
one which can sensitise researchers to “read” participants’ statements and actions more 
effectively than if they are taken to reflect a homogenous, static “discourse”. The 
relationships I have tried to construct between participants’ statements and between their 
statements and their life-situations, in chapters five and six, are hopefully of this former 
kind: trying to see people wrestling in their lives with problems I do not claim to have 
solved myself, but also alive to differences within this milieu. 
Collusion and conflict 
Firstly, the researcher, in their research, necessarily colludes with the micropolitics of some 
participants and conflicts with that of others. As feminist methodology has stressed (Lentin 
1993), research relationships are also power relationships50. To know the world, in critical 
realist perspectives, is always a practical intervention, in that we only know the world 
insofar as we engage with it, and we engage with it with particular, situated intentions. 
In other words, research structure and processes involve both practical organisation of 
social relationships (“directive intellectual activity”) and abstract verbal statements about 
what is involved (“theoretical intellectual activity”): researchers meet with some participants 
and not with others, in some contexts and not others, meet with them individually or in 
                                                
49 The contested nature of this hegemony is important: due to bad interviewing on my part, one interviewee 
fell back into a defensive mode, speaking within dominant discourses rather than alternative ones. His 
partner, however, told a different story! 
50 A similar argument could, I think, be distilled from Marxist arguments as to the relationship between given 
theories and doctrines and their authors’ political positions, organisational strategies and the social groups 
they sought to appeal to. Buried in the internecine polemics of the workers’ movement is a sophisticated 
conception of knowledge politics. 
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groups, in natural or “artificial” situations, say some things to them and not others, ask 
certain questions and not others, use closed or open questions, react in certain ways, 
intervene in this way or that, close the process at one point or another, organise their 
material in one direction or another, provide more or less access to their results and give 
more or less scope for feedback, do different things with their findings in pursuit of 
particular agendas, and so on. 
Since participants are also intellectuals, as Plows (1998) has observed, they are also engaged 
in this kind of process. The researcher, then, is not per se an alien intruder into a “natural” 
group context - although their methods may of course be alien or reassuringly familiar. It is 
not that questions of epistemology and ethics do not arise, rather that the key question here 
is not one of the authenticity of the research or the insider status of the researcher so much as 
of the politics of their research process. 
This can be assessed as one might assess the politics of any other participant: whose 
definitions of the movement are they aligning themselves with, and why? Whose 
experience of the movement are they reproducing, and why? Whose networks are they 
picking up on, and why? Whose agendas are they paralleling, and why? And, of course, 
whose definitions etc. are they not colluding with? If research parallels politics, in other 
words, one can ask what kind of political position a researcher assumes or simulates. 
It is along these lines that researchers need to give an account of themselves, both to the 
movement and to their professional peers: what kind of movement are they “constructing” 
(practically, in the organisation of the research; theoretically, in the account they give of it); 
what kind of position within the movement does this implicitly parallel? and what kind of 
position does it most sharply collide with? To give an adequate answer to these questions - 
as I will try to do at the end of this chapter and in chapter seven - is not to resolve all 
possible problems and put ourselves in the clear; it is, however, to make our knowledge 
“transparent” to others. 
The material preconditions of research 
Secondly, part and parcel of the social and power relations these set up between 
researchers and participants are the conditions for the employment of particular research 
methods. Research usually takes place in a context of power and inequality; in the case of 
social movements, typically also one of conflict. What situation does a researcher have to 
be in to use particular methods? Two examples can be given, from opposite ends of a 
spectrum. 
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In one case, the use of in-depth interviews with members of radical groups, to get anything 
more than “official stories” or even refusals and sabotage (cf. Kriesi 1992) a reasonable 
level of trust is needed. This is often gained in practice by researchers participating and 
contributing to the movement in ways that can convince participants of their bona fides: 
whether this means going on demonstrations, living on protest sites, or running the office. 
In the other case, that of the elaborate methods recommended by Touraine (1981) and 
Melucci (1989), the business of organising large focus group-style events, with video 
recordings in Melucci’s case and multiple iterations in Touraine’s, calls either for high levels 
of prestige and resources on the part of the researcher (for example, several interviewers 
are needed) or explicit deals with those involved (discussed at length by Melucci (1989, 
1995b). Clearly these general research situations, and not simply “methods” abstracted 
from the actual social context, need to be examined critically, and I will attempt to do this 
towards the end of this chapter51. 
Reflexivity and transparency 
Thirdly, movements are active constructions and as I have argued they are rarely static for 
long, in that they are constantly pushing against opponents who are always pushing back. If 
in this situation we want to produce a historical sociology which might be of some use to 
movement participants, perhaps the best service we can do them is to make this situation 
of “open determination” - that movements do not come from nowhere, but that there are 
always changes, choices and learning involved - as clear as possible by showing how we 
have constructed the movement and what the results are: in other words, something of the 
kinds of organisation and theorisation of the movement that is possible.  
While common in feminist and anthropological research, reflexivity is an extremely rare 
beast in the “social movements” literature, represented primarily by young postgraduates 
such as Maxey (1998) and Plows (1998). Rather than claiming to tell the actors the true 
meaning of their actions (by hiding the construction of our research and its situated nature) 
we can aim to furnish an (explicitly) situated reading which may offer them a way to 
                                                
51 A further issue is that of the implications of funding sources. As Jones (1993) points out, to date the only 
collection on researching social movements (Diani and Eyerman 1992) was co-funded by NATO, a fact 
mentioned without explanation in the introduction. Similarly, as Amin (1993: 103 – 104) points out, the 
American military funded large-scale counter-insurgency research in Latin America in “Project Camelot”. 
Tilly’s use of police files, cited earlier, reminds us that this is not a new situation. 
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identify the real choices available to them - and those which are not. Chapter seven 
attempts to offer such a reading of the counter culture. 
If this is so, then, an emancipatory politics of knowledge does not necessarily depend, as 
some authors (Ben-Habib 1983) seem to suggest, on the assumption of a straightforward 
underlying harmony of interests. Rather, it can be grounded in making visible the active 
accomplishment of solidarity in political activity and something of the nature of the context 
in which they are acting. Movement participants are of necessity reflexive to some degree, 
and it is by no means necessarily the case that researchers are better placed than they to see 
the movement as a whole.  
What research may offer them, however, is a second vantage point: if we can take the 
position we find ourselves in too much for granted, the value of an alternative position lies 
precisely in the distance and difference between its construction of a movement and our own. 
The real contribution of reflexive research is to open up this space to movement 
participants. From this point of view, then, reflexivity is not simply a methodological 
choice to be defended on grounds of its academic value; it is also an ethical choice that is 
of value to the movements we research. To say “I have looked at the movement from this 
point of view and through these experiences and so I see it this way” is emancipatory - or, 
more accurately, can be used by other people in an emancipatory way - where “The 
movement is like this” is not. In the next section, then, I will offer an account of how I did 
the research and why I did it that way: where the picture of the counter culture developed 
in this thesis is coming from. 
Problems of the research process 
Up to this point I have outlined a methodology for social movement research based on the 
theoretical perspective elaborated in chapter three. At this point, I will attempt to redeem 
some of the claims made to date52. I discuss three issues, in each case working “back” from 
a general methodological perspective to a particular discussion of method. Firstly, I move 
from the discussion of local rationalities to an account of the nature of the movement 
                                                
52 Of course the order of presentation and the order of intellectual production are to a large extent reversed: 
both the theory and the methodology outlined in previous chapters were developed while working on the 
research project outlined in this and subsequent chapters. The risk is then that the former acts as a 
retrospective justification for the latter; the hope is that it is rather an articulation and working-through of 
issues raised by the research process. 
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network where this research was carried out and the wider context of the counter culture in 
Ireland within which it is located. Secondly, I move from the question of “locating” 
research to an account of the way in which the research proceeded. Finally, I move from 
the question of the politics of knowledge production to a reflexive account of my own 
relationship as researcher to the movement network I was researching, including questions 
of differing rationalities and power53. 
The purpose of these discussions is to enable an assessment of the knowledge value of the 
subsequent findings chapters: how far can this research context illuminate social relations 
in the rest of the counter culture? what kind of knowledge has it produced? and how has 
the specific knowledge politics of my own relation with this particular network affected the 
way I have “constructed” it? 
Understanding the research context 
I have argued that if we want to research the local rationalities of which social movements 
are born, the best place to do so is in “movement milieux” (Vester et al. 1993) where those 
rationalities have been moderately developed and institutionalised. Within such milieux, 
“submerged networks” (Melucci 1989) underlie mobilisation in different types of campaigns 
within a shared movement project. These are “natural” locations for the study of 
movement rationalities insofar as they are formed by and around them, as opposed to (say) 
campaigning groups formed around single-issue campaigns which might have no greater 
coherence. They have a greater range than the purely particular sources of local 
rationalities, however, in that they not only give rise to campaigning but are also products 
                                                
53 Stanley writes that “ ‘Feminism’ […] should be present in positive ways within the research process, as 
feminist epistemological principles underpinning behaviour and analysis both”, identifying 
“five related sites of these: in the researcher – researched relationship; in emotion as a research 
experience; in the intellectual autobiography of researchers; therefore in how to manage the differing 
‘realities’ and understandings of researchers and researched; and thus in the complex questions of 
power in research and writing.” (1990: 23) 
Chapter one has already discussed something of my “intellectual autobiography”. The issues covered in the 
rest of the chapter discuss the researcher-researched relationship, the difference in understandings and 
something of the issues of power. I have not discussed emotion within the research experience, both because 
I was not keeping notes of this at the time and because the interviews in particular took place within a 
framework of relative emotional “normality”, as relaxed conversations between friends. It is certainly the 
case, though, that strong emotions were bound up with the research process more generally; something of this 
should transpire from the thesis generally. 
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of movement history: brought together in movement contexts and surviving through 
successive waves of campaigning, they are “representative” of the movement as a whole in 
a way that groups that have not been formed in this way could hardly be. 
Since we cannot assume the identity of “full-time intellectuals” - full-time activists or full-
time theorists - with the movement as a whole, a further desideratum, would be to find a 
movement network which was not an elite network, in other words most of whose 
participants were “ordinary participants”, not full-time intellectuals. 
The network I have studied fits these criteria well. Firstly, it is a network which has 
regularly given rise to campaigning activity over more than a ten-year period. Secondly, it is 
a network formed in “movement” (counter-cultural) contexts and with a wide breadth of 
social recruitment (local rationalities) and campaigning activities. Thirdly, only a minority of 
participants have ever come close to being “full-time” movement intellectuals (at present, 
none are). 
Ethics and publication 
At this point I need to insert a methodological caveat. It is a routine feature of research 
into groups that are in some way under threat from dominant social institutions that ethical 
questions arise in relation to the publication of information about such groups. Such 
activities as protest, direct action and political organising; squatting, drug use and in some 
countries unconventional religious behaviour (cf. Robbins 1988) place people at risk from 
the agencies of formal social control, and on occasion from informal forms of control. 
To be too specific in the publication of research details, particularly in a closely-knit city 
like Dublin and a small context like the Irish counter culture, is then to place participants at 
risk, a point noted by virtually all my participants in agreeing to be interviewed. If this 
discussion of the research therefore seems at times to err on the side of vagueness, this is 
entirely deliberate. Names have of course been changed, as have details; and I have at times 
had to content myself with general assertions (e.g. as to the activities engaged in by 
participants) where a more specific example would have been more convincing (and 
produced a far better story!) but also made identification of participants all too possible. I 
have of course also arranged for the destruction or safe removal of potentially 
compromising documentation related to the research. 
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The research context 
My research, then, was based around interviews with nine “core members” of a movement 
network based in the Dublin counter culture, in which I had myself been a long-term 
participant before the research was conceived. The choice of interviewees (see next 
section) was based not on representativity but on factors such as perceived centrality, 
availability for interview and relevance for particular aspects of the network not covered by 
interviews with other participants. Thus the data given below is indicative more of the range 
than of the spread of network participants; it is of course in any case far too small for 
statistical analysis54. 
All participants were in their mid- to late-20s when interviews were carried out in the latter 
half of the 1990s; they are thus now in their late 20s and early 30s. While contacts exist to 
similar contexts of younger participants, isolated older participants, and non-age-based 
groups, this “political generation effect” is a direct result of network formation and shared 
movement experiences in the mid- to late-1980s, and likely on present showing to remain 
largely stable pending new movement upswings. The network thus has an age of between 
ten and fifteen years - the latter representing first contacts, the former representing its 
rough stabilisation in terms of participation (contexts and participants). 
Occupation 
Occupational situations vary across a certain range, with parental occupations including 
housewife, skilled manual worker (watchmaker), small farmer, public-sector service class 
(civil engineer), retired self-employed (publican) and small capitalist (camping site owner). 
All participants started third-level education, though several failed to complete it. At time 
of interview situations ranged from unemployed and unskilled manual worker (e.g. 
removals worker) via research student to skilled non-manual employee (e.g. computer 
programmer); at present class positions range from skilled manual worker (e.g. gardener) 
via unskilled non-manual worker (shop worker) to self-employed (e.g. computer 
technician).  
This represents a wide range of occupational backgrounds, although a smaller range of 
current positions, consistent with the generally declining importance of small-property 
ownership, the rising importance of credentials and the growth of the skilled working class 
                                                
54 One of the interviews was carried out for the purposes of a student research project and covered somewhat 
different ground. 
The politics of knowledge 
 139 
and the service class. Since the “self-employed” were either skilled workers attempting to 
set up independent workshops or in effect sub-contractors, the overall trend is clear: none 
own property, but most have skills; most are working for someone else, while none have 
subordinates. At present, then, this is largely a skilled working-class group, some of whose 
members may in the future move into the service class or become small business owners. 
This is similar to Thompson’s (1963) “demotic” composition of the late 18th and early 
19th century working-class movement in England (skilled workers, artisans, and the 
occasional intellectual), and is consistent with Bagguley’s (1992) arguments about the 
occupational range of movements from below. 
Gender 
The interviewees were of both genders - seven men and two women. This is in part an 
artefact of the research strategy (drawing on my own contacts and looking for “extreme” 
cases) and in part a reflection of differential centrality to the network. While a number of 
women, including those interviewed, were “participants in their own right”, others were 
present by virtue of their relationships to male participants, with structural consequences:  
“The girls seem to be pretty separate. I think I’m an exception, in that I’m very good 
friends with Maria and with Amanda and with Emer, and they’re not, any of them are 
actually particularly good friends, would ring each other, and I’m actually the only one that 
would go out for a pint with all of them.” (Tina55) 
The women I interviewed, however, had independent “rights of participation” in the group 
irrespective of their current relationships (see chapter six for more discussion of gender 
practices). It is probably the case that the more “macho” contexts of network formation - 
squats and occupations (cf. Auckland 1997 on gender and direct action) - and the more 
public rather than privatised nature of this network (cf. McRobbie and Garber 1991, Gaetz 
1993) have skewed recruitment56.  
                                                
55 Hence Tina was interviewed, but not the other women mentioned in this extract. 
56 It is also probable that the conventional “policing of women” (contraceptives were legalised for the 
unmarried in 1985, the year before many participants left school) took its toll on women’s ability to 
participate in the contexts where the network was formed (cf Coulter 1993 on the exceptional class 
backgrounds of “mainstream” Irish feminists). In this respect it is noteworthy that the subsequent generation 
“sponsored” by one of the formative institutions of the network is dominated by a strong team of women. 
The politics of knowledge 
 140 
For participants with stable relationships57, there is no obvious pattern of imbalance in 
occupational status between partners. This may change in future, as few have children as 
yet. Of the two female interviewees, one was two years younger than most other 
participants  and the other was a European immigrant. Other women present in the 
network “in their own right” were also more unusual than the men - immigrants, from 
political families or the high service class; even in the subsequent generation, women 
participants are from highly politicised backgrounds or ethnic minorities. Gender ratios, 
then, are probably connected to the extent to which “public patriarchy” is replacing 
“private patriarchy” (Walby 1990), enabling greater participation in the public sphere. 
Ethnicity 
Finally, ethnicity is marked most strongly by relatively weak local ties. Seven interviewees 
grew up in Dublin, but most had at least one parent who had moved from a smaller town, 
or in two cases from Northern Ireland; of the remaining two, one had moved to Dublin 
from a rural setting while still a child, the other had emigrated from a metropolitan context 
in Western Europe to Ireland while a student. Another way of putting this would be to say 
that most participants were to a certain extent “blow-ins”, or more exactly the children of 
blow-ins.  
This is not unusual for counter cultural participants in Ireland; in small towns the strength 
of “community”, kinship and friends is such that it is more likely that those who have 
moved from a different county (personal conversations with Waterford activists) carry out 
most of the environmental and arts activity, while several community development activists 
are originally foreign or have spent many years abroad. Even on a national scale, the 
proportion of German, British, American and Northern Irish participants, of religious 
minorities and of course of people from political families in the counter culture is very high 
(personal conversation with member of Green Party leadership). This is primarily an effect 
of the social closure enacted through the conservative revolution (Breen et al. 1990, Lee 
1989) and the production of locally-based, kinship-organised communities originally of 
property owners: counter-hegemonic interactions are easiest where hegemonic relations are 
weakest. 
                                                
57 This includes all bar one of the interviewees; all relationships are mixed, though one interviewee is bisexual. 
The politics of knowledge 
 141 
Shared experiences 
What enables the formation of heterogenous, “demotic” groups like this? A conventional 
critical theory response is “public spaces”, that is, spaces not structured by the segmenting 
and corporatist structures of private life. In the case of this group, however, such spaces 
are the product neither of access to markets nor of coercive state structures, and in fact 
they have routinely had to be non-public (because involving illegal activity) at the same 
time as they are non-private (because open beyond circles of family and friends, and at 
times concealed from or in conflict with both)58. 
Such spaces were made possible in part by decommodification (Offe 1984), in particular 
the provision of subsidised education and unemployment assistance, which provided 
respectively a context and support for the development of this network59: 
“both [the new middle class and ‘peripheral’ groups] share the condition of 
‘decommodification’. The economic logic of efficiency, of thinking in terms of costs and 
returns, is, for different reasons, far less applicable concerning the use of one’s own labor 
power and efforts than is the case, for instance, in the area of industrial production of 
commodities.” (1985: 852) 
This decommodification is in turn the product of previous movement struggles, even in the 
mixed corporatist-liberal form found in Ireland: education as a product of the small-
property logic of the post-autarky society as it reoriented itself to deal with industrialisation 
and credentialisation; unemployment assistance as an ever-present necessity for the survival 
of populist governments (Allen 1997). Decommodification offers a resource for the 
construction of alternative public spaces to the extent that it entails a distancing of the 
logics of control within the capitalist firm and the property-kinship nexus; as well as 
strategies of recommodification, however, this space can be “clawed back” through 
processes of clientelism. 
If this account seems overly banal, it may be worth recalling that a central part of my 
argument is that social movement activity is not unusual, nor are social movement 
                                                
58 As Fantasia and Hirsch put it,  
“The very subordinate position of outsider groups means that their oppositional cultural expression 
cannot be cultivated openly.”(1995: 145) 
59 For comparison, rates of third level education participation rose from 20 to 36% in the relevant age group 
between 1980 and 1992 (Clancy 1995: 486); real unemployment rates were around 20% in 1985 and 
proceeded to worsen (O’Hearn 1995: 93 - 94). 
The politics of knowledge 
 142 
participants “special people”. One form of social movement activity - nonviolent direct 
action or drug use, say - may, however, stand out against another - Mass attendance or 
watching the national football team, for example. It is then not surprising to find new 
forms of movement developing where hegemonic relationships are weakest: outside the 
sphere of “community”, “family” and property. 
Research method 
My approach in this research consisted of in-depth qualitative interviews “located” by 
participation. Conventionally, participation, usually in the form of participant observation, 
has been seen as a way to develop an understanding of the interactionist construction of 
group knowledge by going through the learning process through which participants acquire 
the knowledge acquired in being competent group members (Hammersley and Atkinson 
1993). 
In my case the problem was somewhat different, in that I was already a participant through 
“natural” processes before beginning my research. The problem was thus not so much to 
discover previously unknown characteristics of group construction through recording and 
reflecting on the process of participating as it was to use knowledge - explicit or implicit - 
that I already possessed, to elicit other participants’ understandings of the network. (See 
Plows 1998 for a sensitive reflection on the practical relevance of insider and outsider 
status in social movement research.) 
Participation as locating research 
Hence the concept of participation as enabling the “location” of a research process centred 
on interviews. By this I mean first of all drawing on the background knowledge I already 
possessed as a member of this network to decide who to interview and how; being able to 
gain agreement to all interviews sought and carry them out in “natural” contexts; being able 
to intervene sensitively and relevantly in the interview process; and being able to elicit 
sufficient trust and solidarity to be given reflective “insider” accounts of how people “do” 
certain things rather than being offered “the official story”. (In the one case where this did 
not work, the interview consists largely of a series of denials!) 
Secondly, on a broader scale, participation enables the development of useful research 
questions and the effective interpretation of research data; in other words, it made it 
possible to locate the specific process of interviewing within a more general, “lived” 
context, and to organise the material gained within non-arbitrary explanatory contexts. In 
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saying this I am not of course arguing that all participants see the world the same way; 
rather, an effective account of the situation of the researcher in relation to other 
participants is necessary to the evaluation of the knowledge produced. 
In any shared context there is necessarily a certain amount of practical knowledge which is 
sufficiently shared to enable sustained interaction. This cooperative moment - as opposed 
to the conflictual moment discussed shortly - corresponds, firstly, to the verbal knowledge 
elicited through sensitive “insider” questioning of one participant by another: the 
articulated, shared “how to do it”. Beyond this, and of necessity only partly accessible to 
participants or researchers, is the tacit knowledge: the developing, not-yet-fully-
institutionalised skills that participants bring to their interaction. Here agreement breaks 
down - or rather, becomes less relevant - as interviewers ask about things that puzzle them 
and respondents reflect on questions they haven’t been asked before. 
The organisation and analysis of this data is then inevitably a construction, but as 
Thompson observed (1977a: 209 - 210), the fact that we can make various things out of a 
given piece of wood does not mean that we can use it to make “just anything”. The 
baseline for this kind of research is inevitably its location in a shared context: the talk 
produced between two participants, as well as the subsequent reflection on that talk by one 
participant, “sets limits and exerts pressures” (Williams 1980: 31-32) on what can and 
cannot be said. Secondly, the micropolitics of that interaction and of the researcher’s 
situation push for a particular “reading”; a politics which then needs to be made as 
transparent as possible to the reader. Thirdly, the requirements of written academic 
research imply the need to be “convincing” in terms of theory and data as well as in terms 
of background knowledge that academics may hold as participants in comparable contexts 
(as opposed to their “recipe knowledge” as outsiders, which is likely to be actively 
unhelpful). 
A good example of this need to “locate” research can be found in Scott (1990). Scott’s aim 
is an “examination of [the] main ideological strands of ‘the new social movements’ ” (1990: 
80). This is reduced, and without explanation, to an examination of “ecological ideology” 
alone (1990: 81), which in turn is then taken as effectively represented by die Grünen, despite 
the well-known complexities of the relationship between the party and contemporary 
movements (Raschke 1993: 499 – 528, 682 – 696). “Ideology” is then reduced to the 
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writings of professional ideologists, again without any examination of this highly 
problematic assumption60 (Eagleton 1991). The choice of ideologists is highly revealing. 
Of the six figures discussed, only Joschka Fischer had any claim to representativity, as a 
regional boss and faction leader. Of the others, Petra Kelly was the only one even to be a 
party member in 1990, but her influence within the party was minimal61. By the time Scott 
was writing, in fact, Otto Schily had joined the SPD; Rudolf Bahro had left the party five (!) 
years earlier, virtually alone (Raschke 1991: 26); to the best of my knowledge (as a 
participant researcher in 1990 – 91) Carl Amery had no political affiliations (cf. Schäfer 
1983: 127); and Herbert Gruhl had spent a decade in the political wilderness. Apart from 
Fischer, the actual ideologists and faction leaders – Antje Vollmer, Jutta Ditfurth, Thomas 
Ebermann, Frieder-Otto Wolf, etc. – are ignored, as are the communication organs of the 
movement62. 
Scott’s writing exemplifies the ethnocentric assumptions I criticised earlier. The conclusion 
that “[d]espite its grass-roots democratic principles the European ecology movement has 
indeed thrown up, and often centred around, political celebrities such as Petra Kelly, Otto 
Schily and Joschka Fischer” (Scott 1990: 117) represents simply the assumption that anyone 
the theorist has heard of must be a leader.63. Instead, what is “obvious” within the author’s 
own local mode of rationality is projected elsewhere, at its worst reducing empirical 
research to what can be found in English in the university library – or so one has to 
assume, since Scott never situates his own tacit understandings. 
Research details 
The participation within which this research is located, then, runs to some 12 or 13 years of 
regular interaction, at times full-time, at times very occasional, with network participants; at 
                                                
60 A similarly unsatisfactory approach is that of Giddens (1987: 31), who discusses the “ecology movement” 
on the basis of an examination of the manifestoes of the European Green Parties, without considering the 
extent to which they represent the actual ideology of the parties concerned, let alone the movement. Any party 
member could have told him that the relationship of manifesto to party is highly contested. 
61 Witness her failure even to be reselected, her lack of factional affiliation, and her isolation at the time of her 
suicide. 
62 See e.g. Jurtschitsch et al. (1988) for a snapshot of party debate around this period. 
63 The problem of the effectiveness of “grass-roots democratic” rules in weakening hierarchy was the subject 
of intense activist and academic discussion at the time (Raschke 1991: 80 – 113), but none of this is reflected 
in Scott. 
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various times I have also held key roles in network organisation (notably in organising 
events and holding open particular “free spaces” in the form of college societies.) I would 
consider all those I interviewed friends, to a greater or lesser degree. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I interviewed 9 people over a period of some 3 years; this 
constraint was imposed by availability on their part (conditioned by emigration) and work 
on my part. The choice of interviewees was governed by two factors: 
n Assessment, based on my own participation, as to their centrality or otherwise to the 
network; this can be confirmed to some extent by interview data (who stories are told 
about, who was present at key events) and to some extent by participant records (who 
was at particular parties, who took part in particular projects, who appears on other 
people’s email lists, etc64.) This is inevitably also conditioned by my own position within 
the milieu, and notably by class and gender differences in activities: alternative versions 
of the same network, then, might focus more on drug use and related activities, or 
more on relationships. 
n A concern to identify the key features and range of the network, operationalised in an 
attempt to interview the “extremes” of the milieu (Kleining 1986; cf. Cox 1994): thus 
the busker, the dealer, the activist, the mystic, the cynic, the immigrant, the weekender, 
the drifter and the one who got caught65. This has the added benefit that the attempt to 
understand what is shared across this life-world, whether on the part of the researcher 
or that of interviewees faced with the question, forces a greater degree of reflexivity 
and a greater focus on underlying features of rationality rather than “taken-for-granted” 
answers along the lines of “Mick and me get on well because….” 
While this certainly produces one version of the network rather than others, it is one which 
is not a million miles away from that of some other participants: 
Das: Even if it’s say, A considers the person hangs round most with is B, B would consider 
the second person to be C, who hangs around a hell of a lot with D, by that kind of chain 
you see what’s happened, we stay in contact. Victor gets in contact with, say 
Jim: with Mark 
                                                
64 Thus, for example, at a traditional Christmas party held at a participant’s house in 1995, participants 
included myself and 6 out of 9 interviewees. There were three further participants. 
65 I offer this obviously not as a summary of the people in question, but simply to highlight experiences 
which are brought out by particular interviewees and not by others! 
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Das: with Mark. Mark gets in contact with em 
Jim: Josh and Ciarán. 
Das: with Josh and Ciarán, Josh and Ciarán spread the news to every, say, to Steve, to us, 
to Jim, Jim feeds it out to me, or someone else’ll feed it to me, or I might get it through 
Shay.66 
Interviews ranged in length from approximately 45 minutes to approximately four and a 
half hours. All were carried out in “natural” context, usually but not exclusively 
interviewees’ own homes, in other cases environments familiar to them - friends’ houses or 
“free spaces” they used. There was generally a fair degree of willingness to be interviewed: 
no-one refused, and in a couple of cases people went out of their way to set up good 
interview environments - in one case arranging a double interview with a friend which 
lasted through most of the night. Interviews were then transcribed and copies returned to 
participants to use as they wished; tapes and transcripts were then stored safely67. 
In carrying out the interviews, I used checklists of issues that I wanted to cover. These 
varied from interview to interview as new themes were raised by previous interviews or as 
older themes produced repetitive answers. With the exception of one or two interviews, 
though, discussion was sufficiently lively and spontaneous that I did not find myself in the 
situation of posing “formal” questions, but rather arriving at the material I wanted to cover 
by relatively spontaneous questions of my own, guided by my participant interests as much 
as my research concerns. Towards the end of the interviews, I gave participants the chance 
to ask questions about the nature of the research; in some cases, this gave rise to the most 
interesting sections of the interview, as participants responded to my presentation of my 
own understanding of the situation. 
Interpretive strategy 
Up to a certain point of the analysis an attempt was made to follow a “grounded theory” 
approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967) of working up to indigenous and then abstract 
categories, via the coding and organisation of transcribed material. This procedure was 
carried out at a point when five of the nine interviews had been carried out and transcribed. 
                                                
66 Those interviewed include Mark, Josh, Ciarán and Steve as well as Jim and Das. 
67 The selections from interviews presented in this thesis have been “cleaned up” in the sense that hesitations, 
repetitions, etc. have been removed to produce a smoother and more focussed text than is normal for actual 
speech; the substance and vocabulary have not been altered, however. 
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It was subsequently relativised rather than abandoned, in that attempts to interpret and 
explain this material in any substantive way in conference papers given around this period 
proved to require a shift to a more dialogic mode in which as researcher I (a) tried to make 
sense of what participants had said (b) for the benefit of academics who were not familiar 
with the context. In other words, the difficulty with grounded theory for participant research 
on social movements is that it requires a pretence of ignorance as to that “tacit knowledge” 
which, as we have seen, is central to movements from below.  
The analysis presented in chapters five and six is thus one whose “workability” rests not 
only on my own assessment of the case and on what talk could be produced in interview 
situations, but also on the internal analyses of at least some participants and my own 
attempts to become clear about this (see next section). If it is also theoretically and 
empirically workable is up to readers to judge. I do not claim, however, that it is the only 
possible interpretation: that participants themselves have different views on what they do is 
sufficient to make such a thing unattainable.  
Interestingly, in moving to this more interpretive mode I moved considerably away from 
my own initial assumptions and came instead to adopt an analysis more closely geared to 
that of two other participants in particular: to articulate tacit knowledge (in this case while 
engaging with other participants’ perspectives) is to learn something, not simply to confirm 
our own prejudices. By contrast, fieldnotes which I kept on my participation in the network 
and in wider counter cultural contexts between July 1995 and February 1996 proved of 
little interpretive value, as they essentially restated what I already knew. 
Knowledge value 
Within a critical realist account of methodology (McLellan 1981; Collier 1994; Wainwright 
1994) it can be said that (a) there is a shared tacit knowledge that makes the network 
possible but (b) existing verbal knowledge is not necessarily identical with this. Research 
thus consists of a dialogic exploration of shared knowledge with other participants, in 
which we can reasonably expect (b) to be elucidated and differing positions as to (a) to 
arise. The researcher then constructs their own best sense of (a), whose sole advantage over 
that of other participants lies in the attempt to bring other participants’ knowledge into 
play (in fact relying on it for the construction of the argument) and in a reflexive analysis of 
the structural relations within which this knowledge was produced. 
For this specific network, then, the discussion is relatively particular and is intended to 
offer a “tight fit” - good workability for a broad range of existing knowledge - although not 
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a perfect identity - not the only such workable account. Moving beyond this, the 
relationship of this material to the broader counter cultural project and the theoretical 
arguments made in this thesis is necessarily one of a looser fit. If the analysis of this 
network as part of the broader counter cultural project is accepted, as well as the 
suggestion that a network formed in and through movement is likely to embody a counter-
hegemonic movement rationality, then we can expect that there will be structural 
similarities between the operation of local rationalities in this network and elsewhere; not 
an identity, but a more or less effective “purchase” on those other local rationalities: 
something which can also be assessed through its relationship to the existing literature and 
its ability to explain particular features of the counter culture (see chapters five and six).  
As to the relationship between what is said of this network and the counter culture as a 
whole, it is necessarily metaphorical or analogical: in other words, it offers something of a 
language in which those more general and more abstract processes can be talked about. 
The “knowledge value” of the findings chapters (five and six) is then twofold: a tight fit as 
regards the interpretation of this particular movement network, a loose fit designed to 
contribute to understanding the counter culture in general. Returning to the criteria set out 
at the start of this chapter for a methodology of social movement research, then, I 
conclude that this strategy is capable of guiding effective research into local rationalities. It 
has not yet arrived at a sufficient level of reflexivity to deal with the power relations 
involved in moving from local rationalities to movement projects or provided an “open 
theory” useful for participants; that is the task of the final section of this chapter. 
Reflexive researching 
The discussion to date has primarily depended on a consensual account of knowledge 
production and to a lesser extent on an externalising perspective (what Habermas (1987a) 
calls the “system” perspective). A reflexive examination of the structural relations involved 
in producing knowledge places the accent rather on the conflictual and the internalising 
(Habermas’ “lifeworld” perspective), in that it takes the existence of a shared situation and 
knowledge “for granted” and asks about how different participants relate to these. By 
making these kinds of research relations more visible, I hope to make the research more 
“transparent” in the sense of enabling a more effective evaluation of the experience from 
which the thesis has been written and hence of its knowledge value. I will discuss firstly my 
own relationship to the counter culture in general and secondly my relationship to the 
network. 
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Hidden discourses 
I have argued that researchers who do not take the local rationalities of movement milieux 
explicitly into account will misread what they see in terms of their own taken-for-granted 
assumptions. The problem is reinforced if the researcher’s perspective corresponds to that 
of some participants. Much of the literature in practice offers an uncritical (because 
implicit) identification by researchers with movement organisers. The researcher’s 
construction of movements as primarily political is likely to be shared by the most 
politically active and organised among their movement contacts, and both can collude in 
this analysis. There is of course a parallel between their situations: both are intellectuals, 
engaged not only in the theoretical construction of a “movement” as an essentially political 
entity, but also in the practical organisation of social relations (of mobilisation, of research) 
which attempt to involve other participants on these terms. Participants who have held 
formal positions in political organisations are also more likely, in this milieu, to have 
followed conventional career paths in other respects, and hence to inhabit a world familiar 
to the researcher68. 
Yet committed activists (like researchers) are a rather small minority within the networks of 
those they (occasionally) mobilise, and only one element, albeit an important one, of 
movement milieux. A focus on the most politicised, organised and articulate elements of 
the lifeworld is in some ways a focus on its least characteristic elements, and on those which 
are in some important ways least different from dominant rationalities. By extension, 
activists’ orientation towards mobilisation may even render the cultural logics of other 
participants opaque to them. As Landim (1993: 227) observes, there is a 
“divergence and misunderstanding between our language (the language of the NGOs, of 
projects, of conscientization) and the vast areas of cultural lifeof the popular sectors [.…] 
It would be worthwhile to analyse the reasons for the blindness of agents at the base with 
respect to whole dimensions of the social life of the groups who benefit from projects – 
despite the agents’ experiential contact of living with them[….] 
For example, analysing the results of participant research done in Brazil, we see many 
important contributions, but they have not succeeded in surpassing certain limits. 
Normally infused with common sense, their analyses rely on the verification only of 
                                                
68 As Sulkunen puts it, “The very familiarity of the new middle class is deluding [….] Its thoughts are difficult 
to recognize because they are our own” (1992: 3). What I am suggesting here is that this is particularly the 
case for the relationship between researchers and full-time activists. 
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problems experienced in work, production, exploitation and the economic activities 
undertaken by the groups. 
The participant researcher and the popular educator hear the people, but one has the 
impression that their hearing is selective in terms of the symbolic and social universe of 
those whom they contact [.…] The agents of the NGOs because of their formation, their 
origins, and the frameworks of thought to which they refer, are unfamiliar with these 
branches of popular culture.” (1993: 226 – 227) 
Participation and local rationalities 
There might then be some value in examining how those other participants view 
mobilisation. Reflecting on the occupation discussed earlier, one participant says: 
“I think most people realistically were in the occupation because it was damn good fun. To 
me, from my perspective, politics is something that, and I think it’s reasonably common 
within this group of people, politics is an interest, but not the driving force, and those for 
whom it is the driving force, such as Seán and Muireann, are now very much peripheral to 
the group.” (Josh) 
Another agrees: 
“Obviously, the whole thing was politically motivated, but once you got in there you were, 
I spent quite a lot of time in there at the start of it, that you had a lot of time to fill, that, 
you know, you had your time when you were doing things and where you were just 
basically hanging round with the other people who were there all the time, and getting to 
know them intimately and getting introduced to things that you hadn’t been introduced to 
before.” (Steve) 
While these participants are aware of the other logics of full-time activists, they locate them 
in terms of their own perspective of a reflexive milieu made up of a series of projects, and 
in terms of their own rationality: 
“I remember sitting in the Coffee Inn, and Das gave everybody a conker, for some weird 
reason, and we were sitting in the Coffee Inn with these weird plans for building this 
windmill in Jonathan’s back garden, and you had this kind of odd plan for world 
domination, trying to [laughter] bring the Sixties back to Dublin because they’d never really 
hit, which I remember I kind of went ‘Well, OK, that’s weird, but I’ve nothing better to do 
for the summer and [laughs] it might be fun.’ “ (Ruth) 
Thus the hidden discourses of ordinary participants coincide with Melucci’s analysis of 
movement mobilisation as simply one part of a broader way of life for the majority of 
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those involved. These participants are fully capable of inserting political action into their 
own local rationalities, and of relating the two: 
“There were a lot of discussions going on about what was happening and what people 
were trying to do and stuff. I wasn’t really all that involved in many of those. And I don’t 
think I was at any of the big sort of decision meetings. If anything, I was sort of a hanger-
on rather than seriously involved in it [.…] I was in the party end of it, and one of the 
things that people there were trying to do was make sure that there was sort of a minimum 
number of people around, so as not to give security an opportunity to come in en masse 
and throw everybody out, and I certainly would have been there as cannon fodder in that 
sense, but really just another face more than anything else.” (Josh) 
The point is not to argue that only the most inarticulate and disorganised of participants 
can speak for movements. It is to say that researchers who fail to notice this double 
hermeneutic, whereby movement cultures are both other than the dominant culture and 
divided between those engaged in their instrumental rationalisation (for political or indeed 
economic reasons) and those for whom local rationalities prevail, are very likely to 
systematically misunderstand what is going on in the cultural milieux from which 
movement mobilisations grow. A fully reflexive sociology of the broader movement, by 
thematising these issues, might make it possible to move beyond this self-confirming 
situation. 
Living in the counter culture 
My own relationship with the counter culture was (and is) conditioned primarily through 
being a second generation member of the counter culture and secondarily through an 
ambiguous ethnic status coming from migration to Ireland at age 4. The former enabled 
me to relate to various elements of the counter culture as in a sense available elements of 
repertoire and habitus rather than something to be conquered by difficult struggle; in a 
sense the situation of a native speaker rather than of a second language learner. The second 
pushed me into a relationship of opposition to dominant social formations (to which I had, 
as Philip Larkin (1988: 104) puts it, no “elsewhere” to oppose, but which were and are 
emotionally alien); and so to a whole-hearted embrace of counter cultural strategies as the 
only personal way forward. 
This meant that when I came to research the counter culture it was certainly with a view to 
establishing its specificity, but from the viewpoint of a long-term inhabitant of that 
archipelago, not the zeal of a convert. In essence, as I shall argue in chapter seven, I think 
my fellow participants are right in their goals, skilled in how they set about achieving them, 
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but not sufficiently inclined to reflect collectively on the adequacy of means to ends. 
Beyond this, a long experience of participation in the counter culture in Germany and 
Norway, travelling in France, Italy, Britain and the USA, and a familiarity with the history 
of the British, American and German counter cultures inclined me to look for the most 
general features and the largest-scale explanations rather than be satisfied with “technical” 
accounts and ad hoc analyses. 
Acting in the network 
Within the network, I have tended (with one or two others) towards a role of “full-time 
intellectual” in the sense of specialising in organising - events, projects, routines - and 
theorising - not only research, but also more directly political writing and talking. Tina 
presents this first as an absolute, then as a question of articulation:  
Tina: You were always the one trying to push for things to happen, and [laughs] if you 
weren’t, they wouldn’t. And that’d be it, like, you know? 
LC: That’s the D&D [game] and stuff69? 
Tina: That’s the D&D, or the Greens, or you know, the Greens feast, that kind of stuff. 
LC: Yeah, but sometimes they did happen, like ‘let’s do this’, sometimes people say ‘Ooh 
yeah, let’s do it!’ 
Tina: Yeah. 
LC: And it would happen. 
Tina: Yeah, but no long term project. I don’t think that really, I mean people weren’t even 
thinking about it, you know? I mean, maybe you were [laughs] possibly, but nobody else 
was. 
Thus this research process - “organising” the network into a book, “theorising” it in a 
particular direction - is in a sense a “natural” continuation of my pre-existing role within 
the counter culture. At the same time, as chapter five illustrates, this direction is routinely 
resisted by other participants, often not so much in its details as in the project of organising 
and articulating itself, or is “reread” in terms of their own agendas: 
“Every time someone set up a committee it was so that they could further their type of 
political, you wanted to further your type of political. Which in some ways was relatively 
vague, you were into more European politics, rather than localised politics, meaning 
                                                
69 In fact the game was run by my partner more than myself, but I was largely responsible for recruitment. 
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Ireland, England and stuff related around that, and Union politics. In some ways a success, 
but I think one of the major problems is everyone picked up more on the American Beat-
stroke-hippy literature, American 60s and 70s music and the rest of that, so there was more 
of an interest in that than say what Eastern Germany was doing. No, I mean, you did not 
succeed in making us totally aware of the Eastern German [laughs] problem at the time. 
But, hey, we had some good times in Glendalough! [laughter]” (Das)70 
While I have tried hard - notably in the selection of interviewees, only one of whom is in a 
similar position to my own- to bring out the “other side” of the coin, this tension is 
intrinsic to the counter culture as a whole. Intellectuals do not come from nowhere, but 
express and work with the everyday intellectual activity of ordinary participants as formal 
organisation and written word. Other participants do not reject this entirely - they do 
participate in events and read what is written - but neither do they wholly accept it - in 
which case they would presumably become full-time intellectuals themselves. Mark, for 
example, distances himself from that possibility thus: 
“You always find that anybody who’s prepared to attempt to communicate a particular 
world-view seems to end up being the kind of people that, it seems to work this way, like 
mathematicians who are much more interested in exploring how to fill in the gaps of the 
system rather than simply take it as given and see what it doesn’t deal with and try and find 
something that deals with them, integrate it with that. Or, instead of it being a stepping-
stone it’s the rock on which they build a house. I think you find that with all kinds of 
things, that it’s the more dogmatic people, people who lean towards dogma and are much 
more interested in communicating than in expanding the actual thing itself.” 
                                                
70 As the network history in chapter five demonstrates, this distancing does not do justice to participants’ own 
activities, even the specifically “political” ones. At the time, Tina was working as a volunteer in a women’s 
refuge; Das was soon to be arrested for a spectacular piece of political street theatre.  
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At times in the interview process (notably the “failed interview”) this tension is resolved in 
more decisive opposition71; at other times analyses coincide closely and participants 
cooperate in developing the discussion. Most commonly, though, the process is negotiated: 
participants are willing to be interviewed and remain in a common intellectual frame with 
the interviewer, but distance and difference are maintained. 
Solidarity and conflict 
Finally, it should be noted that (as chapters five and six will show) other participants do 
also at times make more or less successful bids to organise events (from parties to rituals to 
shared journeys) and articulate ideas (from writing to music to talk). These are not alien or 
reserved activities; rather, even or especially in the production of counter-hegemonic local 
rationalities, verbal and tacit knowledge are in a constant state of tension.  
That both the network and the research process are to some extent conflictual does not, 
however, mean that there is not a more “consensual” sphere of cooperation - around the 
control and interpretation of which conflicts develop, but which is a shared and therefore 
“closely” knowable point of reference. Nor does the fact of conflict mean that we have to 
abandon the attempt at understanding: we can still give an account of why it looks a 
particular way from a particular point of view; if this is not the full story or the only one, it 
                                                
71 Reading the transcript, my sense of this interview is that I made the mistake of starting from an event 
which Steve did not find particularly important. Trying to salvage the interview by moving to one which had 
perhaps been more important for him, I probably gave a false impression of what I was looking for: 
LC: Was that [London crashpad] different from where you’d been before in Dublin? 
Steve: Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, Definitely, definitely. 
LC: Was it a shock, or 
Steve: Oh God no, no. Not a shock at all. It’s like ‘great! Wonderful! [laughs] Lovely!’ Shock, no [….] 
Nothing shocking, why would it be shocking? 
Following from this, much of the rest of the interview was very defensive: 
LC: I mean, do you think there’s sort of something which is common to those people that you don’t 
find in just sort of anyone? 
Steve: I’d have no reason to kind of necessarily believe that, no, like, in practice quite a lot of groups 
of people that you may observe at any one time you’ll find completely and utterly boring, you know, if 
people looked at us they’d find us completely and utterly boring too, from another viewpoint, but I 
dunno, you just have to check enough, like you know go research as much as possible and come up 
with something. 
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is still a relevant part of the story. Specifically, it is what enables me to offer critical and 
political perspectives on the counter culture, from a position other than Cohen’s apparently 
universalising rationalism discussed at the start of this chapter; as Rosaldo writes,  
“Rather than work downward from abstract principles, social critics work outward from 
in-depth knowledge of a specific form of life…. they use their moral imagination to move 
from the world as it actually is to a locally persuasive vision of how it ought to be. Because 
different communities differ in their problems and possibilities, such visions must be more 
local than universal.” (1993: 194) 
These tensions, then, need to be thematised, both in order to show the relationship of local 
rationalities to movement projects, but also to see what possibilities are available - both as 
current “constructions” (interpretations) of the movement and as future “constructions” 
(developments) of the movement project. Accountability (Plows 1998), or in more familiar 
language reflexivity, is an important prerequisite for understanding the one and thinking 
the other: until both others and ourselves can see where we stand and understand how we 
come to see things in the way we do, our statements hang in the void. Once they are situated 
within their own micropolitical context, they become workable. At that point, we can 
return to the central question of praxis, which, as Stanley (1990: 15) writes, entails  
“a continuing shared feminist commitment to a political position in which ‘knowledge’ is 
not simply defined as ‘knowledge what’ but also ‘knowledge for’.”  
The uses of research 
What has this research contributed, then? Three concrete examples may illustrate 
something of the character and limits of this interaction. One is that of interviews and 
transcripts. With only one exception, all participants have expressed a good deal of interest 
in their own transcripts, and in at least one case have circulated it further. It seems from 
conversations that the lapse of time between interview and transcription (typically 1 – 2 
years) and the unusual experience of seeing accurate transcriptions of one’s own speech, 
made reading transcripts something which could help participants gain a clearer sense of 
their own self-understanding and history.  
A second example is that some participants have given me considerable assistance in 
producing an alternative magazine that grew out of much the same roots as the research. It 
is hard to know precisely what value they feel it has, but help has often been given 
unsolicited, which suggests a feeling that it is contributing to a shared project. Thirdly, to 
research a milieu means among other things to find a way of contributing to it. Thus, for 
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several years one part of this role was to maintain as an open room a college society which 
served as a crash-pad, a drop-in centre, a library and other things for participants. 
Such contributions do not add up to a picture of the leading role of Theory and 
Organisation; rather, it suggests that their role has to be analysed from the point of view of 
ordinary participants. Touraine (1981) argues that the process of intervention research is 
concluded when participants have come to adopt a more adequate understanding of the 
movement. We might also want to ask whether the researchers have come to engage more 
closely with the participants. 
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Chapter five: building a reflexive autonomy 
In this and the next chapter I explore the local rationalities of the movement network I 
researched. This chapter gives a brief history of the network and outlines the basic 
elements of this rationality, which I describe as one of reflexive autonomy: autonomist in 
its relation to dominant instrumental rationalities, reflexive in its own self-development as 
conscious way of life. Chapter six will explore some of the contradictions and possibilities of 
this rationality, and asks how participants live with them. 
A brief network history 
This network was formed by a group of young Irish school-leavers, mostly oriented 
towards the technical education that state strategy has strongly promoted throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, who developed links of friendship, sexual relationships, sociability, 
cooperation and shared culture within the London squats, a college occupation, a student 
political society and several shared houses in Dublin and London. In turn, this network has 
formed a context for a variety of alternative “political” and “cultural” projects and 
experiments, such as: 
• political projects (anarchist and green groups, street theatre, student politics and direct 
action); 
• experimentation with living forms, in particular shared houses, squats and “crashpads”; 
• economic projects such as a coop, an alternative bookshop and local economic trading 
systems (LETS); 
• alternative sexual practices, including bisexuality, open and multiple relationships; 
• exploration of drugs, in particular hash, acid and mushrooms; 
• cultural challenges, such as alternative music, Rainbow Gatherings, pagan and occultist 
rituals and groups, and so on. 
In this process the network divided, as we shall see, between those for whom “politics” 
was only one element of their lives and those for whom it was the dominant interest. In 
this research I have concentrated on the former for reasons already given, though including 
one interview with a representative of the latter tendency, which slowly found 
organisational homes. 
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Explicitly political activity, however, has remained one feature of life among others for the 
“holistic” tendency, with involvement in green parties, environmental direct action, third 
world solidarity, and feminist projects mobilising different participants at different times, as 
have alternative economic projects, new religious movements, drug use, travelling, intense 
exploration of relationships. Over the last two years, for example, different participants 
have: 
• worked as a volunteer co-ordinator in an organic food co-op; 
• worked as a peace observer in a third world war zone; 
• worked in a co-op supporting a meditation centre; 
• worked in a women’s refuge for immigrant women leaving violent situations; 
• refused to consider offers of defence-related employment; 
• given considerable technical support for an alternative magazine project; 
• allowed their house to be used as base for large-scale direct action; 
• carried out a spectacular piece of political street theatre. 
Participants in this network have been involved in the kinds of activities that are routinely 
discussed as “social movements”, then. At the same time, as chapter four showed, these are 
rarely the centres of their lives. At one extreme, as Steve describes his own participation in 
a student occupation, 
“[That political interest] was never very very strong, like it wasn’t something I would have 
done on my own initiative, it was just like I sympathised with, put it that way, and if a 
similar thing came up I would sympathise with it again.” 
At the other extreme, it involves being “the kind of person who goes on demos” (personal 
conversation with Frank), and at times rather more than that in terms of volunteer work 
and assistance with different projects. It is not that most participants find the centre of 
their lives in family and career, as might be expected from Irish demographic and 
employment patterns: those are only arriving now, and then only for some participants72. 
Rather, the gap between “ordinary” expectations and “unusual” movement activity is 
                                                
72 Of the nine people interviewed, only one is a parent, one is an expectant parent and one is a step-parent. 
Four are looking for employment or in explicitly temporary work, four are considering migration, two have 
seasonal work, one is self-employed and only one has a permanent contract with pension possibilities: this for 
a group at and around thirty, more than half of whom have university degrees, in a country with near-full 
employment in some sectors. 
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bridged by participation in a particular way of life which I try to explore further in these 
chapters.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the combination of structural mass unemployment and 
the stronger attraction of counter cultures abroad - Italy, Germany, USA, Australia, Britain, 
Belgium - led to large-scale emigration. In the late 1990s, this is now being transformed by 
“partnership” and Standortpolitik-induced growth that have improved possibilities of 
employment in Ireland and rendered much of what was marginal and oppositional in the 
1980s widely available73. The original needs for and purposes of group togetherness have 
faded to be replaced by more extensive networking between individuals (and, increasingly, 
couples). Nevertheless, levels of contact - face-to-face, phone, email - remain high, 
internationally and intercontinentally as well as within Ireland or Dublin; it is not unusual 
for people to cross the country to see friends, to fly back from Britain or Belgium for a 
weekend, or to return from America or Australia for Christmas - and then spend the bulk 
of their time with other participants rather than with their families.  
Locating the Irish counter culture 
By comparison with the impressively articulated counter cultures found in Germany 
(chapter one), Britain (McKay 1996) or the USA (e.g. Jasper 1997: 183 – 209), this network 
(and the wider counter culture it fits within) does not appear as massively oppositional, 
possessed of a very strong identity, or well-resourced. Rather, it is scattered (physically and 
metaphorically), and dependent on outside resources (cultural, personal and practical).  
In chapter three I argued that social movements come from above as well as from below; 
at times, for example in wars of independence, a movement from below can become a 
movement from above. Such a transformation would involve not only a take-over and 
transformation of the institutions of power, but also a progressive sidelining of those 
exploited groups (which might include the working class, small farmers, women, ethnic 
minorities) whose allegiance was necessary to take power. 
Something of this happened in Ireland at the end of the nineteenth century and the start of 
the twentieth, to a degree unusual in Western Europe: the transformation from tenancy to 
                                                
73 To take a single straw in the wind, books universally read in this network like Fear and loathing in Las Vegas 
(Thompson 1972), The electric Kool-Aid acid test (Wolfe 1969) or the Illuminatus trilogy (Shea and Wilson 1986a, 
b, c), in the mid-80s only available abroad or in specialised second hand bookshops, are now routinely 
available in chain bookstores. 
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peasant proprietorship is equalled perhaps only by France, the success in achieving political 
independence only by Norway, and the transformation of the Catholic church from 
underground organisation (in the eighteenth century) to large-scale public influence (Nic 
Ghiolla Phádraig 1995) perhaps best comparable to post-1989 Eastern Europe. 
This has produced very strong hegemonic relationships, despite well-known shifts such as 
that from economic strategies of import-substitution to strategies of dependency on 
foreign investment, the declining influence of religion on the body (Inglis 1998) and the 
rise of feminism (Mahon 1995). To cite some obvious indicators, the “Civil War parties” 
still dominate politics absolutely, despite their changing sources of legitimation; religious 
practice remains at levels more characteristic of America than of western Europe, despite 
the changing meaning of religious practice (Whelan 1994); and class mobility remains 
strongly unequal, despite massive credentialisation (Breen et al. 1990). Plus ça change, plus c’est 
la même chose 74, one could say; or, Bisogna che tutto cambi perché tutto resti com’era 75. 
Subordinate challenges 
Movements from below within this post-colonial order have also definitely “known their 
place”: Peillon (1982) and Allen (1997) have shown that despite the institutional strength of 
the Irish labour movement, its major political orientations have always accepted the 
essentials of the social, economic and political order; though the 1980s mark a new period 
in corporatist arrangements, this has to be set against the background of “partnership” 
going back long before that. A similar argument can be made for the Irish women’s 
movement. Coulter (1993) and Connolly (1998) have argued that nationalist feminism 
between the 1930s and 1960s was “radical for its time”, and have carried out much good 
research to establish its dimensions. What they have failed to observe is that this feminism 
remained subordinate precisely in that it accepted the hegemonic terms of nation, community 
and religion, and that “radical for its time” means accepting the general existence of 
patriarchy and arguing for local modifications.  
Thus Connolly writes that “the IHA was extremely radical in the context of Irish society 
from the 1940s to the 1960s” (1998: 7), meaning apparently not that it rejected 
fundamental features of Irish social structure (e.g. patriarchy) or adopted forms of 
                                                
74 The more it changes, the more it stays the same. 
75 Everything has to change so that everything can stay as it was. 
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organisation that placed existing power relations in question76 but that it stuck its neck out 
further than other people. This demonstrates, however, that hegemonic relations made it so 
difficult to raise major issues that movements had to remain within very narrow limits: 
“if you were one step ahead with public thinking at the time you were a communist. And 
we got branded on occasions just by making a suggestion and often lost a branch 
overnight” (IHA activist cited in Connolly 1998: 9). 
Contrast this with, for example, actual communist parties such as the KPD, the PCF or the 
PCd’I / PCI of the same periods (before, during and after fascism): international rather 
than national in orientation, rejecting the structures of the existing state, challenging the 
fundamentals of the economic order, and so on. In order to talk sensibly about hegemony, 
we need to know what a counter-hegemonic situation might look like77. 
Recuperation and peripherality 
Within the new dispensation of the post-1958 period, too, social movements - even where 
they have had radical moments - have been recuperated, faster or slower, as Broderick 
(1998) has argued for the environmental movement, Geoghegan (1998a) for the 
community development movement and as suggested by the title alone of Mahon’s (1995) 
piece on the women’s movement, “From democracy to femocracy”. Following a pattern 
developed, as Allen (1997) shows, in relation to the labour movement, the state has offered 
various forms of “partnership” - advisory and consultative roles, funding arrangements, 
institutionalisation - to movement organisations, which in turn orient themselves towards 
the state in the hope of gaining influence and funding. 
To an extent, this is a routine feature of social movements in peripheral contexts: where 
“the state is everything and civil society primordial and gelatinous” (Gramsci 1975 [1930-
32]: 866), movements have the choice at an early stage (as Foweraker 1993 has pointed out) 
between co-optation and uncompromising conflict - in effect, exposure to state violence, 
                                                
76 Thus Hilda Tweedy:  
“Conscious of the dual role of women in the mid-century they presented to the public the solid 
frontage of the Irish housewife; strategically they instructed their members on how to negotiate the 
complex maze of the Irish party machinery” (cited in Connolly 1998: 10). 
77 A local example would be the Irish nationalist movement itself prior to independence, with different 
aspects challenging property relations, the form of the state and everyday culture and numbering civil 
disobedience, boycotts and violence among its tools along with “the complex maze” of the British party 
machinery. 
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an option common in Latin America but restricted in Ireland to the republican movement. 
Vilas (1995) has outlined the pressures leading towards co-optation well, in his discussion 
of Latin American social movements: 
“[B]ecause they are only able to deal with small segments of the population, these 
approaches [substitute employment programmes] usually reinforce people’s fragmentation 
as much as they foment renewed clientelistic and corporatist practices. Access to a 
temporary job in a road-building project, or to material resources to build the 
neighbourhood’s day-care center, may be not so much a matter of fitting into an official, 
statistical definition of poverty as much as a matter of knowing someone at the mayor’s 
office or at the governing party’s delegación. Because such programs are administered by 
government agencies, usually people and community organisations have no alternative but 
to get involved in a sharp competition to get favors - that is, resources - from bureaucrats. 
As the state retreats from direct involvement in development, state bureaucrats and 
government officials increase their own roles as brokers of survival. It is not uncommon to 
find that an implicit goal of these programs is the building of political constituencies for 
municipal, provincial and even national officials.” (Vilas 1995: 144 - 5) 
This is then furthered by the particularistic orientation of movement activists - equivalent 
to Hall’s (1996) “negotiated” relationships, accepting the basic framework of power 
relationships and challenging only their specific implications. “Oppositional” orientations, 
on the periphery, are all or nothing. 
Co-optation and movement structure 
There is no autonomous “civil society” in such contexts within which significant 
autonomous structures can be developed; or (to put it another way), such societies tend to 
have a single pillar, that of the national community, combining state, church, sport and (in 
Ireland) pub, which is in effect the institutional sedimentation of earlier movements from 
below78. The choice of co-optation - of partnershipping and clientelism, of funding 
applications and professionalisation - is rendered attractive in part by the low proportion of 
committed activists in the counter culture generally, hence the attractiveness of strategies 
                                                
78 Visitors from the Italian counter culture sometimes ask where they can find “left-wing pubs”, an entirely 
normal request in Italy but one which does not make much sense in Ireland. 
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which use their carefully hoarded communication, legal, technical etc. skills to influence 
élites (Cox 1998a), but also by the widespread adoption of consensualist ideologies79. 
Movements from below thus tend to attempt to position themselves as allies of 
“modernising” state elites, or what the eighteenth century knew as enlightened despots. In 
so doing, they have become deeply fragmented: by seeking state support in the form of 
influence and funding, social movement organisations necessarily find themselves in 
conflict with other groups in the same “sector” and forced to present their ideas as capable 
of being accepted without great changes to the shape of the state or Irish society - in other 
words, to substitute themselves for traditional factional and clientelist relationships in the 
generation of what (borrowing an idea from Durkheim) we could call “organic” rather than 
“mechanical” hegemony. Routinely, this gap between wide vision and narrow mechanism is 
bridged by an appeal to cultural change: if the problem is not in social structure or state 
organisation, it is in people’s heads. Hence ecological survival becomes a matter of private 
consumer morality, domestic exploitation the result of traditional ideas, and poverty an 
effect of lack of “recognition”. 
Hence the paradox that in their praxis full-time social movement activists are often rather 
more conservative than ordinary participants, and the apparently “cultural” edge of the 
counter culture is rather more radical than much of its “political” manifestation. An 
obvious, even banal, example of the latter discrepancy lies in the intensive policing of 
drugs, music and dance (cf. the critique in Moore 1999) and the regular introduction of 
new items of legislation targetting precisely those apparently “unpolitical” activities, such as 
the 1994 Public Order Act. What these activities are in practice charged with, of course, is 
threatening “community” - kinship, religion and policed pastimes like drinking and sport - 
as well as undermining the work ethic and respect for authority. 
It is not that no movement from below has been possible in Ireland, but that hegemonic 
relations have massively constrained its ability to articulate itself (which is of course what 
hegemonic relations are there for) and under normal circumstances forced movements to 
articulate themselves with, and to a large extent within, the state. Nor is it that the network 
I am interested in found no counter cultural context to which it could connect, but that it 
                                                
79 This includes not only explicit nationalism, but also liberal state-centred “educative” strategies, 
communicative visions of consensual communities, and more generally the lack of any sense that there might 
be structural rather than contingent reasons why “the state” might not belong to “the people” - so it is seen 
as capable of relatively easy reform even if at present a bit unacceptable. 
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had to do most of the work itself and to a large extent reinvent the wheel. This, then, 
brought it into relation with a global social movement (Tarrow 1998); in other words, the 
context is not simply that of the Irish left but also that of the American 1960s, the London 
squats, the Zapatista rebellion. 
Though the bulk of social movement writing has been focussed on core countries, the bulk 
of the world’s population does not live in the core; more importantly, in disorganised 
capitalism the national organisation of social relations in general is replaced by a more 
global one. In this sense, the relationship between peripherality and community in the Irish 
counter culture is perhaps a better paradigm than the West German case: the dual 
relationship to a broader determining context and a narrower local one, and the increasing 
difficulty for movements from below to overcome this tension, are problems facing social 
movements everywhere. 
The politics of autonomy 
In local terms, the network participants I interviewed had no difficulties about seeing 
marked differences in ways of life and life-purposes as between themselves and dominant 
ways of life: 
“I think there’s an element of ‘well, I don’t really give a fuck so long as I have a bicycle and 
a pot of tea and a bottle of wine, and I can go out to a club and drop an E’ [laughter], 
depending on which people, the E comes in as more important than the bottle of wine, in 
some [laughs], sort of whatever, not even according to age even [.…] A lot of people are 
just ‘yeah, feck it, I’ve decided I can do without the car and that sort of stuff, or I’ll have an 
old banger or whatever, but, you know, I’m going to’, or maybe it’s not even that, with 
some people they manage to get set up so that they have their income but what they’re 
losing is time. They’re putting time into these things, so somewhere along the line they’re 
saying ‘Yeah, I can give certain things a miss that a lot of people reckon are important’, you 
know, the standard consumer desirables, whether it’s in terms of time or money or 
whatever. And I think there is a perceived gain, I don’t know how consciously [laughs] 
perceived it is, but the gain is that we’re doing something together, we’re actually, yeah, 
making this commitment to changing the world, we are recognisable to others of our type 
and therefore, I don’t know, I think there’s something like that.” (Frank) 
This sets up a fairly explicit opposition between different cultural rationalities: a rationality 
which is sufficiently dominant that participants have to argue against its motivational terms, 
and one grounded in a shared alternative lifeworld. Since participants have themselves been 
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socialised into the former, this opposition can also take the form of a critique of their own 
past assumptions: 
“The whole time I lived in [South Dublin], I was completely convinced that the majority of 
humanity gets a 9 to 5 job, goes out twice a week, and I’m not at all convinced of that any 
more. I’m meeting more and more and more people that just don’t do that, meeting loads 
of people who, maybe because it’s America, maybe it’s a bigger thing there, but all over the 
place, meeting more and more people who are doing things that I would consider odd. 
You know, they’ve been travelling around the world for three years, and they’re perfectly 
normal looking, and they just, this is what they do.” (Ruth) 
Here the contrast is not with ownership per se, as with Frank, but rather with the taken-
for-granted structures of social stability and career. It can also be phrased in terms of 
modes of interaction: 
“The easiest way for me to answer [the question of contrasts] is to point to somebody I get 
on very well with, a guy who is in my class in college [.…] He’s an extremely nice bloke but 
at the same time has quite conservative views on an awful lot of things and will tend to, 
possibly through being intimidated, will tend to reject people because of the front, the face 
that they wear without really giving them the benefit of the doubt and digging beyond the 
face, which I think is very characteristic of that group. There’re a lot of people who are, I 
wouldn’t say social misfits, because that’s a very damning and strong term, but people who 
don’t entirely fit in with conventional society for whatever reason and, in spite of their 
faults and in spite of a certain difficulty in getting on with people in a normal environment 
this group of people tends to, I think, just accept them and you know ‘Yeah, find, join in, 
whatever’, you know? Which I find an extremely commendable attitude.” (Josh) 
Here the contrast is one with hegemonic expectations as to social performances. It can also 
be framed in explicitly political terms: 
“[There are] a lot of people in Ireland now who are doing some fairly seriously different 
things to traditional Irish values and current world-dominant economics and the kind of, 
yeah, consumerist values which are not new, I mean there are a lot of people trying to 
construct alternatives and defend those.” (Frank) 
Thus, in related ways, participants identify a basic contrast of rationalities grounded in 
different ways of life, a dominant one against which they have to struggle in various ways 
(personally or politically) and an alternative way of being. 
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Critiques of the network 
Even where participants did not ascribe fully “alternative” status to the network80, this was 
in terms of their own orientation to a way of life that they felt was only partially realised 
within the network, the latter being criticised from a feminist point of view: 
“[M]yself and Emer and I think Caitríona is the other person, we were talking about this 
some time ago and we were saying, all the girls, just, so, imitating all this ‘Oh, not again, 
talking about the occupation, not again talking about Paddington [St.], no, [laughter] 
please, no.” (Tina) 
or as insufficiently communicative: 
“I suppose I had this idea in my head of coming across a kind of Merry Prankster-ish 
bunch of people who were interested in bouncing off each other as much as they could, 
rather than going to the pub” (Mark) 
or as not sufficiently politicised: 
“[T]he anarchists were kind of more committed to the idea of a communal living squat, of 
a WG [Wohngemeinschaft] kind of thing, and therefore, I suppose felt it wasn’t just bloody 
selfish of these people not to pay up the money or not to do the washing up, it was also 
[laughs] an attack on the programme, or whatever […] they resented us, they thought we 
were mad with the sort of programme stuff” (Frank) 
There are, in other words, more and less radical positions within the network, and conflicts 
around the extent to which it succeeds in embodying participants’ individual perspectives81. 
Autonomy as self-development 
Nevertheless, whether ascribing the movement rationality to the network as a whole or to 
themselves alone, most participants are in no practical doubt that they hold an alternative 
                                                
80 As we have seen in chapter four, Steve tended at times to deny any specificity on principle, but at other 
times in the same interview he was capable of identifying differences between the network and his friends 
from the same college course: 
“They’re all very nice people, but they’ve got their own world, they focus on their own thing. They’re 
not focussed in the middle of what’s happening with you. Which is different with this group.” 
81 This is obviously in a sense true for this thesis as well; like Tina, Mark or Frank I would welcome particular 
kinds of development. I see this more in terms of a development of orientations that are already present, to 
some degree, and that people are struggling with in different ways. In chapters six and seven I try to develop 
something of this immanent critique. 
Building a reflexive autonomy 
 167 
rationality which contrasts sharply with dominant rationalities. Naming those dominant 
rationalities primarily in terms of money and power, what is opposed to them is a 
rationality of autonomy and self-development: 
“[I was] feeling like I’d met a whole bunch of people who were interested in the same kind 
of thing I was interested in, which is, I wouldn’t say it was overtly self-development, but at 
least interest in or awareness of self-knowledg” (Mark) 
The principle of autonomy is of course not a new one within modernity (Wagner 1994). 
Yet most modern formulations take the self for granted: thus instrumental rationality treats 
both the self and its goal as assumptions, and enquires merely after the most effective way 
of getting from A to B. Even in its most hedonistic forms, possessive individualism is 
simply a special case of this approach. Romanticism, commonly ascribed to movement 
milieux (Eder 1993), assumes a natural, pre-given self, albeit obscured by conventions and 
civilisation82. Yet the logic of autonomy developed within this lifeworld places the self in 
question, as an open ended project, something to be constructed or transformed (cf. 
Heelas 1996).  Thus participants make comments along the following lines: 
“Ciarán is ambitious within himself, it’s himself that he wants to develop, not a career or 
any of that kind of stuff.” (Josh) 
Another participant speaks of 
“People who do all kinds of odd and extremely innovative things, an awful lot of people 
whose top priority is sorting their head out, or whose top priority is something along the 
lines of enlightenment.” (Ruth) 
In this context the pursuit of autonomy and self-realisation is explicitly contrasted to the 
goal-rational pursuit of material interests: 
“It comes back to this idea that the way in which people perceive ambition as not a material 
ambition, which again links back to the ideas about people’s attitude to property and that. 
Whilst they have fuck all of it, I don’t think that is entirely responsible for their attitude. 
The development is sort of personal development, it’s not material development. So the 
                                                
82 In Marx the emphasis falls rather on the “disembedding” effects of the capitalist mode of production, 
which is celebrated (Marx and Engels 1967) for its initial release of the potential for freedom from tradition 
and autocracy, yet damned for the limited nature of the freedom it ultimately offers. Autonomy cannot be 
realised within capitalist society; or it can only be realised for the few. Similarly, Habermas (1987a, b) argues 
that capitalist modernity unleashes a potential for autonomous reason which is systematically curtailed by the 
imperatives of economy and state. In these perspectives, then, autonomy is a potential inherent within capitalist 
modernity, which we can grasp and use to criticise that modernity, but which cannot as yet be fully realised.  
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idea of going away to make money isn’t really, you’re not going to impress anybody, really. 
‘Oh wow, he’s earning fuckloads of money, good for him, so what?’ “ (Josh) 
The main theme is that of moving away from the instrumental approach of seeking the 
best available employment towards an explorative approach to one’s own life. This 
explorative sense is underlined by the relatively weak articulation of the nature of the 
alternatives and of how to get there: this is not simply choosing an alternative strategy to 
achieve pre-existing goals. Rather, goals are something to be revised along the way. 
The similarity of this project to the reflexive concept of the modernist “project of the self”, 
and its dissimilarity from the romantic position normally imputed to these lifeworlds, which 
would imply a sense of a “true” self pre-existing social conventions, can be seen from the 
contrast with Berger, Berger and Kellner’s interpretation: 
“The implicit anthropology in all of this is quite clear. Underneath the constraining 
structures of individuality and rationality lies the healing reality of our ‘natural’ being, an ens 
realissimum, which is the object of a quasi-soteriological quest.” (1974: 182) 
This is not the position taken by participants in this network, who are familiar (as we shall 
see) with the romantic rhetoric of Sixties literature, but do not adopt this element of it for 
themselves. The self is not something to identify with but something to develop. One 
distances oneself from the given “self” in order to change it or observe it changing. Or, as 
McRobbie puts it, 
“Different, youthful, subjectivities […] require and find in youth cultural forms strong 
symbolic structures through which ‘who you are’, ‘who you want to be’ and ‘who you want 
to go out with’ can be explored, not in any finalised way, but as an ongoing and reflective 
social process.” (1994: 192) 
Culture and politics 
To state the tension between dominant and alternative rationalities is not, of course, to say 
how it can be resolved, as we shall see in chapter six. Apart from the possibility of a 
privatised pseudo-resolution, participants can and do explore the possibility of a purely 
internal (“spiritual”) liberation, as well as that of a quietist, retreatist or utopian group 
withdrawal, along with collective challenges to the structures blocking autonomy. The 
combination of these latter three within the same individuals and network suggests that at a 
personal or group level they are not the fixed opposites they are sometimes thought to be, 
or as Mark puts it, 
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“They say there’s two things, there’s the urge to be out in the world, to extend oneself into 
life, and at the same time to withdraw from life, to avoid the suffering that life is, like the 
Buddhists have it, but I guess it’s gotta be somewhere between the two on the knife-edge, 
but this is a paradox that you can surmount, the pull to life and from life. It goes in cycles, 
we live and die.” 
Since social structure and everyday routines are not themselves opposites but mutually 
presuppose one another (Giddens 1993b: 122 - 126), Lichterman (1996) is right in arguing 
that social movements need to challenge both: participants need to “free their minds” 
(break out of their own socialisation and reorient themselves in terms of a new “movement 
psychology”), live out alternatives to everyday routines and practically challenge dominant 
structures if they are to tackle the hegemony exercised by “movements from above” in all 
its shapes.  
What we need to start from, then, as Barker and Dale (1997) have suggested, is a sense of 
human needs, or in my terms what is locally rational, first as a response to the situation 
people find themselves in but subsequently - through movement challenges to structures 
and routines - as an articulated “movement rationality” with priorities of its own. The 
rationality discussed here sees narrowly “political” activity as something relative, to be 
located within the broader rationality of the movement itself. In this perspective, political 
mobilisation can be, as critical theorists (Offe 1985) have argued, in defence of autonomy83; 
it may also be a means of pursuing the goal of self-development, much as for Lichterman’s 
(1996) Greens. A third possibility is action in solidarity with others seen as embodying 
some part of the same struggle (see Cohen 1978: 244 - 245 on the importance of this). 
Autonomy and politics 
In keeping with the logic of autonomy as self-development, then, the instrumentally 
rational pursuit of politics in a narrow sense can be rejected outright in the name of 
autonomy: 
LC: Groups are bad things? 
Ruth: Yeah, kind of limiting. If you try and set up anything a lot of these people will just go 
‘I’m not interested’. If they happened to be somewhere and something happened they’d go 
                                                
83 Not, however, that of a “colonised” natural lifeworld, but rather that of the “free spaces” within which 
movements develop (Cohen 1985). 
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for it, but anything organised they’re not interested in, anything that sounds remotely 
political they just don’t want to know. 
LC: Why is that? 
Ruth: Don’t believe in politics, a lot of people just find it boring, or completely pointless, 
or they live their life the way they want to and they live and let live, if other people want to 
get into politics, it would kind of be ‘if you’re into politics that’s your trip, whereas me, I 
just want to wander round and play guitar.’ 
If politics is “your trip”, it is simply one way among many of pursuing the project of self-
development. Alternatively, it may be a means of defending the free space required for the 
pursuit of autonomy: 
“Politics is the mechanism by which decisions that affect my life are made, therefore if I 
wish to have any control over my life I must have an interest in politics, but it is not the 
driving force of my life.” (Josh) 
Or again, speaking of a proto-anarchist group: 
“[T]he people who were most of the time the Network were anarcho-libertarian em hippy 
types [laughs] whatever, and very interested in that kind of free space [….] I think it was 
the looking for a free space kind of thing, which, you know, was politically voiced as 
anarchist and then kind of culturally voiced I think in things like Tarot cards and seances 
and whatever, I’m not sure, but I think they were areas that people were experimenting 
with.” (Frank) 
Free space can also, however, be a very “concrete” issue, where for example a way of life is 
criminalised: 
“Busking was decriminalised in 1988 for a year for the millennium as a tourist attraction. 
That was very funny because the year before there was some huge meetings of buskers and 
I was quite impressed at the number of people that came to the meetings. We were trying 
to get a guild together [.…] There were about thirty people coming to those meetings who 
knew roughly what was going on.” (Ciarán) 
Tolerance and activism 
Thus political activity takes its place as one lifeworld interest among others, to be handled 
with tolerance. Speaking of a couple of heavily committed activists, for example: 
“People know what Seán and Muireann are up to, but they’re not very strongly influenced, 
and that’s an example of Seán and Muireann being part of that group, coming from that 
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group, and finding their own space [.…] But Seán and Muireann didn’t ram it down 
anybody’s throat, and nobody tried to make them conform to what was going on.” (Josh) 
This tolerance appears as a condition of autonomy: 
“There is a sort of laid-back attitude which allows people to do their own thing and is very 
very tolerant of people’s individuality and people doing their own thing and coming and 
going as they please.” (Josh) 
Political mobilisation, then, can form a small or large part of an individual’s project of self-
development, and it takes its place within the local rationalities of the network on this basis. 
This logic of autonomy as self-development, however, has immediate effects in relation to 
the forms of politics which can take root in it and the attitudes taken to the political. 
Autonomous forms of politics 
On the one hand, political forms conducive to this type of autonomy are preferred. The 
description of a college occupation sets the tone: 
“Early stages was just trying to organise things inside, so that people weren’t just running 
round amuck, but still having lots of fun anyway, but at that stage it was real kind of 
patting each other on the back and like ‘We got in, we’ve succeeded’ […] and then just a 
lot of talking to people, a lot of getting into people’s heads and things, and when it got 
kind of [laughs] more organised, if you can call it that, when we started defining exactly 
what we were doing there, and you remember, getting the magazine out and all that, and it 
was actually something to do. But the thing I remember from it was all those engineers in 
there doing there homework all the time, they’d set up a little kind of classroom where they 
were studying and doing their homework. Everyone else was running around the place, 
trying to set up a little commune type thing, Das arrives, starts cooking food for everyone 
[laughter], like a free-for-all, bondage, etcetera, that kind of thing. You know, also Joanna 
was there at the time, and there’s kind of things like that happening, people getting into 
tarot cards and stuff.” (Steve) 
The direct democracy of the squat or the occupation and their articulate counterpart in 
anarchist organising, and the network of alternative projects and its articulate counterpart in 
green politics, offer two possibilities of “doing” politics: 
“[A]lthough you get a lot of strong individuals, I suppose like myself, like Marijke or 
whatever, who do a fair amount of organising, I don’t think people have this desire to 
organise other people. They want to get things done, but there is a desire to do them in a 
group, as a team, which I suppose you don’t get in the normal workplace, even if you’re 
working as a team or whatever, even in an academic department [laughter]” (Frank). 
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The immediate, lifeworld-bound activity of demonstrations, direct action, the local project 
or the once-off event are preferred to more hierarchical political forms, whether of large-
scale organisation or of clientele-building, whose only possible meaning is instrumental and 
whose operation runs directly counter to the logic of autonomy: 
“I think the fact that these people have the laid-back attitude of allowing people to do their 
own thing is a mechanism which allows very strong personalities and very strong 
individuals to be able to interact with each other without stomping on each other’s toes, 
and the sorts of ambitions that these people have, and the way in which they allow that 
ambition to be fulfilled, doesn’t involve getting a group of people to centre round you.” 
(Josh) 
On the other hand, as we have seen, the political is itself relativised, as one means of 
pursuing or defending the project of self-development among others. As Melucci has said, 
activists engage in movement activities on the basis that it has meaning for them, not in 
terms of its instrumental value: “if it doesn’t make sense to me, I am not participating; but 
what I do also benefits others” (1989: 49). In terms of the arguments developed in chapter 
three, this attitude is itself a form of resistance to the instrumental logic of the political 
system: participants see the defence of personal, psychological and group free space and 
independence as primary, and participation in more organised “political” ways of realising 
this goal is always provisional. Thus local rationalities themselves position the political and 
allocate it a very specific place in terms of the pursuit of autonomous self-development: 
“There’s different forms of political. I mean, there’s political active Students’ Union, and 
there was mine, which was more, something like civil rights I’m more supportive of, I 
mean, I’ve got my list of priorities, and to be quite honest student politics don’t come near. 
I reckon by the time there’s a setup where you’re able to be a student and the only thing 
you get harassed by the police for is drugs, you’re laughing. Em [laughs] you’re being fairly 
well left alone. Whereas you’ve still got other countries where becoming a student is 
something almost impossible and if you are a student and you do anything political, that’s 
you strung up by the balls. And then Greenpeace, fine, that was something I could do, I 
mean if I wandered down to Amnesty International they’d just say ‘Write a letter’, when 
you write a letter you go home and you write a letter, and you put a stamp on it and you 
send it off. And the strong point about Amnesty is, it’s something everyone can do about 
the same and everyone can do it at home. Which is like write a letter. Em, Greenpeace it’s 
a bit awkward. I mean, you can’t save a whale, like [laughter] sticking one in the fridge and 
leaving it for later.” (Das) 
As I will argue in chapters six and (especially) seven, this orientation seems to me 
incomplete, in that it lacks a realistic strategic sense of what would need to be done to 
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secure existing free spaces against movements from above and to bring about these 
possibilities for others who do not yet have them. In this sense the network is “reinventing 
the wheel”, and there is not much sense of reflection on past defeats.  
At the same time, it is often a strength of new movements that they do not “know” certain 
things to be impossible (and may score surprising successes because of this if conditions 
have changed), and a weakness of much traditional activism that it falls into a purely 
instrumental pursuit of power where the goal is so far off that in effect the means 
(recruitment, organising) become the end. As Thompson (1977b) argues, there is a need for 
the utopian element; my hope in this thesis is not so much to undermine that as to develop 
it - to deepen the movement’s seriousness about realising its utopias. As one participant puts 
it, the difficulty is that 
“[T]here is a lot of, not real thinking ahead, really, seriously, sort of ‘We’ll still be partying 
in forty years’ time’, but not really thinking it, because I think now we wouldn’t do the 
same, you know?” (Tina) 
Different kinds of challenges 
The relativisation of narrowly “political” activity on the part of participants is not a simple 
rejection, in a network formed in movement contexts and most of whose members have 
been and are regular contributors to movement mobilisations. What they are not, with one 
exception, is full-time activists. As the one “full-timer” among them observes, 
“I think the big difference that I run up against time and time again is the people who are 
running around doing things and the people who are hanging out, and that at times leads 
to a certain amount of intolerance on both sides and a blindness at times, but I think that 
that split between the people who are going and being politically active or the people who 
are getting wasted, and perhaps what’s happening now is that the people who’re going and 
getting wasted, most of them are as you say getting their act together in some kind of a 
way, and the people who are politically active, a lot of them are not quite slowing down, 
but they’re not being quite as manic as they used to be.” (Frank) 
However, along with these strictly “political” mobilisations - directly challenging social 
structures - there is a more systematic challenge to everyday social routines implicit in the 
contrasts of lifestyle we have already seen. At times this is sufficiently threatening to 
dominant instrumental rationalities to invite coercive intervention if detected - squatting, 
occupations, drug use, free festivals and Rainbow Gatherings, for example. At others, the 
energies are more “internal”, building up alternative institutions and developing alternative 
ways of life. This latter should not be underestimated: what is received as socialised routine 
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represents the sedimentation of much skilled effort on the part of past movements from 
below and currently dominant movements. To abandon this and start to reinvent new ways 
of living is, at its most basic, an enormous effort requiring personal resources to initiate and 
external resources to institutionalise - a point often lost in more “idealist” formulations of 
cultural studies. 
Roots of autonomy 
Where then does this local rationality come from? Why, in other words, the politics of 
autonomy? One answer is given by neo-conservatives à la Berger, Berger and Kellner 
(1974): that the movements of the 1960s in particular undermined the cultural conditions 
of reproduction of organised capitalism - the work ethic and labour discipline, political 
docility and privatised values, etc. If we add to this Claus Offe’s (1984) reflections on the 
contradiction between the state’s attempts to recommodify labour and the 
decommodifying effects in practice of state intervention into ever-new areas of social life, 
and the widely-noted attempts by capital since the 1960s to liberate itself from the 
constraints of national power relations and thus cease to contribute to the conditions of its 
own reproduction, the following analysis seems possible: 
The dual effects of the counter culture and globalisation - the two movements dominating 
disorganised capitalism - in developing and reacting against the Fordist welfare state - have 
produced a situation where capital is not only increasingly financial rather than industrial, 
global rather than national, but crucially no longer subject to the collective rationality 
inducing private losses for the collective interest of capitalism, embodied in the Fordist 
regime of production and reproduction. Henceforth the reproduction of the conditions for 
capital investment and profit - the defence of property, the reproduction of appropriately 
socialised workers and consumers - is left to the efforts of “local” actors - nation-states, 
fundamentalisms, etc., whose attempts at turning back the clock are bolstered by the stick 
of disinvestment rather than the carrot of social investment. 
Externalising the costs of reproduction 
Given this, the reproduction of the social relations conducive to capital becomes a far 
more hit-and-miss affair: as Bauman (1995) has observed, not only are large portions of 
humanity irrelevant as producers, they are increasingly irrelevant as consumers. Under 
these circumstances, the authoritarian and corporatist relations of closure characteristic of 
organised capitalism are no longer backed up by effective relations of internal hegemony, 
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and mechanisms of external coercion - policing, recommodification, labour market 
exclusion - tend to replace the latter. The “costs of reproduction” of capital are then 
increasingly externalised - in other words, capital as such now adopts a “functional” rather 
than “intentional” orientation towards them84, weakening the agencies of internal social 
control (Magnusson 1996). It is under these conditions that it becomes easier not to 
internalise these relations: 
“I started doing a business studies course in UCD, I did that for three weeks and dropped 
out [.…] First of all it was boring, and then it was really training you to be aggressive and 
competitive and looking out only for yourself. I mean, even the class, you’d have the 
teachers say ‘OK, I’ve put down books for doing work. These people, group A, eight in 
the morning, group B, blah blah blah’ and then you’d have to go and sign your name into 
the group, and there were loads of us, we’d a big amphitheatre kind of thing, and she goes 
‘Come on [claps] down! Hurry down and get your name, don’t let people go past you or 
you won’t get the time you want!’ You know, I was going ‘Jesus! What’s this?’ you know? 
After that, I think that was the last drop, [laughs], ‘I’m not staying in this environment!’ ” 
(Tina) 
A logic of autonomy vis-à-vis capital and the state becomes easier to sustain, then, on a 
scale running from full withdrawal through radicalised reflexivity to “internal exile” (see 
chapter six). Characteristically, participants in this network express a strong affinity for the 
most developed forms of autonomy - organic farming and permaculture, New Age 
Travellers and Sixties drop-outs: 
“From what I can gather from the people I know, the few people I know and the little I’ve 
read, there’s very strong parallels with the English New Age travelling community in terms 
of that attitude of people doing their own thing. Those people would fit into this group, 
and vice versa.” (Josh) 
And again, from closer experience and with a more intentional orientation: 
“I’d say that things do tend to be going towards kind of the idea of communities, which 
means like the travellers very much, the New Age travellers and the rest of it, it’s very 
much in community, yes, that’s why they keep in contact with one another, they will 
arrange with someone, ‘if I don’t see you beforehand I’ll meet you next year, at such and 
such’, and that’s their plan, they know they’re gonna be there and if their van goes down 
                                                
84 That is, global capital can afford to leave it to nation-states and other local agencies to take care of 
reproduction, unlike national capital, which has an immediate interest in ensuring the conditions of its local 
survival. 
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they’ll hitch, they’ll do anything to get there because they’ve promised they’ll meet 
someone and stay in contact. To an extent we’ve stayed the same.” (Das) 
Autonomy, in other words, requires community; and the literature which contrasts a docile 
“system” population with a fringe pursuing its own concerns - Gibson, Sterling, Loveday, 
Hunter Thompson - is widely read, and indeed passed onto new participants as a form of 
introduction: 
“People kept throwing books at me, which was quite good too. I read a lot that summer 
[…] Things like The Great Shark Hunt, Generation of Swine, The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test, a 
whole pile of Kerouac books, Carlos Castaneda, LSD and the American Dream.” (Ruth) 
This orientation towards an alternative community is certainly the dominant one in the 
Irish alternative press; still, in interviews I was occasionally surprised how much people 
took it for granted: 
Jim: No, I mean, what’re you actually at? [laughs] 
LC: I’m interested in looking at the way not just sort of immediately people like us and the 
kind of people we’ve been talking about, but also say German Greens I’ve come across, or 
people who now are out in the West doing organic farming for the past twenty years or 
whatever, all that seems to me to be moving within some kind of shared space 
Das: Obviously 
Jim: Yeah, I’d agree 
Das: Oh, so d’you wanna open this up to the wider thing, then? 
Jim: About the whole notion of like why for example somebody would go into the ILAC 
[library] and look up Common Ground [magazine] because they’d heard about such a 
publication… 
Building reflexive autonomy 
The form of autonomy institutionalised in counter cultural rationality is reflexive both in its 
form - how participants hold it - and its content - what it is substantively about. In this 
section I first examine, and try to historicise, the reflexive construction of an autonomous 
lifeworld, then the ways in which participants “do” this lifeworld. 
Breaking out 
The world that participants grew up in appears from the interviews discussed below as one 
of everyday routines of social control and a deeply unreflexive culture (cf. Varenne 1993), 
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tied to structures reproducing inequality. To construct an autonomous lifeworld was thus 
no easy task, and participants stress the effort involved in making changes. In discussion of 
their own life-histories, what frequently appears is a narrative of reflexive self-development 
against the taken-for-granted elements of the lifeworld they grew up in, of family, school 
and popular culture. This might start with an inability to take the situation for granted or to 
fit in: 
“In secondary school I felt kind of lonely, that I wished I was in, and all the rest of the 
stuff, all the teenage dating and discos, but I just couldn’t see myself fitting in for the life of 
me. But I was very withdrawn and shy, and things like that. I was quite depressed for a 
while after we came to Dublin. It was pretty grotty, and the sky was this unpleasant shade 
of orange constantly, and there was this constant rumble of traffic that would never go 
away, and there was absolutely no space, and the nearest hills were only a few hundred 
metres high, and they were several miles away, and the smoke, the dirt, the noise, and the 
people, they were the worst thing about it. I used to fantasise that everybody in the world 
would vanish. Mysteriously, suddenly, and I could explore the world at my leisure without 
having to deal with people. Sociopath? Yeah.” (Mark) 
Already before the network developed, then, participants had withdrawn – or been 
excluded from – the taken-for-granted culture around them: 
Das: [I]t’s a group of people that, I think most of them, one way or another, had been the 
relatively quiet person at school who read a lot, an awful lot of them tend to have that sort 
of idea of people who in the seventies would have wandered round in an ex-army parka 
with relatively long hair [laughs] reading out of Kerouac, and this is kind of the eighties 
equivalent, where they just kind of wander into college, discovered like, eventually move 
into the occie [occupation], sit in the occie, they kind of recognise each other as kind of 
‘Aha! Someone else. Wanna game of chess?’ ‘Yep’. 
Jim: Yep. [laughs] 
Das: Almost every single one of them had done something stupid like try to assemble a 
ZX81 
Jim: Yeah, that’s true actually. 
Das: Save the tenner, cause it came in a kit. That kind of stuff. 
A logical prerequisite for any developed form of reflexivity is a certain measure of 
distancing from the “normal” and “taken-for-granted” assumptions of unreflexive 
lifeworlds. At its most basic, this appears as a personal attempt to find another path: 
“People [in the Dublin suburbs] seemed to be content with just kind of shambling along, 
and into secondary school and out the other side, into a job, and not losing touch with 
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their friends in the pub every night of the weekend, but that wasn’t enough for me. I was 
looking for something other, and massively more, something to quench a deeper thirst for 
life. Like zombies, those people.” (Mark) 
Or, as Ruth puts it: 
“If you grow up in a suburb, you live in a row of identical houses with net curtains, and the 
first thing you think is ‘I never want to live in an identical house with net curtains. It’s the 
very first thing.” 
Breaking with assumptions 
Thus participants recount breaks with class assumptions about education as a form of 
inheritance designed to provide access to a suitable career: 
“Even before I went to college I went ‘I want to do a sort of liberal arts thing that isn’t 
going to qualify me for one thing, so I can’t just be pushed into doing a HDip [teaching 
qualification]’, and a lot of people said ‘Oh, so you’re going to be a teacher.’ I said, ‘No, I 
don’t want to be a teacher.’ I just wanted to leave Dublin for a while, do a lot of travelling, 
I’m grand.” (Ruth) 
Most participants, in fact, failed in one way or another to take the instrumental attitude to 
education demanded by conventional Irish assumptions about its role in providing secure 
employment. Similarly, many avoided the “obvious” strategy of taking the available 
opportunities in e.g. computers, translation or the music business: 
“I could get a job now, if I decided to, that I want to translate.” (Tina) 
Participants also stress the break with the ethno-communitarian assumptions of 
“normality” and homogeneity: 
“There are things you know, but they still have to be right in front of you to be obvious, 
like I always knew that the entire world wasn’t white, Irish, all the rest of it, you know that 
all these other cultures exist, but it’s when you actually meet them that it’s different, 
because they live their whole life in a totally different perspective to you, which is great.” 
(Ruth) 
Similarly, routine forms of racism and exclusion have been abandoned: 
LC: When you’re on the street, and not all of them, but you know a lot of travellers, 
homeless people and people just hanging round on the street assume you’re on their side. 
Ciarán: After you’ve spent a few years talking to them you are. 
Lastly, they identify conflicts over gendered assumptions: 
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“It was like Stepford Wives or something [.…] [The film]’s about this couple who move to 
this town called Stepford cause the husband gets a job in this local hi-tech company and all 
the housewives in the vicinity are like something out of a Fifties ad for the happy 
housewife. And this is distressful for her, cause this is the Sixties, and she’s getting into 
female consciousness and stuff and another newcomer arrives nearby and they get to know 
each other and they’re all going ‘Yeah, what’s the story with all these other women, who 
are like so incredibly conformist?’ And then one day her friend turns round, it’s like the 
Bodysnatchers or something, and she’s all happy and content and has to get home and make 
a dinner for her husband [laughter] and I forget how it’s revealed but it turns out that she’s 
a robot, and all these husbands are replacing their wives with robots that the factory 
makes, and eventually she gets replaced, her double turns up to take her out and clean up 
the mess. Anti-coming of age. Yeah, I saw the suburban ideal and nearly vomited.” (Mark) 
These are not just, as with Mark, the observations of outsiders: 
Tina: You know, sometimes I wish ‘Why’m I not like my sister?’, you know? Why do I 
make life so hard for myself? Why don’t I just want a normal job, and a husband, and two 
kids, and a house, and two cars? 
LC: Well, why? 
Tina: I don’t know why, I just don’t. [laughs] I just find it immensely boring. 
As this last comment indicates, these are real choices that have to be made, and continually 
remade, within individuals’ lives (“Why do I make life so hard for myself?”); but they are 
also made in relation to an alternative habitus (“I just find it immensely boring”). The break 
with the taken-for-granted elements of prior habitus involves a whole emotional 
reorientation, whether as cause or result: one participant who had spent time sleeping 
rough abroad and returned to college put this break at the level of an impossibility of 
identification with dominant routines:  
“So after I got back from there, I ended up in college, which was like being right back in 
secondary school again, which was about as far removed from where I’d been as I could 
have got at the time. So I wasn’t very well acculturated, I kind of disacculturated myself 
somehow from all that kind of thing, I didn’t relate to it very well. It’d lost all fear of loss 
of social prestige or position, all the subtle motivations for the middle-class Dublin life, 
they’re all based on social position, standing and material comfort. All those kind of values 
I kind of shed [abroad].” (Mark) 
These contrasts are similar to those Vester et al. (1993) found between participants in “new 
social milieux” in Germany and their parents: 
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“Marked processes of change from the elder to the younger generation express themselves in 
the erosion of values oriented to achievement and order and conventional or conformity-
oriented models of behaviour [….] The children experienced the opening of the social 
space rather as a chance for emancipation from having their minds made up for them in 
class- and gender-specific ways [….] Here, in the youth cultures, the momentous breaks in 
the reproduction of habitus schemas are to be sought.” (1993: 204 – 206) 
Solidarity as a resource 
But how do people who grew up in, for example, the homogenised banality of South 
Dublin housing estates find the resources to make this break? One possibility is simply 
solidarity with like-minded souls: 
“[I]f it was kind of like ‘How do you make a group of people like that?’ and do it 
specifically, you’d go ‘Right, I want to make [laughs] twenty test subjects like this!’ Em 
[laughter] you’d have to be very picky in the beginning [.…] I’d pick a group of people who 
were basically a bit like us in that you pick the people who, say in school, are closer to the 
outsider groups than the really serious cliques. Em, so that when they do actually find 
them, there’s a hell of a lot of people like them, but from other schools. In college, they 
tend to get out, together a bit. They’re the people who all seem the oddity because you had 
one or two interests which were totally outside this particular clique at school, I mean, all 
right, I’d already smoked dope by that stage, I hadn’t considered it as important as maybe 
it was when I was in college, but I smoked it in Spain when I was like sixteen” (Das). 
A key resource for the institutionalisation and plausibility of any new practice is the 
connection with the real or imagined community of others who “were really living the kind 
of life they were talking about”: 
“It does help you if you’ve got a slight idea about something but it’s vague, and you’re 
really not that sure, and then you’ll be sitting in a room with somebody who’ll be talking 
about it and you’ll go ‘Yeah, that’s it, that’s exactly what I was looking for. Where is that?’ 
Or ‘What book was that in?’ And they can tell you [.…] If you find somebody who’s 
already done what it is that you’re about to do you can get a lot of advice from them. You 
can get some pitfalls as well. It’s like ‘I did this for ten years, and it’s not worth it. Try 
something else instead.” (Ruth) 
This could be a shared discovery: 
Jim: An awful lot of people moved over to London […] as a group we managed to change 
ourselves completely by, in that sense, I mean, you had an awful lot of people suddenly, as 
opposed to ‘I’m going to college and do engineering cause that’s what I was told I should 
do’ 
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Das: An awful lot of us suddenly realised that we’d been, there’d been no conscious 
thought going into what they were doing, and everybody was doing maybe a degree or 
whatever, but there wasn’t necessarily any interest, because either ‘I’ve got enough points 
for engineering, I’ll do engineering’ [….] 
Jim: I think everybody had realised that they’d gone from, like, you know, in most cases a 
nice middle-class secondary school straight into 
Das: To drugged hippy dropouts! [laughs] 
Jim: Straight into a very, I don’t know, College being like the rarefied atmosphere of 
college, and finding sort of people in common, and I dunno, had discovered like, by going 
from school to college you had completely missed an entire area of life already. And 
particularly in my case I was doing a, you know, a degree that was professional, in which 
case, you know, go to school, go to college, come out, hassle all the right companies, get 
taken on, you know, basically it was like a recipe for getting a watch in fifty years. [laughter] 
To break out in this sense, however, is not simply a cognitive liberation; it is also an 
emotional one, and the participation of others is central to this: 
LC: I think there is a lot of, as you were saying about the Occie, people sitting round 
sorting each other’s heads out. What’s really going on there? 
Steve: Well, I think being treated with respect by other people, having them spend time 
with you and having basically other people mirroring you, actually saying ‘You really are a 
nice person, you know, you’re a wonderful person’, etcetera, it’s like being involved in a 
relationship [….] So, obviously, the more people that you are friendly with, the more 
people you know that are real with you, not just on your basic social level, the more people 
you get to know very intimately, the better that is for you. 
Physical distancing 
This distancing, then, is not an easy exercise; and it depends crucially on the availability of 
local rationalities within which it makes personal and emotional sense and which can offer 
participants the ontological security to criticise dominant rationalities and explore 
alternatives: 
“Even the freedom, that, just say, take for example something like acid. I wouldn’t, I 
couldn’t really go tripping in Dublin, too many people know me. I’d meet some of them, 
and you’d hear like two days later ‘So-and-so, I saw him off his head on drugs, in such-
and-such a place’. Whereas like in London that didn’t happen.” (Das) 
This very often implies a physical move towards known movement milieux: 
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“People go [to San Francisco] from all over the world. Usually people looking for 
something, or people who are too weird for the small town that they live in. I mean, 
people come from […] places where they’re just too freaky for where they live, or they 
can’t handle how racist where they are is. A lot of people say they couldn’t deal with how 
racist it is.” (Ruth) 
This suggests something of the working of this conflict between lifeworlds: the pursuit of 
autonomy leads both to rejection by unreflexive lifeworlds (“too weird”, “too freaky”) and 
to rejection of those same lifeworlds (“they can’t handle how racist it is”), pushing people 
towards movement milieux or, at its simplest, towards “something else”: 
“I remember leaving for Paris in 87, and I’d just turned eighteen, and I said to myself 
‘Right, now I’m eighteen, my parents can’t stop me from doing what I want to do, so I got 
out from there and got as far away as I could. Over the horizon wouldn’t do, and I had to 
[go] overseas. To an alien culture.” (Mark) 
Along more conventional emigration, it is noticeable that this network also includes a 
number of people who have emigrated to Ireland from western Europe, as well as a number 
of Irish people who have returned from significant periods of time in the movement 
milieux of e.g. London, Paris or Berlin. Such movement milieux offer free spaces within 
which people can develop the skills that make up alternative local rationalities: 
“When I was squatting over in London and then, you know, I was keeping a squat 
together, I was kind of, you know, a useful person if somebody was stuck and homeless, 
em, [I] was running a pub [.…] I was keeping me act together independently for a change, 
whereas were I to have gone straight through and like, you know, walked into a McJob, as 
I say, pick up a watch in fifty years time, that would’ve been, you know, I would never 
have had the problems and the hassles [laughs] granted, but I’d never’ve you know stepped 
out.” (Jim) 
As della Porta and Diani note, 
“Ideas concerning organizational structure, strategies of action or definitions of the world 
‘travel’ from movement to movement, sector to sector, city to city, centre to periphery and, 
on occasions, periphery to centre.” (1999: 246) 
What moves, though, is not just ideas, but skilled human beings. 
Earlier generations 
To develop new skills, the practical example of other people who have already broken out 
to a greater or lesser extent may be deliberately sought out: 
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“I think it was the kind of connection I was looking for. It was more or less the first thing 
I did when I got to college was looked around for people like that, I’m not sure I knew 
exactly what I was looking for, but I was looking for people like that [.…] I was interested 
in the occult at the time, I was interested in neo-paganism, and I wanted to meet people 
who were into that kind of stuff, also buskers, musicians. I was interested in what people 
were doing in Dublin who weren’t in college. You know, people who were just sitting in 
their flats, painting or writing. I think the way I looked at it at the time was, I wanted to 
know bohemians.” (Ruth) 
In some cases, participants were in a position to make direct connections with earlier 
generations of the counter culture: 
“[In London we met] people like say Des K, who’s [laughter], who’s just been at what 
we’re at for longer than us. And he’s also another, he’s quite funny, in London he got 
called Papa Smurf [laughter] because he could smurf anything together, basically, also 
because whereas then you have an awful lot of kind of like scientific interested people, 
who are into kind of like sitting down for a while, [laughs] smoking some drugs and trying 
to get their life together, which is like a very bad idea [laughter], Des K had been at it since 
the Sixties. Des K is 42. But you don’t say that to him, it’s impolite.” (Das) 
Both in Dublin and in London some of the social movement organisations of previous 
decades - students’ unions, squatter organisations, green and anarchist groups, peace and 
Third World solidarity campaigns etc. - were still more or less active: 
“[T]here are a lot of people there who’ve come from lobby groups, sort of a very small and 
marginalised nature, I suppose. The [country] solidarity group would be a very interesting 
one to look at, where its activists from the 80s have ended up.” (Frank) 
This enabled the transmission of a whole range of skills, from those involved in setting up 
squats (see chapter four) to those involved in open relationships. Thus, talking of a 
somewhat older participant in the occupation: 
Frank: The sex stuff as well, the kind of way people in two sort of ways, I mean all the fun 
and games of a very mild bondage in inverted commas [laughs], but then the things that 
were going on with people like Joanna and Robert and the two Emmetts and all that sort 
of relationship stuff 
LC: I was [laughs] not only not involved in any of this but hearing about most of it sort of 
at third hand several years later 
Frank: Right, well, that was mainly Joanna having relationships of varying levels and 
degrees and frequency with various people, and a couple of other people in slightly similar, 
much less complicated [laughs] positions, but people trying to, this being half publicly 
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discussed, and that kind of thing, and a feeling that yeah, we weren’t going to be 
monogamous or monandrous or whatever. 
The uses of other movement milieux 
Such contacts, though important for participants, were mostly of short duration - during 
holidays or periods of intense mobilisation - so that participants have more frequently 
found themselves thrown on their own resources. Another way of putting this is to say that 
if association cannot be face-to-face, mediated participation in other milieux, relativising 
the here-and-now by making present other cultural possibilities, can be an important 
building block for local reflexive milieux. Other milieux are rarely seen as something to be 
imitated verbatim; rather, they are used as a tool for opening up a sense of possibility with 
regard to one’s own life - in other words, to enable reflexivity. Thus one participant stresses 
“the fact that [those involved] are very well read and are involved in, interested in most 
things.” (Josh) 
In particular, this meant participation in alternative “imagined communities”. This was not, 
and could not have been, the neat importation of a pre-packaged “discourse”, but rather a 
reflexive habitus of (literally) reading other ways of life as a means of gaining distance from 
one’s own background and of creating new possibilities: 
“I dunno, the Eastern religion bit, the opportunity, like, being honest most of us come 
from Christian and majority Catholic background, and you grew up, whatever moral codes 
you were drawing on, what you knew was Catholicism. And then when you went to 
redefine that, you really didn’t have anything different to compare it with, and that was the 
one thing that Eastern religion did do, it allowed people to start going ‘Well, it’s all 
bollocks.’ “ (Jim) 
So, for example, the American counter-culture of the 1960s is critically examined as a sort 
of map of the territory opened up by the reflexive perspective: 
“What I thought happened in the sixties was that people started thinking very differently, 
not for the first time ever, but that they had this wealthy class of people who should have 
been happy as flowers […] and instead they went ‘Well, sod this for a game of soldiers, I 
don’t want to go to college, get a degree, get a good job and have a huge house, mortgage 
and 2.5 kids.’ So then they’d started, you know, they started exploring alternatives, and as 
always happens with that a lot of people just spent a lot of time doing a lot of drugs, 
wandering round, getting fucked up, and trying to be enlightened. And of course a lot of 
them weren’t enlightened, a lot of them ended up doing heroin, but a couple were, so it 
was well worth trying.” (Ruth) 
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The choice of the 1960s is not random, but makes sense if chapter three’s argument about 
the 1960s as the starting point of the counter culture is accepted85: 
“I think there was a kind of feeling ‘well, yeah, it’s twenty years on from ‘68 almost’. And I 
think people’s attitude to ‘68 was not just ultra-left radical things, it wasn’t seen as just, 
ultra-left in Paris, it was also sexual revolution and all that sort of stuff, the ‘67 […] I think 
it was a fairly romanticised idea of it, but there wa, I think people had the general idea 
anyway that it was a kind of youth revolt that was attractive to workers, but one where 
youth actually insisted on having its day and being useful and this kind of thing, and the 
idea of, samizdat posters and graffiti and all that kind of thing was pretty attractive.” 
(Frank) 
“To know that it could be done”, as Ruth puts it, was clearly enormously liberating; equally 
clearly, it was not enough. Though participants may have been fascinated with events like 
the public Acid Tests, lifestyles like those of New Travellers, practices like Castaneda’s 
presentation of Mexican shamanism or revolutionary situations like the Spanish Civil War, 
they were in no position to imitate them in the Ireland of the mid-1980s. Thus, their 
appropriation of the skills and ideas of these milieux was always highly selective and guided 
by their own immediate needs: 
Josh: They’ve taken on an awful lot of influences from popular culture and literature 
LC: But they’ve selected them 
Josh: They’ve chosen the nice bits and thrown away the bits they don’t like, yeah. 
Beyond this, the language of these other contexts was clearly stretched to cover new 
practices, as Marx observed:  
“The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the 
living. And just when they seem engaged in transforming themselves and things, creating 
that which has not previously existed, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they 
summon up anxiously the ghosts of the past to their service, borrow their names, slogans 
and costumes, to stage the new scene of world history in this venerable disguise and with 
this borrowed language.”(n.d.: 270) 
                                                
85 Wainwright identifies the possible knowledge value of the 1960s well: 
“The challenge of the late sixties generation to the legitimacy of those in power is closely associated 
with their immense confidence in themselves as the subjects rather than objects of historical change. 
The extraordinary political energy of those years demonstrated in a concentrated way the power that 
people potentially have to dissolve constraining structures which in ‘normal life’they passively 
reproduce.” (1995: 75) 
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The practical development and maintenance of a reflexive lifeworld ex nihilo was no small 
feat, and the symbolic relation between Sixties-as-wished-for and Eighties-as-were opened 
up a creative space within which new practical logics could find a recognisable verbal form. 
Free spaces 
The reflexive (re-)creation of self starts from deliberate acts of distancing from one’s 
lifeworld background, but for its stabilisation it needs to be embodied within the alternative 
rationalities of movement milieux: 
“[The occupation] introduced people to each other, and it sort of set a framework within 
which people interacted with each other […] I think a framework of the way in which the 
social interactions that that particular group of people have subsequently continued to use, 
em, a lot of music, people sitting round playing music. Talking, often about trivia, but there 
have often been, you know, good serious discussions as well, and I think that sort of 
framework was set, for a lot of people set up there, but that was similar to what was going 
on in Montague St [squat] as well. If anything, for me, because of the level of my 
involvement with the two, I would say Montague St was an awful lot more seminal than 
the occie […] in terms of my interaction with those people and that kind of social 
intercourse.” (Josh) 
Individual trajectories of liberation, just as much as the appropriation of other movement 
milieux, require collective contexts. If modernity creates the potential for some kinds of 
autonomy, it remains deeply problematic: 
“There is no general reason why, faced with such a diversity [of values, beliefs and 
lifestyles], more than a very few individuals would be able to succeed in securing their 
identity in the way required for autonomy. They are just as likely to wander perpetually in 
this ‘pluralisation of life-worlds’ with what Peter Berger has called a ‘homeless mind’” 
(Taylor 1982: 160) 
While Taylor identifies “secular family communes” as a means of securing such stability, 
other writers (Raschke 1988: 427–9; Vester et al. 1993: 204-206) have identified more 
general contexts (movement milieux, metropolitan “scenes”) as contexts within which 
people can develop alternative rationalities. These contexts are commonly understood as 
“free spaces” (cf. e.g. Bey 1991); as Fantasia and Hirsch write, 
The very subordinate position of outsider groups means that their oppositional cultural 
expression cannot be cultivated openly. Thus, subordinate groups must operate in private, 
isolated from the surveillance and rule governance of elites. These ‘havens’, or ‘free social 
spaces’, are relatively isolated social settings where subordinate groups may question the 
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rationalizing ideologies of the dominant order, develop alternative meanings, iron out their 
differences, and, particularly in times of acute social struggle, transform traditional cultural 
meanings and construct emergent cultural forms.” (1995: 145 – 146) 
For this network, such havens have meant self-controlled spaces (a squat, a shared house, a 
college society, an occupation) in which to move from individual development to mutual 
recognition and affirmation and from the reception of other milieux to personal practice: 
“I think we had, at least some of us had this very crazy idealistic view of the world, we’d 
spend evenings talking about this and how we’d stay the way we were and wouldn’t be 
corrupted, and blah blah blah [laughs]. This is embarrassing! [….] It was this big thing, like, 
‘I’m not getting into the system, I’m not going to get a career’ – which actually is coming 
true and [laughter] though not in the sense, you know…” (Tina)  
Subsequent to the stabilisation of the network, participants have also continued their 
interest and involvement in other areas of the counter culture as they have had the 
opportunity to engage with them: the alternative press, women’s refuges, the permaculture 
movement, Third World solidarity, anti-racist organising, alternative spirituality, and so on. 
The formation of a movement rationality obviously entails both elements: on the one hand, 
a reformulation of locally felt needs in terms of the available ideas and institutions of a 
wider movement; on the other, a reinterpretation of these ideas and institutions in terms of 
local practical logics. The effective operation of this dialectic amounts to the construction 
of the counter-hegemonic relations of a movement project. 
Networks on the periphery 
The extent to which Irish movement milieux can be independent, however, is severely 
limited by the relations of hegemony discussed earlier. Unlike, say, the German left, this 
network has no published accounts of previous local generations available to it, and relies 
on a perpetual importation of ideas from the past and from abroad, giving rise to 
occasional surprises: 
“I’ve met people in San Francisco who are exactly like the people here. Which really 
surprised me. Like, exactly. Right down to the kind of things that they read. I mean, if you 
go six thousand miles away to the other side of the world and find that people saw the 
same films, were influenced by the same books, they completely paralleled the way I 
developed as well, which is amazing. That was just really interesting, that was fun. But then 
they might have a couple of other things that were different.” (Ruth) 
And again: 
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“There’s been a fair bit of transplantation. The JCR [student café] would be an example of 
that [.…] Like I mean, I think that kind of cooperative run café and information, political 
information and political posters and murals and all that sort of stuff, and, that’s, didn’t 
really click with me until Sarah came over to Berlin there six months ago, and on the 
second day she was there she walked into one of the squats and she said ‘My God! [laughs] 
Now I know where the JCR came from!’ [laughter]” (Frank) 
While importing the finished products, the network exports labour power - it is often easier 
and more rewarding for individual participants to head for Australia, Germany, the USA, 
Britain, Mexico, Spain or Belgium than it is to try to plant the seeds of a developed counter 
culture in the arid soil of the ROI: 
“[I]n London and in Berlin there was a much more advanced, bigger, and more active 
radical scene that had control of houses and all that sort of stuff, space to do things in a 
very marginalised way, which is something that’s very different to Dublin, I think. I think 
the kind of marginalised alternatives in Dublin don’t have the same resources. I think the 
alternatives with resources […] are much less marginalised.” (Frank) 
If it were not for the constant influx in the other direction of participants in continental 
and American counter cultures, such networks would be even more deeply isolated than 
they are. At the same time, however, migrants retain contact and interest in developments 
at home: 
“I reckon there’s a feeling that ‘yeah, you know, we go off abroad and (a) you know, have 
fun seeing new places, doing different things that don’t exist in Ireland at the moment or 
whatever, but (b) we’re kind of building up a toolbox to bring back home and at the same 
time we’re keeping up the contacts at home, so that, you know, we’re kind of going off 
abroad to gather the tools, but we’re back at home every now and then to gather bits of 
wood [laughter] when we have a full toolbox and a full woodpile [laughter] we’ll come 
home and build the dogkennel’, kind of thing.” (Frank) 
The difficulties of reflexive autonomy 
As we have seen, the meaning of autonomy in this network is something like “personal 
development” (Josh) or “searching for enlightenment” (Ruth). In other words, the 
assumption is that the self which is the subject of autonomy is not given but to be made, 
practically and emotionally. Mark’s elaboration of the problem is probably the most 
complete: 
“I mean existentially there’s another thing, there’s the bedrock and the bedrock experience 
that I had, the kind of magical realist bit, the transtemporal, transpersonal awareness, but 
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the real question is how to develop this and how to motivate oneself to develop this, 
because if you try, you find that almost everything you can think of has a motive, every 
motive you examine or every impulse you look at, you find in yourself that it brings you 
towards this kind of thing, has its roots somewhere in your upbringing.” (Mark) 
From the givenness of social structures it is extremely difficult to create something 
genuinely autonomous. This acts as an individual parallel - and perhaps also a metaphor - 
for the construction of an autonomous lifeworld, or the development of a counter culture. 
The intention is not to replicate some idealised past, but to create something as yet 
unknown: 
“I kind of kept an eye on myself, waiting to see where it would manifest itself, but the 
lifestyle I had and what I was doing wasn’t bringing out this block, whatever it was, so I 
more and more was prepared to just do whatever turned up next on the assumption that 
this is going to bring me closer to, that the way my life was working with, in bursts of 
sustained serendipity it was bound to turn up whatever was, I felt was preventing me from 
getting sort of closer towards what it was that I really wanted to be doing.” (Mark) 
Tacit knowledge, we might say, cannot be brought out by an act of will alone. If 
participants frequently say that they do not know what they want in their lives, then, there 
are reasons for this: 
“I was kind of adrift then, with the knowledge that I could go wherever I wanted, but not 
knowing first of all what the options were, secondly which one I wanted to pursue, so that 
the ensuing several years were a bit rudderless.” (Mark) 
The difficulties of commitment 
As this last quote suggests, the definition of autonomy in these terms is not without 
problems. In particular, it leads to a constant tension around organising and commitment: 
Tina: [Y]ou don’t put yourself out. I mean, I’m not saying that nobody every does, you 
know what I mean, but you don’t, like I mean, people that can be and are very nice and 
help and this kind of thing, but I think all this thing about doing your own things loads of 
times was basically ‘I don’t want to commit myself to anything.’ It’s used very much for 
breaking up with somebody. You wanna be free. 
LC: Right. And you don’t think that was sincere, or? 
Tina: It probably was at the time. I’m sure it was. I mean, I’ve used it myself. [laughter] 
On the one hand, to live this autonomous life implies actually constructing other routines, 
other ideas, other institutions, other networks, and if it is to be sustained some kind of 
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long-term commitment to these. On the other hand, these relationships - of membership, 
identification, commitment - share form if not content with the relationship that 
participants are rejecting. Having successfully (for example) given up their commitment to 
a conventional career, they cannot simply “swap labels” and transfer unproblematic and 
routinised habitus to something new: 
“Most people I know don’t want to be committed to anything. Or anybody, because 
they’re so desperate to get their lives together, get whatever it is that they want to do 
together, that that takes up an awful lot of time, so they don’t want to compromise that by 
being stuck in one place or one job or with one person or in one country.” (Ruth) 
“Getting it together” - creative and reflexive activity in general - is potentially threatened by 
too great a degree of commitment to any specific project. The logical conclusion is that it is 
normal for participants to see the milieu as something that is ultimately provisional and 
external, in other words, to maintain the reflexive attitude towards the movement itself: 
“It’s kind of paradoxical to want to be part of a group and at the same time not yet part of 
the group. To want to create a comfortable subset or define its boundary or something.” 
(Mark) 
The lifeworld, then, is legitimated by its contribution to reflexive projects, and if it moves 
towards becoming “taken-for-granted” in its turn it needs to be ditched, and for the same 
reason it was initially entered. Thus it is always an open-ended exercise: too tight an 
articulation would defeat the purpose. The fascination with experimentation discussed in 
chapter six, and the double-edged tolerance and refusal of commitment, are ways of 
structuring interaction within this “free space”,  the skills of living together in a particular 
way. This may be formalised at times in particular institutions, but exists primarily as a way 
of doing things, a common “structure of feeling” geared towards reflexivity. 
Seeking and drifting 
This has important consequences for movement mobilisation. Not only is commitment 
only likely to projects that have strong personal value, but the lack of commitment to the 
milieu itself makes stable organisation difficult. Virtually all participants have spent 
considerable periods of time abroad, for example; the very mobility that facilitates reflexive 
creativity also makes sustained involvement a difficult achievement. The problem is 
exacerbated by the tendency of social relationships to lose their reflexive edge and become 
“retraditionalised”. One participant says of his decision to emigrate: 
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“[The difference new people make is] new influences, new ideas. If I can be excused using 
a sort of Americanism cliché, personal development, in the sense that my interaction with 
these people, whilst it is completely wrong to suppose that I can’t get anything more out of 
interacting with these people, I had got caught in a rut, where my relationship with them 
was such that something had to change before I could get more out of my interaction with 
these people. That something needed to be other people bringing new attitudes, new ideas, 
fresh outlook on old ideas, anything, into it, would have possibly changed that and sort of 
got me out of that rut.” (Josh) 
Hence some of the most obvious features of the counter culture: the high proportion of 
“drifters” and “seekers” (Musgrove 1974) to active members; the tendency even for the 
latter not to identify with the organisation, and the difficulties experienced with long-term 
commitment (witnessed by the repeated mobilisation, but also repeated demobilisation, of 
these participants). More generally, there is a tendency for the practical logic of building 
institutions and ideas to crumble as it reaches the point of verbal or official logic: hence 
perhaps the oft-expressed preference for building “castles in the air” (see chapter six) 
rather than go through the disappointment of seeing them take on active reality and be 
found wanting. 
Problems of routinisation 
The reflexivity of this logic of autonomy is the product of a historical situation: the 
unusually sharp break with existing social formations, pushing attention towards the forms 
of socialisation, desocialisation and resocialisation; but also the lack of readily available 
models and institutions of “how to do it”: no readily available “red subculture” or fully 
assimilated history of style, but the difficult process of self-creation. The principle of 
reflexive autonomy further implies that all activity, not only work processes or political 
organisation, requires clear reasons and articulate decisions. Giddens (1994) has recently 
explored the pathological effects of the impact of reflexivity “from outside” on lifeworld 
contexts in the generation of compulsive and obsessive activity. Here, however, is a 
lifeworld where the demand for reflexivity comes very much “from within.” 
This entails, then, not a substitution of one set of routines, one taken-for-granted habitus 
for another, but the attempt at a break with routinisation as such: the creative stress on 
self-development and the reflexive rejection of labels, habits, identities and so on, and a 
critique of those who have got caught up in the labels: 
“[The neo-pagans] were into it as a religion, rather than a vehicle for expression of what 
was happening to them in terms of development. It was an alternative comforting belief 
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system which incorporated matriarchal principles, a connection with a more, deeper 
motivation in Ireland than the Catholic church could give them, but once they seemed to 
have got that far they’re content to explore its paradigms rather than continuing to expand 
an understanding of things.” (Mark) 
However, it is a sociological commonplace (Berger and Luckmann 1967) that routine, 
convention, tradition and ritual are enabling mechanisms: they enable the regular and 
unproblematic (re)production of action without much need for prior thought and 
discussion, they enable a sedimentation of “how-to-do-it” knowledge and skill, while the 
“symbolic universe” of a dominant culture provides ready-made reasons for action.  
For the same reason, they privilege means rather than ends, exclude the operation of 
reason, reinforce local power structures, and prevent the exploration of new possibilities.  
The implication of this is that to undermine routinisation and “ideologies” as such is to 
make the production of action extremely challenging, as both the “how” (routine) and the 
“why” (ideology) are placed in question: 
“There’s a component in social interaction, there’s a component of trust and openness, but 
you have the added problem of being able to articulate anything beyond the sort of 
cocktail party level of interaction or the soap opera level of interaction. But given that, that 
there’s a potential conversation on that level, one has to establish trust and openness, and 
it’s not habitual in most people. You will find lots and lots of people who’re unaware, or 
not desirous of this level of interaction. Myself, I suppose, it’s all kinds of fear neuroses 
around it. But even then, I find it hard to imagine what one might talk about once one 
dispenses with the lack of trust and openness, like is there at heart anything to say about 
anything, really?” (Mark) 
If a reflexive orientation to the lifeworld demands a focus on ends and the elaboration and 
coordination of reasons for action, democratic agreement on the forms of activity, and the 
exploration of all the possibilities that can be imagined or read about, this makes activity of 
any kind an extremely demanding business. The stakes are particularly high when neither 
the nature of the self, nor its goals, can be taken for granted, and the prices paid include 
criminalisation, homelessness, academic failure, loss of employment, emigration and so on. 
Where reflexivity widens the range of actual options to include all possible choices, with no 
fixed yardstick to evaluate these possibilities and their consequences, choice becomes 
difficult, if not impossible. Choosing itself becomes and almost impossibly high barrier: 
“If you do have that amount of choice, if you sit down, like for instance, at the moment 
I’m in completely the ideal situation, because […] I’ve got no ties whatsoever, I don’t have 
to be back in Dublin for anything, I don’t have to come back for a course, I don’t have to 
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come back for a job, I’ve got a job where I don’t have a contract. I could leave tomorrow 
[…] my only limitations are money, that’s the only thing. There’s nothing else. Which is 
great. But it also means ‘Oh no, what should I do next?’ Cause if you can do anything at 
all, it’s difficult to narrow it down.” (Ruth) 
Creativity and stagnation 
By retaining the commitment to self-development and the prioritisation of autonomy, their 
stable institutionalisation becomes deeply problematic. Thus it is not surprising if activity in 
this network consists of short bursts of collective energy and enthusiasm, around some 
shared project or mobilisation86, and long periods of “downtime” - an opposition 
characterised by participants as one between “creativity” and “stagnation”. 
The alternation between the two corresponds more to Thompson’s (1993) account of the 
rhythms of agricultural work life than to those of paid and domestic labour. Indeed, paid 
labour can become attractive partly as a way out of this situation, an effective means of 
mobilising energies which does not face the conflict between efficiency and legitimacy that 
will arise “internally”. Corresponding to this alternation are then periods of elation and 
depression, of togetherness and isolation, which participants counter inter alia through 
emigration: 
“[By emigrating] I get a chance to reinvent myself to new people, which should be fun, and 
I think I’m more or less aware of most of the psychological baggage I’m dragging around 
with me, so the reality is that changing, moving around, not putting down roots, one 
avoids confronting the difficulties one has with the social game. But at the same time, 
doing that allows you to explore other parts of yourself, it’s a compromise.” (Mark) 
Alternatively, participation in paid labour can be a way of breaking out of stagnation, by 
drawing on the skills sedimented in dominant rationalities: 
“At the moment he’s still officially temporarily employed by [a removals firm], which he 
has said himself is doing him an absolute world of good in that there is a degree of 
externally imposed discipline which has a knock-on effect in that he’s able to achieve 
whatever the hell he wants to do, he values his spare time, he uses it efficiently, he gets 
things done, whereas previously he had so much bloody spare time to do anything he 
achieved nothing.” (Josh) 
                                                
86 As Josh puts it, 
“Togetherness is almost an infectious quality, when people around you get their shit together, you 
tend to be dragged along by the coat-tails, as it were on the shirt-tails of it.” 
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Simply reverting to such logics wholesale is not a solution, however: 
LC: What would the kind of job be that you want, or what would getting it together mean? 
Tina: Well, if I knew the kind of job I wanted, Laurence! [laughs] I’d be fine! And I would 
be doing it! 
LC: What would you want it to do for you? 
Tina: I’d want to do something that’s not a nine to five job, that allows me to change 
countries every now and then, and see a bit of the world, and that it’s working with people 
rather than with computers or things. You know, face to face, like. 
This problem goes beyond the question of work satisfaction to place the general project of 
“getting it together” within the terms of reflexive autonomy in question: 
LC: Are people do you think doing what they want to do? 
Steve: Ultimately no, not many anyway, but it’s more a question of trying to set yourself 
short term goals and try to realise some of them. You know you have to get hassled, 
obviously, and do things seriously, get hassled by the fact that you’re not actually getting 
anywhere really close to your ultimate goal, but you look at it. 
LC: What are people’s ultimate goals? 
Steve: [.…] I suppose I kind of want the feeling of being useful, this kind of thing, I can 
attain this particular goal, and that I’ll actually do something. 
To this extent this network must be seen as ultimately unable to satisfy participants’ needs: 
it facilitates becoming autonomous, but not doing anything with that autonomy; prizes self-
development, but cannot provide the internal resources to make it possible. What is 
lacking, to cite Raschke (1993), is a way of combining legitimacy with efficiency - of 
connecting the legitimate desire for self-development and the production of an alternative 
lifeworld with equally legitimate forms of institutionalisation, routinisation and shared 
ideas. As it stands, the reflexive attitude is highly legitimate but not particularly efficient; 
goal-rational behaviour is illegitimate in terms of both reflexivity and autonomy. 
Participants who see the need for goal-rational behaviour commonly suffer from a lack of 
identification with the way in which they need to behave in order to achieve their aims: an 
acute form of the Weberian paradox. They have set themselves as individuals off from 
oppressive social structures - and partly because of this history have trouble finding ways of 
structuring life that could enable further development - or, to put it another way, cannot 
produce a developed form of interdependence that would not seem a form of dependence 
for the individual. 
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This is in part at least the effect of being the first generation of members of the counter 
culture: brought up to be subordinate, the self-confidence that would be needed to 
collectively take control of their shared existence is lacking. While basic solidarity and 
cooperation are very strong, this is in support of apparently isolated individual directions. 
An active sense of collectivity, or an effective form of democratic decision-making, are 
lacking and not particularly missed. But at the same time this inability to “hang together” 
risks leaving them “hanging separately”, as Benjamin Franklin put it - or, in less dramatic 
terms, it reproduces their peripherality and dependence on the rest of the counter culture 
for inspiration and on dominant structures for everyday activity.  
Despite its weaknesses, however, the relatively simple language and weak institutions of 
this network express a movement rationality which is developing what in this context are 
new - and hence relatively vague and inarticulated - ways of doing things out of a context 
of existing conflict between movements and on the basis of the legacy - good and bad - of 
existing movements. In this fairly ordinary network of fairly ordinary movement 
participants, then, we have one aspect of the slow development of a counter culture. 
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Chapter six: radicalising reflexivity 
Chapter five identified important contradictions within the possibilities for creativity of the 
movement rationality of reflexive autonomy: the same reflexive critique of routine, the 
same autonomist critique of commitment, can enable the creation of free spaces but also 
disable any attempt to do anything with them. Choice can be paralysing; freedom can turn 
to stuckness; the dull compulsion of physical labour in the black economy can be necessary 
to wind up the springs of action. If, as I have suggested, movements are learning processes, 
we should be able to identify attempts at resolving this problem within movement contexts 
such as the network studied here. 
Reflexive resolutions 
In this chapter, I will argue that two kinds of resolution of the “problem of reflexivity” are 
possible; a contemplative reflexivity, which dominates in social theory as in everyday life, 
and an active or radicalised reflexivity, which (as I shall show) requires practical techniques 
to become possible. The conventional meaning of reflexivity - often identified with 
reflexivity tout court - can best be described as contemplative, in the sense that the 
knowledge interests that structure its production require that it can be held without making 
any difference to social practice. 
By contrast, implementing the project of autonomous self-development sketched in the 
previous chapter necessarily implies a reflexive attitude to social relations, of an active kind, 
in the sense of the creation of meanings and practices which not only defend the “free 
space” necessary for the project but directly enable this self-development, and develop the 
projects of the self as they move from the theoretical to the practical. 
Movement milieux, then, are reflexive milieux, and we can speak with Lash (1994a) of a life-
world reflexivity along with self-reflexivity or institutional reflexivity, and attempt to locate 
movement activities within this logic. In particular, if “self-development” is to have any 
social reality, it must mean a change of the social relations within which people experience 
themselves and are confirmed in their identity. This implies a questioning of given social 
relations and a distancing from them; a search for alternative possibilities; and an 
exploration or experimentation with projects, including movement activities, which might 
enable the realisation of new “identities” or a longer-lasting project of self-development. 
This move away from unreflexive lifeworlds is immediately political, in the sense of raising 
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questions of power and control, but not necessarily in the sense of an engagement with the 
institutions of political intermediation (Melucci 1992). 
This is not, however, what is always or even normally meant by the concept and “figure of 
thought” of reflexivity, which contemporary social thought deploys in a wide variety of 
often unclarified meanings. There are at least two important ways in which social 
phenomena can be described as reflexive (leaving aside usages in relation to social research 
and the activity of theorising). 
Reflexivity as universal human condition 
This points to a micro-social condition of monitoring one’s own actions, enabling the 
maintenance (sometimes the transformation) of social relations. This is a very old position 
in social thought; it is implicit in Weber’s (1984) emphasis on the meaning of action, as well 
as in Freud’s (1975) analysis of the superego as in a sense the internalisation of other 
people’s perspectives on our action. Symbolic interactionism (Becker 1973) and Goffman’s 
(1975) work develop the sense of distancing from and monitoring of the social self. More 
recent work in ethnomethodology and the philosophy of language has refined these 
positions, and works such as Giddens (1993a) and Habermas (1984) draw on this work to 
canonise this reflexive condition as fundamental to any social activity. 
Reflexivity as a specifically modern phenomenon 
At the same time, critical modernists from Marx to Weber claim that modernity sets free 
the potential of reflexivity in historically specific ways. In particular, “society” becomes 
both the (legitimate) subject and the (thinkable) object of rational (systematic and explicit) 
intervention, whether this operates through work or legal relations. Reflexivity in this sense, 
then, is a (specifically modern) macro-social activity of intervention into what Touraine 
(1981) calls “historicity” (the self-production of society), enabling in particular the 
transformation (sometimes the maintenance) of social relations. The institutions of 
modernity, in particular those of capital and the state, then represent the institutionalisation 
of modernity (Giddens 1990), however partial and restricted (Habermas 1985). In a sense, 
then, reflexivity in modernity can be identified with “social movements from above”, and 
their colonisation of the lifeworld. 
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Social movements and the roots of l ifeworld 
reflexivity 
Yet there is also a reflexivity from below, and of course social movements from below have 
themselves represented important interventions into society, as well as developing major 
bodies of theoretical knowledge of society. They have also been reflexive in other sense, if 
we consider the characteristic importance of organisational issues, theoretical disputes and 
(self)-education within social movements; Eyerman and Jamison’s (1991) analysis of the 
“three dimensions” of movements’ cognitive praxis reflects precisely this. 
Bagguley (1996) elaborates an interesting analysis of the relationship between reflexivity 
and social movements. If I understand him correctly, he argues that Giddens’ concept of 
self-reflexivity, a reflexive approach to one’s own activity, applies “to those who are 
relatively high in a hierarchy of power”, such as senior managers restructuring a company 
(1996: 11). Now while self-reflexivity may of course be restricted by direct domination - he 
considers “the example of the working class” - it is not necessarily the case that movements 
from below do not aim precisely to gain some control over their conditions of existence 
(for example, through industrial conflict) at the same time as attempting to develop an 
understanding of those conditions (for example, through socialist thinking or informal 
discussion). Nor is it clear how far Offe’s “decommodification” (1984) would affect the 
argument. 
It is also unclear that this example refers to self-reflexivity. It might, if the acting “self” were 
the company, and not the senior managers (who as individuals are presumably largely 
rearranging the activity of other individuals). Or, perhaps, if managerial or professional 
staff were restructuring, not the activities of the firm as a whole, but the way in which they 
work and communicate together. This would then not be a reflexivity of individual selves, 
or indeed of a company, but rather the operations of a (partially) reflexive lifeworld (we can 
be sure that reflexivity would not be pushed to the point of raising questions about profit 
and power).  
Such a lifeworld reflexivity has also been attributed to movements from below by a number 
of theorists. Lash and Urry identified a relationship between the “radical-democratic ethos 
[…] shared by the various new social movements”, the “destructured habitus” of the new 
middle classes and receptivity to postmodernist cultural phenomena (1987: 285 - 300). 
More recently, Lash has used the concept of a “reflexive community” to describe, among 
other things, the core of the ecological movement. He writes: 
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“These communities are reflexive in that; first, one is not born or ‘thrown’, but ‘throws 
oneself’ into them; second, they may be widely stretched over ‘abstract’ space, and also 
perhaps over time; third, they consciously pose themselves the problem of their own 
creation, and constant re-invention, far more than do traditional communities; fourth, their 
‘tools’ and products tend to be not material ones but abstract and cultural.” (Lash 1994a: 
161) 
Similarly, German research into “movement milieux” has as we have seen brought out the 
development of an “alternative” lifeworld, within which 
“[T]o the manifold strivings for autonomy of the younger generation correspond for 
example extended demands for self-realisation at work, hedonistic leisure practices or new 
models of division of roles between partners. Noticeable is also their greater self-
reflexivity, which enables conscious distancings from the ‘incorporated’ schemas of the 
habitus [of their parents’ generation].” (Vester et al. 1993: 204) 
We have seen in chapter five something of how this “distancing” works. The reflexive 
autonomy of the network I have researched is not that of the powerful, applied to others; it 
is one of withdrawal and challenge, applied to the self and one’s own social relations. 
Ironic reflexivity 
To theorise one’s own identity and culture without wanting to challenge it practically is, by 
contrast, to produce a particular form of knowledge - a contemplative reflexivity that at its 
most critical is “ironic”: “I do this because of the kind of culture I’m from and you do that 
because you’re that kind of person”. Its most obvious active purpose is to accumulate 
cultural capital within academia and certain kinds of markets of cultural sophistication87. 
What it lacks is any real sense of critique, whether immanent or transcendental; any serious 
questioning of why these particular forms of socialisation should come to be; any serious 
interest in fashioning the kind of knowledge that could change the situation. Under these 
circumstances, even the most complete distancing becomes simply a form of alienation - an 
“inner exile” which does not seek any changes in how we act. 
This form of consciousness has historical precedents, in particular on the part of colonial 
intellectuals, where there is a long tradition of precisely this ironic recognition of cultural 
                                                
87 As Nelson et al. (1992) have noted, the migration of cultural studies has also meant a loss of its starting-
points as an attempt to produce a knowledge adequate to enable a connection between movements and 
popular culture (cf. chapter two) and a tendency for it to adopt the purely contemplative role of cultural 
capital, not the active purpose of political theory as in Gramsci, Williams or Hall (Grossberg 1993). 
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difference and refusal to do anything about it. Thus, for example, Kipling, in works like 
Kim (1908) and Plain tales from the hills (1907), has a lively awareness not only of the variety 
of relationships of class, caste and culture in Southern Asia, but also of the peculiarities of 
British colonial culture, the out-of-placeness and lack of understanding of the Empire’s 
officers and civil servants, of the relationships of power and money underlying the 
interactions he chronicles - and there it stops: 
“The boy resented his silence and lack of interest by beating him, as was only natural. He 
did not care for any of the bazars which were in bounds. He styled all natives ‘niggers’; yet 
servants and sweepers called him abominable names to his face, and, misled by their 
deferential attitude, he never understood. This somewhat consoled Kim for the beatings.” 
(1908: 150) 
People are like this - have always been like this - in their different ways; it is funny, ironic or 
tragic, and that is all that can be said about it. There is no hint here of the new relationships 
being forged, not only between Indians, but, in the person of a socialist like Annie Besant, 
between Indians and Europeans in the attempt at new kinds of solidarity, new political 
relationships and a new form of communication. Instead, as the retired Indian officer (who 
owes his gift of land to his refusal to join in the 1857 Mutiny) rhapsodises: 
“ ‘All castes and kinds of men move here. Look! Brahmins and chumars, bankers and 
tinkers, barbers and bunnias, pilgrims and potters - all the world going and coming. It is to 
me as a river from which I am withdrawn like a log after a flood.’ 
And truly the Grand Trunk Road is a wonderful spectacle. It runs straight, bearing without 
crowding India’s traffic for fifteen hundred miles - such a river of life as nowhere else 
exists in the world. They looked at the green-arched, shade-flecked length of it, the white 
breadth speckled with slow-pacing folk; and the two-roomed police station opposite.” 
(1908: 81) 
Caste, inequality, police, soldiers and development make up the backdrop of this kind of 
reflexivity. Similarly with Yeats: there is nothing inherently radical about the recognition of 
difference and awareness of one’s own status and culture; indeed, the latter becomes 
sharper as he became older and moved further right in his rejection of democracy, writing 
in his own epitaph: 
“Irish poets, learn your trade, 
Sing whatever is well made, 
Scorn the sort now growing up 
All out of shape from toe to top, 
Their unremembering hearts and heads 
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Base-born products of base beds. 
Sing the peasantry, and then 
Hard-riding country gentlemen, 
The holiness of monks, and after 
Porter-drinkers’ randy laughter; 
Sing the lords and ladies gay 
That were beaten into the clay 
Through seven heroic centuries; 
Cast your mind on other days 
That we in coming days may be 
Still the indomitable Irishry.” (1989 [1938-9]: 451) 
The postmodernist cliché which presents a reflexive awareness of difference as the radical 
opposition to liberal universalism is short on historical perspective, then. What it misses 
out is the recollection that the “universalist” French Revolution was defeated - internally by 
Napoleon and externally by the Holy Alliance, or that the majority of the European 
population (and the vast majority of the American) retain their allegiance to the religion 
that the Enlightenment supposedly overthrew. In other words, Habermas (1985, 1987b) is 
right to object that modernity and enlightenment are “unfinished projects”; alongside the 
ideology of the universalistic liberal Enlightenment is a straightforward conservatism 
(embedded, incidentally, in many modern states: Esping-Andersen 1990) which sees a 
differentiated status order as the natural order of things. Such a conservatism can be 
reflexive about its own place within this differentiated order because it does not claim to be 
acting for a universally valued goal (and so stresses the importance of Christian democracy, 
western culture, Irish solutions and so on) - and is not located within the kind of political 
movement where the relationship between rational understanding and practical action 
might make such ideas problematic. 
A third example of this, located within a more explicitly political context, is TE Lawrence. 
In his Seven pillars of wisdom (1973) what enables him to foment nationalist revolt for the 
benefit of the British General Staff is precisely his in-depth knowledge of Arab cultures and 
the differences between them - differences which he moulds and manipulates in the 
creation of a proto-nationalism. At the same time, Lawrence is fully aware of the 
manipulative part he is playing and of the lack of any intention on the part of his superiors 
to fulfil the commitments he is making. As Williams (1985: 261) has put it, “even the self 
becomes raw material” as Lawrence deploys his personal integrity - and the honour 
awarded him by the people he is working with - in an essentially manipulative strategy 
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whose value he does not even believe in himself. The “reflexive imagination” carries no 
guarantees of making any difference to social practice; hence the need to draw distinctions. 
Radicalising reflexivity 
By contrast with this ironic reflexivity, a radicalised reflexivity - to stay for a moment with 
Habermas - is one which intends to redeem its speech claims. Insofar as the act of 
distancing draws on a communicative rationality which makes implicit claims about truth, 
ethics and sincerity, radicalised reflexivity attempts to redeem these; in other words, it is 
serious about the practical social implications of its “suspension of assent”. 
To return to Lash, this works within reflexive lifeworlds - where new kinds of social relations 
are produced - it is chosen, not given; and, crucially, it is active, not contemplative. What 
redeems its claims to truth, authenticity and ethics, in other words, is not the idea of 
reflexivity; it is its use as an active part of a process of social change, as opposed to a 
contemplative location, within social relations which - if not taken for granted - are 
nonetheless (“ironically”) accepted, as in the examples above. To quote Offe,  
“[T]he values on which new social movements are based must be understood as a selective 
radicalization of ‘modern’ values, rather than a comprehensive rejection of these values” (1985: 
853-4). 
The apparently ungrounded relativism of contemplative reflexivity, then, is in practice 
deeply rooted in a practical acceptance of what Hakamaya (1997), following Vico, calls the 
topos of given social relations. An effective orientation of critica, in this same terminology, is 
ultimately not a relativist one because it refers, not to an affirmative norm, but to 
commitments implied in the act of critique88. In this sense the “cultural populism” 
(McGuigan 1994) of much contemporary academic writing acts as a sophisticated means of 
reconciling erstwhile critics with the topos - and converting critica into cultural capital. 
A distinction that may help here is that between orthodoxy (normative belief) and 
orthopraxy (normative practice). Within the deeply idealist modes of writing that identify 
symbolic activity as the only kind there is, the practical hegemony of market and state over 
the “diverse” lifeworlds that are “celebrated” - not to mention the intellectuals who do the 
                                                
88 This has been a frequent route for intellectuals such as Lukács or Williams from critique to commitment: 
observing the cognitive fallacies, the aesthetic inadequacies, the emotional inauthenticity, the ethical 
abominations of everyday life in capitalism, they have found a commitment to working for a situation where 
those claims - still implicit or “immanent” in everyday speech acts - can be redeemed. 
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celebrating - goes unnoticed. The diversity of what is bought masks the common 
dependence on buying and selling (Storey 1994). 
By contrast, then, radicalised reflexivity attempts not only an act of intellectual distancing 
but the much harder tasks of bringing emotion (social identity) and action (social relations) 
into line with the implications of this critique - and thus refashioning the critique itself as 
active rather than contemplative knowledge. In the terms of critical theory, this is radical 
not because it introduces some new idea which is not present in modernity, but because it 
attempts to realise the potential for reflexivity which modernity makes available but which 
is normally unfulfilled. How can this be done? 
Techniques of the self 
It is one thing to want to move from cognitive reflexivity to emotional and practical 
change, another thing to be able to do it. As we have seen, the activity of distancing and of 
reorienting priorities can be a challenging and long-drawn-out process, drawing on the 
skilled knowledge of the counter culture. It is also, though, a process of personal re-
creation, as the formulation of “autonomous self-development” suggests: as well as 
cognitive critiques and the acquisition of practical skills, success requires emotional or 
identitarian resources: people have to be able to abandon deeply-socialised orientations, 
find new forms of motivation, and perhaps above all - in an open-ended process of change 
- “stick it out”.  
A key element of radicalised reflexivity, then, is “techniques of the self”: institutionalised 
practices that produce (ideally, at least) a supportive solidarity within which participants can 
combine an individualising exploration of “self-development” with a group context where 
this is defined positively, rather than seen as a threat. If positive institutional creation is a 
difficult achievement under conditions of reflexive autonomy, these “techniques of the 
self” and the interactive contexts in which they are embedded, provide at least a bottom 
line of solidarity and commitment to reflexive autonomy itself. 
Tools for change 
The phrase “techniques of the self” comes from the third volume of Foucault’s History of 
sexuality (1988), in which (by contrast with the later Christian focus on specific acts) he 
notes that Greek and Roman ideals of sexuality were predominantly ideals of orientations - 
temperance and self-mastery, for example - rather than of specific acts - abstention from 
sex, avoidance of particular kinds of sexual act etc. The concept itself, however, derives 
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from Hadot’s (1995) analysis of the “spiritual exercises” recommended to followers of the 
classical “ethical philosophies” (Stoics, Epicureans etc.) to bring their volitions into line 
with the life of the sage or lover of wisdom recommended by the school in question (a key 
example for Hadot is Aurelius’ (1964) Meditations, which he interprets as the author’s 
reflections and exhortations to himself designed to enable him to live the kind of life he felt 
appropriate to a Stoic)89.  
In other words, the problems tackled by such techniques is not that of what to believe, 
what to do, or even of what orientation to hold while doing it - it is that of producing the 
kind of emotional self for whom such behaviour comes naturally: 
“Since then, over the last year and a half, I’ve been kind of digesting that, coming to know 
and come to terms with everything inside me that holds me back, all the little valves and 
barriers within, that stop me doing what it is I think I should be doing.” (Mark) 
It is in the nature of things that movements from below, trying to change existing social 
relations, will need to produce new forms of (self-)socialisation to enable their participants 
to act in accordance with their counter-hegemonic project: as Gramsci says, politics 
consists of “a conception of the world and a corresponding norm of conduct” (1975 
[1932-33]: 1378). In counter cultural movements, as we saw in chapter five, this moment 
has been particularly problematic, since the power relations and the convergence of 
behaviour implied by such processes is in tension with some elements of autonomy, such 
as the distancing skills needed to create free spaces in the first place. An opposition 
between “intensive” and “extensive” organisational forms - the former making great efforts 
to bring about the new orientation, the latter rejecting the project outright - has thus been 
fairly common, with the slack being taken up elsewhere: in the movement media; in 
explicitly cultural groups; and, as here, “underground” in non-formalised practices seen by 
members themselves as periods of inertia. 
Thinking stuckness 
As we have seen, there is an alternation between periods of collective enthusiasm, action 
and “creativity” and periods of apparent inertia, non-participation and “stagnation”. I stress 
the “apparent” here because I want to argue that where people spend large amounts of 
time together, even if no visible activity results, something may still be happening. One way 
                                                
89 Although I did not ask directly about it in interviews, at least six of the interviewees have practiced some 
form of either meditation or yoga. 
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of theorising this is to say, with Gramsci (1991: 13), that practical logics are not yet ready to 
become explicit challenges to the official logics; or we could say that participants, following 
what Bagguley (1992) has called the logic of “informed fatalism”, do not see a chance for 
success in such a challenge. Melucci’s (1989) dialectic between movement mobilisation and 
latent networks, or that between utopianism and quietism in religious sects (Hill 1975), are 
other variants of this argument that in “downtimes” movements turn their energies 
inwards, productively or otherwise. 
An alternative way of theorising this is Lynch and MacLaughlin’s (1995) analysis of “love 
labour” as that which is geared to creating solidary bonds between people, and “caring 
labour” as that whose product is people rather than services or things. Both of these 
concepts - designed as part of a feminist critique of patriarchal models of “work” - can be 
fruitfully deployed to see elements of movement activity that do not produce immediately 
visible results in power terms as nevertheless real and necessary work in any long-term 
perspective. If, as I suggested in chapter four, what movements ultimately deal in is skills, 
these two approaches can be seen as simply different perspectives of the same process: 
developing and transmitting skills (not just the technical skills of “how to” do something 
but also the techniques of the self involved in “becoming the kind of person who can” do 
something). How does this work? 
The importance of doing nothing 
One feature of participants’ narratives that is immediately striking is the central place 
various kinds of “doing nothing” play within it - but also the intensity of this “nothing”: 
“There were a lot of people who were getting buzzes out of various different things and 
kind of running around the place, and that was fun, you’d have people kind of getting 
freaked out, and people not getting freaked out, and sometimes it was a hassle and 
sometimes it wasn’t. Sometimes it was a lot of fun.” (Steve)  
Immense amounts of time and energy are devoted to it; stories are told and retold about 
particular episodes; strong feeling for (and, on occasion, against) are raised; it gets in the 
way of economic success. “Nothing”, then, is “done” very actively; it is a social institution 
in its own right; and as such it deserves our attention: 
“I just loved it, I had a great time [laughter], I wasn’t really thinking about it, I just enjoyed 
it, it was fun, it was great, and it felt really good. As I say, we felt really, you know, I went 
this night, and we walked all the way, myself and Rossa walked all the way to Sandycove, 
wherever, to see the sun coming up. That’s one of the typical things we’d get up to, and 
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just sit round and say ‘Isn’t the world beautiful, and we’re not going to get corrupted and 
spend our days in offices’, kind of stuff [laughs]” (Tina). 
What is happening, I want to argue, is that periods of apparent inactivity are periods in 
which participants engage in collective practices that offer a context of supportive solidarity 
for individualising creativity; that enable the exploration of new possibilities while 
minimising the practical costs of this exploration; and that enable the negotiation of the 
dialectic between “creative” and “stagnant” periods. I will discuss each of these in turn, 
then give specific examples. 
The social production of “individuality” 
Firstly, it will come as no surprise to sociologists to find that “individuality”, of any kind, is 
a social product: a practice, an ideology or a rationality, but centrally an achievement: 
“This liberation [from quasi-natural identity formation] is in a sense a precondition for 
approaching real individual autonomy as the right and ability to choose the others one 
wants to associate with as well as the substantive and procedural terms of association [.…] 
While this sounds like the best of all possible worlds, it is marked by at least three 
fundamental problems. The first relates to the socially uneven availability of the material, 
intellectual and cultural means that modernity provides. In a social world that refuses to 
provide other collective identifications, distributive justice acquires increasing importance 
as a provider of access to the material of autonomous identity formation. Second, even if 
that were the case, such a modernity may demand more in terms of autonomous identity 
formation than many individuals would want to choose, if the choice of restricting one’s 
choices were still perceivable [.…] Third, a great variety of offers will decrease the 
likelihood for coming to collective arrangements with high substantive implications.” 
(Wagner 1994: 183 – 187) 
So too with the individualising creativity discussed in chapter five: to practice it effectively 
requires, among other things, a context which offers the necessary material resources and 
skills and where one’s own changes are recognised and validated by peers without 
undermining their development in turn. There are limits to this process as well, and as we 
have seen participants stress the need at a certain point to gain distance from the network 
in order to continue changing. Nevertheless, the basic figure of speech is one which 
identifies both “strong individuality” and close group links - practical support, emotional 
solidarity, intellectual resources - as characteristic of the network. “Self-development”, 
then, is anything other than isolating or privatising. 
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Free spaces and movement rationalities 
The rationalities I am discussing here were initially formed in the specific contexts of 
movement milieux. Thus one participant comments of a student occupation that it set 
“a framework of the way in which the social interactions that that particular group of 
people have subsequently continued to use: a lot of music, people sitting round playing 
music, talking, often about trivia, but there have often been, you know, good serious 
discussions as well.” (Josh) 
These “good serious discussions” are of course fundamental technologies for the 
institutionalisation of a reflexive attitude towards the self and the lifeworld, and more 
indirect forms are possible. Another participant in the same occupation says: 
“I got into tarot cards and palmreading and stuff like that, you know, just kind of basic 
psychology sessions, like sitting down and just trying to sort each other’s problems out, 
that kind of thing.” (Steve) 
The resources for the development of autonomy and reflexivity, such as books or music 
are then made available through the networks of these milieux: 
“There’s a very laid back attitude to property. People are not particularly possessive or 
protective of what is their property, you know, people borrow things from, there’s an 
awful lot of kipple that transfers and ends up in various flats. It’s not uncommon to arrive 
in somebody’s flat, ‘Oh, can I have a look through your tapes?’ - ‘Yeah, sure, go for it.’ - 
‘Oh fuck, that’s mine, where’d you get that?’ - ‘I dunno, oh, take it back.’ - ‘Oh yeah, well, 
haven’t seen that in years.’ You know, people don’t get wound up about it, they just ‘Ah 
shit, I haven’t seen that, I was wondering where it went.’ “ (Josh) 
The extent of this exchange was sometimes quite dramatic: 
Das: [There were] the people who were kinda like the book exchange, would be say you 
two, Ciarán, Leonard, Ian for certain stuff, myself on the receiving end [laughs], someday I 
must give everyone their books back [laughter] 
Jim: Seriously, he has fucking cases of books 
LC: I know [laughs]  
Das: […] I mean, I have in the house apparently belonging to me something in the region 
of about thirteen hundred books of which ones I owe to other people that I know are 
probably about a hundred and fifty. 
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Basic material requirements for the development of reflexive rationalities of this kind, then, 
include free spaces, with strongly communicative forms of interaction, in which the 
resources for change circulate relatively freely. 
Reflexive l ifeworlds and autonomous reflexivity 
This entails a particular kind of social relationship within such milieux, as Ruth’s account 
stresses: 
“The only philosophy I thought that was behind all that group of people was, you know 
this thing, ‘What goes around comes around’, you know, the idea of like, at a simple level, 
somebody bums a cigarette off you, you bum a cigarette off somebody else? This kind of 
thing, at a really low level, but it’s true, what goes around comes around. You do things for 
people, the idea is, instead of, I was brought up with a favours system, you know, I do this 
for you therefore you have to do this for me. Somebody gives you a Christmas present, 
you’re morally obliged to give them one, this kind of thing. Whereas I just liked that, you 
know, that people would do things for other people for no apparent reason. It’s like, I 
have something that I don’t need. You need it, take it.” (Ruth) 
It is not that the relationship in itself enables the kinds of reflexivity that are sought after; 
autonomy, self-development, reflexivity are not the automatic products of particular kinds 
of relationship but in a sense represent a particular orientation to such relationships. Hence 
there is a distinction between a (provisionally) given milieu and the response to those 
conditions: 
“Well, ultimately you have to do it yourself. You know, people can sit you down and say 
‘you’re this sort of person and that means this is what you should be doing.’ You’ll say 
‘yeah, yeah, I know, you’re absolutely right’ but till you get to that point you’re still not 
going to do it. But yeah, people can help people. To a certain extent, you can say, you can 
help them along.” (Ruth) 
Nevertheless, this is a collective achievement, albeit (as Josh’s account in chapter five 
stresses) one achieved by tolerance of and cooperation with each other’s projects of 
autonomy. Hence the building of a reflexive lifeworld is not incompatible with strong 
personal links: 
“I think it was like a support group. It was one of the closest groups of people I ever came 
across. I hadn’t come across groups of people who knew each other that well and were 
that close, which was really nice. Knew everything about each other, had been through lots 
together.” (Ruth) 
Even in cases of strong disagreement there is an attempt to bridge this gap: 
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LC: You don’t actually tell people to get out of your life? 
Ciarán: No, but I’ve seen it happen. I’ve seen it happen, like. Say, twelve or thirteen people 
sat around with somebody and told him what he was doing was pissing them off. That was 
extremely heavy at the time. But it did him a world of god. And he said, yeah, he really 
appreciated it. Like sentence was being passed going all around, there was a few people 
saying ‘you know, at times I thought I don’t ever want to see you again.’ But what really 
came out was ‘look, if we didn’t think you were worth it we really wouldn’t bother.’ He 
took it very well. But I suppose that’s a very unique occurrence. 
More commonly, however, the collective response is to maintain the attitude of tolerance, 
even when it gets too much for some individuals: 
Josh: Dan had been winding me up, not intentionally of course [….] I just told him at Pat’s 
twenty-first, I got very very drunk, and that was quite a momentous evening actually, 
whole bloody thing, but I told him that I basically couldn’t fucking stand him and would 
he ever [laughs] fuck off and leave me in peace [laughter]. I can’t remember exactly what I 
said, but it wasn’t very nice. It was interesting though, in that whilst I knew what I said was 
not exclusive to the way I felt about him, there were an awful lot of other people felt 
something very very similar, there was a serious breach of etiquette on my part, in that I 
actually said it [….] 
LC: When you say it was a breach of etiquette, do you mean other people came and told 
you that you shouldn’t have said that, or 
Josh: They didn’t have to fucking tell me. 
LC: You felt that yourself? 
Josh: Oh, bloody right. There was a roomful of people sitting there in [laughs] stunned 
silence [laughter] because I’d just let rip at Dan [laughter] and it was like ‘What?’ [laughter] 
Such socially organised practices enable an apparently individualistic mode of life to 
maintain its separate identity; as far as participants can manage it, they tolerate and support 
each others’ attempts at development, and such incidents as the two discussed above are 
identified as being extremely unusual. There is naturally a close relationship in this context 
between an individual’s continued participation in such practices and the networks that 
sustain them, and their continued development of personal and lifeworld reflexivity. It is 
then unsurprising that participants make a great effort to stay in touch: 
Das: [A]lthough there was never anything specifically said, everybody 
Jim: “We’ll see you in Dublin at Christmas” [laughs] 
Das: -everybody has, I think that 
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Jim: -is a rough rule 
Das: even if it’s 
Jim: [laughs] in the Hangman at 9 pm [.…] 
Das: because people know that you’re on the lookout for information about everyone else, 
because you’re staying in contact, it’s more accessible. I mean, even me, I have no email, 
I’m far away from everybody, and news still gets across to me. 
LC: With the same intention of keeping things together? 
Das: Keeping in contact, we’re good friends, -I’d find 
Jim: -It’s always nice to know what somebody’s up to. 
Das: I find it important to stay in contact. 
Jim: Er, yeah, you know? 
Das: I find, I phone from Brussels to find out what’s happening to everyone. I’m fairly 
much on a news hunt, find out that Jim’s doing all right, find out whether he’s any news 
from anyone else of what they’re doing, or if this or that was all right. I really enjoy that, I 
mean, I don’t watch TV, I don’t follow political news too much, to me it’s kind of like my 
particular community of people are what’s important to me, the same as I’m going to be 
phoning back tomorrow to Brussels. 
At the same time, these local practices support rationalities that are potentially capable of 
abstraction and generalisation far beyond these contexts. I have suggested in chapter three 
that a concept of local rationality can bridge the gap between the sociocultural basis of 
contemporary movements, their characteristic modes of formation, and their impact on the 
wider society. The implication is that we could consider individualisation and the 
development of reflexivity (Giddens 1990; Beck et al. 1994) not as a structural feature of 
high modernity reflected in contemporary movements, but as a rationality formed within 
movement milieux. The suggestion that contemporary social movement milieux are a key 
source of cultural change (Lash and Urry, 1987; Lash 1994a, b; Sulkunen, 1992) would then 
be directly analogous to Weber’s (1958) arguments about the cultural roots of instrumental 
rationality: starting from attempts to articulate new forms of tacit knowledge within 
culturally particular contexts, such local rationalities can become abstracted and travel far 
beyond their original locations. 
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Fun and games 
Exploring new possibilities is, however, a challenging business. This is not only because of 
the difficulties of choice faced within an autonomous milieu. It is also because the goals 
being pursued are held only provisionally, and the risks and costs incurred are great. 
Participants have run the risks and at times incurred the costs of educational failure, 
unemployment, criminalisation, homelessness, emigration and poverty. Given all of this - 
and the general uncertainty of a reflexive lifeworld - it makes sound sense to explore new 
possibilities through talk and play as extensively as possible before making decisive 
commitments, and this is a noticeable feature of this milieu. 
“Stagnation”, then, can pave the way for “creativity”, but it also offers a useful position to 
return to after “creativity”, which would be difficult to sustain indefinitely: 
“That flat was lived in by various buskers and musicians for about a year and a half, always 
maybe one or two rooms changing at a time, it was three bedrooms. That’s another thing 
that ends up happening with busking, is that the address of a house tends to become 
extremely well known and it tends to be pretty heavy for the people living in it. They really 
really enjoy it for the first month or two, up all the time, people arriving back with dutyfree 
from places, and whatever else might have come in. Loads of music, loads of crack. And 
loads of people. Loads of mess. There tend to be always a lot of people around. Very 
much twenty-four hour existence. Very little organised sleep, it’s just, you crash out when 
you can’t keep your eyes open any longer. And that tends to happen for months on end.” 
(Ciarán).  
If “stagnation” was purely inertia, non-participation and inactivity, it would be a resource-
low period of depression: a post-action hangover. As it is, though, even recognising its 
practical limits, participants appreciate it and find it rewarding personally, which is perhaps 
unsurprising given the instrumental “moment” of action and the communicative 
“moment” of “doing nothing”: the latter is likely to seem a more authentic form of self-
expression if nothing else. From a political point of view, this might suggest that social 
movement organisations could profitably devote fewer energies to “resource mobilisation” 
and more to “identity maintenance” - and some reasons for declining levels of participation 
in overly-instrumental social movements: 
“I think that’s one of the gains that people feel, that a compensation is the kind of social 
circle you kind of [laughs] you’ve a lot of friends with all these, among all these people, 
doing all these things. It’s a very sociable sort of thing, because there’s a lot of networking 
goes on mainly. And I don’t know where it comes from, but I think a lot of people have 
this feeling ‘yeah, we want to do things for the common good’ and with that goes this ‘we 
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want to, or we enjoy being with people and working in groups and networking, or what 
have you.” (Frank) 
The meanings of music 
A range of methods of “doing nothing” can be identified, including “techie trips”, specific 
kinds of music making and drug use, “mind games”, talking about projects and reading. 
This starts from a straightforward sharing of interests in activities that can enable an 
exploration, not just of form, but also of interaction and inner experience: 
“A lot of them have a background in either computers or roleplaying games, fantasy 
novels, science fiction, music, they all play guitar, and they listen to the same kind of music, 
maybe books as well.” (Josh) 
This involves a shift from Wagner’s quasi-natural identities to Lash’s communities of 
choice: 
Steve: [My friends from my college course] are all very nice people, but they’ve got their 
own world, they focus on their own thing. They’re not focussed in the middle of what’s 
happening with you. Which is different with this group, everyone is focussed on more or 
less the same things to a certain extent. Not everyone, but if you know what I mean, in 
general. 
LC: Are focussed on what? On what’s happening to each other, or? 
Steve: Good one, good one, yeah. Yeah, to a large extent people kind of sit there and 
watch what’s happening to everyone else, kind of like ‘Ooh, yeah, did you hear this, and 
ooh, mm’. 
One such shared interest is the practice and consumption of music: 
“Music is definitely a very strong, it’s a binding force among everybody. Those that don’t 
actually play themselves are certainly into hearing it [.…] So the fact that certain people are 
musicians after a fashion and others aren’t isn’t exclusive. The music thing is not exclusive 
to those that do actually perform.” (Josh) 
So music is used to structure interaction, and in specific forms: the emphasis is on 
“sessions” of creation, improvisation and interactivity: 
“Especially during the summer months when buskers are playing together more, most 
nights after people have been out playing, they go back to the house and have a few drinks, 
a few smokes, and play music all night. Unless you’re really into hearing spontaneous 
music just happening, you tend to get browned off. Ah, it’s an amazing feeling, when 
there’s about twelve or thirteen musicians, most of whom know each other, have played 
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with a few of those people before. It’s great when that many people just get something out 
of it.” (Ciarán) 
Such sessions are of course themselves a form of reflexive interaction, recalling Melucci’s 
(1989) claim that the organisational features of social movements are messages developed 
in submerged networks; but they are also organised around a particular type of music: 
“It was a lot of the kind of music I liked, I mean, there’s a lot of sort of ballady stuff and 
folk stuff, and then there was your kind of John Martyn, Tom Waites, that kind of thing 
[….] But that is always all part of it, I mean, the music is very much part of it.” (Ruth) 
The type of music involved - apart from technically lending itself to impromptu sessions - 
is relatively verbal, often quasi-literary, music, focussed primarily on exploring the subtleties 
and uncertainties of personal interaction and inner experience. This is also true to a large 
extent for the music written by participants themselves. 
The use of drugs 
Something similar appears in the case of drug use: the drugs preferred are themselves 
suited to a reflexive approach to interaction and to the self, and they are taken with very 
specific orientations: 
“The people over there do smoke, as much as people over here [in Dublin], and yet the 
attitude and the lifestyle is quite different. They are still a very tolerant group of people, but 
the attitude is quite different, so I would definitely refute the idea that the use of drugs is a 
significant factor for the way in which these people behave.” (Josh) 
More specifically: 
“It felt as if a cartoon changed into reality, there was a shift of perception there. I don’t do 
a lot of acid on my own, other people [in London] would go on doing acid and going to 
raves, and sort of going out into the city at night, but I tended to do it on my own, all night 
and watch the dawn. And I continued on going into myself until I kind of got to the point 
of ego death and rebirth [.…] The first thing was the failure of language to express, to 
verbalise what was happening with the experience, and this led straight away of symbolic 
expression.” (Mark) 
Everyday social routines and discourses, then, can be practically undermined with drugs, 
which in appropriate contexts can enable the kind of insight discussed by Mark. In other 
contexts, for the same reason, it can be difficult to sustain normal social performances: 
“I was in Montague St. most of the time, yeah. Used to spend days on end, you’ve heard of 
the legendary quarter [ounce] that we bought and that wasn’t really a quarter, it was a 
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quarter that thought it was a half, and we spent about five days in Montague St. just 
constantly smoking and at the end of the fifth day Jim’s mother actually called out to 
collect him and he had just gone upstairs to shave off his beard with a blunt razor [laughs]. 
Came down with his face pouring blood, and his mother was at the door.” (Steve) 
Apparently isolating activities, such as taking acid, in fact imply a whole social context. In 
each case a social body of knowledge is entailed: chords for songs are exchanged, and 
shared books and “folk science” discussions orient expectations and techniques in drug 
use. Stories are also told about drug sessions in particular90: 
“This guy wrote his first trip ever, he’s up in Merrion Park, and he’s with this bunch of 
hippies [laughter] and he’s tripped off his bin, and he suddenly finds himself looking at the 
tulips and freaking out that they’ve, how many different colours they all have and how 
weird it is [laughter] and suddenly he stands up and he’s blabbing about this for ages, and 
he stands up and goes ‘Oh fuck, I’m a scumpunk!’ [laughter] He starts ripping up the 
tulips.” (Jim) 
Music is created in sessions, and drugs are usually if not always taken together. Similarly, 
books are borrowed, tapes copied, and drugs circulated through the network. The 
apparently individual technologies of the self, then, exist within a very specific mode of 
network organisation: 
Das: It got to be an awful lot like I mean, say I bought a book by Ken Kesey, say I was 
sitting in there reading a copy of One flew over the cuckoo’s nest, someone’d go ‘Oh wow! Em, 
I haven’t read that. But I have read this book about Kesey’, and they’d easily give you the 
name of it, which meant you’d fuck off to the library and read it, or they’d have it, which 
meant like 
Jim: True, it used to be a book exchange to a large extent, because an awful lot of people 
would be up there stoned reading a book 
Das: Or even if you weren’t stoned an awful lot of the time. 
Playing with form 
Two features are worth highlighting here in view of what has already been said: the 
importance of creative and formal elements in play, and the solidaristic and cooperative 
underpinning of activity. A fascination with form is of course a very visible feature of 
                                                
90 Such stories tend to fall within Fine’s (1995: 136) categories of “war stories”, tales of tough times for 
participants, or of “happy endings”, tales in which participation brings its own benefits. 
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contemporary social movements, where the effort devoted to formulating and 
implementing an organisational form will often exceed the effort devoted to its ostensible 
purpose. Melucci comments that 
“The self-reflective form of action is another specific feature of the emerging collective 
phenomena. Action is a message sent to the rest of society, which speaks through its own 
forms and with a high degree of self-reflexivity. Organisational forms, patterns of inter-
personal relationships and decision-making processes are themselves meaningful signs 
addressed to the society as a whole. But they are also a goal in themselves: actors 
consciously practice in the present the objective they pursue.” (1995: 113 - 114) 
I am less convinced by the argument that this is something new (consider for example the 
importance of disputes over organisation within the traditional workers’ movement), but it 
is certainly an important feature of movement activity. Apart from its external purposes, 
though, what of its internal point? I have already mentioned the variety of projects 
developed within this milieu. Some of these projects are relatively successful, for a variety 
of internal and external reasons; others are stillborn or die rapidly. I am interested here in 
the cultural habitus, in the sense of a general orientation to the world, that enables this 
experimentation, that makes it possible to “try out” the implications of reflexivity. The best 
way of summarising this seems to be in terms of a general valuation of creativity and 
“makeability” (Berger, Berger and Luckmann 1974), which as we have seen applies to the 
self as well as to the external world.  
Castles in the air 
One manifestation of this reflexivity is the large amount of time is devoted to playing 
around with form - looking for elegant or baroque technical solutions to problems, or 
complicated games with communication and understanding, or, in the case of one 
participant in particular, planning elaborate castles in the air: 
“Das had this plan, where you know he wanted to do this, set up a retirement fund, 
basically, which would pay for a retirement home for old drug [laughter] free, basically, to 
all of the people we know, for your dopeheads, who’d like to be wrecked off their heads 
for their latter days, when they can’t move any more, and they’re bed-ridden, so [laughter] I 
think if Victor makes a million he’s probably gonna build that, you know.” (Steve) 
Rarely is there much immediately practical purpose to this: the castles in the air are so 
infrequently built that it was an effective practical joke to take such a project seriously: 
Das: I was never particularly bothered with the getting it done or not, I’ve always been a 
sucker for the idea 
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Jim: Well, the one and only time somebody tried to get something off the ground […] One 
night he was mouthing off up on Galway St. going, ‘And this would be fucking brilliant, 
you know, if somebody did it in the next couple of weeks, they’d make a fuck-’ ‘Right Das, 
you’re on, I’ll meet you tomorrow.’ And [laughs]” 
The technical problems are normally taken on for their own sake and not because there is a 
pressing need; and communication is made deliberately complex and “layered”. The 
enjoyment is simply in the playing with form and ideas: 
“[I liked] anything that would just stimulate your brain a little. I mean, even if you just sit 
down and plan something completely bizarre, plan it from start to finish, even if you never 
do it, if you plan it flawlessly, it’s like Das used to do. Das would plan something through 
flawlessly, and it would never happen. And then he’d plan something else flawlessly. And 
after you knew him for a while you’d think ‘Well, it doesn’t matter that he doesn’t do it, 
cause that’s not what he wants, he gets a kick out of just planning it.’ “ (Ruth) 
Form and mind games 
Something similar is expressed in the enjoyment of formalistic “mind games” - the interst 
in things such as the nature of consciousness and artificial intelligence, theoretical physics 
and mathematics, the more elaborate brand of conspiracy theory and alternate reality books 
and the psychological “mind games” of e.g. Zen and Sufi stories. 
“What I was interested in was ideas [….] And I was reading about a lot of different ways of 
viewing the world, the different ways of viewing the inside of your own head.” (Ruth) 
Another participant said: 
“I was going a little crazy one afternoon and wrote a long, very rambling email to 
somebody and got a mail back, ‘Oh, I see you’re pretending you’re mad just in case people 
realise that if you don’t pretend you’re mad, you might actually be mad!’ [laughter] Yeah, 
there is an element of that. There’s certainly an awful lot of mind games go on, but 
everybody does it for fun.” (Josh) 
In his last writings, Williams stressed the extent to which an engagement with form was a 
response to a break from the taken-for-granted: 
“Liberated or breaking from their national or provincial cultures, placed in quite new 
relations to those other native languages or native visual traditions, encountering 
meanwhile a novel and dynamic common environment from which many of the older 
forms were obviously distant, the artists and writers and thinkers of this phase found the 
only community available to them: a community of the medium; of their own practices 
[….] Thus language was perceived quite differently. It was no longer, in the old sense, 
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customary and naturalied, but in many ways arbitrary and conventional. To the immigrants 
especially, with their new second common language, language was more evident as a 
medium – a medium that could be shaped and reshaped – than as a social custom [.…] At 
the same time, within the very openness and complexity of the metropolis, there was no 
formed and settled society to which the new kinds of work could be related. The 
relationships were to the open and complex and dynamic social process itself, and the only 
accessible form of this practice was an emphasis on the medium” (1989a: 44 – 47). 
By extension, some of this is also true for the formation of new kinds of rationality, new 
sorts of meaning, across the different ranges of inherited “language”, as new modes of 
social interaction are formed in movement milieux. Thus, in the heart of the occupation 
discussed earlier, people developed a 
“kind of party game where you sort of impose confidentiality on everyone and you go 
round in a circle and people ask each other questions and you’ve got to answer them 
truthfully, which kind of caught on, it became, it stopped becoming a game, and it became 
a session every night where people, and of course there’s no way of proving this, but I 
think on certain issues, anyway, people were fairly open and honest, and they just became 
open honest semi-public conversations where you’d have a group of from five to fifteen 
people. And I think the topics tended to be, it was probably about fifty percent sex, thirty 
percent politics and twenty percent miscellaneous. But I think there were certain, there were 
times when people were fairly frank and there were discussions then about that, and, yeah, 
I think there was a way of talking that doesn’t happen enough.” (Frank) 
Techie trips 
The exploration with form, then, was at one point also a way of making connections and 
finding new ways to relate. A final symbolisation of this valuation of creativity is the 
fascination with elegant and baroque technical solutions to what are very often non-
problems. If play is a means of flexing particular kinds of muscles, this is another way of 
maintaining a creative orientation to the world. This “techie trip” is an attitude of play and 
appreciation rather than of immediate usefulness: 
“With me it’s just a fascination with anything clever. Somebody comes up with a solution 
to a problem that is clever, I will admire it.” (Josh) 
Clever solutions and creative play with forms: these are modes of leisure of a reflexive 
lifeworld that enable non-instrumental approaches to movement activity. They are also, 
however, resources for practical action - and sources for stories: 
Radicalising reflexivity 
 218 
Jim: An awful lot of people we know are people who would have something useful to 
provide, are involved in areas where […] and I’ll take Ciarán as an example here, are 
people who, if they were stuck somewhere, and they had two sticks and a piece of string, 
they probably could get a fire together [laughs] 
Das: Yeah, cause they’d know what type of wood […] 
LC: And a lot of you’ve been doing that quite literally in squats, or camping sometimes 
Jim: Squatting, camping, whatever, then from that you also have, I dunno, the guerrilla 
electricians [laughs] I mean, like, for example, actually, a classic example is the time Ken 
Grogan was on his first trip, and he came back, and there was only one working light in 
the squat. And he was sitting there, and there was only like one light working in the squat, 
in the middle of my living room, cause I was the only person who bothered to do any 
electricity work, and he was really freaked out, and he’s like ‘People do this for fun’ and 
freaked out of his brain, so myself and Victor, ‘Look, Ken, take off, we’ll get the lights 
together, just relax’ and we’re like tripped off our bin completely, but at the same time all 
we had to do was connect through the fuseboard, work out where the wires were going, 
basically break all the connections and remake them, so ‘that fuse there comes out this 
way, kill it, take the wire out, that’s the fuse that controls all the plugs in this room. Now 
[laughs] plugs, room, front, right.’ Did the whole fuseboard that way. We did this at two in 
the morning while we were tripped, and this is the kind of thing that, like for example 
Jonathan’s story of repairing the phone exchange in Sarajevo 
LC: Jonathan repaired the? Nah. 
Jim: Well, apparently in order to get a phone connection through, in order to mail some 
project or other that he had to have in back to the college he repaired the local exchange in 
the University in Sarajevo, or was involved therein [laughs] 
LC: yeah, the time he hitchhiked through 
Jim: Yeah, but whatever about the veracity of this tale [laughs] the fact is that most of the 
people that we hang around with would in that situation, were they there and would 
actually have the technical competence to be useful. 
LC: I think it goes a bit beyond that, I mean 
Jim: It does go beyond that, I mean, it’s not just technical competence, an awful lot of 
people are researching how society should be built privately, in their own minds. 
Play and practice, then, are not ultimately separate from mobilisation. It can, of course, 
become the case that form takes over completely from content, or means from ends; this is 
undoubtedly part of the reason for the inordinate focus on rules and procedures that 
paradoxically plagues many movement institutions: 
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“The organisational forms of movements are not just ‘instrumental’ for their goals, they 
are a goal in themselves. Since collective action is focussed on cultural codes, the form of 
the movement is itself a message, a symbolic challenge to the dominant codes.” (Melucci 
1989: 60) 
If I am right, however, this is a necessary price if movements are to operate on the basis of 
a reflexive rationality. 
Collective explorations of form 
What is important, then, is the explorative moment of creativity, imagination and play, 
which in turn helps to explain the element of delight in “pure form”: if we think of play as 
a non-committal or metaphorical engagement with problems that one faces practically in 
other contexts, what is transferrable is precisely the formal shape of particular ideas or 
solutions, not their actual content. 
This sense of a collective exploration of form is of course heightened in the production of 
music, reading and drug use. We are used to categorising these as forms of consumption, 
displaying particular features of cultural capital, but this explanation tells us little about the 
active and solidaristic elements involved. Thus, for example, much effort may be put into 
concealing the fact of drug use rather than displaying it; drugs are acquired privately and 
often on a non-commercial basis (i.e. as an expression of solidarity); and as we have seen 
the drugs preferred in this network tend more to weaken competences for playing public 
roles while enhancing inner experience (hash, mushrooms, acid), with exceptions such as 
speed and alcohol. 
Similarly, music is made rather than consumed, in participative sessions rather than centred 
around solo exhibitions, and privileging the reflective and communicative (e.g. John 
Martyn, Bob Dylan, Neil Young) rather than acoustic wall-paper to enhance other 
activities. Reading, too, is highly solidaristic: books are lent and borrowed rather than 
bought, and the emphasis is on providing valuable resources rather than claiming cultural 
capital from consumption. Thus, in various ways, “doing nothing” provides resources for 
movement activity, enabling collective exploration of possibilities and mustering solidarity 
to enable individual development. 
Even the physical living space of participants, and their time structures, play their part in 
this, as one participant notices discussing the decline of some kinds of socialising: 
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Tina: Part of it is just there’s no big houses any more, everybody’s in flats and three beds in 
a flat, but that’s a symptom as well as a cause. Nobody wants to live together, and now you 
live with the boyfriend or you live on your own [….] 
LC: There’s just sort of that much less willingness to go somewhere half across the city and 
stay up till four or five am 
Tina: Yeah, there is a bit of that, I think, because the people you mention are people that 
are getting something together, and so probably the following morning will have to wake 
up at a certain hour. [laughs] Also I think it’s a geographical thing, in like, say even two 
years ago, when we were living in Rathmines, there were about, I don’t know, five people 
you could reach with ten minutes walk, I mean, there’s three of us in Beech Lane, there 
was that big house in Ranelagh, we knew somebody else around, and possibly living in 
Rathmines is getting too expensive and people are moving out, so people are actually 
farther away than they used to be. It’s not as easy to sort of say ‘Well, I have an hour, I’ll 
drop into somebody.’ Cause it takes an hour to get there.” (Tina) 
As this suggests, such situations are achievements, and achievements that can be eroded. 
To return to Wagner’s argument, critical and practical thought and activity has material 
preconditions: solidarity, communicative and cooperative competencies, flexible and 
explorative modes of thought and action, and the collective production of these necessary 
resources: 
“Political would be Kenner and Muireann through Das a bit, Ciarán a bit, but probably 
yourself, Frank [.…] Book exchange, myself and Bob Gaskin had a lot, Josh as well a bit, 
and a total musical exchange between myself and Jim […] and actually, because we used to 
wander up different groups, say, the groups that really wanted to do things, like go for a 
walk in the mountains, it’d be yourself and myself, Josh, Das and Ciarán not so much, 
Jonathon, don’t know whether I already mentioned him […] you’d have people that hung 
around as friends […] then there’s like the people who used to go off to Merrion Park and 
get pissed was a larger group.” (Das) 
Although in the Irish case weak and restricted in scope, such reflexive lifeworlds of 
ordinary movement participants may go some way towards redeeming the promise of a 
critical modernity. Dominated neither by state or market, they are “free spaces” in the 
sense discussed in chapter five, within which creative activity, driven by modes of 
substantive rationality (e.g. communicative) can take place. If they are a long way short of 
being ideal speech situations, they are nevertheless considerable achievements on the part 
of ordinary people inhabiting class societies.  
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Reflexive l ifeworlds and intellectual activity 
In particular, they are skilled achievements, they cannot be taken for granted. They depend, 
for example, on developing appropriate means for communication within a very transient 
population and a city of a million people: 
“I think we’re quite a communicative group [laughs] in a lot of ways, and, you know, non-
communicative in other ways. The ways in which we communicate, I think [are different].” 
(Steve) 
This communication has to do particularly with the creation and sharing of skills and 
knowledge: 
“I think it was like a mutual support group, cause if you are a certain kind of person and 
you meet other kinds of people like you, you go ‘Great, there are other people in the world 
like me’ and you can discuss the things together and come to conclusions that you mightn’t 
have otherwise, and somebody will know something you don’t, and you’ll know something 
they don’t, and you can exchange information and stuff.” (Ruth) 
The intellectual organisation of social movement milieux is discussed in similar terms by 
Eyerman and Jamison: 
“A social movement is not one organisation or one special interest group. It is more like a 
cognitive territory, a new conceptual space that is filled by a dynamic interaction between 
different groups and organisations [….] It is precisely in the creation, articulation, 
formulation of new thoughts and ideas - new knowledge - that a social movement defines 
itself in society.” (1991: 55) 
This grassroots intellectual activity of rethinking and reorganising everyday life links, as 
Wainwright writes for the women’s movement, “transformation of self and transformation 
of social structures” (1994: 79). In her argument, it forms a fundamental resource for social 
change. Certainly, it has remained a staple feature of participation: 
“[I was living] the way I’m living now, pretty much, I wasn’t too fussy about the actual 
physical details of my living space, I tended to spend an enormous amount of time with 
people, whether we were doing something or not, even if we were all just sitting there being 
bored, you would spend time with them [….] I spent a lot of time with people, spending a 
lot of time in pubs or people’s places getting stoned, chatting, seeing what everybody’s up 
to, basically living on a diet of gossip.” (Jim) 
That participants are apparently doing “nothing special”, then, does not mean that nothing 
is going on. People are practicing living in different ways, they are developing the skills 
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appropriate to new kinds of rationality; in other words, they are recreating themselves in 
ways which challenge dominant everyday routines. 
Radicalised reflexivity 
I have called the kind of reflexivity discussed in this chapter radicalised; it is so firstly 
because it breaks with the hegemonic acceptance of given social relations and draws on 
experience and needs from below, and because it does so in relatively communicative 
contexts where its reflexive critique is held to be not simply cognitively true, but also 
normatively justified and emotionally sincere - in other words, a practical proposition and 
not simply an elegant idea. Given this, it is radical because it tends to go beyond a purely 
particularistic (“negotiated”) solution and follow the logic of its critique of the taken-for-
granted (everyday routines) and of its articulation of needs and desires (challenging social 
structures) to the level of the movement project of the counter culture. 
Hegemonic activity from above may be simply a matter of encouraging different groups to 
fall in line with existing social relationships under the leadership of a particular group, but 
(as Singh 1999 has shown) it nevertheless involves the transformation of that leading 
group, and history is littered with the corpses of formerly hegemonic groups which failed 
to grasp this point. Counter-hegemonic rationalities, similarly, need to be elaborated in 
contexts which are capable of self-transformation as they both engage with and develop 
needs expressed from below. The image of a fully-prepared “alternative elite” simply 
waiting in the wings is a myth, because under routine circumstances the only group 
engaging with and leading a broad range of social groups is the ruling class. It follows that 
transformative hegemonic activity depends on contexts which are practically open to self-
transformation on the basis of communication. Given this, the appearance of reflexive 
lifeworlds in non-elite contexts, however undeveloped, is a significant change within 
disorganised capitalism: 
“[T]here are a lot of people trying to construct alternatives and defend those, and I think 
why it’s worth trying to make people aware of that and making the links is to defend them 
and to push them out more.” (Frank) 
The radicalised reflexivity I have been discussing uses the movement legacy of 
decommodified “free spaces”, and the reorganisation of power and culture within 
disorganised capitalism, to advantage to enable just such an openness, and participants are 
capable of seeing themselves within these terms, at least to some extent. 
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LC: Would you be happy to see CAT [Centre for Alternative Technology] and Common 
Ground and so on as all sort of moving within some common space? […] 
Jim: That space is somewhere that an awful lot of people are thinking about, because I 
think everybody recognises to some extent or other that things are changing, and are going 
to change very fast, and people actually define where people themselves stand, you know, 
as groups of people, and as more and more people realise that to one degree or another 
you’re going to get fringe interest areas whereby people are capable of self-sufficiency and 
are capable of small successful local groupings, people are going to get more into the 
security that offers.” 
I am not arguing that the network of ordinary participants I have been discussing is capable 
of leading a revolution; the limits mentioned in this and the previous chapter testify how 
much further the counter culture’s learning process has to go before it can produce a 
coherent and sustainable counter-hegemony. But I do want to suggest that it is from the 
kinds of rationality discussed here - reflexive autonomy and radicalised reflexivity - that a 
genuinely counter-hegemonic rationality can be developed and communicated. Vester et al. 
(1993) link the openness of such rationalities to substantive political effects, noting that his 
comparable categories 
“show the highest support for the right to vote for foreigners, and the highest or a very 
high social and political engagement [….] If we attempt to understand the social-political 
habitus that expresses itself in the readiness to give non-Germans the vote or in a high 
level of social activity, we find in both cases a disposition to encounter without reservations the 
unfamiliar, the experiences that lie outside the narrower social context. It is clear that such a 
disposition is more markedly present in the open-multiple, non-conventional, if also 
ambivalent socialising behaviour of the [seekers] than in styles which point to a more 
closed, more conventional or even an explicitly restrictive socialisation behaviour [….] This 
relationship [between socialising style and politics] becomes visible above all in relation to 
those who think and live differently and ‘strangers’.” (1993: 384 – 387) 
Something of this openness comes across in the experience of a late-comer to the network: 
LC: Did you find it intimidating, coming into that group with all those people who already 
knew each other […]? 
Ruth: Well, that’s what was very strange about it. There are people you just click with, you 
just meet them and you just sort of click with them immediately. I did click in very fast, 
cause I just thought ‘Yes, I like these people, these are the kind of people I want to hang 
out with, they’re fun, and they’re nice, and they’re smart, and they’re interesting’, and no, I 
thought I was accepted in very quickly, cause it can be a lot harder to get to know people, 
and that mostly people were just like ‘Oh, OK, whatever, come along’.” 
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Whatever about the limits of this particular network, something of this orientation of 
openness and engagement is a basic precondition of the kinds of political strategy discussed 
in chapter seven. Counter-hegemony is not achieved by the imposition of a single way of 
being; but rather, as Gramsci (1975) stressed in his discussion of organic intellectuals, by an 
willingness on the part of the movement to talk the language of other social groups, albeit 
with a determinate content91.  
The limits of the l ifeworld 
How far can this analysis be taken? To attempt the construction of a milieu organised 
around the movement rationality of reflexive autonomy is certainly to resist everyday 
routines and dominant rationalities; in a lifeworld perspective what stands out is the 
dismantling and reconstruction of everyday routines (and, as we have seen, of routinisation 
itself); in a system perspective this appears as the “war of position” between dominant and 
movement rationalities. As we have seen, the potential for the development of this kind of 
movement rationality derives from the break-up of organised capitalist relations; its 
concrete content comes from a move beyond the limited response of particularist 
privatism, a move made possible in part by the decommodifying results of earlier struggles 
and the possibilities opened up by direct and mediated contacts with other counter cultural 
contexts. 
So far so good, one might say; but this kind of movement rationality also seems to be self-
undermining: on the one hand, reflexive autonomy enables the freedom from structural 
power relations and habitual routines that is needed for the creation of new projects; on the 
other, it is potentially destructive of such projects, making the freedom to create a 
precarious and contested achievement and blocking in particular the transition from a 
practical and informal logic of action to an explicit, institutionalised and theorised 
approach. In this, of course, the participants in this particular network mirror not only the 
weaknesses of the Irish counter culture discussed in chapter six but the more general 
difficulties outlined in chapter four. 
                                                
91 At this kind of level of development it makes little sense to tax this network with failing to supply the 
determinate content, since few if any of its members aspire to lead others. As we shall see in the next section, 
however, an immanent critique is entirely possible. 
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Collective learning processes 
I think it can be helpful to see this, with Eyerman and Jamison (1991) and Vester (1975), as 
part of a collective learning process developing coordinated skilled activity. The counter 
culture, in its first formations as the New Left of the 1950s and 1960s, challenged the 
substitution of means for end characteristic of the highly regimented movements of the 
middle years of this century, which evolved in symbiosis or as mirror-images of militaristic 
and authoritarian nation-states. To say that commitment should be earned, not had as a 
gift, is a salutary rejection of top-down organising; to challenge the taken-for-granted 
routines which encode structural power relations in everyday life is a necessary reaction to 
the instrumentalism of Stalinism and social democracy. Raschke may be right to argue that  
“[I]f an internal solution of socio-cultural problems is only possible to a limited degree, the 
question raises itself of how a transformation of the whole society can come about with 
the means of a movement whose motivation orients it towards the cultural. How can a 
movement geared to communication and understanding enter into strategies of the 
conquest of power and the reorganisation of the economic and political systems, without 
being defeated by internal contradictions?” (1988: 436) 
The answer, however, can hardly be found by strategies of straightforward 
instrumentalisation. North (1996) has tellingly compared LETS systems to the “exemplary” 
strategies of early nineteenth century utopian socialists; in similar vein Touraine (1981) has 
argued for a developmental (rather than cyclical) approach to movements in which the 
moment of revolt is not a static “thing” to be analysed in isolation, but in effect a response 
to an earlier situation. In the Irish case, with only a fragmentary relationship to the longue 
durée  of movement learning processes and negotiating the difficult experience of 
“liberation” from organised capitalism, it is not surprising that if we freeze the picture we 
are not satisfied with what we see. But in the longer term of people’s lives and movement 
development we can not only hope, but also argue, for change. 
As Habermas (1984) reminds us, rationality is not a given “thing”, but (as in his discussion 
of e.g. aesthetic, legal or scientific rationality) takes times to acquire institutional shape, its 
own “intellectual” form, and reach its own maturity. Sociology, with access to the learning 
processes of other movements and an articulated sensitivity to the strategic and theoretical 
issues raised by movements, can at times come to believe (like a bored teacher) that the 
only question is how long movements will take to discover the “right” answer. What this 
impatience forgets is the twin fact of the changing history of movement struggles - earlier 
answers do not seem to be socially “workable” in their original form - and the new needs 
present in the practical logic of movements, but which may not yet have reached the 
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exalted heights of social theory. A better kind of “teaching” role here is to help movements 
bring out the specificity of the experiences to which they respond and the newness of their 
answer, and to follow that with questions that can help the movement identify and resolve 
its internal problems.  
Limits and possibil ities 
Such questions are raised by participants themselves, and their expressions of 
dissatisfaction can be read as a thoroughly immanent critique of the network. Here I want 
to look at three themes in particular, which recur in interviews. One issue, already touched 
on, is how the autonomist orientation of this milieu undermines the ability to “get things 
together”. This is a problem for participation in counter-cultural institutions of a formal 
kind:  
“The wanting to be a free spirit was really hippyish days, the [refuge] came from the 
women’s studies, and basically they came over for a lunch talk, and that’s the way I got 
interested, and you actually couldn’t really be such a noncon-, you have to commit yourself 
to do your shift, for example, you can’t say ‘But I’m a free spirit and if next Monday 
something happens and I want to go [laughs], I’m not coming in to do my shift’, you 
know.” (Tina) 
As yet, counter-cultural rationalities have not developed to the point where participants can 
find the resources for participation of this kind within internally legitimate techniques of 
the self, nor have counter cultural institutions been able to resist the adoption of 
instrumental techniques of labour discipline, even in voluntary work. This situation is also 
problematic for the development of the project of the self beyond a certain point: 
“I don’t know if it’s age or what, but just more, not very focussed, but I’ve definitely more 
of an idea of what to do. I think it’s a sense of time going by, and deciding that you would 
like to actually do something with your time. It’s not a question of saying ‘Oh, I have to do 
something just because I haven’t really done very much’, but more trying to get an overall 
perspective of things. Everything that you want to do, not just careerwise, not just like 
studying, further postgraduate study, or getting a job, or anything like that, but a lot kind of 
wider spheres of what you want to do with your time, with all your time, being more 
creative, being more productive, or whatever.” (Mark) 
Facing limits like this, inaction is not so much a solution as a sign of the general difficulty 
in orientation and direction-finding: 
Radicalising reflexivity 
 227 
Steve: We’re not  a group that is tied together by anything, like a one kind of a career 
choice or something like that, we’re not all tied together just by, like we’re kind of random, 
well not 
Tina: We’re not random [...] we are looking for alternative 
Steve: we’re all kind of pissing around the place for instance 
Tine: We’re looking for alternative careers or ways of life, that’s what we have together, 
and I’d say an engineer won’t have that 
Steve: People aren’t, really! 
Tina: Most are, though 
LC: What sort of things d’you mean? 
Tina: OK, we don’t all want to go and work in a 9 to 5 job. 
Steve: Yeah, majority didn’t want to work at all […] 
The project of autonomous self-development, then, runs into difficulties in prolonging 
itself beyond a certain point, and this is also reflected in a greater tendency for “getting 
things together” to be a privatised and fragmented affair than in the past: 
Tina: The whole crowd as sort of crumbled [laughs] and loads of people are not round, if 
they’re round they don’t talk to each other, if they went doing different things, got their 
lives together [.…] It’s just people are getting involved in other things. Like college, or 
work, or something. 
Under such conditions, the current limits of counter cultural rationalities are found where 
participants resort to dominant rationalities or emigration to further their own projects, 
emptying the network of its creativity: 
“People would still meet, but it wasn’t the same, and there wasn’t the same sort of spirit of 
wonder and [laughs] you know, ‘everything is beautiful’ sort of stuff that you get in the 
very early times. People were doing their own things, they were going, staying, starting 
college, finishing college.” (Tina) 
The good life 
Another way of coming at this problem is to ask after participants’ sense of what would be 
a good way to live: 
Mark: The most interesting guy is probably Graham. A friend of Tadhg, who’s a friend of, 
it’s a tenuous link […] And he’s into things like permaculture and weed filtering of the 
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water supply, and all kind of groovy things, and he’s so focussed and centred, and bang in 
this whole thing, he’s really doing something with this, and he’s got what he wants. 
LC: He’s sorted it. 
Mark: Yeah. It’s fascinating, you know, he’s really, really good to talk to [….] Myself and 
Ciarán met him in Sarah’s flat one night. And we both picked up straight away that here is 
somebody doing exactly what they wanted to do, and they’re really happy doing exactly 
what they wanted to do, and is prepared to enthuse at length all night about it and it was 
great to hear him. 
Similarly, Steve identified this “creative” sense of being heavily involved in things that are 
personally worthwhile as important: 
“It’s like this guy, a friend in Milan, this couple that we know, like Dave and Mary, Dave is 
working with, he’s what, 22 I think, 23, and he’s not really together as such, but he’s living 
in Milan, because he kind of gets a buzz out of it and he likes to write, and he’s got an 
English degree, and he is writing his second book, and probably, I haven’t read his first 
one, but probably as far as a lot of people would think, a complete load of crap, but for 
him it’s something, it’s him doing something creative, and he writes a lot of poetry, 
etcetera, and he works TEFLing, like teaching English a few hours a day, spends the rest 
of the day writing and doing whatever. And that’s what he does, that’s what he wants to 
get done, and in a couple of years he’ll go and live somewhere else. He just kinds of gets a 
buzz out of it.” 
The difficulties in commitment identified above, however, have made this a far-away goal 
for many, confirming Wagner’s pessimism: 
Tina: Some people ended up doing what they wanted, which was music. Some of the 
people changed very much, from travelling round the world to doing engineering [laughs]. 
But actually I think he’s one of the most together persons, cause he’s doing that with a 
view to travelling after he’s got a degree in engineering, which is probably quite an easy 
thing to do. I don’t think people would actually set up and think ‘Oh right, OK, now I’m 
getting it together so then I can travel’, they just say ‘Well, I’m fed up with doing nothing 
with myself’ [….]  
LC: Do you think many people are happy with what they’re doing now? 
Tina: No, I think many aren’t.  
While it is probably true that Tina, Mark and Steve were particularly unhappy at the time of 
these interviews, both in relation to other participants and in relation to other periods in 
their own lives (at the time they were all planning emigration, and so perhaps tended to 
identify individual action with creativity and the network with stagnation), they are fairly 
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accurate (to judge from other interviews) in identifying a general sense of stagnation within 
the network at that time, and an inability to enable participants to pursue the project of 
self-development beyond a certain point. This was probably more urgent a problem for 
some participants than for others: in the terms of chapter three, the pressure of tacit 
knowledge against existing forms can run from a feeling of vague unease or a desperation 
to escape. 
Developments over the three to four years since these interviews have tended towards a lot 
of “getting it together” as individuals or couples, but (as far as I can judge, having spent the 
last three years working outside Dublin) rather than a thorough fragmentation this has 
worked itself out as a more distanced form of networking, and participants’ involvement in 
articulated projects has tended more to take place within other contexts and less to grow 
out of network interaction. The absence of the buzz of creativity, I think, remains much of 
the time, resolved by some as depression or uncertainty and by others as resignation or 
acceptance. To this extent, I think, the limits of the network as developed to date can be 
said to have been reached; the question is how participants attempt to move beyond this 
situation, and whether they use the network as a tool to continue developing reflexivity or 
rather “retraditionalise” it while turning their attention elsewhere. 
Gender 
A third limit, mentioned in chapter four, is that of gender relations within the network. 
Looked at through the eyes of two feminists and one non-feminist woman, this appears in 
different ways. For Tina, the problem is that few women count as full members: 
LC: You don’t think it’s a particularly laddish scene? 
Tina: Well, it is a bit, actually. 
LC: Is it? 
Tina: Mm. [laughs] Yeah, yeah it is. I think there’s worse scenes, where this happens, but I 
think it is to a certain extent. And it’s hard to say, because really there’s always been more 
guys than girls, I think I’m the oldest, you know, oldest apart from the fact of age, but 
actually longest staying in the group women, you know, myself and Maria and Emer, and 
kind of Ruth arrived quite a bit later, and that’s it, really, it’s us. 
LC: And a lot of people who were there earlier and left one way or the other. 
Tina: But I mean that were there and are still there, it’s only us, as far as women are 
concerned. 
LC: Why is that? 
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Tina: Well, I don’t know. [laughs] Ask the guys. Well, some of the women left, as you said, 
like Melanie. I don’t know, maybe other girlfriends were never really part of the group, but 
girlfriends of somebody [….] So they actually were never themselves part of the group but 
they were sort of appendages to whomever they were going out with. 
Ruth, however, was defensive on this point at first, perhaps because she saw it as a 
challenge to her position: 
LC: There’s quite often been a thing where a woman has come in as somebody’s partner… 
Ruth: Didn’t happen in my case. I know it happened a lot [….] That didn’t happen in my 
case, really [.] for the first year that I knew all of you, maybe more, the first year and a half, 
more even, that I knew everybody I wasn’t going out with any one of them. 
At another point, though, Ruth did see this as a more structural feature of the network: 
“You get a lot of women hanging out, but how many of them are what you’d say totally 
part of it, and how many of them are either just hanging out because it’s fun or because 
they’re going out with somebody who, yeah, that’s true. You get reasonable numbers of 
female buskers at the moment, but who just hang out.” 
At the same time, this is not a universal rule: 
“Emer and myself, with or without boyfriends, we’re part of it, you know. But for loads of 
people it is not, I dunno, and I dunno why we are, I think because we are such a pain in 
the arse anyhow [laughs] that we stay there, you know?” (Tina) 
The difference between Ruth and Tina on this issue seems to have to do with a more 
general confidence in the extent to which participants are committed to the project of 
autonomy: 
Ruth: I don’t think that very many people would be contented, of our generation, would be 
content to live the kind of lives their parents did, who would be content to just have a 9 to 
5 job and not do very much. I mean, for instance, my mother went to meet some people 
she hadn’t seen since ‘69 [….] And when you say to them what are they doing, they tell you 
what their husband is doing now, or what their children are doing now, and I don’t expect 
that will happen with the people I know now, I don’t ever expect that to happen, that 
when I meet them I’ll say ‘What are you doing?’and they’re not going to say ‘Well, I’ve got 
three kids’. 
LC: Yeah, I remember you having an argument with Joanna about that actually, she was 
saying ‘Well, women get oppressed, and they get pushed into these conventional boxes’, 
and you were saying ‘That’s not going to happen to me.’ 
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Ruth: Yeah, exactly. I was surprised that she would say that. I mean, yes I know that there 
are things like, it depends what country you’re in, and yet women still get paid less [.…] 
That all still happens, but it’s people’s expectations that are higher. The ideal of happiness 
is not a house and a job that pays, all this.  
Frank shared something of Ruth’s analysis of expectations, but felt that these higher 
expectations might express themselves differently depending on gender: 
“A point that a friend of mine made to me was that while she could see that happening, 
that you have the ones who don’t go on into kind of approved society from Belvedere, and 
from a couple of those other middle-class Dublin schools, she says it seems to be the men 
who get involved in solidarity work and all that sort of stuff. The women, she reckons, are 
more likely to maybe go into education or something like that, or to go into business or 
whatever, but not to go into that kind of stirring up trouble, changing the world.”  
Tina’s analysis of the problem focusses more on issues internal to the network: 
“I think there’s a bit of this laddish thing say when people get together now, which I find 
very annoying, and Emer finds very annoying too, and I think Dizzy as well, there’s 
another woman that finds it very annoying, when all these guys get together and start 
recounting for about the hundredth time their great stories of drinking and smoking, 
stories that you heard already, and you were there, and you knew, like, you know [laughter] 
they weren’t! They weren’t like that!” 
There are areas of interaction, then, which have become retraditionalised, and are (no 
longer) subject to any kind of reflexive attention. Similarly, Frank, looking at more political 
groups, felt that a lack of explicit attention to the issue exacerbated the problem:  
“I think it’s easier for women to get on in the kind of structured groups [….] I think now, 
in some of the smaller groups, like the more informal, spare-time groups, there’s still very 
little conscious planning, in the mixed gender groups, like, outside of women’s groups, to 
looking at the way the genders interact, or looking at the way people interact on a gender 
basis. That doesn’t just go for men, you know, not thinking about the mechanics of it, it 
goes for women as well in terms of thinking about quotas or whatever [….] There’s much 
more equality in the newer groups.” 
As we saw in the last chapter, participation in the network was initially part of a process of 
liberation from traditional expectations, for women at least (consider also Mark’s 
comments on Stepford Wives), and a certain amount of critique and exploration of 
relationships and sexuality was part of its early development. One possible reading would 
be to say that processes of retraditionalisation are overtaking processes of reflexivity. A 
shake-up in relationships since these interviews, with the development of what (from the 
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outside at least) seem more egalitarian relationships for a significant number of participants, 
suggest that these issues may now be being played out within couples, in which case gender 
relations across the network may be being left to one side92. It seems likely, then, that the 
project of radicalised reflexivity is finding important limits in and around the gendered 
features of its internal interactions. 
The war of position 
The situation I have been describing is in some ways extremely specific to Dublin during 
the last ten years, in other ways very general. In this section I want to attempt to relocate 
this movement milieu within the context of global modernity. If organised capitalism was 
predominantly national in scope (Lash and Urry 1987), and geared towards the 
intensification of one type of domination and exploitation within the confines of the 
national territory of core societies and another type within their overseas dependencies, 
then disorganised capitalism, by globalising the scope of its activities, abandons large areas 
of the core societies as it shifts its attention elsewhere. Within the welfare-state context 
inherited from organised capitalism, groups such as the unemployed or students are 
“decommodified” (Offe 1985); that is, they are marginal to the production process and of 
interest primarily as consumers. From Berger et al. (1974) to Bey (1991), this situation of 
marginalisation - which is at the same time a marginalisation from the associated structures 
of intensive domination and exploitation - has been identified as an important site for the 
generation of the cultural resources for challenges to the dominant forms of global 
modernity. Participants in this network, whether unemployed or studying, in seasonal or 
temporary employment (teaching English as a foreign language (TEFL), kitchen porter 
(KP)), or as subcontracting technicians and translators, have tended to inhabit this space as 
far as possible. 
This marginality is felt in specific ways in Dublin. Ireland’s traditional economic semi-
peripherality, coupled with its involvement in the European state-formation process and 
Dublin’s role as an educational and administrative centre, has given rise to large numbers 
of skilled and mobile individuals. At the same time, its de facto political and economic 
                                                
92 An alternative reading, consistent with Waite (1999), would be to suggest that the network has to an extent 
been overtaken by the wider shift from private to public patriarchy (Walby 1990) in Irish society over the 
decade and a half since its formation (Mahon 1995). If so, this would explain some of the difference between 
this and subsequent generations, noted here in Frank’s interview and in chapter four. 
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dependency on the centres of European and American capital has placed the Irish left in a 
similar situation to trade unionists in a subcontracting firm: global capitalism is ever-
present as a structuring element of Dublin’s economy, yet it is not made physically present 
as a target. Unlike the British or German states, the Irish state does not act as an explicit 
representative of the interests of global capital, and it tends to avoid set-piece repression of 
protest activity. The historical role played by nationalism as an official state ideology and its 
current meanings in Northern Ireland make it largely unavailable as a potential mobilising 
ideology for anti-systemic protest. And in the “flat-land” areas of Dublin, the traditional 
relationships of clientelism and faction are mostly absent as instantiations of power in daily 
life. Thus the scope for reflexivity and self-development is that much greater than, for 
example, in the far more heavily politicised situation of the German state and economy. 
Yet the appearance of related lifeworlds and movements across the core capitalist countries 
suggest that similar rationalities can develop in a variety of related contexts: as we have 
seen, this network is anything other than isolated from the wider world, and participants 
often find friendly spaces abroad. 
Such lifeworlds, then, are neither simply passive victims of radical modernity (Giddens 
1994), nor locations of purely defensive struggles against colonisation by the logics of 
instrumental rationality (Offe 1985). They are also, and crucially, a source of new 
rationalities. Under appropriate circumstances, the communicative rationalisation of such 
local rationalities can proceed to a point where they are capable of breaking the bounds of 
the lifeworld and spreading to other lifeworlds. Whether they succeed in this is of course a 
question of the politics of culture. 
The stakes of conflict 
Within the cultural politics of post-1968 western states, the challenge to the previous 
“taken-for-granted” modes of cultural domination has provoked cultural and political 
responses which make “business as usual” possible once again. If Touraine (1981) is right 
that the struggle between social actors is what constructs the stakes of “historicity”, then 
there has been a shift from a “hegemony of closure” (within which the centrality of the 
conflict between the dominant “old right” and the subordinate “old left” enabled a 
marginalisation of other actors) to what can provisionally be defined as a “hegemony of 
openness” (in which the conflict between the dominant forces of disorganised capitalism 
and those of the subordinate “new left”, or the counter culture, over the question of just 
how far openness and reflexivity are to be taken, defines the new stakes at issue, and 
marginalises other forces.) 
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In this chapter, we have seen that reflexivity tends to mean a situation where social 
relations are “consumed” reflexively, but “produced” unreflexively; in other words, a 
situation of a diversity of “negotiated” readings, which represents a precondition for effective 
cultural hegemony - the ability of the dominated to find their own value in the cultural 
construction of their own domination (Gramsci 1991: 12 - 14). Similarly, the dominant 
meanings of autonomy in affirmative modernisms involve a situation of atomisation, 
possessive individualism and goal-rational action. The local rationalities of the counter 
culture are capable of radicalising both towards an active life-world reflexivity which 
applies to the actual production of social relations as much as to the attitudes adopted 
towards them, and towards a reflexive autonomy which does not restrict itself to the 
pursuit of given goals. 
McKay (1996) repeatedly asks why the Thatcher and Major regimes adopted such a brutal 
strategy to destroy the free festival scene, the New Traveller lifestyle, rave culture and so 
on, pointing out the paradox that these groups are among the most “enterprising” 
representatives of “personal initiative” and “individual freedom”. In other words, one of 
the key issues at stake in contemporary conflicts is precisely over the meanings of 
reflexivity and autonomy, and over whether they can form part of a new hegemony 
containing social conflict or whether they can be radicalised to the point of rupture. The 
conflicting meanings that can be attributed to “autonomy” and “reflexivity” (and to 
“change”, as “modernisation” and “rationalisation” imposed from above or as the micro-
politics of social transformation from below) are then key stakes in the politics of 
hegemony and counter-hegemony.  
Alternative modernities, then, remain a present option within what is ultimately a “war of 
position” between different movement projects, different ways of making and remaking 
the social world. Both the initial development of this network, and its current tendencies to 
fragmentation or retraditionalisation, need to be seen in this context: rather than reifying 
“networks” as self-existing “levels” of movement activity, they can then be seen as a stage 
in a particular process of the struggle to develop local rationalities. In the next chapter I 
will attempt to relocate this analysis within a wider understanding of the problems and 
choices facing the counter culture. 
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Chapter seven: choices for the counter culture 
Introduction 
In chapter six I suggested that the development of local rationalities within the network 
might be running into limits which could be best understood and overcome by relocating it 
within a broader picture of the conflicts and choices facing the counter culture at present. 
In doing this, I hope to avoid the danger of much contemporary writing on social 
movements, which - tied to a static analysis that in effect rejects the possibility that 
movements can move and change - often concludes with an uncritical celebration or an a 
priori condemnation of what is taken to be an essentially fixed object.  
If we refuse to reify “movement” as essentially one kind of thing, whether protest, SMOs, 
or networks, and focus rather on the question of how particular local rationalities are 
developed in struggles - that is, of the changing and developing skills which movement 
participants bring to their participation - then it may be possible to identify the limits 
entailed by particular forms at the same time as naming possibilities for overcoming those 
forms; in other words, to ask after the adequacy of particular versions of a movement 
project to the local rationalities out of which it grows. 
Open theorising and social movements 
In this thesis I have argued for a social movement theory grounded in theories from and 
for social movements; that such theories need to account for their own situatedness rather 
than claim universality for their statements; and for the production of concepts which are 
praxis-oriented, that is, historical and open, and hence able to engage with the problems 
faced by movement participants rather than simply condemning or approving their 
existence in general. This chapter attempts to redeem some of the implications of these 
claims. Marx argued that 
“[t]he question of whether there is objective truth to human thought is no theoretical 
question, but a practical question. In practice human beings must show the truth, that is the 
reality and power, this-worldliness, of their thought. The argument about the reality or 
unreality of thinking that is isolated from praxis is a purely scholastic question.” (n.d.: 113 - 
114) 
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Within the scholastic bounds of an academic thesis, I would make a weaker claim. That 
knowledge is political, that is, has implications for power relations, is an explicit claim of 
Marxist and feminist thought on the subject, and one that is widely accepted in, for 
example, Foucauldian and postmodernist writing. While there remain “scientistic” 
conceptions of sociology that deny this, it would be odd for even the most scientistic 
observer of social movements to deny that research on social movements potentially has 
implications for the practice of those movements, and of course it is precisely within such 
“enlightenment” modes of thought that the utilitarian nature of scientific knowledge is 
most commonly stressed, notably when making applications for research funding. As 
Giddens has observed, sociological knowledge spirals in and out of the social world 
(1993b: 150), and it is not unusual for academic writing to be noticed by drawn on in 
various ways by activists. 
The strategy of this chapter 
It is appropriate, then, for a theory of social movements to ask after its implications. 
Within the framework of the argument I have developed in this thesis, other questions also 
arise, such as the question of the usefulness of its concepts to movement practitioners and 
the question of where the analysis is situated. This chapter tries to use the perspective I 
have developed to think about the options of contemporary social movements from my 
own viewpoint, that of a long-term participant with an interest in theory, in other words to 
ask questions like “what are we up to?”, “where are we trying to get to?” and “how are we 
trying to do that?” – to demonstrate, that is, the appropriateness of the perspective 
developed in this thesis for the kind of open theorising it argues for. Since, as we shall see, 
these questions are also raised within counter cultural contexts, it is not a question of 
moving from the lifeworld perspective of chapters five and six to a supposedly 
disembodied “system” perspective, but rather one of moving from the perspective of the 
network participants discussed there back to my own as a participant more deeply involved 
in the political side of counter cultural processes. 
One of the difficulties with these kinds of question is that there are many different possible 
kinds of answer we can give as activists, ranging from the intensely specific and task-
oriented (“we’re trying to prevent this particular incinerator proposal from going through”) 
to the grandly general and utopian (“we have lost our inner connection to nature, and we 
need to find it”), not forgetting tangential answers which refuse the question (“I think we 
need to do more dancing and less committee meetings”). It isn’t a rejection of these kinds 
of answers to suggest that there are also spaces in which the more movement-theoretical 
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questions are useful; and perhaps to identify those spaces is also to identify how we can go 
about answering the question, or under what circumstances and for what purposes this 
kind of question and answer might be useful. 
Within this chapter, then, I start from my own activist situation as a theorist within 
movements, to think about what theory is doing there; considering existing conflicts within 
the movements I am involved with to think about where we might go from here, and using 
my own experience of those movements and understanding of their possibilities to give 
provisional answers to that. I try to do this within the terms developed in this book: in 
other words, to show that this offers an effective language for movement theorising.  
An important claim of chapter one was that historical concepts offered the possibility of 
open thinking, that is, thinking about the future and thinking about a range of possibilities 
within the present. To show that this is the case for one particular set of answers is not to 
demonstrate that it is possible for all such answers, but it does demonstrate the basic 
possibility of linking theory and practice, and beyond this the initial “usability” of the 
concepts developed in this thesis. The particular answers that I give, finally, are situated as 
far as possible; in other words, they do not claim universality. In terms of Hakamaya’s 
reading of Vico (1997), they do not situated themselves within the universal terrain of 
claims to absolute truth, the logos, but rather within the local terrain of claims to plausibility, 
the topos. 
How can a movement understand itself? 
Talking in terms of social movements makes it possible to say “these questions are ways of 
clarifying the self-understanding of a movement”. This is a line of thought associated 
particularly with Touraine (1981), though of course it goes back before him to thinkers like 
Lukács (1971) and Gramsci (1991), and before them again to Marx (e.g. 1967). Within this 
perspective, it is often read “how can we know what the self-understanding of a movement 
is?” Lots of different ideas are voiced in movements, after all, for lots of different purposes 
and by lots of different actors. When we research or take part in movements, though, we 
find that to have a self-understanding, to have a view on the movement as a movement, 
rather than simply having a view on particular issues, on organisational goals, on personal 
ideals and so on, is not always something people do. In other words, it’s an achievement of 
quite a particular kind, and movements don’t always seem to have this kind of capacity for 
self-awareness. Quite extensive movements, and quite powerful ones, can exist without 
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talking in these terms (except perhaps in pep talks at annual conferences or in the pub after 
the fifth pint). So when do movements think in these terms? 
When can a movement understand itself? 
An obvious kind of answer, drawing on the sociology of knowledge (Goldmann 1969, 
Mannheim 1960) and the arguments made in chapters three and four, is to say that ideas 
are systematically produced around a subject when it plays some role in the purposes the 
actors want to achieve93. So there are likely to be ideas around the nature and purposes of 
the movement as a whole (a) when one of the things people are doing is trying to build 
connections across the movement, whether for strategic reasons (“how do we win?”) or for 
identity reasons (“how do we survive?”).  
These ideas need to become clearer and more specific (b) when the goals of the movement 
are both large-scale (going beyond e.g. getting a specific law repealed) and within reach (not 
a matter of the far-off future but a question of massive social changes happening within the 
next few years); and when the movement is internally pretty complex (so that it becomes 
important to find common denominators) and has had a significant effect on the 
surrounding society (so that there’s a need to make distinctions). If so, a movement’s 
capacity for self-awareness is at its height when a wide-ranging and radical movement is in 
a position where it can realistically look at remaking society in its own image; in other 
words, as it develops from a local rationality towards a fully-developed and counter-
hegemonic movement project. Obviously this isn’t something that happens every day, but 
within the Marxist tradition it’s illustrated by (say) the blossoming of a whole range of 
movement theorists – Gramsci, Lukács, Luxemburg, Lenin and so on – around  precisely 
such a situation.  
Conversely, we’d expect that movements with limited goals, or movements with little hope 
for the future, talk in mostly organisational or utopian terms respectively; and movements 
which have actually taken state power are liable to identify the movement with what is 
likely to become its major instrument, and so in a sense see themselves through that 
particular glass, darkly. So (c) a third point is that of autonomy: a movement dependent on 
“traditional” intellectual structures, whether the state bureaucracy, a commercial media or a 
professional academia, will be harder put to it to “see the wood for the trees” than one 
                                                
93 This is not of course to say that the subject need itself be real: much energy can be expended on discussing 
the moment at which the soul enters the foetus, for example. 
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which has “organic” decision-making structures, communications organs and spaces for 
theorising of its own. As we shall see, these conditions are problematic in the Irish context. 
Situating the questions 
In this context I’m falling rather uncomfortably between the two stools of organic and 
traditional activity. With one hat I’ve been involved in alternative politics of different kinds 
in Ireland and elsewhere for the last 15 years or so; more particularly I’ve been involved in 
different kinds of political project, different attempts at creating an alternative media and 
different spaces for networking. With the other hat on I’ve followed the kinds of questions 
this experience brought up into a research project which has been over ten years in the 
making, and which has had me involved in the different worlds of “reading the literature”, 
teaching students, administering academia and trying to build links between (some) activists 
and (some) academics. This puts me to an extent in the situation described by McRobbie: 
“As part of the ‘68-educated radical professionals, our everyday lives at work, especially in 
teaching and in education, but also at home and in the community, comprise endless 
political interventions conducted at every level, from simple acts of communication and 
pedagogy to high-level policy-making decisions. Postmodernity has not stopped us 
functioning in this hyperactive way.” (1994: 47) 
“Traditional” intellectual activity expresses itself most pressingly, as far as my thinking 
about movements goes, in an activity of “defensive translation” - firstly, within research 
contexts, translating ideas developing from my own engagement with movements into a 
language acceptable in academic contexts, notably by finding “accredited” intellectuals who 
could act as spokespersons for this perspective94. Secondly, in more general teaching and 
“collegial” environments, the problem is normally to avoid the general ridicule and 
trivialisation levelled at movement activities and participant understanding by students, 
colleagues and superiors. This is unsurprising, given the subject of the research, but tends 
to divert the project of understanding into one of defending; this “identitarian” concern is 
common to movement intellectuals in Ireland (for example in the women’s and community 
development movements) insofar as they are likely to have a foot in both worlds. 
“Organic” intellectual activity, by contrast, expresses itself mostly practically, in trying to 
find a form of understanding adequate to the project at hand, whether that means trying to 
                                                
94 At an early point in my research, one senior academic told me that they couldn’t see why someone studying 
social movements should take any notice of theorists from inside movements! 
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find a workable formula to bring social movements activists together, writing a leaflet 
against a proposed incinerator, or defending the policy interests of the Irish party within 
the European Federation of Green Parties. What derives from this experience, and what I 
recognise in the “movement theorists” I have discussed, is a characteristic shape of thinking, 
oriented towards relational thinking, an attempt to bring out the not-spoken, and an 
awareness of the “makeability” (Berger, Berger and Kellner 1974) of the social world; an 
orientation which offers a point of connection with the “open theorising” defended in 
chapter one. 
The context of contemporary Irish movements 
A constant question for any activist in a peripheral country like Ireland, where writing on 
contemporary movements is thin on the ground but vast waves of theory sweep the 
country from outside, is how to locate our local experience within some coherent frame of 
understanding at the same time as finding some such frame that is validated by our local 
experience. The crucial questions involve the way social movements are going or might go, 
both within that peculiar (and rapidly changing) mix of semi-periphery and semi-core south 
of the Border and within that peculiar (and rapidly changing) mix of periphery-core 
relationships that make up the capitalist world-system towards the end of the “long 
twentieth century”. Three central elements can be identified, corresponding to the action 
from above of capital and state and that of movements from below: 
• Following dependent industrialisation in the 60s and 70s and deep industrial crisis in 
the late 70s and 80s, “modernising” strategies on the part of capitalist and state elites 
have entailed the reinvention of “Ireland” as a position within the world-economy 
through developing niches such as computer localisation and tourism and through a 
clientelistic relationship with the EU (MacLaughlin 1997, but see the qualifiers in 
O’Hearn 1997). This clearly entails the creation of new kinds of experience – of work 
relations, of ethnicity, of culture (Crowley and MacLaughlin 1997, Peillon and Slater 
1998), which are as yet only partially understood, whether by those affected, by 
academics (see Torode 1999), or by activists trying to engage with these experiences. 
• As part of this turn-around, the capacity for action (though not autonomy: Breen et al. 
1990) of the Irish state has increased considerably, first with the expansion of its 
activities into new areas in the 1970s and more recently with a willingness, fueled by 
EU funding, to offer movement elites access to policy-making and support across a 
scope ranging from neo-corporatist arrangements at national level to local 
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“partnership” arrangements and state funding for e.g. women’s refuges. In terms of 
state strategy versus movements from below, this marks a shift from a policy of frontal 
opposition to a policy of incorporation, similar to that long followed in relation to the 
labour movement (Allen 1997). 
• Movements from below, which had been very effectively suppressed by the nationalist 
movement they had helped to power in the 1920s, began to be able to reassert 
themselves from the 1970s on, with a flourishing of large-scale and often remarkably 
successful movements, such as the long-fought campaigns over contraception, divorce 
and abortion, the defeat of nuclear power, etc. (Yearley 1995). In the late 1980s and 
even more in the 1990s there has been an increasing divide between movement elites, 
oriented towards an apparently more open-minded state, and an increasingly 
disempowered grassroots, drifting into demobilisation or eccentricity. With the 
successful cooptation of the parliamentary Left, there is a widespread disorientation in 
movements from below, which is being experienced as a source both of creativity and 
of powerlessness. 
Contested movement projects 
In this context, movements from below are necessarily attempting to redefine the nature of 
their activities. On occasion, this amounts to a politics of developing individual campaigns; 
more commonly, it consists of proposing particular kinds of movement project – restating or 
rethinking existing projects, attempting to outline new ones. In terms of the conditions for 
movement reflexivity identified earlier, an intention to build connections is clearly present; 
as is a sense of widespread social change, although there are divided readings between a 
liberal reading which sees past changes as implying future ones and a radical reading which 
identifies this as a process of cooptation and demobilisation. Autonomy is more 
problematic: it is not that movements from below lack institutions of their own, but that 
they frequently assume (for liberal or nationalist reasons) that the state should be theirs to 
control, and thus have difficulty thinking separately about the movement (cf. Geoghegan 
1999). What particularly heightens movement reflexivity, though, is the first condition: to 
build connections, it is necessary to identify (if only by default) who “we” are and what 
“we” are about. Melucci (1989, 1995b) has observed that movement identity is a 
construction; what he has not observed is that there are moments in which this 
construction is the straightforward reproduction of acquired ways of “doing” the 
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movement, and moments in which it is a rebuilding from the ground up. The present 
moment is one of the latter95. 
My own perspective, then, is shaped by my participation in particular attempts on the part 
of the counter culture to rethink itself and tackle the question of direction, and this chapter 
in particular is an attempt to contribute to these discussions, which include: 
• Strategy sessions and policies within political parties and formal organisations which 
might have the capacity to structure and lead movements from below (in my case as 
secretary for the Green Party’s strategy development process in the mid-1990s and later 
as the party’s delegate to the European Federation of Green Parties (see Cox 1998b)); 
• The development and transformation of an extensive alternative press with left, 
feminist, environmental and development themes and attempts at networking within 
this, which I have helped support and organise as editor of An Caorthann (see Cox 
1996a, b, MacBain 1996, and the January 1999 special issue of Community Media 
Network’s Tracking on alternative media (see Cox 1999a)); 
• The “Sustainable Earth fairs”: fairs with extensive workshop space using the framing 
device of sustainable development - hence environment, global economics and 
development issues - at which I’ve run workshops on the alternative press, social 
movements and anti-incinerator campaigning (cf. Sustainable Ireland Project 1999); 
• Meetings of “elders” of the “alternative movement”  (see the comments in Cox 1998c 
and Brennan et al. 1998) with a view to creating new organisational forms to meet new 
needs; 
• Formal conferences around “environmental” themes with speakers representing 
different kinds of organisational form within the movement, such as the UCG 
conference “The future of the Irish environmental movement” (UCG EcoSoc 1997; 
see my paper to that conference at Cox 1997); 
• The “unidentified political object:”: get-togethers of small groups of activists in party-
like organisations which I co-organised in a fairly discursive and unspecified “political” 
space (hence left / feminist in orientation); 
                                                
95 I am indebted to Colin Barker for the observation that this is a frequent result of moments of defeat. In the 
Irish context, this defeat is marked most strongly by the ability of movements from above to contain 
challenges from below during the 1980s and early 1990s; a situation which has forced a great deal of 
rethinking, even where the defeat has not been recognised as such. 
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• My own current project, “Ireland from below”, bringing together theoretically-minded 
movement participants with politically-minded academics in workshops under the 
general rubric of “social movements”. 
This should be enough to give an indication of the kinds of problems that have shaped my 
thinking in this thesis: trying to define an adequate direction for movements facing major 
problems of reorientation (Cox 1998d), exploring various possible organisational forms, 
and trying (necessarily) to move beyond purely particularist stances that would undermine 
both projects. It is in this context in particular that the concept of counter culture offers a 
useful means of understanding and organising particular movement developments96. 
Alternative ways of doing this – and hence alternative movement projects - have involved: 
• Left academic conferences (“Red Stripe”97, “Understanding Class in Ireland”) around 
classic themes of economics and politics, but remaining within a purely academic 
context (dictated among other things by the massive gravitational pull exerted by the 
possibility or actuality of left participation in government on conservative terms, and 
more recently by the rightwards move of the parliamentary left); 
• Feminist conferences (“Women’s Studies”, “Women and Social Exclusion”) trying with 
more or less success to span the range of academic, community and artistic interests, 
but in practice caught by the continuing divide between academic and community 
feminism (the “Women and Social Exclusion” conference, which set out explicitly to 
remedy this, has had no follow-up); 
                                                
96 As Jenson (1995) observes, “decisions about self-naming affect social movements’ strategies” in various 
ways: 
“First, a name generates strategic resources. Drawing boundaries around a community makes the 
resources of that community available to the movement as well as generating the solidarity necessary 
for successful action. Second, selecting one name over another sets discursive boundaries such that 
some claims become meaningful and others are less relevant. Third, any definition of one’s own 
community locates it in relationship to others. Therefore, it presents possibilities for alliances as well 
as for identifying opponents. Likely conflicts and patterns of cooperation follow the borders 
delimiting the community. Fourth, any name has consequences for the routing of claims through state 
institutions. Routes to representation become available in accordance with the name selected.” (1995: 
116) 
97 The limits of this particular project were also marked by the fact that speakers were by invitation and the 
thematic was the viewpoint on Irish politics held by the British left…. 
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• More institutionally focussed attempts to organise “NGOs”, the “third sector” or the 
“voluntary sector”, often with underlying charity or religious ideologies (e.g. “The 
Wheel”) or around purely sectoral concerns (the Latin America Solidarity Centre, the 
project of a general Solidarity Centre). 
Beyond these specifically Irish projects, there is considerable interest in the Zapatista-
sponsored Encuentro process and more recently in the “People’s Global Action” (June 
18th) projects: in dependent societies, movement actors cannot be and never have been 
parochial in their orientation. The problem, in fact, is often the reverse, that it is too easy to 
build external links and too difficult to forge local networks. Movements from below in 
Ireland, then, are certainly capable of posing themselves questions about direction, 
whatever about their capacity to answer them coherently and practically, the problem to 
which I now turn. 
Tensions within movement projects 
As we have seen, there a wide range of current attempts to put some shape on movements 
from below. Three fields of tension can be identified from this experience, which I will use 
to structure this paper and incidentally move beyond specifically Irish concerns. Table 1 
illustrates this: 
Table 1: Strategic issues facing Irish movement projects 
Field of tension Movement projects 
Interaction with state structures From clientelism via mainstreaming to ghettoising 
Relation to cultural orientations From consensual via educative to disruptive 
Self-construction in terms of class and power From populist via mass organisations to elitist 
1. The first issue is how movements are to grasp their interaction with the state. Clientelist 
orientations aim to act as specific advocates for a particular set of clients, ideally in a 
policy community with the relevant departments; this has been particularly attractive 
for welfare-oriented movements (such as community development) and for 
professionals within them (Geoghegan 1998b). Mainstreaming orientations aim to 
generalise their themes to all areas of the state; this has been the dominant theme of the 
Irish feminist movement, which has been notably generous and ambitious in this 
respect (Mahon 1995, Connolly 1998). Ghettoising orientations expect opposition from 
the state; perhaps the best example is the republican movement. As chapter four notes, 
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this is a particular dilemma for movements in dependent societies, where movements 
have to enter into structuring relationships with the state at a very early point. Current 
state strategies of “partnershipping” make this problem a central one for movements, 
and one with important organisational consequences. 
2. The second question is how movements should see their relationship to existing 
cultural orientations. One theme, attractive to rural community movements (Curtin and 
Varley 1995), has been to stress community consensus above all, and this of course has 
specific meanings in the nationalism of a post-colonial state. A second is to think in 
terms of educating the population, in other words challenging cultural orientations from 
above in line with an emerging cultural hegemony, often backed up by a rhetoric of 
modernisation; “official environmentalism” (Tovey 1993) has often found this strategy 
particularly attractive. A third is to be explicitly and deliberately disruptive of existing 
cultural modes in the name of an alternative and subordinate culture; much modern 
Celticism falls into this camp (Hardman and Harvey 199698). The success of earlier 
movements from below organised around themes of nationhood and community puts 
massive pressure on Irish movements around this point. 
3. The third tension is around the area of how movements construct themselves in terms 
of where they recruit, how they operate, and so on. One approach is the predictable 
populist one of status-conscious groups led by charismatic figures or focussed on the 
symbolic leadership of celebrity; new religious movements (Robbins 1988) may come 
closest to the classical model of this. A second is that of mass organisations with a stable 
bureaucratic structure, of which Irish farmers’ organisations offer a good model (cf. 
Tovey 1996 on this development in an unexpected context). Thirdly, there are elitist 
orientations which work towards a small group of full-time (paid or unpaid) activists 
interacting with dominant elites in the state, the legal system, the media etc.; 
professional environmentalists may be the best example of this (see the critique in Cox 
1998b). As changing capital investment strategies change the everyday experience of 
participants, this conditions movement projects deeply. 
Obviously these typologies aren’t exhaustive, and many movements contain internal 
tensions around these issues. But it’s precisely these tensions that I want to start from, 
                                                
98 This simplifies a more complex situation, where e.g. “Celtic Christianity” attempts to recuperate critiques of 
the Church, while what could be described as “acid Celticism” presents the Celts-as-wished-for (Piggott 1974) 
in essentially liberatory terms. 
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because they highlight key problems facing the attempt to rethink Irish movement projects: 
how do we challenge social structures, how do we handle our interaction with everyday 
routines, and how do we relate to each other within the movement? 
Local rationalities and movement projects 
As chapter three and the examples I’ve given suggest, the kinds of answers we give to these 
start from our local rationalities as movement actors, in other words the way we make 
sense of our situation and respond to it, which is a matter both of the situated experience 
we have of the social world generally - and our movement location in particular - and of the 
way we understand and pursue our interests and purposes. In Table 2 I have tried to 
outline this as far as can be done without direct research on local rationalities, by 
identifying the experiential contexts likely to mediate the formation of local rationalities 
and hence also of more elaborated responses (campaigns, movement projects).  
Table 2: Strategic issues and the formation of movement rationalities 
Field of tension Movement rationalit ies influenced by 
Interaction with state structures Centrality of state involvement to movement 
structure and participants’ occupations; scope of 
movement goals (perceived acceptability to power 
structure) 
Relation to cultural orientations Cultural orientations of participant groups 
(mainstream versus marginalised groups and internal 
dissidents) and framing of movement goals 
(instrumental versus communicative forms of 
rationality) 
Self-construction in terms of class and power Class basis of most committed participants and 
points of reference for action (status claims, mass 
movements, elite intervention) 
The left and right columns here are of course alternative ways of saying the same thing 
(logical arguments consist of elaborate truisms), but hopefully the right-hand column 
makes some of the underlying issues a bit clearer: 
1. The structural situation of participants, and the movement as a whole, vis-à-vis state 
institutions - whether it and they exist within the “soft fringes” of the welfare state, for 
example, or are private-sector employees or self-employed, is likely to have a major 
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impact on what the movement as a whole thinks it can or should do with the state: is it 
the normal mechanism for processing everyday demands, something on which one 
projects hopes for wider change, or only a source of harassment? Inseparable from this 
kind of mental processing is how the movement understands and constructs its own goals: as 
already bearing the form of specific administrative or legislative measures, as a demand 
for the state as a whole to act in certain ways, or as an autonomous attempt to change 
society and culture without or against the state. 
2. The life experience of participants in relation to the dominant everyday routines of the 
society they are living within is obviously crucial to their cultural strategies and to how 
they construct the goals of their movement. Willing participants in dominant cultural 
groups (elite or popular) are likely to want to frame issues in instrumental terms, as a 
matter of the most practical way to achieve goals that can be taken for granted within 
those cultures, and will devote much effort to making this link and in effect showing 
how non-threatening the issue is. Members of excluded cultures (eg ethnic minorities 
or alternative elites) or dissidents from within the dominant groups (eg feminists, gays 
etc.) are more likely to be attracted either to educative strategies if capturing the 
relevant institutions seems plausible, or to disruptive strategies if it does not, in both 
cases privileging the communicative over the instrumental insofar as they are arguing 
for replacing one way of framing the world with another on the grounds of its 
intellectual, emotional or aesthetic superiority99. 
3. Thirdly, movement participants try to create and reproduce particular kinds of 
movements in ways which are tied both to their own class experience (in the sense 
defended in chapter three), as marginalised and fragmented, as members of coherent 
and highly structured social groups, or as elite members, and to their reference points in 
terms of action and interaction: public spaces owned by other people, participation in 
large-scale organisations, or a belief in the key importance of “insider” decision-making 
processes for determining outcomes. 
Thus key tensions within movements in terms of strategy have to do with participants’ 
situation in relation to social structure and everyday routines, and with the way in which 
they understand the structure and routines the movement is directed towards or against. 
But this is not the full story, or there would be little to say. Obviously the internal structure 
                                                
99 This obviously depends on a distinction between “communicative” and “instrumental”, as general categories 
of rationality, and “local rationalities” as actual ways of thinking and acting; see chapter three. 
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and culture of a movement is not a given, but is itself a site of struggle and conflict, in 
which (counter-) hegemony is an achievement. Less obviously, the situation of participants 
is also contested, in that participation in social movements can entail radicalisation and 
personal transformation (Dix 1998) as well as the better-known effects in terms of the 
formation of alternative elites, downward social mobility and on occasion the 
transformation of the situation of a whole social group. So the questions I am interested in, 
of the shape and direction of movement projects, are not neatly given by their starting 
point, any more than there are infinite possible outcomes. This is of course what makes 
thinking about them both difficult and necessary. 
Immanent critiques of strategic choices 
Social movements, then, have genuine choices to make about their directions, although 
they do not make them “under circumstances of their own choosing”; their capacity for the 
kind of self-awareness which can think about direction and choices arises because 
movements are in a situation where participants need to do so, in other words where they 
are already making these choices consciously and actively and have some capacity for 
organisational reflexivity (the ability both to act on oneself and to think about oneself). 
How can a historical sociology contribute to this process? 
How do we think about our choices? 
A starting point is to ask how we can justify making one kind of choice as against another. 
I want to suggest that it’s possible to develop an immanent critique, by which I mean a line 
of argument which does not reach outside the movement for intellectual resources. In 
other words, we can accept that knowledge is socially grounded and that there are 
frequently contradictions between our understanding and our action, and use this situation 
to clarify the way the movement thinks about itself within its own terms. So we are not 
importing an answer from outside, but trying to clarify what is already there. This depends 
on chapter four’s assumption, central to any emancipatory strategy, that there is something 
for people to emancipate themselves from: in other words, that there is a gap between the 
explicit organisational forms and ideologies that participants verbally subscribe to and the 
creative ways of doing things and thinking that they engage in tacitly. This is then the gap 
between what is and what could be, which is precisely where movements find something to 
do. 
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Practically, this means identifying two terms (experience and response) and asking how 
adequate one is to the other. Thus, framing the question in cognitive terms, we can ask 
whether and how far the movement’s strategy is adequate to its purpose: “is method X the 
best way to achieve goal Y?” or “is purpose Y compatible with the interests of the 
institution Z we are trying to use to achieve it?” Now this is a fairly straightforward 
approach, and many movement-internal debates are cast in precisely these lines. The 
immanent critique of a movement’s strategy has more depth than this, though, and for two 
reasons. 
Fitting project to rationality 
Firstly, as I’ve said, knowledge interests are tied to social action. So this narrowly cognitive 
approach runs into difficulties when other people refuse to follow through what seem to us 
like perfectly logical arguments. At that point, if we’ve done things by the book, we might 
reasonably suspect that we’re in the presence of ideology - ours and theirs - and abandon 
the fiction that what we are dealing with is pure and innocent knowledge of the world as it 
is100.  
Thus we can reframe the question as one of the adequacy of a particular version of a 
movement project - the way it constructs itself, the way it engages with the world, the 
directions in which it hopes to transform the world - to the local rationalities at the base of 
the movement, in other words to the socially-grounded ways in which movement 
participants make sense of their own lifeworld. This process is a “critique of ideology” of a 
specific kind, in which as activists and as theorists we encourage others and ourselves to 
abandon received orientations (practical as well as intellectual) which tie us into accepting 
the hegemony of traditional organising and intellectual structures and to develop practices 
and ideas which come closer to expressing and developing our own motivating 
orientations, in other words to develop organic structures of organisation and thinking. 
Clearly only some movements are capable of acting in these ways, but equally clearly 
movements which set themselves sufficiently ambitious goals and come sufficiently close 
to realising them need to be able to do so, and frequently enough are. 
                                                
100 If we were, this kind of discrepancy between purpose and strategy would be both considerably rarer and 
considerably easier to overcome. 
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Measuring up to the whole movement 
Secondly, there is typically not a total community either of explicit views and organisational 
structures or of underlying local rationalities: activists think and do different things, and if 
we get them individually to clarify their own needs, ideas and motivations we will not arrive 
at the same result in every case. So this project depends on rejecting a methodological 
individualism and stressing both the ways in which the existing social totality structures 
received ideas and ways of doing things and the ways in which social movements are 
transformative processes. 
This is very well known in community development and feminist activism, and receives 
back-handed recognition in e.g. alternative and environmental movements through the 
discussion of the virtues of “community”; but in some senses I think it has to be central to 
any concept of movement as movement: to participate in a movement which is challenging 
social structures and everyday routines (Lichterman 1996) is both to transform those (if 
successful) and to enter into new kinds of relationships, with other participants, with those 
whose cooperation and support we are seeking, and with opponents. So to the extent that 
there is a movement, there is a “movement totality” which is not simply the sum of the 
individuals involved; but to the extent that there is also a “movement process” of 
recruitment, mobilisation, change, advance and retreat, there will always be a gap between 
the existing understanding and orientations of participants and this process or totality. 
Movements from below also face the specific problem that, as movements from below, 
they are always by necessity struggling against an organisational and ideological hegemony 
which is not theirs. 
Changing heart and hand 
This understanding is of course at the basis of Touraine’s (1981) methodology, as it is of 
Gramsci’s (1975); and in both cases the link between changing understanding and changing 
action is explicit. It isn’t, and can’t be, purely a matter of changing how we think or purely a 
matter of changing how we act. The two are intimately connected; and any movement 
capable of organisational reflexivity has already got this far. 
As a realism, this perspective recognises the existence of totalities and processes operating 
to some extent behind the back of the actors; as a critical realism, it recognises that these 
totalities and processes are the results of situated social action and nothing else. Given this, 
it is not an unreasonable goal to work towards a greater self-awareness on the part of 
movements as a whole. To do this, as Touraine in particular stresses, we need to engage 
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with actors in contexts which approximate the movement rather than those which 
reproduce traditional intellectual structures101. 
Rather than meeting them (say) as market researchers speaking to isolated consumers, or as 
traditional intellectuals translating the orientations of groups into the language of existing 
power relations, this strategy of immanent critique needs precisely to be immanent: to take 
place within movement structures and as part of movement processes. In other words, it 
can only work in and as part of autonomous movement relationships which enable the 
movement to experience and transform itself as a movement: whether this means party-like 
organisations, collective decision-making situations, the alternative media, festivals and get-
togethers, or whatever102. As in chapters five and six, this can also mean the attempt to 
engage with the way participants remake their world at the basic level of local rationalities 
and movement milieux. 
Given this, however, such a strategy is possible, and then becomes not so much an isolated 
and external exercise in polemic as an organic and shared process of interaction and 
development - which is not to say, of course, that it is conflict-free, steered by 
communicative rationality alone, or devoid of power relations; simply that the power and 
conflict are necessary rather than extraneous. 
How are we doing? 
There are a few yardsticks that can effectively be used to evaluate how close any actual 
process comes to this ideal and to see how far the communicative, as opposed to 
instrumental, rationality reaches within it (a similar thought underlies Touraine’s (1985) 
arguments about “virtual” social movements). These follow from the concept of 
movement self-awareness developed above: 
1. Comprehensiveness rather than one-sidedness. If a movement is in some sense a totality, then 
the process of developing its self-awareness will be more adequate to this totality the 
more it is comprehensive; conversely, the fewer aspects of the movement and forces 
within it that are taken into account the less adequate it is likely to be. This is then a 
processual version of chapter one’s criterion for an adequate theory that it engage with 
the whole range of activities involved. 
                                                
101 A similar thought is entailed by Melucci’s (1989) methodology, despite his rejection of the unitary 
conception of movement. 
102 Or, as with Touraine and Melucci, research processes which simulate these relationships. 
Choices for the counter culture 
 252 
2. Scope rather than limits. By the same token, a static movement analysis, which fails to see 
the movement as a process and takes existing limits for granted, is unable to develop a 
picture of the movement of sufficient scope to be adequate to future possibilities. This 
is so almost by definition, at least for movements from below: insofar as they are 
attempting to change some aspect of the way things are and are still in existence as 
movements, this implies that they have not yet achieved that goal, and thus that they 
aim to reach a scope which they have not yet reached. A failure to try and think 
“forwards” limits movements to where they are, which is precisely not where they want 
to be. Movement self-awareness thus needs to try to take on board questions like the 
known shape of successful movements in the past, the knowledge that is available of 
social groups that the movement hopes to include but has not yet been able to, and the 
scope of sister movements in other contexts. This parallels chapter one’s requirement 
for concepts which enable movement participants to engage effectively with the 
problems entailed by their own purposes and activities. 
3. Compatibilities rather than exclusions. Movements proceed from campaigns to projects, or 
from fragmentation to synthesis, by overcoming the starting-points of particularism, 
sectoralism, status politics and so on. In other words, participants come to find that 
they have compatible interests with one another not as the result of an abstract analysis 
on the basis of given interests, but through a struggle in which to a greater or lesser 
extent their given interests (given by the existing state of affairs) and the mutual 
exclusions these produce become relocated in terms of a possible state of affairs, in 
which (on terms other than those produced by the status quo) they can find an 
emancipatory compatibility rather than a particularist exclusion. This parallels chapter 
one’s criterion of a convincing engagement with the experience and understandings of 
participants. 
I think it is these kinds of question that need to be asked of specific direction-giving 
processes: how far are the processes in question geared towards producing one-sided, 
limited and exclusivist directions and how far do they move in the direction of 
comprehensiveness, breadth of scope and the search for compatibilities?  
Provisional answers 
In this section, I want to offer one set of possible outcomes of this direction-finding 
process. In particular, I hope to show the possibility of using the criteria outlined above 
(and thus processual rather than static categories) to develop answers to this kind of 
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question; as well as this, I hope to identify what might be involved in such an outcome; to 
specify, that is, the actual workability as well as the immanent desirability of such a result.  
My aim, however, is not so much to argue for this particular analysis as to show the 
possibility and pointfulness of theorising in these terms: in other words, to attempt to 
demonstrate the usefulness of situated, “open” theorising and the ability of the perspective 
developed in this thesis to enable such theorising. 
What follows is then a possible answer which, from the research presented in chapters five 
and six and my own participation in the decision-making processes mentioned above, 
seems to come closest to adequacy (under the criteria outlined in the previous section) to 
the movement totality, the local rationalities and the explicit purposes of the counter 
cultural project in Ireland at least. Table 3 shows the shape of this: 
Table 3: A possible strategy for the counter culture 
Field of tension Strategic direction 
Interaction with state structures Counter-hegemonic 
Relation to cultural orientations Conflictual 
Self-construction in terms of class and power Popular 
1. Not only are contemporary movements from below in Ireland considerably broader 
than those organisations within them which are devoted to interacting with the state, 
but those organisations are notably unsuccessful at acquiring an organisational 
hegemony over the movements which would structure the movements as a whole in 
terms of a particular relationship to the state. (As we have seen, this is a problem for 
the contemporary counter culture more generally.) The local rationalities of ordinary 
participants are considerably broader in scope than their public mobilisations, and they 
typically relativise their involvement with “politics” (see the discussion in chapter four). 
Lastly, the contradiction between the explicit purposes of social movements and the 
power relations upheld by the existing state is and remains wide in most cases, giving 
rise among other things to the conflict of legitimacy and efficiency identified in chapter 
five. In other words, the state-fixated orientation described earlier exists faute de mieux 
and not as an organic expression of the structure of Irish movements. Given this, 
comprehensive long-term perspectives have to place the development of counter-
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hegemony, the restructuring of social relationships along alternative lines and towards 
different purposes, as an important aim103.  
2. One of the major problems facing movement culture in Ireland is the extent to which 
existing social institutions (small proprietorship, religion, sports, literature, the pub as 
well as the major political and representative organisations) are the products of the late 
19th century and early 20th century revolution. This has been a key sticking point in 
Irish movement politics since the 1920s: the domination of the central term of cultural 
community by an increasingly conservative movement from above. Given this, 
attempts at joining this consensus, transforming it from above or disrupting it from 
outside have little purchase, and the key question becomes one of how conflicts within 
that community - of class and gender, since it is defined precisely in ethnic terms - can 
be brought to life. Women’s movements have made some steps in this direction, but 
for reasons which Coulter (1993) outlines, they have tended themselves to be split by 
this division between anti-Catholic and liberal women’s movements and community 
women’s groups. Without the scope offered by a conflictual orientation, movements will 
remain trapped within narrow limits. As we have seen in chapter five, the first step 
counter cultural participants take is precisely to step outside these limits. 
3. The central weakness of movements which accept existing social divisions and 
relationships is that they reduce movement politics to a politics of identity where what 
is at stake is issues of status within existing social relationships rather than any attempt 
to challenge such relationships. Movements that construct themselves in this way can 
tackle issues of distribution and of who holds power, but not the organisation of 
exploitation and domination, as the history of the nationalist revolution itself makes 
clear (Lee 1989): would-be emancipatory movements that simply reproduce existing 
social relationships, whether populist, elitist or mass-organisational, will not achieve 
emancipation. Restructuring social relationships within the movement then becomes an 
important part of the work of the movement, for which “popular” (as opposed to 
populist) seems as good a name as any. As chapter six suggests, the counter culture has 
some way to go in this respect. Without this focus on compatibilities, however, 
movements will remain trapped in the zero-sum game of playing off given interests 
against one another. 
                                                
103 This has been a major theme of community development rhetoric, but in practice the movement has 
accepted clientelistic relationships - and hence a self-limiting strategy - rather too easily. 
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This is of course only one possible set of solutions to the strategic tensions I identified 
earlier, and it is entirely possible that the movement processes of self-reflection will revise 
this dramatically or make much of it appear as wishful thinking, although the “stalling” of 
movements from below in the current era of partnership all round and trasformismo suggests 
that these are at least the right kinds of questions. For the moment, this placeholder 
response makes it possible to develop the question of how movements produce a direction 
for themselves, and to show the usefulness of the perspective I am arguing for in thinking 
about that. The “maximalist” scenario implied by these three orientations - counter-
hegemonic, conflictual and popular - is sufficiently different from the existing orientations 
of movements from below to highlight the scope of the consequences, and hence to think 
about the general value and importance, of pursuing this kind of line of critique. My aim is 
thus analogous to that of the Latin American participatory action research discussed by 
Borda: 
“to examine and test, in a comparative and critical manner, the idea that it was possible to 
produce a serious analytical work, based on practical knowledge of the reality of both the 
ordinary population and of the activists, that would enrich not only the general fund of 
science but also the people’s own knowledge and wisdom. Our idea was to take grassroots 
knowledge as a starting point and then to systematize and amplify it through action in 
collaboration with external agents [of] change – such as ourselves – in order to build and 
strengthen the power of formal and informal rural workers’organizations.” (1993: 197 – 
198) 
The social construction of movement 
strategies 
It is one thing for a direction-finding process to come up with a possible solution that is 
more or less adequate to the nature of a movement, and another thing for it to actually 
happen and to work. In this section of the paper I explore the questions of what the kind 
of strategy I have just outlined might entail internally, mention some points of reference, 
and think about its chances of winning internally: these being the kinds of questions that 
would need to be asked of any strategy. They are also, in part at least, a response to the 
problems identified in chapter six, and a suggestion as to what might be involved in 
“moving on” from the current situation. 
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Historicising the problem 
In looking at the first question - the internal implications of picking a particular strategy, I 
think three kinds of practices need to be highlighted: organisational frameworks, 
communicative structures, and techniques of the self, roughly how movements structure 
themselves, how they talk to themselves and how activists think about themselves. This can 
be made a bit more concrete by illustrating it briefly with three different examples from 
recent history, as follows (Table 4): 






of the self 




Large numbers of 
similar publication, 
linked by news service 
Lack of boundaries, 
permanent pressure, 
hedonist / puritan 
conflicts 
1980s NSMs in  
West Germany 








Good life; “sustaining 
the tensions”; moral 
purity 
Contemporary 
counter culture in 
ROI 
Significant but vague 




press in tatters 
Submerged in 
alternative urban or 
rural lifestyles 
To elucidate these: 
1. The key organisational situation in the American 1968 was that of a number of large-
scale national organisations, notably SDS (Gitlin 1987) but also e.g. the black and anti-
war groups. There was a massive alternative press, which consisted primarily of large 
numbers of alternative publications following a limited number of models - a sort of 
media Fordism - deriving as much as anything from this organisational situation and 
dependence on centralised sources of information (Mungo 1990). With the exception 
of long-term activists who had learnt their trade five or fifteen years previously, 
techniques of the self seem largely to have been determined by circumstances - the lack 
of boundaries entailed by participation in a massive and radical movement wave; the 
high-pressure operating circumstances (Gitlin 1980); and internal conflicts between 
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puritan and hedonist ways of life. Clearly such a situation could not be sustainable 
indefinitely, but neither would it need to be. 
2. In the “alternative scenes” of West Germany in the 1980s, by contrast, centralised 
national organisations played a more modest role by comparison with the importance 
of local (in particular metropolitan) networks of movements and organisations: 
Frankfurt, Hamburg, Berlin and so on (Vester 1993). The bulk of the alternative press 
attempted at least to locate itself at a national level (albeit normally proceeding from a 
single urban base), and entailed a “flexible specialisation” rather than Fordism, with 
different publications being strongly distinguished in terms of content, format, 
audience etc. (ID-Archiv 1991). The same long-term internal differentiation was also 
reflected in the techniques of the self that activists disposed of: different variants of the 
“good life” (notably those of urban intellectuals and those of rural romantics) for the 
more stable parts of the movement, strategies of  “sustaining the tensions” (or 
Kontradiktionen aushalten, “withstanding the contradictions”) for those more on the edge 
of project, political or personal survival, and a concern with moral purity as a means of 
group defence for the most marginalised groupings (see Horx 1985, 1989 for literary 
portrayals). 
3. In the contemporary counter culture in Ireland, including the network studied in this 
thesis, there is quite a large amount of rather vague support, sympathy and 
identification, with relatively few active projects in existence at any one time, and those 
often deeply particularist due to their primary relationships with state or supporters 
rather than with other projects. Consistent with this, there is a respectable alternative 
press in the shape of the in-house organs of movement organisations, but the 
independent alternative press has had to struggle to survive, particularly in recent years 
as the few committed volunteers have found it easier to find employment; migration 
(see chapter five) is an ongoing problem. Techniques of the self tend to be submerged 
within wider alternative ways of life - urban or rural – which, as we have seen in 
chapter six, are good for sustaining commitment and solidarity but weak on the 
production of action. 
What does a strategy need to work? 
It need hardly be said that the examples given above are very sketchy, but they should 
suffice as examples, to show what the different areas I’m trying to thematise mean, since in 
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the direction-finding mode the kinds of answers that can be given will necessarily be more 
abstract (Table 5): 














Integrated system of 
communications 
Means of emotional 
sustainability  
Conflictual Shared cultural 
orientations 
Ability to talk  in 
“internal” language 
Ability to maintain 
autonomous sense of 
reality  
Popular Attempts to challenge 
dominant class / 
gender / ethnic 
relationships 
Thematising and 
questioning nature of 
existing speech 
situations 
Skills for handling 
permanently unsettling 
modes of interaction 
Organisational frameworks 
The most obvious feature of the organisation of a counter-hegemonic movement has to 
be the existence not simply of autonomous projects and organisations, but of an 
autonomous network of relationships between those projects, in other words one which is 
not mediated through joint participation in a commodified market, in state-structured 
activity, or in a shared space within the commercial media. These relationships do not need 
to be all-encompassing, and given that the welfare state and commodified popular culture 
have long since penetrated the spaces within which earlier movements were able to 
articulate themselves more fully (consider 19th century working-class self-provision of 
welfare (Pierson 1991) or mid-20th century underground culture (Fountain 1988)), it would 
be remarkable if they could be so for any other than a very small number of “conscientious 
non-participators”, who are likely to find the effort needed for survival in the long term 
outweighing the demanding process of network-building. Nevertheless, some level of 
autonomous cooperation for practical purposes is fundamental to developing movements 
as movements, and a key part of the generation of trust, solidarity and interaction between 
their different parts. One of the greatest weaknesses of contemporary movements from 
below lies precisely in this area: how can we find reasons to cooperate which make sense 
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across the movement (in other words, beyond the bounds of an individual movement 
milieu) and do not feed right back into state and market? 
For a movement to be capable of conflictual intervention in everyday routines, these 
networking relationships need to be constitutive of a shared rationality which is distinctly 
other than that of the dominant cultural orientations. Autonomous interaction is not 
enough, in other words; it needs to be placed on a footing which does not simply 
reproduce the orientations which are taken as instrumental in dominant contexts. They 
may be instrumental in their own terms, that is geared to the achievement of goals which 
make sense to participants but not within the terms of the dominant ideology, and of 
course this alternative “common sense” is necessary to sustaining the sociological “reality” 
of a movement (Buckner 1971). 
Thirdly, for a movement to be popular, these relationships need to avoid simply 
reproducing existing class, gender and ethnic patterns of interaction, familiar relationships 
of domination and exploitation. This is not to say that a movement can (or necessarily 
should) try to create a full-blown sphere of freedom within itself; rather that at least the 
germ of transformation needs to be present within its internal interactions.  
This of course still does not tell us what those interactions should be about, and of course 
this is one of the crucial questions facing both the Irish processes I’ve been talking about 
and global attempts at interaction: given the failure of attempts to impose a single structure 
on such movements and the strength of dominant institutions, this is probably the most 
serious stumbling-block facing movement activists at the end of the century. While at times 
the network I studied could achieve some of these conditions within the practices of the 
lifeworld, and something of this carries over into more formalised movement 
organisations, their sustainability as “official knowledge” and articulated structures is a 
continual problem for counter cultural institutions. 
Communicative structures 
How do communicative structures fit into this? Thompson (1997) suggests that in the 
rubble of Stalinist and Social Democratic attempts to impose a coercive hegemony on 
movements from below, the starting point should instead be attempts to reach a 
communicative hegemony. I would have said that he’s right in this in so far as it is 
obviously easier to make a fair stab at saying something that will be widely acceptable than 
it is to find a form within which people are happy to cooperate. But communication which 
simply consists of the distribution of “information” in the abstract is no communication at 
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all, and more importantly leaves a movement at the level of a preference for consuming 
one kind of “information” over another. 
For a communicative counter-hegemony to exist, there must be a communicative structure 
which enables the “theoretical leadership” Gramsci spoke of: a neat separation between 
ideas and organisation is illusionary. Since we are talking about movements which do not 
exercise such a hegemony over society as a whole, this imposes severe problems, the more 
so since areas in which movements from below have been able to develop their own 
institutions in the past - internal media, educational institutions, cultural facilities and so on 
- have now been extensively colonised by capital and the state. They are still of course areas 
that movements (have to) invest in, but the movement media of the end of the 20th 
century is far weaker in numbers, frequency and distribution than (say) the socialist press at 
the end of the 19th century, and more generally the cultural structures of contemporary 
movements from below are more marginal and very often also more dependent on state 
support or commodification than those of their counterparts a century or even fifty years 
ago (Williams 1965, cf. Consorzio Aaster et al. 1996 on the changing face of Italian socio-
cultural centres). 
So once again there is a problem of “where and what?”, which goes beyond the scope of 
this chapter. Something can be said, however, about the nature of the communicative 
structures that would have to exist for a movement to take this kind of strategic direction. 
As with organisational frameworks, and for the same reasons, a counter-hegemonic 
movement needs an autonomous network of communicative institutions: an integrated 
alternative press rather than a particularist one, self-controlled cultural centres which relate 
primarily to one another rather than to the world of commercial culture, spaces for 
discussion which are designed as that rather than as recruiting points or academic exercises, 
and so on. 
This offers the chance to act conflictually, which is something other than simply taking up 
a position within the existing cultural field of the dominant society. By analogy with 
ethnicity, it entails being able to talk internally, the existence of a more or less coherent 
structure of feeling and way of making sense, and not simply being able to represent 
externally. The two communicative exercises - speaking your own language, and talking the 
language of the wider society in a distinctive way - are not identical activities. This is made 
possible to the extent that the movement’s cultural activities have something to say to the 
movement, and not simply to the outside world, in other words to the extent that there is an 
internal communicative structure and people are trying to communicate with one another 
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inside the movement. Without this, there is no scope for conflict with dominant cultural 
routines, because there are no alternative routines to offer, simply an alternative set of 
choices within an existing system. 
This is then the field where a movement has the chance to become popular by creating an 
alternative kind of communicative relation, by (to fall into utopianism for a minute) 
enabling forms of communication across class, gender and ethnic divisions which do not 
simply reaffirm those divisions but seek to understand them, thematise them and ultimately 
overcome them.  
Again, something of this can, as we have seen, be sustained with the development of 
movement rationalities. My own experience is that the ability to communicate in this way is 
more widely distributed across movement milieux, and as individual skills, than it is 
manifested in the “public” modes of communication of movement organisations. This 
points to a certain scope for development, but also to currently existing limits which 
cannot easily be overcome. 
Techniques of the self 
Although “techniques of the self” (see chapter six) can usually be taken for granted in 
many fields, one area where they cannot is clearly social movement activity, which of its 
nature is creative and when successful (when movements are “advancing”) involves 
learning not merely how to do things people have not done before (write a leaflet, speak in 
public, occupy a building, set up a government) but also how to become the kind of person 
for whom such things are easily produced in terms of motivation, interaction with others, 
and (perhaps most importantly) maintaining the effort over time - “burnout” and erratic 
behaviour have always been problems in sustained social movement activity. 
It is, I think, harder to say much about this area than about the others, partly because 
relatively little sustained thought has gone into it. But it is clear that setting oneself in 
opposition to dominant institutions has particular implications for social recognition and 
everyday interaction: how do activists sustain their sense of reality and purpose when 
institutions central to the societies they live in act as if they did not exist or consistently 
misrepresent them? Building counter-hegemony is a long and weary activity, in which our 
own resources of energy, emotion, friendship, obligation and so on are constantly being 
used up: how are activists to find ways of sustaining themselves emotionally in the long 
run? Similarly, how do activists negotiate the “moving boundary” of cultural conflict that 
seeks not simply to “agree to differ” on everyday social routines but to challenge the 
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routines that others identify with while retaining some sense of reality and validity for their 
own routines? Internally, to generate movements which are popular in my sense, activists 
must learn to live with one another in new and unsettling ways, which can neither entail a 
wholesale acceptance of existing status positions nor a denial of their existence. 
Counter cultural networks such as the one discussed in this thesis certainly show the ability 
to develop such techniques within lifeworld contexts, but difficulties appear in developing 
them beyond that point. The kind of project identified in this section, then, entails a 
qualitative shift, albeit one which develops existing orientations rather than starting from 
scratch.  
The internal politics of movement organisation 
As well as the social construction of movement strategy, any reality-oriented thinking also 
needs to be clear about the internal politics of this construction: what is entailed, who it 
might be attractive to and what its chances of internal success are.  The maximalising 
project sketched here is clearly quite a long way off in terms of what the movement can 
achieve in and of itself. During “wars of position”, however, the most committed 
movement activists are not in the business of storming the Winter Palace, but of creating 
the orientations which may eventually make it possible for the movement to do so rather 
than to present a petition for an audience with the Tsar. Which activists are likely to find 
this perspective attractive? 
In the context of the Irish discussions mentioned earlier, three features of situated 
experience seem to encourage participants to be more ambitious along these kinds of lines. 
One is their straightforward employment situation, in the sense of the extent to which 
activists are dependent on the movement for their means of existence or are employed in 
conventional situations. Against the self-images of many participants, but in line with 
libertarian critiques of bureaucratic socialism, my own experience is that those who are 
trying to make a living from activism are typically under such pressure to ensure the 
survival of their institutions in the short-run - securing state funding, reliance on marketing 
etc. - that it is hard for them to think in terms of restructuring the movement for any 
longer-term (see also Tovey 1996 on institutionalisation). Autonomy, in other words, is 
paradoxically least valued by those who think of themselves as most autonomous - but who 
in their movement activities are most dependent on the processes of commodification and 
political exchange. For similar reasons, tendencies to organisational patriotism, 
particularism and parochialism are particularly strong among this elite. 
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A second and related theme is movement situation, in that for similar reasons those who 
do not form a central part of the major formal structures of the movement are in a better 
position to rethink the nature of movement activities: creative initiatives are much more the 
property of organisational dissidents rather than apparatchiks, independent activists rather 
than organisation people, communicators rather than power wielders. 
A third and (to me at least) unexpected discovery has also been the gender and ethnic 
relations involved: that those who do not find their vision of the movement encapsulated 
by existing organisations are to a high proportion women and people from ethnic 
minorities. Thus there is a clear divide between meetings of movement notables, 
organisation spokespeople and so on with agendas tightly related to developing the 
interests of existing organisations (which tend to be dominated by men and by Catholics), 
and meetings of dissatisfied activists in communicative or exploratory spaces: at the Ireland 
from Below event, for example, the ratios of women to men and of Southern Catholics to 
others were fifty-fifty. There are other possible reasons for this, of course, but in retrospect 
(this was a welcome, but unexpected, result) it should not be very surprising to find that in 
non-revolutionary moments movement organisations tend to reproduce rather too much 
of the relations that characterise the dominant social institutions, and that the push to 
broaden this is likely to come in a sense from “outside” that provisionally stabilised core. 
How can the chances of success be identified? 
This brings me to the question of the chances of internal success, and to the banal 
observation that radicalising a movement in this way also entails making it over; under 
current conditions, with relatively low participation rates in formal movement 
organisations, this means less a struggle for the “commanding heights” of existing 
movement institutions than an effort to mobilise outside them and in new ways104. 
The success of such an approach depends on two things. One, the ability of such activists 
to mobilise effectively outside existing institutions, is only partly within their control, and 
depends not just on finding forms that are adequate to popular needs but also of course on 
the direction and shape of those needs themselves. The other factor, though, is within the 
control of such activists, at least to a limited extent, which is to remain in contact with one 
another, to develop their thinking together, and to support each other’s attempts at creative 
                                                
104 Having spent several years trying to move the Green Party to the left, this wasn’t a very comforting 
conclusion personally, but again once reached it isn’t particularly surprising. 
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responses. So solidary rather than destructive interaction, holding non-routine kinds of 
communicative spaces open, and creative rather than conservative techniques of the self 
are all useful in this approach: building on existing movement milieux, but also moving 
beyond them. 
Historical context 
So far this chapter has tried to identify some tensions within movement strategies in the 
counter culture, asked how we can argue for resolving them in one way rather than 
another, and looked at the kinds of things that are entailed by such a choice of direction. In 
this section I want to step back from this internalist view to ask about the general situation 
within which movements from below find themselves at the end of the century and how 
movements respond to these general situations, so moving from what is still the partial 
totality of a movement project in a particular place to the totality of a society. 
Both kinds of movements 
Movements from below, after all, are always faced with (usually more powerful) 
movements from above (see chapters two and three), so that their activity does not take 
place in isolation. And although I have been mostly talking about the Irish situation, social 
movements in modernity are pre-eminently international (Tarrow 1998 is one of the few 
works of social movement theory in which this is thematised in any useful way). Table 6 
tries to give an overview of this for the recent history of capitalism (the dates are obviously 
pretty nominal, since the processes in question are neither perfectly aligned to each other 
nor entirely synchronous internationally): 
Table 6: Periodisation of movement struggles 
Period c. 1875 - c. 
1923 
c. 1923 - c. 
1968 
c. 1968 - 
present 
Capitalist drive Liberal / open Organised / closed Disorganised / opening  
Movement 
orientation 







Upwards from 1880s to 
mid-1910s 
Downwards to 1940s, 
upwards to 1960s 
Downwards from mid-
1970s, upwards from 
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mid-1990s? 
This analysis, which connects to the discussion of the counter culture in chapter three, 
involves three elements: 
1. The cycles of capitalist action, understood as movement from above, the organising 
and reorganising of social life through the mechanisms of capital and the state. The 
three-part model I outline here, deriving from Claus Offe (1984), Lash and Urry (1987) 
and Wagner (1994), is useful descriptively and in terms of the local orientations of 
capital. As Arrighi (1994) has shown, though, it must be situated within a longer time-
frame, as representing one of several “long centuries” of capitalist accumulation and 
reorganisation from the 15th century, each of them containing a movement “inwards” 
(and hence towards closure in Wagner’s sense) in which capital is productively 
“commodified” in the long-term in particular systems of production and distribution, 
which then come to entail a particular stabilisation of inter-state relations and local 
cultural forms, and a movement “outwards” (towards opening in Wagner’s terms), in 
which the “creative destruction” of these systems of commodity exchange for the 
purposes of expanding the financial circuits of capital entails precisely the kind of 
“disorganisation” of states and cultures discussed by Lash and Urry. So movements 
from below have to be situated within the context of these massive movements from 
above. 
2. The “movement orientations” I suggest here are largely based on chapter three’s 
premise that the original “New Left” analyses of the late 1950s and early 1960s had 
something to them (cf. Wainwright 1994), in identifying a break from the practices of 
Social Democracy and orthodox Communism, as they had developed in particular since 
the First World War and the Russian Revolution. The dates given are structured in 
particular by Katsiaficas’ (1987) suggestion of a series of “world-revolutionary” 
moments, in other words that within the capitalist world system there are a series of 
high points of popular opposition to and attempts to overthrow the existing order, 
which are themselves as international in scope as the movements from above they are 
challenging. In this scheme of things, the new cycle of accumulation of the latter half of 
the 19th century comes after the defeat of the movements of 1848, which belong to the 
“long nineteenth century” in form and orientation. As is well known, workers’, 
nationalist and feminist movements change shape dramatically in the second half of the 
nineteenth century (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 1989), and the high point of these 
movements is expressed, under deeply unpropitious circumstances, from the middle of 
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the First World War onwards, in mutinies and desertions, revolutionary socialist 
movements, and nationalist insurrections (Mitchell 1970). Following the defeat of most 
of these movements and crucially the split between the Second and Third 
Internationals, there is a widespread reaction expressed in fascist movements, and it is 
the resistance against this which marks the first turnaround of the fortunes of the Left 
in many European countries at least, and which lays the foundations for independence 
movements in Asia. (Hobsbawm 1995, Thompson 1982). “1968” is the most recent of 
Katsiaficas’ “world-revolutionary moments”, and much of the history of the 
subsequent two decades has been taken up with the (still undigested) consequences of 
that event (Fink et al. 1998). Optimistically, I have suggested that in the latter half of 
the 1990s there are signs of a new upturn, in the appearance of new generations of 
activists for whom 1968 is ancient history, and a growing creativity in the form and 
structure of movement activity (Jordan and Lent 1999). 
3. This second point (movement orientation) points towards a third, which is the internal 
dialectic of movements. Gramsci’s aphorism can be used to suggest an alternation 
between “wars of movement” (direct, head-on challenges to the established order) 
which correspond at their height to Katsiaficas’ world-revolutionary moments, and 
“wars of position”, lower-level conflicts carried out for control of different fields of 
civil society. This needs to be qualified in two ways. One is to observe, with Hall 
(1988), that the “battle” does not always go in this direction, and as we know 
“movements from above” not only wage a steady war of position under ordinary 
circumstances, but are capable of unleashing aggressive “wars of movement”, usually as 
part of a situation in which a major challenge from below has destabilised power 
relations to the point where a new system needs to be imposed from above. European 
fascism, and the New Right of the 1980s, both have important elements of this 
imposition of a new elite consensus following the breakdown of the old in the face of 
the movements of the 1916 - 1923 period and those of the 1965 - 1975 period. 
Secondly, this dialectic structures movements from below, in a spectrum varying from 
“flecks and carriers” (Waite 1997) to “moments of collective effervescence” (Barker 
1997). In other words, “movement” by no means has the same referent at each of these 
points: at one time it may mean a handful of isolated activists surrounded by a hostile 
culture in which even the most limited acts of resistance are difficult; at another, 
enormous popular movements that can perhaps be channelled by activists, but hardly 
controlled. 
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The changing face of movements 
Within this long twentieth century, then, the face of movements has changed considerably, 
so that it is possible to speak of the “three lefts” of the twentieth century. This is obviously 
a massive subject, and this chapter cannot do more than raise a couple of issues whose 
main point is to ask, from the perspective of the Irish counter culture, “where are we 
now?” Table 7 illustrates the general proposition: 
Table 7: The three lefts of the twentieth century 
Period c. 1875 - c. 
1923 
c. 1923 - c. 
1968 
c. 1968 - 
present 
Shape of left Radical left Authoritarian left Fragmented left 
1. Movements from below up to the 1920s existed within a space where challenge on a 
very broad front - to capitalism, to the form of (usually deeply undemocratic) states, to 
patriarchy, to ethnically-based oppression, to religion and so on - was widely possible 
and frequently combined aspects of multiple such critiques, along with the persistence 
of particularistic and reformist orientations (Mills 1963, Rowbotham 1972). This 
challenge to structure was often combined, and not only among intellectuals, with a 
challenge to everyday social routines and a commitment to more emancipatory forms 
of culture, however conceived (Williams 1989a), which acted in direct competition with 
the encroaching generation of popular culture “from above” through nationalism, the 
development of state intervention, the re-formation of religious and status structures in 
the new industrial and urban contexts and the development of commercial mass media. 
Themes of self-education, sexual emancipation, cosmopolitanism and so on were 
widely possible within this movement, even in the most apparently unpropitious 
circumstances such as Irish nationalism (Kiberd 1996, Coulter 1993). 
2. During the “mid-century closure” (see Wagner 1994), heralded by the defeat of many 
of these movements and aggressive “movements from above”, not only in explicitly 
fascist Europe but in weaker variants such as post-colonial nationalism in Ireland, 
movements from below found themselves increasingly contained (where they were able 
to exist at all). Crucially, there was an increasing collusion on the one hand with the 
state, whether (as in Social Democracy and dominant nationalisms) the existing state or 
(as in orthodox Communism) the Soviet state: libertarian left forces, of whatever shade, 
were increasingly marginalised (Thompson 1982, Thompson 1997). Along with this, 
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there was an increasing taking-for-granted of the new “popular culture from above”, 
marked by a widespread sympathy for dominant nationalisms and an increasing 
relegation of gender issues, resulting in the development of a left populism which 
depended on an increasingly narrow construction of popular interests and culture. 
3. “1968”, and the movements which preceded (civil rights, peace etc.) and succeeded 
(feminism, ecology etc.) it, transformed this situation, but in unforeseen ways. On the 
one hand, the increasingly narrow definition of “left” by comparison with the 1920s 
made the exercise of hegemony on anyone’s part rather unlikely, and has I think to be 
seen as a major contributor to the rise of particularist identity politics (Rowbotham et 
al. 1979). On the other hand, the fact that actually existing states (capitalist, communist, 
post-colonial) rather than imagined future states became the primary point of reference 
had perhaps made thinking in terms of a total social order (in other words, mentally 
taking other movements from below on board and trying to project such a larger 
alternative totality into a possible future) difficult if not impossible, and hastened the 
fragmentation of movement thinking of this kind other than the formulaic or utopian 
(Liguori 1996). The radical push of 1968, then, has found it hard to develop a 
movement project adequate to its scope, with the consequence of a centrifugal 
fragmentation of movements from below at the end of the century. 
The prospects at the end of the century 
Something positive can perhaps be said about the prospects for the counter cultural project 
under these circumstances. Firstly, it is widely accepted that “disorganisation” produces 
rather weak states (Lash and Urry 1987), by comparison with those of organised capitalism. 
As I have argued in chapter three, disorganised capitalism appears to be compatible with a 
wide range of local power arrangements and forms of social control. As Magnusson (1996) 
has argued, there may be advantages to movements from below from this sort of situation 
where their immediate target is not an all-powerful national state, but something perhaps in 
the long term more comparable to a city government in that it is neither self-sufficient in 
power terms nor possessed of effectively closed boundaries: disorganisation, in other 
words, may offer more local scope for transformation than organisation did, and enable a 
wider scope for movements’ development of autonomous and reflexive modes of self-
structuring. 
Secondly, one of the most successful legacies of “1968” on most accounts (von Dirke 
1997, Baier et al. 1988) has been the increasingly contested nature of everyday culture. 
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Movements which are aiming to tackle not only structures, but also routines, clearly benefit 
from this situation, insofar as movement action is not marginalised as “deviance”, but need 
to avoid such challenges being transformed wholly into the currency of identity politics and 
the “field of cultural conflict”, which (in Touraine’s (1985) terms) removes the reference to 
a socially identified opponent and the challenge for control of the social totality. The 
counter culture has this potential, but (for reasons identified in chapter six) has difficulty 
fulfilling it. 
Thirdly, the “movement legacy” of earlier movements should not be underestimated. Offe 
(1985) has drawn attention to the role of “decommodified areas”, generated by the welfare 
state and offering particular advantages to initial movement mobilisation and survival. By 
comparison with the authoritarian empires of the late 19th century or the fascist regimes of 
mid-century, such scope for popular movements as exists is greatly increased (Arrighi, 
Hopkins and Wallerstein 1989). In both cases, the situation is of course worse now than in 
the recent past, and perhaps in part at least this is the result of deliberate action. In this 
longer context, the near-total disappearance or trasformismo of genuinely Left forces from 
parliaments and governments, is not that unusual105; and the grounding of movement 
projects in everyday life is a strength, not a weakness, even if it is not in itself sufficient to 
bring about change. 
The “old Left” / “new Left” arguments, then, were not misplaced, though the “new Left”, 
the shape of movements from below in our current period, proved to be very different 
from what was thought at the time. In a longer view, what has happened is that the 
libertarian left which was marginalised in the mid-century closure has returned, but in a 
fragmented context where “left” hegemony over movements from below is limited at best. 
To quote Offe: 
“[T]he issue areas from which working class organizations (unions, socialist, social 
democratic and communist parties) have largely withdrawn, and which they often had to 
abandon in the interest of their struggles for institutional recognition and the material 
improvement of the social and economic conditions of their core constituency, tend now 
to be occupied by middle class radicals who, again partly due to the accomplishments of 
the fully developed welfare state, are sufficiently numerous and economically secure to be 
able to afford to reemphasize some issues on the ‘forgotten agenda’ of the working class 
                                                
105 It mirrors, for example, the role of liberal and republican forces in France and Italy at the end of the last 
century, or of Social Democratic politicians in Britain, Germany and France in the inter-war period. 
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movement and to revitalize some of the noninstitutional forms of politics that were 
characteristic of earlier periods of the working class movement itself.” 106 (1985: 836) 
Hence the usefulness of the concept of counter culture to grasp the shared shape and 
direction of movements from below at the turn of the century: something which is visible 
more at the level of the everyday rationalities of participants and in the form of their 
projects than at the level of nation-state institutions. If there is such a shared shape and 
direction, though, the project of self-clarification and movement development I am arguing 
for here is not impossible, though it is certainly a long-term one. Along with the internalist 
questions discussed in the first three sections of this chapter, these externalist questions - 
which situate movements from below within a broader totality structured by their 
interaction with movements from above - are, I think, important elements in the attempt to 
think through such a project in any form. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to show the possibility of open theorising, as well as make a 
political contribution, by arguing for a particular movement strategy and showing what is 
involved, drawing from my own research and activity within the Irish counter culture, and 
situating this within the shape and direction of movements from below in disorganised 
capitalism. I want to conclude with a brief defence of the direction of this counter culture. 
I have suggested that contemporary movements from below tend to combine a critique of 
structural inequality and everyday routines. The suggestion that this is a good thing, 
however, is under attack from two directions simultaneously. 
On the one hand, “postmodern” critics are frequently happy with the critique of everyday 
routine (albeit usually in the “contemplative” terms of an ironic reflexivity), but reject any 
attempts to link this critique to “grand narratives” which might suggest that such routines 
come from somewhere and reproduce nameable social structures (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe 
1985, Hetherington 1997). On the other hand, there is a kind of Left neo-traditionalism 
which sees the challenge to everyday routine and the stress on the libertarian and the 
emancipatory as undermining the foundations of the instrumentalist building blocks on 
which that particular kind of Left project is apparently to be built (e.g. Schäfer 1983, 
Eagleton 1996). 
                                                
106 On the arguments made in chapter three, I do not share Offe’s distinction here between “working class” 
and “middle class”; these are better seen as different fractions of the working class. 
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I think this polarisation is simply mistaken. Without the challenge to social structures, the 
critique of everyday routines returns as status conflicts and identity politics. Without the 
challenge to everyday routines, the critique of social structure becomes a matter of interest 
group struggles and machine politics. In other words, the choice is between Weber and 
Marx, not as an argument over objective realities, but as an argument over objective 
potential, and hence over political choices. To take either social structure or everyday 
routines for granted, and attempt to operate within the context produced by this, is to 
foreclose the possibility of a genuinely revolutionary challenge, in the sense of one which 
does not take the social totality and its constitutive relationships for granted and reduce the 
questions available for discussion to a matter of specific institutions or specific aspects of 
everyday life. We have to start from the latter, of course; but that does not mean we have 
to stop there. 
This, I think, is why in Marx as in Morris, in Gramsci as in “1968”, there is a stress and 
even a fascination with both - but also why it is precisely in and around the high points of 
radical movements that it is least difficult to think and act in this way. As Thompson put it 
at the end of The making of the English working class, the “romantic” and “revolutionary” 
tendencies have moved further and further apart since Blake’s day: 
“After William Blake, no mind was at home in both cultures, or had the genius to interpret 
the two traditions to each other. It was a muddled Mr. Owen who offered to disclose the 
‘new moral world’, while Wordsworth and Coleridge had withdrawn behind their own 
ramparts of disenchantment. Hence these years appear at times to display, not a 
revolutionary challenge, but a resistance movement, in which both the Romantics and the 
Radical craftsmen opposed the annunciation of Acquisitive Man. In the failure of the two 
traditions to come to a point of junction, something was lost. How much we cannot be 
sure, for we are among the losers.” (1963: 832) 
Bringing the two closer is always an effort, and always to an extent against the grain. It is 
also, though, a necessary and important part of any seriously transformative movement to 
start thinking and acting in this way before the moment in which it may be possible to put 
this fully into practice. The counter-hegemonic challenge to the structures of the social 
totality, the conflictual challenge to the taken-for-grantedness of everyday routines, and the 
attempt to build a popular movement which starts to do at least some of this internally are 
certainly a tall order, and not one which existing movement institutions are likely to find 
easy to undertake or sustain. But if the counter culture is to develop its full potential, it 
needs to find ways of creating a coherent and emancipatory alliance of these two elements: 
the critique of structure and the critique of routine. 
Choices for the counter culture 
 272 
Arguments of this kind must necessarily be contested. It is for this reason that I have 
chosen to present it as explicitly situated within a particular movement situation at a given 
point in time, and as understood from a particular kind of engagement. The point is to 
show that the kinds of concepts elaborated elsewhere in the thesis can be used in this sort 
of open-ended fashion, to develop a particular situated argument about the development of 
the counter culture that might contribute to (some) participants’ decisions, both political 
and personal. In other words, this chapter aims to relocate the themes of the thesis within a 
broader context; to quote Borda again: 
“we view PAR [participatory action research] as a methodology within a total experiential 
process [….] This total process simultaneously encompasses adult education, scientific 
research and political action in which critical theory, situation analyses and practices are 




Chapter eight: conclusion 
This chapter consists of a brief conclusion to the thesis. Firstly, I summarise the main 
arguments and propositions of the thesis. Secondly, I attempt to identify the intended 
contribution of this thesis to current thinking about its subject. Thirdly, I ask what areas of 
research are not covered in the thesis and might logically follow from this research. I close 
with a reflexive discussion of the “politics of knowledge” of this thesis. 
Summarising the argument 
The theoretical discussion which opened this thesis (chapters one to three) argued for a 
perspective on social movement derived from “movement theories” such as Western 
Marxism and socialist feminism, in which movements, from above or below, are the 
hegemonic or proto-hegemonic organisation of the skilled activities of a conflictual 
everyday life. Within this framework, I proposed “counter culture” as a historical concept 
to grasp the form and direction of struggle from below in disorganised capitalism. 
In the methodological discussion which followed (chapter four), I argued that a research 
strategy which is sensitive to ordinary participants’ skilled activity entails a particular politics 
of knowledge production. I tried to show the nature of this politics within the network I 
researched in terms of my own relationship to the network and the counter culture. 
Thirdly, within the empirical chapters (five to seven) I examined the local rationalities of 
the counter culture, identifying logics of reflexive autonomy and radicalised reflexivity and 
showing their workings in everyday life. In examining the implications and weaknesses of 
these local rationalities, I also indicated ways in which such rationalities could, and arguably 
should, develop, suggesting a role for reflexive research as immanent critique and in 
enabling open theorising. 
The intended contributions of this thesis 
The most obvious contribution I would claim for this thesis is that of counter culture as a 
historical concept, meeting the criterion of an approach enabling engagement with a wide 
range of contemporary phenomena. Historical concepts are of course limited in their 
application, though if we live within the period they apply to this need not concern us so 
much. Within this context, they enable us (if they are effective) to think afresh, that is to 
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reorganise our knowledge and understanding, reconsider the boundaries we draw between 
“fields” and “subjects”, and identify new kinds of relationship and causality. Beyond this, 
they may sensitise us to what we might look for elsewhere as their counterparts, or indeed 
to the peculiarities of our local assumptions. I have suggested that conventional social 
movements writing has taken particular moments of movement development too much for 
granted; conversely, when looking at the counter culture our eye for the familiar has 
disabled our ability to ask “What is the form taken by the organisation, from above and 
below, of skilled social action within this period?” 
A second contribution can, I think, best be described as epistemological. By this I do not 
so much mean bringing social movement research into the era of reflexivity, or recasting 
materialist theories of action as theories of social movements, as the attempt to show 
practically how knowledge and action, social theory and movement organisation, research 
and the micropolitics of knowledge production, local rationality and lived experience, 
emancipatory understanding and political project, are inseparable. This is not so much a 
formal proposition as it is a way of understanding or a cast of mind, expressed in the 
proposition that knowledge is a practical, active and conflictual relationship; not a “thing”, 
an “idea” or a “discourse”. In particular, I hope to have shown that every research strategy 
has an implicit politics – micro and macro – and an implicit standpoint; and that research 
needs to be sensitive to this dimension of cultural power. This orientation should go some 
ways towards meeting the criterion of thematising the possibility of cultural differences. 
 Thirdly, I hope to have made a political contribution (and thus fulfilled the third criterion) 
by offering emancipatory knowledge (cf. Collier 1994, Inglis 1998) - understanding 
which helps actors clarify the nature of their own action (by offering a more adequate 
account) and consider appropriate strategies for developing this logic - within an “open 
framework” geared to possibilities and open situations rather than description, fatalism or 
prescription. Here I am thinking not only of ordinary participants in the network I 
researched, and people in similar counter cultural contexts; I am thinking also of those 
“full-time activists” who in my experience often have difficulty seeing how other 
participants locate them as well as understanding the whole historical field they are moving 
in; and of those academics who feel solidarity with movements from below but do not 
know how to do other than act within “traditional” intellectual relationships107.  
                                                
107 While completing this thesis, I was delighted to come across Liguori’s definition of “the most alive part of 
Gramsci’s legacy” as “the objective reading of modern social conflicts married to the assumption of a 
determinate and critical point of view and a praxis which follows from that” (1996: 230; italics in original). 
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For all of us (and I find myself trapped within each of these situations at different times) to 
develop our own perspective, and to understand how others see us, are tasks that we 
ultimately have to do for ourselves; but other people’s efforts at communication (such as 
this thesis) may prod us to do this or open up new areas we had previously taken for 
granted. Emancipatory knowledge “from outside”, then, is useful insofar as it helps us 
imagine differently. Within this thesis an important mode of imagination has been 
metaphorical: the learning processes of a small network standing in for those of the 
counter culture; the conversations between ten friends standing in for the political conflicts 
across a movement; the “ordinary” specificity of these Dubliners for the alternative 
common sense of a movement project. As Thompson (1977a) put it, ultimately the only 
exact images for human affairs are human ones: if we cannot grasp imaginatively the 
historical processes of three decades of conflict on a planet of six billion people, perhaps a 
decade in the life of ten people can offer something of a “language” with which to start 
imagining that larger context. 
Further research 
This thesis points to a number of areas for research which, in the nature of things, it has 
not been able to pursue. One is that of a comparative study of movement milieux 
within the counter culture. In this thesis I have drawn essentially on my primary research 
within the Irish counter culture and existing literature on the German and British counter 
cultures. These are not strictly comparable, however, in that the kind of ethnographic 
research into local rationalities offered here is at best marginal elsewhere (its closest cousin 
is Lichterman 1996). Similarly, longitudinal studies are thin on the ground and rarely more 
than anecdotal; while to the best of my knowledge no systematic research on links between 
counter cultures in core and periphery exists. An extensive literature review could be 
written for all of these areas, but in terms of systematic research it would probably have 
relatively little to show for itself. By contrast, the scope for comparative ethnographic and 
oral history research (given the relatively recent periods involved) is by no means trivial. 
A second area touched on only in passing in the thesis, is the place of the counter 
culture in the polemic discourses of its opponents. In this thesis I have deliberately 
avoided it, but “hippies”, “68ers”, “the 60s”, “drugs” and so on play a role in much right-
wing political discourse similar to that played by “Communards”, “Bolsheviks”, “Free 
Love” or “Atheism” in earlier decades (cf. Hilwig 1998 on student movements and right-
wing media in 1968). An analysis of this imaginary - from serious New Right think tanks 
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who saw the task of the 1980s as “rolling back the 1960s” to the modern-day equivalents of 
witchcraft panics - might shed important light on the workings of hegemony and conflict in 
disorganised capitalism. 
Thirdly, the problem of creativity identified in chapters five and six - the contradictions 
of reflexive autonomy - have yet to be resolved, both on the micro-scale of this network 
and on the macro-scale of the counter culture as a whole. If research could offer some way 
forward it would clearly be of immense practical - personal and political - value. This could 
mean participatory action research of a Tourainean kind, recreating the counter culture in 
miniature to bring out and resolve such issues; or an examination of contexts where these 
problems seem to have been resolved. 
Finally, two smaller projects derived from this research are already in existence. One is 
the annual Ireland from below workshop, bringing together activists from different 
movements from below to develop practical skills and theoretical understanding (see Cox 
1999b; Heynen and O’Grady, in progress). The other is the WIT Centre for Research on 
Environment and Community’s MA programme, designed to encourage activists in social 
movements to carry out research developing issues of interest to the wider movements and 
feed it back in (see Geoghegan 1998, 1999 for the first products of this project). 
The relationship between researchers and participants is often seen as one where the 
researcher offers knowledge and the participant offers access; yet in social movements 
generally, and the counter culture no less than others, participants are also intellectuals, 
they have their own theoretical understanding of their actions, and as we have seen 
academic theories are often parasitic on this. Academic social movement theories has 
considerably more to gain from engagement with the “indigenous” theorising of social 
movement activists than is usually recognised. 
The micro-politics of reflexivity 
This brings me to my final point: the relationship between the “traditional” intellectual’s 
research process and the “organic” intellectual’s political process. 
The basic orientation of this thesis is towards solidarity in shared learning processes. The 
problems faced by other participants in developing reflexive autonomy are the same 
problems I face, and if my ability to interpret their statements is partly due to this common 
ground, I am learning as much or more from their attempts to deal with the problem. What 
this thesis hopes to offer is a mirror reflecting their own different understandings of the 
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situation (as well as the missing interview - with myself - that one participant requested). I 
do not think the power relations between us are such that participants are likely to swallow 
what I say in this thesis simply because I say it; nor am I calling for any intervention into 
their lives on its basis. 
What I do intend to do, when the thesis is completed, is gather as many participants as 
possible for a long and reasonably “natural” session to discuss it. Apart from making 
changes where necessary, I plan to include excerpts from that discussion as a “reply” in 
what I hope will be the published version of the thesis. That publication is then a second 
kind of feedback, and joins projects like those mentioned earlier in the attempt to bring 
these articulations of counter cultural rationalities back into the counter culture rather than 
simply converting them into academic capital. 
One of the great weaknesses of contemporary social movements from below is the 
thinness of their autonomous institutions and - especially in a peripheral country like 
Ireland - the extent to which they are dependent on “traditional” intellectuals, and 
“organic” intellectuals in “traditional” situations, for particular kinds of resources. That 
being so, a central question for such intellectuals is where their priorities and solidarity 
really lie - with career and caste, or with the alternative priorities and movement 
rationalities of the counter culture? 
In its origins, the problematic tackled by this thesis had its roots in my own counter 
cultural experiences. It drew on movement theories preserved in academia and on my 
continuing involvement with the counter culture to develop those experiences and 
understanding; as it stands, then, this theorising has more of the returning emigrant’s 
perspective than that of the foreign anthropologist. Returning emigrants have a choice 
themselves as to whether they throw in their lot with the coloniser or with the colonised; 
and at bottom this comes down to their sense of who they are and what their priorities are. 
This theory comes from the counter culture; my hope is that it will return there. 
If you want to help me 
then I do not need you. 
If your liberation is linked to my liberation 
then let us sit down together and talk. 
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Appendix: who knows best? 
Although it is not strictly part of the thesis, the question of the value of the knowledge 
created by social movements is not without academic interest. Since Lukács (1971) the idea 
that movements from below know things about the world that are not found in the 
“official story” (Wainwright 1994) has been developed into various arguments to suggest 
that such “knowledge from below” is more complete than “knowledge from above”. For 
Lukács this was because the standpoint of the proletariat was that of the future social 
totality. For more recent feminists (see Tong 1989, Lentin 1993) it is because those who are 
oppressed know more about the world than those who do the oppressing. These 
arguments operate on two possible levels, depending on whether we consider tacit or 
verbal knowledge. 
Verbal knowledge from above and below 
Firstly, if what we are looking at is verbal knowledge - in other words that articulated by 
movement projects from above or below - it seems reasonable to argue that the ability of a 
movement project to offer adequate (in the sense of practically workable and socially 
acceptable) solutions to human problems is in a sense coterminous with its hegemonic 
capacity and thus to a large extent with its actual power at a given point in time: until we 
arrive at the point of stalemate described by Gramsci, “official” knowledge can be said to 
“work” for everyday purposes, even if (as Hall 1996 has observed) it is often in practice 
“negotiated”. This “working” is not an external criterion, but is part and parcel of 
hegemonic relations as the leading and organising of one social group by another. It is 
possible, particularly in the case of a movement from below, for a movement project to 
have a greater hegemonic capacity than its actual power - in other words, to have developed 
an alternative “verbal” knowledge which is capable of “working” for large social groups 
who have not yet been reached by it - and this is of course one element of large-scale 
revolutionary mobilisations. 
One important role for critical sociology may be to ask after the nature of this capacity and 
power: to whom does / can the existing social order offer workable solutions? To whom 
does / can available counter-hegemonic movement projects offer workable solutions? This 
problematic makes sense within a democratic politics of truth: what expresses best the 
practical striving-for-solutions of the six thousand million other people we share the planet 
with is, not “truth” in the absolute, but the best shared understanding available. In this 
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sense I would argue that the capitalist world-system and its associated rational-scientific 
ideologies provided a better response in the eighteenth century than the feudal-religious 
order, within the European “core” at least108, but that that response has worn very thin 
faced with the human suffering it has given rise to (Wallerstein 1996); if social movements 
from below are trying to construct a better answer, sociologists could do worse than help 
them in that.  
The completeness or otherwise of competing forms of verbal knowledge, then, cannot be 
judged entirely on their present showing, but it is unlikely that potential and actual power 
can remain vastly different for long periods; more plausible that where movements from 
below are restricted in their development of verbal knowledge to an engagement with the 
tacit knowledge of small sections of the population, or to small fields of tacit knowledge, 
they also lack the “organic intellectuals” necessary to enable the junction between their 
existing verbal knowledge and the tacit knowledge of wider groups of the population. 
These are, of course, areas that movement projects from below, to the extent that they 
remain movement projects, constantly try to develop109. Thus I conclude that the truth or 
otherwise of the claim in the context of verbal knowledge depends on historical 
circumstances. 
Tacit knowledge from above and below 
In relation to tacit knowledge, however, it is entirely plausible that certain kinds of oppressed 
groups know more about the world than their oppressors. This cannot be deduced from 
the simple fact of oppression, however; even barring extreme cases such as the exploitation 
of the mentally handicapped, children or animals, it is clear that, if surviving oppression 
requires much knowledge of one’s oppressors, managing to remain on top requires much 
                                                
108 GA Cohen: “Marx frequently allows that a dominant class promotes not only its own interests but, in so 
doing, those of humanity at large - until its rule becomes outmoded, and it becomes reactionary - and he gives 
no explanation of class supremacy which is not founded on the productive needs of the present age” (1978: 
149). 
109 For movements from above, to remain in this situation for any significant period of time is to risk 
overthrow, and certainly to manifest the inability to generate active consent as opposed to an absence of 
resistance to coercion. 
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knowledge of one’s victims. The matter is not absolute in either case: the oppressed 
sometimes fail to survive, and coercion can substitute for some lack of consent 110.  
The oppressed can, however, be argued to know more than the oppressors where it is the 
case that the oppressed engage with a wider spectrum of the world (and thus have a wider 
basis of tacit knowledge) than their oppressors. This is not primarily a matter of numbers, 
more a matter of the range of experience. The most important likely case is that where the 
oppressed are distinguished by carrying out forms of work which their oppressors do not; 
in other words, where oppression is carried out for the sake of exploitation. (Since 
oppression is a social relationship, both oppressors and oppressed understand particular 
aspects of it; it is not, therefore, a specialised knowledge of the oppressor.) To sustain the 
position that “knowledge from below” in this case is more complete than “knowledge 
from above”, however, the wider range of individual experiences combined by the 
exploited group must be shared rather than individual possessions; in other words, we can 
argue that knowledge from below is potentially more complete than knowledge from above, 
to the extent that we can imagine a form of shared action from below within which this 
knowledge would in fact be shared. (That from above is routinely shared, and an important 
part of sustaining the relationship of exploitation and domination). 
I conclude that both tacit and verbal knowledge from below is potentially more complete 
than that from above, but needs to be made so in fact. The activity of doing so is that of 
movement projects; but both movement and academic theorists can contribute to the 
examination of which forms of verbal knowledge are likely to be adequate to this task. 
                                                
110 Not, however, for a total lack of consent except possibly in the case of invasion or colonisation: at a 
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